When the Cold War ended in 1989, many international relations experts opined that the Spratly archipelago in South China Sea will be a potential flashpoint as China (also Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei were having conflicting claims of territories.
Francis Fukuyama, a well known International Relations scholar, came up with the thesis that the end of history has come with the ultimate success of liberal democracy and states that do not embrace liberal economy will not progress. War as an instrument of policy was relegated to a lesser position compared to economic growth that comes with trade and commerce. Many International Relations experts said that the battle amongst states has shifted from theatres of war to markets.
As a state that stakes a claim to the whole of the Spratly archipelago, China’s position will have important implications for East Asia’s stability. Within the last twenty years, by embracing some aspects of capitalism, China has emerged as the second largest economic power in the world and is poised to replace the US in the top position. It is also a major military power in the region and has the potential to become a superpower in line with its global economic dominance.
In relation to the Spratly islands, China has announced that the Spratly archipelago as its sovereign territory. It even claims the whole of the South China Sea as Chinese territory based on its nine-dotted-line claim which encroaches into the territories claimed by other coastal states. The first announcement about its sovereignty over the islands was in 1955 following the Peace Treaty that officially ended the Second World War in the Far East. Since then, there has been no change in China’s position in relation to the archipelago. It used force in the archipelago against Vietnam in 1979 and in 1988. Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, China realized that the Spratly issue will be an obstacle to its modernization programme and relegated it to the next generation to foster cordial bilateral relations with the ASEAN states. Although at one time, China was unwilling to even discuss the problem with any other claimant state, she later adopted a policy of dealing bilaterally with states that have claims in the Spratly archipelago. On realizing that the policy was not well received by the ASEAN states and it was not in its interest, China decided to deal with ASEAN as a whole. A Joint Statement issued after the Meeting of Heads of States/Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, on 16th December 1997, noted that China will follow its five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its relations with ASEAN states amongst which is the peaceful settlement of disputes. While the Joint-Statement covers the overall economic prosperity and the security of the region, its Point No. 8 specifically addressed the issue by providing for the exercise of self-restraint to promote peaceful resolution of the problem by encouraging friendly relations, cooperation and development amongst the competing states as well as promoting peace and the stability of the region.
This was followed by the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China on 4th November, 2002, in Phnom Penh. Points 5 and 6 of the DOC provided for the promotion of peace in the disputed area pending peaceful settlement by juridical means. Point No. 5 provides for promotion of trust and confidence amongst the parties by exercising self-restraint in conducting their activities in the disputed area by not occupying uninhabited geographical features, involving in dialogues and exchange of views between defence and military officers, humane treatment of persons in danger or distress, notifying each other of their military exercises and exchanging information. Exploring cooperative activities which include marine environment protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime, including but not limiting to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea and illegal traffic in arms are addressed in Point No. 6.
The non-binding nature of the DOC appears to be conducive to the temporary management and maintenance of peace in the Spratly archipelago. That may also be in line with the ASEAN way of handling the issue and in the interest of China as well. For a complex issue like the Spratlys, there should be a more binding code of conduct that calls for more commitment towards resolution. The non-binding nature of the DOC provides the parties a way to manage the problem while giving some breathing space to find an acceptable solution in future. All the smaller contestants were looking upon the magnanimity of the Chinese dragon to find a lasting position among the islands in the Spratly archipelago. On the other hand, China was eyeing total control of the potential oil and other marine resources in the archipelago that will help much towards its emergence as the number one economic power as well as a credible military power in world politics.
The statement by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the Hanoi ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2010 that the US has ‘strategic interest’ in the South China Sea and it could play a role in solving the dispute, has angered China as that will be a challenge to her sovereignty claim in the Spratly archipelago. President Obama’s meeting with ASEAN leaders on 22nd September, 2010 in New York during which the Spratly dispute was discussed would have added further salt to the injury, especially when China has declared that the South China Sea and the territories within the water are her sovereign territory of core interest that cannot be compromised. Following the US announcement of its interest in the Spratly issue, China seems to be prepared to relook the DOC for one that is more binding. Whether that will become a reality will be an important issue of China’s domestic politics. Military history shows that nations have gone to war when core interests were challenged, especially in their sovereign territories. Whether China will use force to resolve the Spratly issue is a concern of not only those states that have conflicting claims in the archipelago but also those have national interests in East Asia.
It is important to see the Spratly conflict from the perspective of the emerging US-PRC rivalry in East Asia. China is fast rising as an important economic and military power, fast exerting its influence amongst the states in Southeast Asia. The US has realised that if it continues to remain aloof and less committed in East Asia, China will become more dominant and hegemonic and that will have negative implications for US interests in the region. Hence there is a need for the US to return to East Asia and to use the Spratly issue as a smokescreen to counter China’s influence in the region, especially amongst the ASEAN states.
Given that major powers always compete in influencing states to win support, the US and China are trying their best to win over the Southeast Asian states. Most important is whether the US-PRC rivalry will destablise the region. Currently both powers, despite the irritants, enjoy cordial bilateral relations, especially in trade. Both benefit from the sizeable markets of each other. The US also needs China to pacify North Korea while fearing that China, North Korea and Russia may form an alliance that may be detrimental to the US interests in the Northeast as well as Central Asia. An antagonized China will become a thorn in the flesh, especially when the US is still bogged down in Afghanistan, entangled in Iraq and sees a threat from ‘nuclear’ Iran. Similarly China too is not in a position to antagonize the US as it is no match to the US military might and any military conflict with the US will only be harmful to its national aspirations of becoming a dominant actor in international politics.
Currently, all ASEAN states enjoy good economic relations with China, including those having conflicting claims in the Spratly archipelago. China’s economic dominance is evident in the neighbouring states, especially in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are also benefitting economically from China. China’s economic and military power might cause anxiety amongst the ASEAN states, especially those with overlapping claims in the Spratly archipelago. They have to balance their relationship between the two great powers; but given the history of the region they may choose to bandwagon with the US. Besides, any conflict in the Spratly archipelago will also not be in the interest of the ASEAN Dialogue partners, such as the European Union, India, Australia, Japan and others that may wish to see a peaceful East Asia that will benefit them economically.
Malaysia has to handle the US-PRC rivalry with much caution, diplomatic skills and wisdom. There are five elements of its national interest involved here. China is a very important trade partner, an influential regional military power and a rising economic giant with much clout in the region, especially amongst the ASEAN states. If Malaysia aligns more towards the US, then it will antagonize China to the detriment of bilateral relations. With regard to the US, it is also a major trade partner, an important military power with long cordial bilateral defence relations and a likely ‘ally’ at times of crisis as it proved during the 1963-1965 Confrontation with Indonesia and assisting Malaysia against communism after the fall of Saigon in 1975 . Malaysia must also take into consideration the importance of ASEAN as a regional organization when viewing the situation. Hence, it has to be careful that its response to the US-PRC rivalry and the Spratly problem does not harm ASEAN’s position as a regional inter-governmental organization committed to promote peace and stability in the region. Malaysia must also determine how it is going to manage its diplomatic relations especially with those ASEAN states having conflicting claims in the Spratly archipelago. As the ultimate objective of a state is to promote its national interest and protect its sovereign rights, each may adopt different positions in responding to the US-PRC rivalry and the Spratly issue. Finally, Malaysia has to exercise its diplomatic skills to protect and promote her sovereign rights in a milieu of emerging US-PRC rivalry and the complexity of the Spratly problem.
There are enough peace-promoting mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus 3, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and others that can help to mitigate the negative impact of US-PRC rivalry on the region. Given that US-PRC relations are of mutual benefit, that ASEAN countries gain from both powers, and a peaceful East Asia is a prerequisite for the economic growth of all the states in the region as well as for extra-regional powers, there is little probability of the Spratly dispute escalating. The territorial dispute in the Spratly archipelago needs peaceful settlement using the mechanisms available in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The aim of the United Nations Charter is to promote international cooperation to achieve international peace and security for humanity. The decision to resolve the Spratly dispute by peace or war is a choice for the sovereign states involved in the dispute but it is important for that decision to be tempered by the wisdom derived from the lessons of military history which show that while war brings chaos and destruction peace brings progress and prosperity.