Just International

The Gallows Law: Israel Moves Toward Executing Palestinian Children

By Dr. Ramzy Baroud

According to Israel’s new death penalty law, Palestinian children, like adults, could, in practice, find themselves facing the gallows. This might take some by surprise, or even be dismissed as an exaggeration. Sadly, it is neither.

The death penalty law, passed by Israel’s Knesset on March 30, mandates capital punishment for Palestinians convicted of carrying out deadly attacks. The legislation, often referred to as the ‘Death Penalty for Terrorists’ law, requires that executions be carried out swiftly, within 90 days, while sharply limiting avenues for appeal or commutation, according to human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

It resolves a long-standing political demand by Israel’s far-right leadership to formalize execution as a tool of control over Palestinians. As extremist Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has repeatedly argued, those accused of such acts “deserve death,” framing the law not as an exception, but as a necessary policy.

Though the law itself does not explicitly mention children, it does not exclude them either. Knowing Israel’s treatment and legal classification of Palestinian children, this distinction is not minor—it is decisive.

Under Israel’s military court system, Palestinian children as young as 12 are prosecuted. In practice, they are often treated as adults within a system that offers few safeguards and operates with an extremely high conviction rate.

Defense for Children International–Palestine reported in its 2023 briefing Arbitrary by Default that the Israeli military detention system subjects Palestinian minors to “systematic”, institutionalized and “widespread ill-treatment.”

Reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other rights organizations describe consistent patterns of abuse, including night arrests, physical violence, threats, and psychological pressure.

Many children, these groups note, are interrogated without adequate legal safeguards, in conditions that facilitate coercion and the extraction of confessions.

Under international law, children are protected persons, entitled to special safeguards under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child—both of which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Not in Israel, however—a state that has consistently treated international law not as binding, but as an obstacle to its political and military objectives.

For Israel, Palestinian children are often framed not as civilians, but as potential threats. This framing represents a profound assault on basic humanity and fundamental rights—one that goes even further than the cynical language of ‘collateral damage’, by preemptively stripping children of their civilian status.

Israeli officials have made such views unmistakably clear.

In 2015, former Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked shared and endorsed a text declaring that “the entire Palestinian people is the enemy,” including its children, and that Palestinian mothers should not give birth to “little snakes.” Her statement was not an aberration, but a reflection of a political discourse in which dehumanization is normalized.

This, too, has often been dismissed as routine racism in Israeli politics. It is not.

Since October 7, 2023, Gaza’s children have been killed in staggering numbers: at least 21,289 children among more than 71,800 Palestinians killed, and over 44,500 wounded, according to UNICEF’s February 2026 update.

In the occupied West Bank, the pattern persists, with Palestinian children increasingly killed during Israeli military raids and settler violence.

All of this in mind, it should not be surprising that the death penalty law does not exempt children from the horrific fate it envisions for Palestinians who resist Israeli occupation.

To be clear, the death penalty law is neither about punishment nor deterrence. Israel does not require a law to kill Palestinians—whether those engaged in armed resistance, or, as has often been the case, civilians with no involvement in hostilities.

For decades, Israel has carried out assassinations, extrajudicial killings, and large-scale military operations that have resulted in thousands of Palestinian deaths.

The killing of Palestinians in Israeli prisons is no longer incidental, but documented. Since October 2023, at least 98 detainees have died in custody—many under conditions linked to torture, abuse, and medical neglect, according to Physicians for Human Rights–Israel.

The law, therefore, is about something else: the projection of power.

It is not fundamentally different from the performative brutality associated with figures like Ben-Gvir, whose rhetoric and conduct toward Palestinian prisoners have emphasized domination, humiliation, and control.

But within this projection of power lies a deadly consequence: Many people stand to be killed—including children.

Though some voices in the international community have spoken out against the law, these reactions have been limited and short-lived, quickly overshadowed by other developments.

Without sustained pressure, Israel has no reason to refrain from carrying out executions—decisions that will be made by military courts that lack even the most basic standards of fairness or adherence to international law.

Once this, too, is normalized, the threshold will shift again. And children will inevitably be drawn into it.

Israel has already normalized practices once deemed unthinkable. If it now normalizes the execution of children, it will cross a threshold even many colonial regimes did not openly breach.

There must be a limit—because its continuation will not only devastate Palestinians, but reverberate far beyond, eroding the most basic protections of human life itself.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

9 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Israeli Soldiers Beat Elderly Palestinian Woman to Death During West Bank Home Raid

By Quds News Network

Occupied West Bank (QNN)- Israeli soldiers beat a 68-year-old Palestinian woman to death during a raid on her home in the town of Jayyous, in the northern occupied West Bank on Tuesday.

According to local sources and her husband, Walid Shamasneh, the soldiers stormed the house of Sabriya Shamasneh in the early hours of Tuesday morning, conducting an aggressive search and interrogating the family.

The husband said that shortly before the raid, his daughter-in-law had approached him in fear, believing there were “thieves” outside. She reported hearing unusual noises and noticed that the front garden gate had been forced open.

Israeli forces then broke down the front door, terrifying the family.

[https://twitter.com/RamAbdu/status/2041769758937288730]

“The Israeli officer began asking me for the names of people I did not know. Then they forced us all into a corner of the room while they searched the other bedrooms,” Walid said.

At one point, Sabriya attempted to move and called out to her son Hassan, fearing he had been arrested. The soldiers responded by shoving her violently with their rifles, knocking her to the ground and shouting at her to be quiet.

The elderly woman’s head struck the wall, causing her to lose consciousness. Her husband panicked, shouting and pleading with the soldiers to help, but they refused.

After the soldiers left, Sabriya’s husband and son rushed her to Darwish Nazzal Governmental Hospital in Qalqilya. A heavy presence of Israeli military vehicles had prevented an ambulance from reaching the scene.

At the hospital, Sabriya was pronounced dead from the injuries she sustained during the raid.

Israeli forces routinely raid Palestinian towns and homes in the occupied West Bank, a practice that has intensified sharply since October 2023, when Israel launched its genocidal war on Gaza. Between January and September 2025, nearly 7,500 such raids and operations were carried out, representing a 37% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

In November, an elderly woman, Haniya Hanoun, died after Israeli soldiers stormed her home in the village of al-Mazraa al-Gharbiya, north of Ramallah, beating her severely in front of her family and arresting her grandson.

According to United Nations data, over 1,000 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank, including Jerusalem, by Israeli forces and settlers since 7 October 2023, one in five of those killed were children.

9 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Seven Messages – Can Israel Survive Defeat without Setting the Region Ablaze?

By Dr. Ramzy Baroud

The moment a two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran was announced—brokered through Pakistani mediation on April 7—Iran declared that Lebanon was included in the arrangement. It was a clear message: the war could not be compartmentalized, and the fronts were linked.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to deny it. But the denial exposed more than it concealed. Lebanon and other resistance fronts were already embedded within Iran’s broader ten-point proposal—a framework the Trump administration had accepted as a workable basis for negotiations set to begin Friday.

Netanyahu was left politically and strategically exposed.

Iran was never just another battlefield. It was the culmination of a long campaign of perpetual war that Netanyahu has sustained for years—beginning with the genocide in Gaza, expanding into Lebanon, and stretching across multiple fronts whenever his political survival demanded escalation.

Each war served a purpose: to silence dissent within his coalition, to distract from collapsing approval ratings, to evade accountability in corruption trials. War became governance.

But the Iran gambit failed. And failure, for Netanyahu, is never an endpoint. It is a trigger. With no victory to claim and no strategic gains to present, he turned—once again—to Lebanon.

Dahiya Doctrine Revisited

On Wednesday, Israeli warplanes unleashed one of the most extensive bombardments of Lebanon in recent memory.

Beirut. Southern Lebanon. The Bekaa Valley. Mount Lebanon. And more. Within just two hours, approximately 150 airstrikes were carried out, according to Lebanese media.

The death toll continues to rise. Entire families buried under rubble. Rescue workers targeted. Funerals struck. Civilian infrastructure pulverized. This is not warfare. It is punishment.

But these attacks are not random. They follow a doctrine—one that Israel has refined and reapplied whenever it seeks to compensate for military failure.

Netanyahu is reinstating the Dahiya Doctrine—a strategy first articulated after the 2006 war against Lebanon.

The doctrine is simple and brutal: use overwhelming, disproportionate force against civilian infrastructure to collectively punish populations believed to support resistance movements.

Entire neighborhoods are treated as military targets. The goal is not precision—it is devastation. The logic is coercion through destruction.

Today, Lebanon is once again its laboratory.

Seven Messages

This escalation is not chaos. It is communication.

First, Netanyahu is asserting that war and peace are his decisions alone. Not Iran’s. Not Washington’s. Not the region’s. The message is clear: no agreement binds him.

Second, he seeks to reimpose fear across the Middle East—at a moment when millions are celebrating what they see as a decisive Iranian victory against the combined power of the US, Israel, and their allies.

Third, he is attempting to fracture the resistance front by suggesting that Iran has abandoned its allies. The goal is to manufacture distrust where unity has just been strengthened.

Fourth, he is providing ammunition to his political allies in Lebanon—and to compliant Arab regimes—who argue that Hezbollah has dragged Lebanon into catastrophe. This narrative is designed to intensify pressure for disarmament.

Fifth, he is distracting from his own failure. Both supporters and critics inside Israel are questioning the outcome of the war with Iran. Thus, Lebanon becomes the diversion.

Sixth, he is masking a military reality: Israel has failed to neutralize Hezbollah’s capabilities. Despite repeated claims, Hezbollah remains operational, resilient, and capable of disrupting Israeli plans along the border. The targeting of civilians is not a strength—it is an admission of limits.

Seventh, Netanyahu is raising the cost ahead of an inevitable settlement. He knows that he cannot defeat Hezbollah outright. By inflicting maximum damage now, he hopes to reshape the political terrain before negotiations he cannot avoid.

The Fragile Ceasefire

Yes, ending the war on Lebanon was embedded in Iran’s conditions for talks. But there are cracks.

Washington can—and likely will—argue that its agreement applies only to US actions, not to Israel, which it portrays as acting independently.

At the same time, Iran’s proposal was the basis for a temporary ceasefire—not a finalized framework for a permanent settlement.

This ambiguity is not accidental. It is the space in which Israel now operates.

Will Israel’s massacres be enough for Iran to declare that the US-Israeli camp has violated the ceasefire?

Or will negotiations proceed, despite the bloodshed in Lebanon?

The answer will shape the next phase of the war. But one lesson is already clear.

Since the beginning of the genocide in Gaza, a pattern has emerged: every time Netanyahu escalates in an attempt to regain the initiative, his adversaries respond in kind—and often with greater strategic effect.

Therefore, his escalation has not delivered victory. Instead, it has deepened Israel’s entanglement.

Lebanon may be burning today, but the war is far from decided. Netanyahu may believe that he is reshaping the battlefield.

History suggests otherwise, because the other side still holds its cards—and this time, at least for now, Washington is not stepping in to tilt the balance.

For they, too, have been forced to step back. And that, more than anything, is what makes this moment so dangerous.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

9 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

The U.S. Suspends the Attack – Winners and Losers

By Dimitris Eleas

This war is hubris and barbarity. In this absurd conflict, we have arrived at a 10-point plan that has already been accepted by “all sides,” along with a ceasefire. The ceasefire was ratified by the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. Iran emerges as the winner, yet it is equally clear that Pakistan and China have significantly strengthened their standing, given the pressure they exerted on Tehran to accept the ceasefire. Russia’s stock has risen as well. The entire Middle East will be “under American control,” with the exception of Iran.

Thus, the much-talked-about Donald Trump, as we read across many outlets, “announced in a post on Truth Social that he agrees to suspend the attack against Iran for two weeks, on the condition that Iran proceeds with the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. As he stated, the decision came after talks with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir.” Draw your own conclusions as to which countries count among the winners, even through the exercise of diplomacy. Among the winners as well: Spain’s Sánchez.

A bitter defeat for the Americans, who saw their bases and embassies come under attack, and for small Israel, which dreams of a greater Israel. The Gulf states, too, come out as losers, having lost both their luster and their sense of security. Europe is also on the losing side; it showed no political stature. Turkey, likewise, is a loser in this affair, as this was precisely the kind of mediating role it has always sought to play in the problems of its neighborhood.

India, a major power, had recently been cozying up to Netanyahu. Greece, as the other great ancient nation of the region and a country with vast maritime reach, is virtually absent from these developments, like a declining power that nonetheless boasts, with the air of a fallen aristocrat, about shooting down a few Iranian missiles. We also read: “Israel has agreed to a temporary ceasefire, according to a White House official.” I support Israel and the Jewish people, yet their state must submit its borders to the UN. Why hasn’t it done so yet?

It is also reported: “Two weeks of negotiations with the U.S. in Islamabad, Tehran responds, which, according to the New York Times, accepted Trump’s agreement after intense pressure from China.”

The plan includes 10 decisive points, which will serve as the foundation for further refinement and the pursuit of peace. Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible under Iran’s supervision during these two weeks. This period could be extended, and the big spectacle will be that the “blabbermouth” Trump, in his own expert way, will call a fish a steak, declare a magnificent ceasefire around the clock, and present defeat as a grand victory.

What the U.S. and Israel achieved

The ten points also reveal what the two superpowers, the U.S. and Israel, have actually accomplished on the ground. A mere drop in the ocean, a line drawn in the desert. Given what has unfolded so far, it’s more likely that Tehran will pursue nuclear capability in the future as a means of self-defense. So, all you need to do is read between the lines, without blinders, and it’s not difficult to grasp how any human mind interprets each point that follows.

(1) Commitment to non-aggression. (2) Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. (3) “Acceptance” of Iran’s uranium enrichment. (4) Lifting of all primary sanctions. (5) Lifting of all secondary sanctions. (6) Termination of all UN Security Council resolutions. (7) Termination of all decisions by the Administrative Council. (8) Payment of compensation to Iran. A condition the U.S. had previously refused under any circumstances. (9) Withdrawal of additional U.S. military forces from the Middle East. (10) Cessation of the war on all fronts, including southern Lebanon. Israel disagrees over southern Lebanon, according to the Guardian.

All of this is a good start, after this war-fiasco. So many innocent lives have been lost in Israel, Lebanon, Iran, and other neighboring countries. Hundreds of buildings have been flattened, railways and bridges destroyed, and the environment has suffered from constant pollution, bombings, and fires. The truth is, as we concluded in our previous article, that it is always the poor, their children, and the workers who pay the price of every war, and this war has been no exception.

Dimitris Eleas is a political scientist, writer and independent researcher living in New York.

9 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Unprecedented Assault on Lebanon Exposes the Fragility of Ceasefire Diplomacy

By Countercurrents Collective

The latest wave of Israeli attacks on Lebanon marks one of the most intense and expansive military escalations in the country in recent years, raising urgent questions about the viability of emerging ceasefire arrangements in West Asia. Within hours of a US-Iran ceasefire announcement, Lebanon became the site of devastating bombardment, revealing deep contradictions in the diplomatic framework and exposing how fragile—and perhaps illusory—the truce truly is.

Across Beirut, its southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley, and multiple regions in southern Lebanon, Israeli airstrikes killed at least 254 people and injured more than 1,160. The scale and speed of the assault were staggering. In the first wave alone, dozens of strikes were carried out in under ten minutes, hitting over 100 locations that Israel claimed were linked to Hezbollah. Yet many of these strikes landed in densely populated civilian areas, with no prior warning issued to residents.

Hospitals were quickly overwhelmed. Medical centers, including those in Beirut, issued urgent calls for blood donations as casualties surged. Scenes from across the country reflected chaos and fear—families fleeing, neighborhoods reduced to rubble, and emergency responders scrambling to recover bodies still buried beneath debris. The human toll continues to rise as rescue operations proceed.

This escalation comes against the backdrop of a ceasefire agreement brokered by Shehbaz Sharif between the United States and Iran after weeks of mounting tensions. Sharif had described the agreement as comprehensive, asserting that it would apply “everywhere including Lebanon.” His announcement generated cautious optimism that a broader regional de-escalation might finally be within reach.

However, that optimism quickly unraveled.

Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, both Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu publicly contradicted the notion that Lebanon was included. Trump described Lebanon as a “separate skirmish,” explicitly stating that it was not covered by the agreement. Netanyahu echoed this position, asserting that the ceasefire “does not include Lebanon.”

These statements introduced immediate ambiguity into the ceasefire’s scope. While one set of actors presented the agreement as region-wide, others framed it narrowly, effectively carving out Lebanon as an exception. This divergence is not merely semantic—it has had deadly consequences on the ground.

The continued bombardment suggests that Israel is seeking to capitalize on this ambiguity. As analyst Dania Arayssi noted, Israel appears intent on maximizing its operational gains in Lebanon while the diplomatic landscape remains fluid. This strategy reflects a calculated effort to weaken Hezbollah before any broader settlement—particularly one involving Iran—could constrain Israeli military actions.

Yet this approach carries significant risks. Iranian officials have already signaled that ongoing attacks in Lebanon constitute violations of the ceasefire framework. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf explicitly cited Israel’s actions in Lebanon as one of several breaches undermining the basis for negotiations. Alongside reported drone incursions into Iranian airspace and disputes over nuclear rights, these developments have deepened Tehran’s distrust of US commitments.

From Iran’s perspective, the exclusion of Lebanon from the ceasefire is not only unacceptable but strategically untenable. Hezbollah is widely regarded as a key Iranian ally, and continued Israeli attacks against it are unlikely to be viewed as separate from the broader US-Iran confrontation. Iranian officials have warned that such violations make further negotiations “unreasonable,” raising the specter of renewed escalation.

On the ground in Lebanon, the consequences are immediate and devastating. The strikes have targeted areas that had previously been spared even during earlier phases of conflict, including parts of Beirut. This widening of the battlefield suggests a shift in Israeli strategy, moving beyond containment toward more expansive and aggressive operations.

The timing of the attacks is particularly significant. Many displaced residents had begun returning to their homes in southern Lebanon, encouraged by reports of a ceasefire. Instead, they found themselves caught in a new wave of violence. The lack of clarity about Lebanon’s status within the ceasefire has left civilians dangerously exposed, highlighting the human cost of diplomatic ambiguity.

This is not the first time Lebanon has experienced such escalation in recent months. Since early March, Israel has intensified its campaign following rocket fire attributed to Hezbollah. Although a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah had ostensibly been in place since November 2024, Israel continued near-daily strikes that have killed hundreds of Lebanese. The latest assault, however, represents a dramatic intensification in both scale and coordination.

What distinguishes this moment is the intersection of military escalation with high-stakes diplomacy. The US-Iran ceasefire was intended to halt a rapidly expanding conflict involving multiple actors. Instead, it has revealed the limits of bilateral agreements in a deeply interconnected regional landscape.

By excluding—or appearing to exclude—Lebanon, the agreement has created a dangerous loophole. This has allowed Israel to continue its military operations while maintaining that it is not violating the ceasefire. At the same time, it has placed Iran in a position where restraint may appear increasingly untenable, especially if attacks on its allies continue.

The result is a ceasefire that exists in name but not in practice—a fragile arrangement that risks collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.

The political dynamics surrounding the agreement further complicate the situation. Israeli officials have reportedly expressed frustration at being excluded from the ceasefire negotiations, while also rejecting its applicability to Lebanon. This dual position—opposition to the agreement combined with selective adherence—underscores the challenges of achieving coordinated de-escalation in a multipolar conflict.

Meanwhile, the United States’ position has raised additional concerns. By endorsing Israel’s characterization of Lebanon as a separate conflict, Washington appears to be undermining the broader framework it helped negotiate. Trump’s remarks, coming less than a day after the ceasefire announcement, have been interpreted by some as a de facto endorsement of continued Israeli operations.

For many observers, this raises fundamental questions about the credibility of US diplomacy. If ceasefire terms can be so quickly reinterpreted—or contradicted—what assurances can be offered to other parties involved in the conflict?

The unfolding crisis in Lebanon thus serves as a stark reminder of the complexities of modern warfare and diplomacy. In a region where conflicts are deeply interconnected, attempts to isolate one theater from another are unlikely to succeed. The exclusion of Lebanon from the ceasefire—whether intentional or not—has demonstrated how quickly such assumptions can unravel.

As airstrikes continue and casualties mount, the prospects for a durable ceasefire appear increasingly uncertain. Without a clear and inclusive framework that addresses all active fronts, efforts at de-escalation risk being overtaken by events on the ground.

Ultimately, the unprecedented attack on Lebanon is not just a humanitarian catastrophe—it is a critical test of whether diplomacy can keep pace with the realities of war. So far, the answer remains deeply in doubt.

9 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

China Surpasses U.S. in Global Leadership Ratings

By A Correspondent

China has surpassed the U.S. in global leadership rating. China’s leadership approval climbs to 36% while the U.S. leadership’s falls to 31%.

According to a new Gallup poll released April 3, 2026 [https://news.gallup.com/poll/707945/china-edges-past-global-approval-ratings.aspx], global approval of China surpassed the U.S. in 2025, the widest favorability gap between the two countries in almost 20 years.

Gallup said: “China’s five-percentage-point advantage over the U.S. is the widest Gallup has recorded in China’s favor in nearly 20 years.”

The poll-organization said: “The latest results are based on Gallup surveys conducted in 2025 in more than 130 countries; they notably predate several major developments in early 2026, including the U.S. withdrawal from 66 international organizations in January and the outbreak of war with Iran in late February.”

Gallup’s findings include that China’s global approval rating last year reached a median of 36 percent in support of China’s leadership while the U.S. leadership experienced its median approval rating drop to 31 percent – a fall of 8 percentage points since 2024. China’s approval rose from 32 percent in 2024.

Gallup found: Disapproval of China’s leadership remained flat at 37 percent while the U.S. leadership’s disapproval reached a record-high of 48 percent.

Gallup also found: China saw the strongest relative alignment from countries like Russia, Pakistan, Tunisia and Singapore, and these countries’ preferences “reflect deep negativity toward the U.S. more than strong enthusiasm for China” while countries that include Israel, Poland, Kosovo, the Philippines and Albania favor the U.S. Their net approval resembles their net disapproval of China.

According to the poll:

  • Most countries do not have a strong preference for either China or the U.S.
  • China saw strong alignment from 8 percent of countries compared to 5 percent strongly aligned with the U.S.
  • Another 40 percent are weakly aligned to the two countries, with 32 percent to China and 8 percent to the U.S.

Another 40 percent are weakly aligned to the two countries, with 32 percent to China and 8 percent to the U.S.

Gallup said:

“The recent shift reflects a decline in U.S. ratings alongside an increase for China. Median approval of U.S. leadership fell from 39% in 2024 to 31% in 2025, returning to earlier lows, while China’s approval rose from 32% to 36%.

“For the past two decades, Gallup has asked residents of every country polled as part of its annual World Poll to rate the leadership of the four leading economic or military powers — the U.S., China, Russia and Germany.”

The poll-organization said: “Before the most recent survey, China had led the U.S. in leadership approval twice: once during the Bush administration and once during the first Trump administration.”

U.S. Ratings Fall Sharply Across Countries

Gallup found:

  • “Approval of U.S. leadership declined by 10 points or more in 44 countries between 2024 and 2025, while it increased by a similar amount in only seven. The declines were concentrated among U.S. allies, including many NATO partners.”
  • “Germany led the world in declines; its approval of U.S. leadership fell by 39 points, followed closely by Portugal (down 38 points). Several other long-standing U.S. partners — including Canada, the United Kingdom and Italy — also showed substantial decreases.”
  • “U.S. standing improved by more than 10 points among Israelis, marking an exception among U.S. allies. Approval of U.S. leadership in Israel, which surged after the October 2023 Hamas attack and then fell sharply in 2024, rebounded to 76% in 2025 after Trump’s return to the White House — a 13-point increase, among the highest levels globally.”
  • “These patterns echo the distribution of declines seen at the start of Trump’s first term, when approval dropped most sharply among U.S. allies. The current shift is widespread, with large declines spanning many countries and regions.”
  • “Overall, China’s move ahead of the U.S. more broadly reflects a decline in U.S. ratings rather than an increase in China’s ratings. Approval of China’s leadership increased by double digits over the past year in 23 countries (versus 44 showing a similar decrease for the U.S.). However, many of China’s increases occurred in countries where U.S. approval fell, including allies such as the U.K., Spain, Italy and Ireland.”

More Countries Lean Toward China Than the U.S.

The poll found:

  • “Comparing net approval at the country level reveals which ones lean toward one power over the other in terms of public opinion. The countries and territories most aligned with the U.S. — those that have strong net approval of the U.S. that roughly mirrors their net disapproval of China — span several regions, and include Kosovo, Israel, Poland, Albania and the Philippines.”
  • “Russia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Singapore and Hong Kong show the strongest relative alignment with China, though notably, their preferences reflect deep negativity toward the U.S. more than strong enthusiasm for China.”

Gallup said: “Grouping countries by their relative net approval figures offers a clearer picture of alignment strength. Countries with a gap above 50 points in either direction are classified as strongly aligned; gaps of 30-49 points indicate aligned; 10-29 points, weakly aligned; and 0-9 points, contested.”

It said: “Despite China’s overall lead in net approval, most countries do not have a strong preference for one power over the other. Last year, 8% of countries were strongly aligned with China, compared with 5% strongly aligned with the United States. Alongside the 30% of countries with no clear alignment, another 40% are only weakly aligned to either power: 32% to China and 8% to the U.S.”

China Leads U.S. in Net Approval, Though Both are Negative

Gallup said:

“Looking at net approval — the percentage who approve minus those who disapprove — provides a more complete view of global sentiment toward the U.S. and China.

“2025 was only the second year on record in which both Washington and Beijing registered negative net approval ratings worldwide. China’s median net approval of –1 was barely negative, while the median net approval of –15 for the U.S. was its lowest on record, marginally below the –13 measured in 2020.

“Net approval of China fell gradually for several years after 2008, but first turned negative in 2020 and has remained negative since. By contrast, net approval of the United States has fluctuated more in line with changes in political leadership.

“In 2025, as both approval and disapproval shifted for the U.S. and China, the percentage expressing no opinion reached some of the lowest levels seen in the past two decades. This suggests that global views of both powers are becoming more defined, with more people forming clear opinions in both positive and negative directions.”

Nearly Half of All Countries Hold a Negative View of Both Powers

Gallup said:

“China leads the U.S. on three leadership approval statistics: global median approval (36% vs. 31%), net approval (–1 vs. –15), and relative net approval (54% of countries aligned vs. 16%). Yet Beijing’s advantage over Washington tells only part of the story.

“Nearly half of all countries surveyed last year (45%) delivered negative net approval ratings to both powers, meaning more people disapproved than approved of each. Fewer than one in three countries (29%) gave positive net approval ratings to both. Aside from 2020, when fewer countries were surveyed because of the pandemic, this is the most negative the world has been toward both powers in two decades.”

Towards a Multipolar Order

Gallup said:

“The shifting perceptions of U.S. leadership over the past two decades reflect a world that has moved toward a more multipolar order. Many countries, particularly U.S. allies, may be open to balancing relationships across major powers than aligning clearly with one.

“For policymakers in some allied countries, this may make alignment with the U.S. more politically sensitive, even as engagement with China appears somewhat more acceptable. For businesses and investors, it signals a less predictable environment, where public sentiment may shape market access, regulation and partnerships.”

A Declining Power

After the WW II, the Empire lent the Marshall Plan and similar plans to its friends and client-states. Almost at the same time, the Empire gained the power to print money for use in international trade and finance. Scholars serving the Empire termed the time as the “American Century.” “The U.S. predominance”, write Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy, “in production, trade and finance, backed by formidable military power straddling the globe, furnished a powerful stimulus to domestic prosperity during the early postwar years. But this too began to wane as other advanced capitalist nations gathered strength, entered into vigorous competition and even overtook the United States in some areas. …

“The relative loss of competitive strength in world trade intensified the difficulties connected with the dollar’s role as an international currency, thus limiting the ability of the United States to take advantage of its hegemonic position by flooding world markets with dollars.” [The Deepening Crisis of U.S. Capitalism, MR Press, 1980]

More developments have followed within the Empire and on the world stage, since H Magdoff and P M Sweezy found the reality cited above. The rise of China as an economic power was unimaginable to the Empire and the camp it leads years ago. The NATO’s Ukraine War, the unprecedented sanctions the NATO-camp imposed on Russia, the way Russia countered those sanction-measures, and the increasing use of national currencies in bilateral trades are important developments that get reflected in the area of leadership domestically and internationally. The latest Gallup findings reflect this reality moving against the Empire. In Africa, China’s and Russia’s role is increasing. China has economically made noteworthy inroads in Latin America, which leads the Empire to openly violate international laws and sovereignty of a Latin American country – Venezuela, and threaten other countries – Cuba, Colombia and Mexico – with voice heard during the medieval age. This voice of threat is a weapon in the hands of the Empire, which will turn blunt after a certain time. After end of the Empire’s Iran War, the Empie’s leadership position will wane further, which means its influence, and commanding and bargaining power will erode further.

6 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Accident or Murder? The UN Should Find the Truth of the Death of its highly admired Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold

By Bharat Dogra

The death in highly suspicious circumstances of the Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold in 1961 has been widely debated. There have been several allegations that this was not an airplane accident as stated officially at that time. Instead, it has been alleged, the likelihood is much higher that the famous Secretary General known for his deep commitment to peace, and to peace and stability in Africa in particular, was the target of a plot to kill him.

Dag Hammarskjold was the youngest ever Secretary General of the UN and he alone has received the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously. He created the earliest UN peace-keeping operations, including those in Congo. Although in the context of Congo his work was at times criticized by both the USA and the Soviet Union, his work is now widely believed to be non-partisan and sincerely committed to peace. His commitment to peace is well-established, and his personality had significant philosophical and spiritual dimensions. While he was an eminent economist and diplomat, he also had important literary accomplishments. Surely the death in mysterious circumstances of such an eminent and many-sided personality should have been properly investigated, and it is very much to be regretted that 65 years after his death the truth has not been uncovered.

Here it needs to be noted that before Dag Hammarskjold died on 18 September 1961 along with 15 other passengers in an airplane, the Prime Minister of the newly independent country Congo Patrice Lumumba had been killed on 17 January 1961, at the beginning of the same year. Regarding the killing of Patrice Lumumba it is now widely agreed that the USA’s CIA as well as Belgium were involved in this. The Belgium government has already apologized and belatedly trial against a 90 year old diplomat, the only surviving official among the Belgium officials accused, was started recently. The reason behind this killing of a highly popular and capable leader deeply committed to the welfare of his people was that due to the vast mineral resources of Congo, the USA and its allies like Britain and Belgium were not willing to accept the leadership of a left-oriented democratic leader who could have nationalized the mines or otherwise used the minerals only in the interests of the people. It was to prevent this that secessionist violence was instigated and in the course of this a suitable opportunity was found to isolate, humiliate and kill Lumumba.

As became clearer later, while getting rid of patriotic leaders committed to welfare of people, other leaders who were promoted by the forces of imperialism were those who continued policies of colonial plunder while repressing and torturing people.

It is within this wider reality that the reasons for killing Dag Hammarskjold must be traced. Dag was deeply committed to peace in Africa. The extent of his commitment to Africa and its people should be evident from the fact that from 18 December 1959 to 31 January 1960 he visited as many as many as 21 African countries and territories and tried to meet people with many points of view to obtain better understanding of peace possibilities.

When Lumumba saw the coming violence, he appealed to the UN Secretary General for help. Hammarskjold responded well in organizing a peace mission. He personally visited Congo four times. It was in the course of the last attempted visit that he died.

The names of CIA, representatives of mining interests in Belgium (going back to colonial connections) and a South African para-military outfit have been mentioned in some reports in this context. It should also be remembered that the 1960s were the worst years for alleged CIA (with related organizations) involvement in assassinations of leaders committed to peace and justice, including great leaders within the USA like President John Kennedy. The name of Allen Dulles, former CIA director, has often come up in the context of these plots.

The investigation into the death of Dag Hammarskjold cannot ignore these wider realities of those times. President Kennedy had referred to him as one of the greatest statesmen. Using his highly respected status and high likelihood of support from President Kennedy (despite some initial differences), Hammarskjold could have been the key figure in saving Congo from the path of plunder and ruin by securing justice based peace and unity here. There is a high likelihood that the journey in the course of which he was likely to take important steps forward in this direction was disrupted and he was killed.

The UN has taken up several investigations but has not come up with a firm conclusion so far. However its investigation report in year 2024 stated that some member states have been reluctant in making available those documents from their archives which can help in finding the truth. These documents are particularly likely to be available in the USA, UK and South Africa.

One hopes that the truth regarding these tragic happenings of the past can be uncovered soon with the UN playing a lead role. After all, the UN can hardly become a symbol of justice if it fails to find the truth of the circumstances of death of its own most admired Secretary General for 65 years.

Bharat Dogra is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now.

5 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

How the U.S. Weaponised Global Women’s Rights: Imperial Feminism, the Rescue Narrative, and the Hollowness of Humanitarian Pretexts

By V.A. Mohamad Ashrof

Throughout the past two decades, U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the ongoing rhetorical positioning regarding Iran have frequently been couched in the rhetoric of promoting women’s rights and improving gender equality. This framing not only seeks to garner domestic and international support but also attempts to legitimise actions that are often driven by broader geopolitical interests. By critically examining these narratives, we can uncover the underlying motives behind American interventions and how the instrumentalisation of women’s rights serves to obscure imperial ambitions (Amnesty International, p.1).

The core of this paper is an inquiry into the ‘Civilising Mission’ of the twenty-first century. It explores how the most intimate aspects of human life – gender roles, family structures, and bodily autonomy – have been transformed into tactical ornaments of the military-industrial complex. We must begin by recognising that the use of women’s rights as a justification for American military interventions warrants rigorous historical scrutiny. The narratives constructed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran are often more reflective of geopolitical interests than genuine concern for women’s well-being. This realisation challenges activists and scholars to reclaim feminist discourse from the clutches of imperialism and develop a more authentic, inclusive approach that respects the autonomy of women globally (Mohanty, p.18).

THE PRETEXT OF RESCUE

The intersection of Western military intervention and the rhetoric of gender liberation is not a modern phenomenon, yet it reached a definitive zenith in the post-9/11 era. To understand these interventions, we must first analyse the concept of ‘Imperial Feminism.’ Unlike the overt territorial acquisitions of the nineteenth century, modern American expansionism is often framed as a mission to export universal values: democracy, free markets, and human rights. Under this framework, the subaltern woman is not merely a victim of local patriarchy but a symbol of the ‘backwardness’ of the target state. Consequently, her liberation became a prerequisite for that state’s entry into the ‘civilised’ global order (Abu-Lughod, p.783).

The theoretical core of this strategy lies in what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak famously described as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak, p.92). In the globalised media landscape, this trope transforms complex socio-political conflicts into simplistic morality plays. This framing positions the Western soldier as the ‘liberator’ of the ‘oppressed Eastern woman,’ utilising a form of gendered orientalism to sanitise the realities of imperial expansion. This narrative functions as a ‘humanitarian veneer,’ obscuring the colder calculations of resource security, regional hegemony, and the installation of neoliberal economic structures (Gopal, p.45).

Scholars argue that imperial powers historically deploy gendered narratives to justify domination. This framing frames intervention as a moral obligation whilst obscuring structural violence. The U.S. case exemplifies this pattern. During the War on Terror, the language of women’s rights became central to interventionist discourse. The claim of ‘liberating Afghan women’ served as a key justification for military intervention, embedding gender within geopolitical strategy (Williams, p.1). This instrumentalisation reduces women to symbols rather than agents, transforming their suffering into political capital.

The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, titled Operation Enduring Freedom, serves as the primary case study for the co-optation of feminist discourse. In the lead-up to the war, organisations such as the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) had been pleading for international attention for years. Yet, it was only when their cause became strategically useful for the Bush administration’s counter-terrorism goals that their voices were amplified by the White House. This was not a sudden conversion to feminism by the American executive branch, but rather a tactical deployment of empathy to garner support for a long-term military presence in Central Asia (Kolhatkar, p.41).

Feminist critiques emphasise that militarisation itself is inherently gendered. War disproportionately harms women through displacement, sexual violence, and the collapse of social infrastructure. Thus, the paradox emerges: interventions justified in the name of women’s liberation often exacerbate the very conditions they claim to resolve (Amnesty International, p.1). By focusing on the ‘veil’ or specific cultural practices, the interventionist narrative avoids discussing the structural violence of sanctions, bombings, and the destruction of infrastructure, all of which disproportionately affect women (Abu-Lughod, p.784).

The ‘problem’ of the Taliban, as presented in 2001, was often stripped of its historical context. This simplistic portrayal ignored the complex cultural, political, and historical factors that contributed to the Taliban’s rise – factors that often involved prior Western interventions (Gopal, p.45). The U.S. interest in Afghanistan was far from altruistic. Analysts note that a critical component of the invasion was access to resources and strategic geopolitical positioning. The emphasis on women’s rights served as a veneer over broader imperial objectives.

One of the most striking features of U.S. interventionist discourse is its selective humanitarianism. Human rights concerns are emphasised in some contexts whilst ignored in others, often aligning with strategic interests rather than ethical consistency (Naghibi, p.140). The rhetoric of women’s liberation echoes earlier colonial narratives of the ‘civilising mission.’ In both cases, the West positions itself as the bearer of progress, legitimising intervention in ‘backward’ societies.

This framing not only obscures the agency of local women but also reinforces cultural hierarchies. It reduces complex societies to caricatures, justifying external domination (Said, p.1). Empowered women, in the Western gaze, are often defined by traits of ‘Westernisation’ – dress, participation in a neoliberal market – rather than their own self-determined goals. There is a profound need to challenge the assumption that empowered women only exist with certain Western-aligned traits. In the process of glorification of the public sphere, the private domain often emerged as an oppressed space for women in these narratives, resulting in a gendered binary instead of a gender-neutral evolution (Jayawardena, p.25).

As we move forward into the historical case studies of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, we must maintain this critical reflection on feminist interventions. Feminism has often been co-opted and weaponised in ways that obscure the realities of the very women they purportedly aim to help. Many feminist scholars and activists have critiqued this instrumentalisation, emphasising the need for a more nuanced understanding of women’s lives in differing contexts, arguing against a one-size-fits-all narrative that fails to account for local specifics (Mohanty, p.18).

The argument that the U.S. went to war for women’s rights raises critical questions about the authenticity of these narratives. As scholar Naomi Klein posits, the efforts to promote democratic values often serve as an alibi for economic interests (Klein, p.67). The intended liberation of women became secondary to the interests of corporate America and regional dominance. This structural logic involves several interconnected elements:

  1. Manufacturing Consent: Framing intervention as a moral duty secures domestic support by appealing to shared values.
  2. Moral Asymmetry: It delegitimises targeted states by portraying them as violators of universal norms.
  3. Obscuring Material Interests: It hides the stakes of resource access, military positioning, and regional influence (Chomsky, p.1).

Across the case studies that follow, a recurring pattern emerges: the use of moral language to legitimise interventions that are primarily driven by strategic considerations. This pattern reflects ‘humanitarian imperialism,’ wherein ethical discourse is mobilised to justify actions that serve geopolitical interests. Sustainable progress in gender justice is more likely to emerge from indigenous movements, legal reforms, and social transformations grounded in local contexts rather than externally driven interventions (Mohanty, p.18).

THE AFGHAN MIRAGE

To understand the ‘rescue’ narrative of 2001, one must first dismantle the Western myth that Afghanistan has always been a static, medieval vacuum of gender oppression. Contrary to dominant Western narratives, Afghan women’s struggles did not begin with U.S. intervention. Women in Afghanistan had secured significant rights during earlier periods, including suffrage in 1919 – a year before the 19th Amendment was ratified in the United States – and constitutional protections in 1964 (Williams, p.1). These historical precedents complicate the portrayal of Afghanistan as uniformly oppressive prior to 2001.

In the 1960s and 70s, Kabul was often referred to as the ‘Paris of Central Asia.’ In urban centres, women were prominent in the judiciary, the medical field, and the civil service. They attended universities alongside men and were active participants in the nascent democratic movements of the era. This ‘Golden Era,’ whilst largely confined to the urban middle and upper classes, demonstrated that the capacity for gender-progressive reform was an indigenous Afghan phenomenon, not a foreign import (Jayawardena, p.25).

However, this simplistic portrayal of a ‘modern’ Kabul often ignores the complex cultural, political, and historical factors that contributed to the eventual rise of extremist movements. The disconnect between urban reform and rural traditionalism created a friction that was later exploited by foreign powers. By 2001, the U.S. narrative would ignore this entire century of indigenous progress, framing the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women as a task that only the West could perform (Gopal, p.45).

The historical irony of the 2001 invasion lies in the fact that the very forces that dismantled Afghan women’s rights in the late twentieth century were the primary beneficiaries of American Cold War policy. Throughout the 1980s, the United States, via the CIA’s Operation Cyclone, provided billions of dollars in military aid to the Mujahideen to counter Soviet influence (Mamdani, p.119).

The U.S. chose to fund the most conservative and reactionary factions of the Afghan resistance, such as those led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was notorious for throwing acid in the faces of women who did not wear the veil. By prioritising the ‘bleeding’ of the Soviet Union over the social stability of the region, the U.S. effectively subsidised the dismantling of the secular infrastructure that had protected women’s rights for decades (Moghadam, p.73).

During this period, the Mujahideen utilised gender as a rallying cry against the ‘godless communists.’ The education of women was framed as an affront to Islam, and schools were frequently targeted. The U.S. administration, far from condemning these actions, hailed the Mujahideen as ‘freedom fighters.’ As Mahmood Mamdani argues, the U.S. helped create the very infrastructure of fundamentalism that it would later claim to dismantle in the name of women’s liberation (Mamdani, p.119). This strategic amnesia is the cornerstone of imperial feminism: the arsonist returns decades later dressed as a firefighter.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 did not lead to peace, but to a brutal civil war amongst the U.S.-backed Mujahideen factions. It was during this era of lawlessness – characterised by widespread rape, kidnapping, and the total collapse of the urban professional class – that the status of Afghan women reached its nadir. The Taliban emerged in 1994 as a ‘cleansing’ force, promising to restore order and ‘protect’ women by secluding them entirely from public life (Gopal, p.45).

The Taliban’s governance from 1996 to 2001 resulted in severe restrictions on women’s rights. Women were barred from education, employment, and public life. However, the Western narrative often paints a monolithic image of this oppression without acknowledging that the Taliban’s rise was made possible by the vacuum left by the collapse of the secular state – a collapse facilitated by foreign intervention (Naghibi, p.140).

Throughout the 1990s, whilst the Taliban were imposing their draconian edicts, the U.S. remained largely indifferent, even engaging in negotiations with the regime regarding oil and gas pipelines. It was only after the events of September 11, 2001, that the ‘plight of Afghan women’ was suddenly elevated to a national security priority. This shift demonstrates that the concern for women was not foundational, but instrumental – a moral lubricant for the transition from Cold War proxy warfare to the War on Terror (Abu-Lughod, p.783).

When the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom, the narrative shifted from counter-terrorism to a ‘war of liberation.’ The rhetoric was carefully crafted to mobilise the support of Western feminist movements. First Lady Laura Bush’s 2001 radio address famously declared, ‘The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women’. This framing served a dual purpose: it galvanised a domestic American public and provided a moral high ground that silenced anti-war critics. If one opposed the war, one was framed as opposing the liberation of women. This ‘colonial feminism’ served as a veneer over broader imperial objectives, such as access to resources and strategic geopolitical positioning in Central Asia (Gopal, p.45).

The media’s sudden obsession with the ‘burqa’ served as a visual shorthand for Afghan ‘backwardness,’ successfully masking the geopolitical desire for a permanent military presence. The Afghan woman was portrayed as a passive victim in need of a Western saviour, an image that erased her history of indigenous activism and political agency. As Lila Abu-Lughod notes, the focus on ‘saving’ Muslim women creates a ‘reductive sense of justice’ that ignores the historical and economic conditions that contribute to gender inequality – conditions that the U.S. itself helped create during the previous two decades (Abu-Lughod, p.784).

THE MATERIAL REALITIES OF THE 20-YEAR OCCUPATION

The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan was hailed as a milestone, formally guaranteeing equal rights and reserving a 25% quota for women in the lower house of parliament. Women were appointed to ministerial positions and provincial governorships, creating a new class of female political elites. However, a critical historical evaluation reveals that these gains were often top-heavy and unsustainable. As scholar Haifa Zangana points out in the context of Iraq – a critique equally applicable to Afghanistan – a quota in parliament is a decorative metric if the political system is so fractured by corruption and foreign dependency that women’s issues are traded for political favours by male-dominated power structures (Zangana, p.112).

This urban-centric progress created a ‘showcase’ version of feminism that was highly legible to Western donors but disconnected from the broader social fabric of the country. The ‘liberated Afghan woman’ became a standardised image used to justify continued military appropriations in Washington, even as the structural foundations of that liberation remained precarious (Stabile, p.768).

A critical component of the American intervention was the influx of thousands of Western-funded Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Whilst many of these organisations provided essential services, they also facilitated what scholars call the ‘NGO-isation’ of feminism. This process transformed radical, indigenous social movements into professionalised, donor-driven service providers. Instead of advocating for systemic land reform or the dismantling of the patriarchal war economy, women were funnelled into ‘leadership training’ workshops and ‘micro-finance’ schemes (Mohanty, p.102).

This model of empowerment was inherently neoliberal. It equated freedom with the right to participate in a volatile market economy, ignoring the fact that the occupation’s focus on privatisation often destroyed the very social safety nets – healthcare, subsidised bread, and public employment – that women relied on for survival. As Naomi Klein posits, the efforts to promote democratic values often serve as an alibi for economic interests (Klein, p.67). In Afghanistan, the ‘rights’ offered to women were often decoupled from the material security required to exercise them.

Furthermore, the reliance on foreign funding meant that Afghan women’s organisations had to tailor their agendas to the fluctuating priorities of Washington and Brussels. When the strategic interest shifted towards counter-insurgency, the ‘gender projects’ were the first to be downsized or securitised. This created a class of ‘NGO-preneurs’ who were fluent in the language of international development but were increasingly viewed with suspicion by their own communities as agents of a foreign cultural agenda (Abu-Lughod, p.789).

The militarisation of rural Afghanistan effectively negated any rhetorical gains in women’s rights. As Anand Gopal documents, rural women often viewed the U.S.-backed government as a source of corruption and violence, frequently preferring the harsh but predictable ‘justice’ of the Taliban to the predatory behaviour of local police and militias funded by the occupation (Gopal, p.45). In many provinces, the security situation was so dire that women were forced back into seclusion not by religious edict, but by the sheer necessity of avoiding the crossfire of a twenty-year insurgency.

The discourse of ‘saving’ Afghan women relied on a profound erasure of local agency. By framing the Afghan woman as a monolithic, passive victim, the interventionist narrative denied her the capacity to be a subject of her own history. This colonial gaze transformed the complex, diverse identities of Afghan women into a singular trope that served the needs of the metropole.

Lila Abu-Lughod argues that this focus on ‘saving’ Muslim women creates a ‘reductive sense of justice’ (Abu-Lughod, p.784). It suggests that freedom is something that can be delivered on the tip of a bayonet, rather than something that must be won through internal social evolution and political struggle. By positioning the Western military as the only force capable of granting rights, the intervention undermined the legitimacy of indigenous feminist activists who were trying to negotiate power within their own cultural and religious frameworks.

When Western states instrumentalise these struggles, they often put local activists at greater risk. In Afghanistan, the association of women’s rights with a foreign military occupation allowed the Taliban to frame gender equality as a ‘foreign plot’ to undermine Afghan culture and Islam. This effectively sabotaged the progress that might have been made through organic, sovereign social movements, leaving women vulnerable to a violent backlash once the foreign forces inevitably withdrew.

Ultimately, women’s rights in Afghanistan were treated as a tactical ornament rather than a foundational priority. When the strategic utility of the mission began to wane during the Trump and Biden administrations, the ‘commitment’ to Afghan women was the first casualty of the peace negotiations. The 2020 Doha Agreement, negotiated between the U.S. and the Taliban, notably excluded Afghan women and the Afghan government entirely (Power, p.1).

This transition from ‘liberation’ to ‘withdrawal’ exposed the hollowness of the original justification. Rights that are granted by an external military force are contingent upon that force’s continued interest. When the strategic landscape changed, the ‘moral imperative’ vanished. The 2021 collapse of the U.S.-backed government and the subsequent return of the Taliban demonstrated that twenty years of ‘saving women’ had failed to build any durable, sovereign infrastructure for gender justice. The women were left to navigate the wreckage of a society shattered in their name.

THE CASE OF IRAQ – THE DESTRUCTION OF A SECULAR STATE

The 2003 invasion of Iraq introduced another profound instance where women’s rights were invoked to justify military action. Whilst the primary pretexts for the war – the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the alleged link between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda – eventually crumbled under the weight of empirical evidence, the humanitarian narrative remained as a fall-back. This strategy has been termed the ‘feminisation of war,’ a process by which military aggression is rebranded as an act of chivalry and rescue (Al-Ali, p.122).

In the lead-up to the invasion, the Office of Global Women’s Issues at the State Department began a concerted effort to highlight the brutality of the Ba’athist regime towards women. Stories of ‘rape rooms’ and state-sanctioned torture were disseminated to create a moral imperative for regime change. As Naomi Klein posits, the promotion of democratic and gender-progressive values often serves as an alibi for broader economic and strategic interests (Klein, p.67). By framing the invasion as a mission to liberate Iraqi women, the U.S. administration sought to soften the image of a unilateral ‘war of choice’ and manufacture a consensus amongst a sceptical international public.

To critically evaluate the impact of the U.S. intervention, one must acknowledge the complex starting point of Iraqi women’s rights. Before the 1990-91 Gulf War and the subsequent decade of sanctions, Iraq possessed one of the most advanced educational and healthcare systems in the Middle East, with women participating heavily in the labour force (Al-Ali, p.122). Under the 1959 Personal Status Law – one of the most progressive in the Arab world – Iraqi women enjoyed significant legal protections regarding marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The Ba’athist regime, whilst undeniably authoritarian and repressive of political dissent, was fundamentally secular. Women were encouraged to enter the professional workforce as doctors, engineers, and civil servants to fuel the nation’s modernisation. However, the U.S.-led sanctions of the 1990s decimated the middle class, forcing many women back into the home as the social safety net evaporated. By the time of the 2003 invasion, the ‘problems’ Iraqi women faced were not merely products of indigenous culture, but were significantly exacerbated by prior decades of American-led economic warfare (Al-Ali, p.122).

Post-invasion, many Iraqi women experienced a brief period of heightened visibility. Western media often highlighted the ‘purple fingers’ of women voting and their participation in the new Governing Council. Reports indicated that women’s participation in socio-political spheres increased, and Western-funded NGOs surged into the country to provide ’empowerment’ workshops (Amnesty International, p.1).

However, this visibility was a fragile superstructure built atop a collapsing state. The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made the fateful decision to dissolve the Iraqi military and civil service – a process known as de-Ba’athification. This dismantled the secular state infrastructure that had historically protected women’s professional status and physical safety. As the state collapsed, a power vacuum emerged, filled by sectarian militias and extremist groups who viewed the U.S.-backed ‘women’s empowerment’ agenda as a foreign imposition and an affront to religious tradition (Zangana, p.108).

One of the direst consequences of the U.S. intervention was the institutionalisation of sectarianism. To manage the chaos of the occupation, the U.S. empowered conservative religious parties that had been in exile. In the negotiation of the 2005 Constitution, women’s rights became a negotiable currency. To secure the political cooperation of powerful Shia and Sunni clerical elites, American administrators allowed for the inclusion of Article 2, which stated that no law could contradict the ‘established provisions of Islam’ (Al-Ali 145).

This was a catastrophic regression for gender justice. It effectively opened the door for religious authorities to replace the secular 1959 Personal Status Law with sectarian codes. Women’s rights activists in Iraq fought a desperate rear-guard action against Article 137, which sought to put family law under the jurisdiction of religious courts. The paradox was clear: the ‘liberators’ who claimed to bring freedom were responsible for creating a political system that systematically eroded the legal foundations of women’s autonomy (Al-Ali, p.145).

The destabilisation of Iraq under U.S. occupation had catastrophic effects on the daily safety of women. Violence against women surged as state security was replaced by militia-led ‘morality’ policing. Women were targeted for their dress, their jobs, and their participation in public life. Kidnappings and sexual violence became endemic, forcing many women to abandon their educations and careers simply to survive (Zangana, p.108).

The case of Iraq demonstrates that the U.S. did not go to war for women’s rights; rather, it used women’s rights as an alibi for economic interests and regional dominance. The intended liberation of women became secondary to the interests of corporate America and the strategic goal of establishing a pro-Western foothold in the heart of the Middle East (Klein, p.67).

By critically examining these narratives, we uncover the underlying motives behind American interventions and how the instrumentalisation of women’s rights serves to obscure imperial ambitions. The reality for Iraqi women in the decades following 2003 – defined by the rise of ISIS, the persistence of sectarian law, and the loss of secular safety – stands as a rigorous historical rebuttal to the narrative of benevolent intervention. Liberation cannot be delivered via the destruction of a state, and rights cannot be sustained through the empowerment of religious fundamentalism (Chomsky, p.1).

THE IRANIAN CONTEXT – HISTORICAL OPPRESSION AND THE COLONIAL GAZE

In recent years, the burgeoning tensions between Washington and Tehran have once again brought women’s rights to the forefront of American foreign policy discourse. As the ‘War on Terror’ narratives of Afghanistan and Iraq have lost their domestic lustre, the Iranian context has emerged as a new frontier for the instrumentalisation of gendered rhetoric. U.S. narratives frequently depict Iranian women as monolithic, oppressed victims of a uniquely repressive regime, suggesting that external pressure – or even intervention – could be the only pathway to their liberation. Some supporters of the US-Israeli war on Iran are using the treatment of women in the country as a justification for bombing a sovereign nation called Iran.

This framing serves a specific geopolitical function: it moralises the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. By positioning the United States as the champion of Iranian women, policymakers can frame their adversarial stance not as a contest for regional hegemony or control over the Strait of Hormuz, but as a crusade for universal human rights. However, a critical historical evaluation reveals that this selective advocacy ignores the agency of Iranian women and the devastating material impact that American policies have on their daily lives (Parsi, p.210).

To understand why American claims of ‘liberating’ Iranian women are met with deep scepticism within Iran, one must look back to the CIA-orchestrated coup of 1953. The overthrow of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who sought to nationalise Iran’s oil, and the subsequent restoration of the autocratic Shah, established a precedent of American intervention that prioritised resource control over democratic self-determination.

Under the Shah’s ‘White Revolution,’ Iran underwent a period of rapid, state-sponsored Westernisation. Whilst certain legal rights were granted to women, such as suffrage and the Family Protection Law, these reforms were often enforced from the top down and were inextricably linked to a repressive, pro-Western monarchy. For many Iranians, the ‘liberation’ of women became synonymous with the erasure of national sovereignty and the imposition of a foreign cultural model. This historical trauma informs the current political landscape, where the Iranian state frequently labels indigenous feminist activism as a ‘Western plot’ – a rhetorical weapon made possible by the history of American imperial overreach.

The 1979 Revolution was a multifaceted movement that included secular feminists, Marxists, and religious conservatives, all united against the Shah’s autocracy. However, the subsequent consolidation of power by the clerical establishment led to a significant rollback of women’s rights. The mandatory hijab laws, the suspension of the Family Protection Law, and the exclusion of women from the judiciary were profound setbacks (Moghadam, p.142).

Whilst the post-revolutionary state has indeed restricted women’s rights, the Western narrative often fails to acknowledge the incredible resilience and agency of Iranian women within this system. Despite legal barriers, Iranian women have achieved high levels of literacy and university enrolment, often outnumbering men in STEM fields. The struggle for rights in Iran is an indigenous, ongoing process led by women who have spent decades navigating the complexities of their own political landscape. When Western narratives paint them purely as victims, they erase this history of sophisticated, internal resistance (Abu-Lughod, p.789).

As scholar Nima Naghibi argues, the framing of Iranian women’s experiences in Western media often reflects an ‘imperial gaze’ that simplifies complex social realities. This gaze focuses obsessively on the veil – specifically the black chador – as the ultimate symbol of oppression, whilst ignoring the structural economic and political issues that Iranian women prioritise (Naghibi, p.140).

The advocacy for women’s rights, in this context, can serve as a form of ‘cultural imperialism.’ By defining ‘liberation’ exclusively through Western lenses of secularism and dress, the U.S. narrative delegitimises indigenous forms of Islamic feminism and local activism. This selective focus allows Western observers to feel a sense of moral superiority whilst ignoring the ways in which their own governments’ policies – such as the ‘Maximum Pressure’ sanctions – actively undermine the material security of the very women they claim to support (Mohanty, p.18).

The most significant contradiction in the American narrative regarding Iran is the impact of economic sanctions. Whilst Washington claims to stand in solidarity with Iranian women, its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign has had catastrophic effects on the Iranian middle class, where the heart of the women’s rights movement resides. Sanctions are never gender-neutral; they disproportionately harm the female labour force.

As Valentine Moghadam notes, the resulting inflation and economic contraction lead to higher unemployment for women and the degradation of the healthcare system, specifically affecting maternal and reproductive health (Moghadam, p.142). When medicine for breast cancer or basic prenatal care becomes unavailable due to banking restrictions, it is a form of gendered violence perpetrated by the state that claims to be a liberator. The Iranian woman’s body becomes a symbolic battlefield for the U.S. to assert moral authority, even as American policy chokes the material resources necessary for her survival (Parsi, p.210).

True solidarity with Iranian women requires a fundamental rejection of the ‘rescue’ narrative. It requires listening to local voices who insist that their struggle is for internal reform and national sovereignty, not for foreign military intervention or economic strangulation. As long as women’s rights are used as a condition for diplomacy with Iran – but not with American allies who have equally repressive gender laws – the U.S. narrative will remain intellectually and morally bankrupt (Abu-Lughod, p.789). The liberation of Iranian women cannot be delivered by the same powers that have a long history of undermining Iranian self-determination; it can only be won by the Iranian people themselves, in the absence of imperial coercion.

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS – CO-OPTATION AND THE WEAPONISATION OF GENDER

At the heart of these interventions lies a pedagogical and psychological framework often described as the ‘white saviour’ complex. As articulated by scholars following the tradition of Gayatri Spivak, this narrative is built on the premise of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men.’ In the context of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, this trope has been modernised to fit a neoliberal global order. It positions the Western interventionist as the enlightened bearer of progress and the non-Western man as the inherently barbaric oppressor (Spivak, p.271).

This binary construction does double violence: it erases the history of indigenous men who have fought for gender justice and, more importantly, it denies agency to the women themselves. By casting Afghan or Iraqi women as passive objects awaiting rescue, the ‘saving’ narrative reinforces colonial hierarchies. It suggests that liberation is not something women can achieve through their own political struggle, but something that must be ‘granted’ or ‘delivered’ by a superior external power. This paternalism is a form of ‘epistemic violence’ that devalues the lived experiences and local strategies of women in the Global South (Abu-Lughod, p.783).

Many feminist scholars and activists have offered a scathing critique of this instrumentalisation. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, in her foundational work Feminism Without Borders, emphasises the need for a more nuanced understanding of women’s lives in differing contexts. She argues against a ‘one-size-fits-all’ narrative of Western feminism that fails to account for local specifics, class dynamics, and the legacies of colonialism (Mohanty, p.18).

Mohanty’s critique is essential for understanding why American interventions often fail the very women they claim to protect. When Western feminism is used as a template for intervention, it often prioritises symbolic victories – such as the right to wear Western clothing or participate in a foreign-style parliament – over the structural needs for economic sovereignty and physical security. A genuinely emancipatory feminism must be ‘decolonial’ and ‘transnational,’ seeking solidarity through horizontal partnerships rather than imperial hierarchies. It must recognise that the primary threat to many women in the Global South is not ‘culture’ or ‘religion,’ but the global economic and military structures that maintain their poverty and insecurity (Mohanty, p.18).

In light of these criticisms, the question arises: how can international engagement be conducted with genuine concern for women’s rights? The answer lies in reframing interventions in ways that do not assume Western superiority. An ethical approach to gender justice must prioritise local voices and foster genuine partnerships with grassroots organisations that are already embedded in their communities.

Key principles for reclaiming feminist discourse from the clutches of imperialism include:

  1. Respect for Sovereignty: Recognising that sustainable change must come from within a society, not be imposed by foreign military force.
  2. Prioritising Material Security: Acknowledging that rights are meaningless without the material foundations of peace, food security, and healthcare.
  3. Challenging Selective Humanitarianism: Demanding that women’s rights be upheld consistently, including in states that are allied with the West.
  4. Decoupling Gender from Militarism: Rejecting the idea that the ‘woman question’ can ever be solved by the destruction of a state or the implementation of economic warfare (Abu-Lughod, p.789).

A more recent development in the political economy of the Afghan intervention involves the discovery of vast untapped mineral deposits, including lithium, copper, and rare earth elements – essential components for the ‘green energy’ transition. By the mid-2010s, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated these resources to be worth over one trillion dollars.

The rhetoric of ‘not abandoning Afghan women’ was frequently used by political hawks to argue against withdrawal, but critics point out that the desire to maintain a presence was equally tied to ensuring these minerals did not fall under Chinese or Russian influence. Here, the ‘feminist’ argument was weaponised to sustain a military-industrial presence that facilitated corporate prospecting. The tragedy of this ‘resource curse’ is that the wealth generated by such extraction rarely reaches the women of the region; instead, it fuels the very corruption and warlordism that U.S. interventions purportedly aim to dismantle (Gopal, p.45).

The fundamental lesson of the past two decades is that war cannot be a feminist tool. Militarisation disrupts the very social fabric – schools, hospitals, family networks – that women rely on. An ethical, humanistic approach to women’s rights must prioritise de-militarisation and diplomacy. It must recognise that the most effective way to support women’s rights globally is to foster an international environment of peace, economic sovereignty, and respect for international law.

As scholars of decolonial feminism argue, we must ‘reclaim feminist discourse from the clutches of imperialism’ (Mohanty, p.18). This means developing an authentic, inclusive approach that respects the autonomy of women globally and rejects the use of their rights as a ‘pretext’ for war. The path to gender justice lies not in the ‘civilising mission’ of great powers, but in the radical solidarity of transnational movements that target the root causes of both local patriarchy and global empire.

The history of these interventions is a history of destabilisation, legal regression, and systemic trauma. It challenges us to develop a more authentic, inclusive approach that respects the autonomy of women globally and recognises that genuine liberation must be a sovereign, indigenous process. The ‘hollowness’ of the justification is found in the ruins left behind once the ‘liberators’ withdraw, leaving the women to navigate the wreckage of a society shattered in their name (Chomsky, p.1).

RECLAIMING THE DIVINE MANDATE FOR WOMAN

If the “Civilizing Mission” of the West is built upon the erasure of local agency, the path to genuine liberation lies in reclaiming the theological and ontological frameworks inherent to the culture being “rescued.” Central to this reclamation is the concept of Khilafat (stewardship or vicegerency), which serves as the cornerstone of the human mission as defined in the Quran (Q.2:30). In the Quranic worldview, the designation of a Khalifa (steward) was never gendered; it was a divine appointment bestowed upon the entire human species. This mission necessitates the full exercise of spiritual equality and moral agency by both men and women.

The Quran provides a radical, egalitarian framework that contradicts the “backwardness” narrative utilized by Western interventionists. When we look at the divine text devoid of colonial or patriarchal filters, we find an expansive list of rights endowed to women that predate Western feminist milestones by centuries. These include:

•          Spiritual and Ontological Equality: The right to spiritual equality (3:195, 33:35) and the right to paradise based on moral agency (4:124, 40:40).

•          Legal and Financial Autonomy: The right to own property and maintain financial independence (4:7, 4:32), the right to inheritance (4:11-12), and the right to legal personhood and to witness in legal matters (2:282, 24:6-9).

•          Socio-Political Agency: The right to education (96:1-5), the right to political participation and leadership—modelled by the Queen of Sheba (27:23-44)—and the right to voice opinions and engage in intellectual debate (58:1).

•          Bodily and Marital Autonomy: The right to consent in marriage and choose a spouse (4:19, 2:232), the right to sexual fulfilment and agency (2:187, 2:223), the right to seek divorce from abusive husbands (4:128-129), and the right to protection from domestic violence (4:19).

•          Intellectual Authority: The right to interpret religious texts and the mandate to reclaim “Quranic Feminism” (4:1), effectively challenging cultural patriarchy (81:8-9) and rejecting “Qiwamah” as a tool for male dominance (4:34).

When women are denied political participation, leadership, or the right to interpret religious texts, the human mission of Khilafat is fundamentally compromised. True stewardship requires the collective intellectual and spiritual contributions of all humanity. Therefore, the responsibilities of maintaining justice and challenging oppression are not merely “women’s rights” in the Western liberal sense; they are essential components of a divine commission that women are duty-bound to uphold.

The contemporary reality—where certain Islamic groups, such as those adhering to Wahhabist ideologies, appear regressive—is often weaponized by U.S. foreign policy to justify intervention. However, a rigorous analysis reveals that this backwardness is not inherent to the Islamic faith, but is the result of powerful external factors and political manipulation. Many restrictions observed today are remnants of pre-Islamic Jahiliyyah (ignorance) or regional tribal codes. For example, the suppression of travel or the right to consent in marriage often stems from tribal notions of “honour” and patriarchal control rather than theology. These cultures have effectively cloaked local customs in religious terminology to maintain a male-dominated status quo.

Groups like the Wahhabis often adopt a rigid, ahistorical literalism that ignores the Maqasid (higher objectives) of Sharia. By focusing on a narrow reading of Qiwamah as “dominance” rather than “supportive guardianship,” they negate the overarching Quranic command for mutual protection (9:71). This interpretive lens prioritizes social control over the liberation intended by revelation. In many societies, the denial of education is a political tool used to sustain authoritarian structures; by preventing half the population from realizing their moral agency, these systems thwart the intellectual awakening required to challenge unjust leadership.

Furthermore, this regression is fuelled by the systematic erasure of historical female figures who embodied non-stereotypical roles, such as Maryam (as a spiritual model) or the Queen of Sheba (as a political model). When societies ignore these Quranic archetypes, they fall back into patriarchal patterns that are external to the divine text.

In conclusion, the Quranic framework offers a sovereign path to gender justice that does not require a Western “liberator.” The failure to realize these rights is a sociological and political failure—a result of cultural baggage and patriarchal misinterpretations—rather than an inherent flaw in Islam. Reclaiming these rights through the mandate of Khilafat is not just a matter of justice for women; it is a prerequisite for fulfilling the collective human mission. By recognizing this indigenous framework, we undermine the “rescue” narrative of imperial feminism and return the power of liberation to the women themselves.

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Lila. “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others.” American Anthropologist, vol. 104, no. 3, 2002, pp. 783–790.

Al-Ali, Nadje, and Nicola Pratt. What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Amnesty International. “Iraq: The Forgotten Breadwinners: Women in Iraq’s Economic Crisis.” London: Amnesty International, 2011.

Bush, George W. “Remarks by the President on the War Against Terrorism and the Liberation of Women.” Washington, DC: The White House Archives, 12 Mar. 2004.

Bush, Laura. “Radio Address to the Nation.” Washington, DC: The White House, 17 Nov. 2001.

Chomsky, Noam. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.

Gopal, Anand. No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014.

Jayawardena, Kumari. Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Verso, 2016.

Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Knopf, 2007.

Kolhatkar, Sonali. “The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women’s Rights.” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice, vol. 17, no. 1, 2002, pp. 41–55.

Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004.

Moghadam, Valentine M. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

Parsi, Trita. Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

Power, Samantha. The Education of an Idealist: A Memoir. New York: Dey Street Books, 2019.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988, pp. 271–313.

Stabile, Carol A., and Deepa Kumar. “Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and the War on Afghanistan.” Media, Culture & Society, vol. 27, no. 5, 2005, pp. 765–782.

Williams, Giselle. “Liberation Through Imperialism: How the U.S. Weaponizes Women’s Rights as a Pretext for Military Intervention.” Columbia Political Review, 2021.

Zangana, Haifa. City of Widows: An Iraqi Woman’s Account of War and Resistance. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007.

V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence.

6 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

The Great Unravelling: Israel’s Existential Descent and the Collapse of the Zionist Dream

By Feroze Mithiborwala

​The date of February 28, 2026, will be etched in history not as a moment of Israeli triumph, but as the day the “Invincible Fortress” began its terminal decline.

Operation Roaring Lion, launched by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in coordination with the Trump administration’s Operation Epic Fury, or rather, “Epstein Fury”, was intended to be a decapitation strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Instead, it has triggered a multi-front retaliation from the Axis of Resistance that has shattered the Israeli home front, paralyzed the economy, and pushed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to the brink of a systemic collapse.

​The Home Front in Flames: Mobilization and Mutiny

​Across the cities of Israel, occupied Palestine, the myth of national unity has dissolved. While initial polls in early March suggested a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, the reality on the streets by April 2026 is far more volatile. Reports from Tel Aviv’s Habima Square and West Jerusalem indicate that tens of thousands have begun mobilizing—not in support of the war, but in a desperate plea for its cessation.

​The mobilization is no longer restricted to the secular left or the liberal “Kaplan” protesters. In a historic shift, segments of the Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) community have joined the fray. This shift is driven by a combination of the intensified pressure of the conscription crisis and the direct threat to their lives in the absence of adequate shelter in their densely populated neighborhoods. “The Zionist state is gambling with the lives of millions for the political survival of one man,” notes cultural critic Gilad Atzmon, highlighting the internal rupture. “The ideological glue that held this colonial project together is melting under the heat of Iranian thermal warheads.”¹

​While official police figures attempt to downplay the numbers, local activist groups suggest that over 100,000 people participated in nationwide rallies on March 28 alone. These protesters face a brutal crackdown, as law enforcement invokes wartime regulations to bar gatherings, further fueling the fire of civil disobedience.

​The Rain of Fire: Infrastructure Under Siege

​The retaliation from the Axis of Resistance—spanning the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Ansarullah (the Houthis)—has systematically dismantled the illusion of the Iron Dome’s omnipotence. While the military censor in Tel Aviv works overtime to suppress the full extent of the damage, the data escaping the blackout is grim.

​Beyond the well-documented strikes on Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Dimona, the geography of the conflict has expanded to include:

  • ​North: Kiryat Shmona, Safed, Nahariya, and the Galilee panhandle have become ghost towns. Hezbollah’s precision drones have specifically targeted power substations and IDF command centers, rendering the region effectively uninhabitable.
  • ​Central: Beit Shemesh, Ramat Gan, Bnei Brak, Petah Tikva, and Herzliya have sustained direct hits. Notably, on April 3, a missile struck an industrial zone in Ramat Gan, demonstrating that even the heart of Israel’s high-tech corridor is within reach.²
  • ​South: Ashkelon, Beersheba, Ashdod, and the Eilat port have been rendered non-operational by Ansarullah’s long-range cruise missiles, effectively choking Israel’s southern maritime artery.

​Crucially, the conflict has spilled into the West Bank. Iranian missiles have reportedly targeted IDF installations and settlements near Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim. While the IDF claims many of these were intercepted, the psychological impact of fire falling on the “heartland” of the settlement movement has been profound. “The resistance has successfully unified the fields,” states Muhammad Marandi. “There is no longer a ‘front line’ and a ‘rear’; the entirety of the occupied territories is now a combat zone.”³

​A Military Exhausted: The General’s Warning

​Inside the “Kirya” (Israel’s Ministry of Defense), the mood is apocalyptic. Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir recently delivered a “ten red flag” warning to the security cabinet, stating bluntly that the IDF is facing a troop shortage so severe it may soon be unable to conduct routine missions, let alone a multi-front war.⁴

​The IDF is reportedly short of approximately 12,000 troops. This manpower crunch is not just a result of the current war on Iran but follows nearly two and a half years of high-intensity operations in Gaza and the West Bank. General Zamir warned that the reserve system is “collapsing in on itself.”

​Politicians like Yair Lapid have echoed this sentiment, noting that the army is physically tired and morally overextended. As Professor John Mearsheimer has observed, “You cannot fight a high-intensity war against regional powers when your domestic base is fractured and your primary military force—the reservists—refuse to serve a government they don’t trust.”⁵

​The Great Exodus: Fleeing the Promised Land

​For the first time in its history, Israel is experiencing a net migration crisis that threatens its demographic foundation. The scenes at Ben Gurion Airport are of controlled chaos, with flights booked out months in advance. Many who cannot find flights are seeking passage by ship to Cyprus and Greece.

​Even more startling are the reports of dual-national Israelis utilizing the Rafah crossing into Egypt or maritime routes to escape the rain of missiles. While exact 2026 figures are guarded, estimates suggest that over 150,000 citizens have fled since the February 28 escalation, adding to the nearly 70,000 who left in late 2025.⁶ George Galloway has remarked on this shift, stating, “The settlers are becoming the unsettled. The very people who came to displace others are now finding they have no place of their own that is safe.”⁷

​Economic Ruin: The $3 Billion Weekly Bleed

​The Israeli economy is in a tailspin. The Finance Ministry warned in March 2026 that the war is costing the state approximately $3 billion per week in lost productivity and direct military expenditures.⁸

  • ​Infrastructure Loss: Preliminary estimates place the damage to Israeli civilian and military infrastructure at upwards of $25 billion.
  • ​Capital Flight: The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) has seen a massive withdrawal of foreign capital. International investment agreements—once the pride of the “Start-up Nation”—are being canceled daily.
  • ​The US Burden: The United States is footing a bill that exceeds $18 billion in just the first few weeks of the conflict. This includes the cost of Tomahawk missiles and naval deployments.

​Jeffrey Sachs has pointed out the insanity of this fiscal policy: “The US is bankrupting its future to fund a regional conflagration that serves no strategic interest other than keeping Netanyahu out of a courtroom.”⁹

​International Isolation and the Trump Factor

​Israel’s global standing has reached a nadir. European capitals, once staunch allies, are now distancing themselves as the humanitarian and economic fallout of a war with Iran threatens global energy markets.

​In the United States, the political landscape is shifting. While President Donald Trump initially authorized the strikes, he is increasingly being blamed by his own “America First” base for being maneuvered into another “forever war.” Tucker Carlson recently remarked, “Why are we risking World War III for a leader whose own people are protesting him in the streets? This isn’t ‘America First’; it’s ‘Netanyahu First.’”¹⁰

​Pepe Escobar aptly summarizes the geopolitical shift: “The ‘Zionist project’ was built on the premise of security. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have now removed that premise. Without security, there is no investment; without investment, there is no state.”¹¹

​Conclusion: The End of the Myth

​As Max Blumenthal has documented, the current crisis is not a temporary setback—it is the sound of a system breaking. The combination of internal dissent, military exhaustion, and a decimated economy suggests that the war on Iran may be the final chapter for the Netanyahu era. The longer the war lasts, the more the regional and international order shifts against the interests of both Tel Aviv and Washington.

​References and Footnotes

  1. ​Atzmon, Gilad. “The Melting Pot of Zionism,” Interviews on Global Affairs, March 2026.
  2. ​The Times of Israel. “Iran hits Israeli industrial zone for third time,” April 5, 2026.
  3. ​Marandi, Muhammad. The Axis of Resistance and the Multi-Front War, Tehran Policy Institute, 2026.
  4. ​The Economic Times. “IDF Chief warns military could ‘collapse’ due to manpower shortage,” March 27, 2026.
  5. ​Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 2026 Update, Yale University Press.
  6. ​Middle East Monitor. “Record Israeli emigration exposes deep crisis,” January 9, 2026.
  7. ​Galloway, George. The Mother of All Talk Shows, April 2026 broadcast.
  8. The Times of Israel. “War set to cost $3 billion a week,” March 4, 2026.
  9. ​Sachs, Jeffrey. “The Economic Suicide of a Middle East War,” Common Dreams, March 2026.
  10. ​Carlson, Tucker. The Tucker Carlson Network, Episode 412: “The Iran Escalation,” April 2026.
  11. ​Escobar, Pepe. “The New Silk Road vs. The Burning Levant,” The Cradle, March 2026.

Feroze Mithiborwala is an expert on West Asian & International Geostrategic issues.

6 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

The End of Strategic Monopoly: War, Energy, and the Fragmentation of Global Power in 2026

By Laala Bechetoula

Abstract

The 2026 war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States constitutes a systemic rupture in the architecture of international relations. Beyond its military dimension, the conflict exposes the erosion of Western strategic monopoly and the emergence of a condition this article terms fragmented multipolarity — a system characterised by distributed power, persistent instability, the absence of equilibrium, and the simultaneous failure of existing theoretical frameworks to account for observed dynamics.

This article situates the conflict within three competing theoretical frameworks — structural realism (Waltz), offensive realism (Mearsheimer), and neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane) — and demonstrates that while each captures elements of the crisis, none accounts for its systemic consequences. It further argues that classical Western international relations theory suffers from a deeper deficit: the exclusion of non-Western analytical traditions — notably Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory of civilisational decay, Malek Bennabi’s concept of civilisational readiness, and Gramsci’s interregnum — which together illuminate dimensions of the current rupture that structural, offensive, and liberal frameworks cannot reach.

The paper concludes that contemporary geopolitics has entered a post-hegemonic phase in which power persists but control dissipates, and that the construction of an adequate analytical framework requires drawing on the full breadth of global intellectual traditions — not merely those produced within the Western academy.

Keywords: Fragmented Multipolarity; Structural Realism; Offensive Realism; Neoliberal Institutionalism; Iran War 2026; Energy Geopolitics; Chokepoint Warfare; Systemic Instability; Ibn Khaldun; Malek Bennabi; Gramsci; Post-Hegemonic Order

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  1. Introduction — The Empirical Shock

On 18 March 2026, Brent crude futures closed at $147.30 per barrel — a 78.8% increase from the $82.40 recorded on 1 January of the same year.[1] Lloyd’s of London reported that war risk insurance premiums for Persian Gulf transit had risen by approximately 4,200% from pre-conflict baselines.[2] The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20.5 million barrels of petroleum liquids pass daily — roughly 21% of global consumption — became, for the first time since the 1980s, an active theatre of military operations.[3] Three successive United Nations Security Council draft resolutions on the conflict were vetoed by permanent members.[4]

These are not theoretical propositions. They are empirical facts. And they constitute a challenge not merely to policy but to the analytical frameworks through which international relations are understood.

The 2026 Iran war is, in this sense, not only a geopolitical event. It is an epistemological event. It reveals that the dominant theoretical paradigms of international relations — structural realism, offensive realism, neoliberal institutionalism — each illuminate a dimension of the crisis but none, individually or collectively, accounts for its systemic dynamics. The conflict demands, in short, a new concept. This article proposes one: fragmented multipolarity — a condition in which multiple centres of power coexist without producing equilibrium, stability, or coherent governance, and in which the analytical tools inherited from the Western academy are necessary but insufficient.

The argument proceeds in ten stages. Sections 2 through 4 subject classical theories to the empirical test of the 2026 war, steel-manning each before identifying its structural limits. Section 5 introduces chokepoint warfare as a missing variable. Section 6 analyses Iran’s distributed power model. Section 7 defines fragmented multipolarity and differentiates it from existing alternatives. Section 8 draws on Ibn Khaldun and Gramsci to provide non-Western and critical theoretical anchors. Section 9 examines China’s posture through the lens of Malek Bennabi’s civilisational readiness. Section 10 proposes the foundations of a new analytical framework. The conclusion reflects on the end of strategic monopoly and the imperative of theoretical pluralism.

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  1. Waltz Revisited — Structure Without Stability

Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism remains the most parsimonious account of international order. His core propositions are well known: the international system is anarchic; its structure is defined by the distribution of capabilities among units; and this structure constrains and shapes state behaviour in ways that tend toward balance.[5] No theory of the 2026 conflict can proceed without engaging Waltz, and none should dismiss him lightly.

2.1 The Strongest Waltzian Case

A Waltzian reading of the 2026 war would emphasise that the conflict confirms the persistence of anarchy as the ordering principle. No supranational authority prevented it; no institution overrode sovereign calculation. The war is, in this view, a predictable consequence of the distribution of capabilities: a rising regional power (Iran) with nuclear threshold status provokes a balancing response from the dominant power (the United States) and its regional partner (Israel). The system works as Waltz predicted — not by producing peace, but by producing structural responses to shifts in capability.

A defender of Waltz might further argue that the instability observed in 2026 is not evidence of structural failure but of structural adjustment. The system is rebalancing. Hormuz disruptions, proxy activations, and energy shocks are the friction costs of a systemic transition from unipolarity toward a new equilibrium. Give the system time, the Waltzian would say, and balance will reassert itself.

2.2 Where the Framework Fractures

This is the strongest version of the Waltzian argument — and it is insufficient. The 2026 conflict reveals three structural anomalies that Waltz’s model cannot accommodate.

First, the military expenditure asymmetry between the United States and Iran exceeds 134:1.[6] In Waltzian terms, this should produce either deterrence (Iran accommodates) or rapid defeat (the system rebalances quickly). Neither has occurred. Iran’s capacity to sustain strategic resistance through distributed networks, proxy activation, and chokepoint leverage operates outside the capability metrics that Waltz’s model measures. Waltz counts divisions, warheads, and GDP. The 2026 war demonstrates that these metrics miss the operational architecture through which power is actually exercised.

Second, energy interdependence does not moderate conflict, as Waltzian balance-of-power theory would implicitly predict. Instead, it accelerates systemic shock transmission. When Hormuz transit is threatened, the consequences are not contained within a bilateral or regional balance — they propagate instantaneously through global energy markets, shipping insurance, and supply chains.[7] The World Bank’s January 2026 report explicitly warned that economic fragmentation amplifies rather than absorbs geopolitical shocks.[8]

Third, and most fundamentally, the system is not rebalancing. It is fragmenting. Waltz assumed that balance-of-power mechanisms produce equilibrium — that the system tends toward stability even through conflict. The empirical evidence of 2026 suggests the opposite: escalation generates further escalation; disruption generates further disruption; the system does not converge toward a new steady state but diverges into increasing complexity and unpredictability.

Thus, Waltz’s structure persists — anarchy remains the ordering principle, capabilities still matter — but its stabilising function has eroded. The system is structured without being stable. This is the first fracture in classical theory.

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  1. Mearsheimer and the Paradox of Rational Escalation

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism offers the most uncompromising account of great power behaviour. States, in his framework, are rational actors that maximise power to ensure survival in an anarchic system. Regional hegemony is the optimal condition; conflict is the inevitable consequence of competition among great powers.[9]

3.1 The Strongest Mearsheimerian Case

The U.S.–Israel military campaign against Iran aligns closely with offensive realist logic. The strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, air defence systems, and proxy infrastructure represent a rational attempt to degrade a rising competitor’s capabilities before it achieves nuclear breakout. Israel’s preemptive posture, informed by the doctrine of preventive war, fits squarely within Mearsheimer’s framework. So does the broader U.S. strategic calculus: if a nuclear-armed Iran would fundamentally alter the Middle Eastern balance of power, then acting before that threshold is crossed is the rational choice.

A Mearsheimerian defender would further note that the conflict’s escalatory dynamics are precisely what offensive realism predicts. When one power escalates, the adversary responds. This produces an action–reaction cycle that offensive realism explicitly describes. The loss of control that observers lament is not a failure of the theory — it is the theory’s central insight: competition among great powers produces tragic outcomes, not optimal ones.

3.2 Escalation Without Dominance

And yet the outcome diverges from Mearsheimer’s expectations in a fundamental way. Offensive realism posits that power maximisation produces relative advantage — that rational escalation, even at high cost, yields strategic gains for the stronger party. The 2026 war does not confirm this.

Escalation in 2026 produces not dominance but diffusion. Iranian proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen — documented extensively by the International Institute for Strategic Studies — have activated across multiple theatres simultaneously.[10] The Hormuz disruption imposes costs not primarily on Iran but on the global economy, including the United States’ own allies.[11] Military operations that were designed to concentrate strategic advantage have instead distributed conflict across a wider network of actors and geographies.

This reveals a paradox at the heart of offensive realism: power-maximising behaviour, when directed against a networked adversary with chokepoint leverage, can produce loss of strategic control. The stronger actor escalates rationally and still finds itself less in control of outcomes than before the escalation began. Mearsheimer’s framework explains the decision to escalate — but not the systemic consequences of escalation. It explains power but not its dissipation.

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  1. Keohane and the Inversion of Interdependence

Robert Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism occupies the opposite pole of the theoretical spectrum. Where Waltz and Mearsheimer foreground power and competition, Keohane argues that international institutions — regimes, norms, and cooperative frameworks — mitigate anarchy and enable cooperation even in the absence of a hegemon.[12] Interdependence, in his view, creates mutual vulnerability that incentivises restraint.

4.1 The Strongest Institutional Case

The institutional architecture surrounding the Iran conflict is substantial: the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards regime, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework (however attenuated), the UN Security Council, and multilateral energy governance through the IEA. A Keohane defender would argue that these institutions have not disappeared — they continue to provide information, facilitate communication, and establish baselines for cooperation. The IAEA continues to produce safeguards reports.[13] The IEA continues to publish market analyses.[14] Institutions persist and function, even under stress.

4.2 The Collapse of Regulatory Function

Persistence, however, is not efficacy. The defining feature of institutional performance in 2026 is not absence but impotence. Three Security Council resolutions have been vetoed.[15] The JCPOA framework is defunct. IAEA reporting continues but has no constraining effect on military operations. Norms of civilian protection and maritime security are openly violated. The institutions exist — but their regulatory function has collapsed.

More fundamentally, the 2026 conflict reveals what may be called the inversion of interdependence. Keohane’s central claim is that mutual vulnerability created by economic interdependence incentivises cooperation. The empirical evidence of 2026 demonstrates the opposite: energy interdependence, routed through the chokepoint of Hormuz, transmits instability rather than reducing it. When 21% of global petroleum consumption passes through a single strait that is simultaneously a theatre of military operations, interdependence does not restrain belligerents — it amplifies the systemic consequences of their actions.[16]

S&P Global estimates that 15–18% of global LNG trade transits the Strait of Hormuz.[17] The IEA’s 2025 special report on global energy security had already identified concentrated dependency on maritime chokepoints as a structural vulnerability.[18] The 2026 war confirms that this vulnerability is not hypothetical. Interdependence, under these conditions, becomes a vector of systemic instability — the precise inversion of Keohane’s prediction.

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  1. Chokepoint Warfare — The Missing Variable

None of the three classical theories adequately accounts for the strategic centrality of geographic chokepoints. Waltz’s structural model treats capabilities as aggregate national attributes (military spending, population, industrial capacity) and does not foreground geography as an independent variable. Mearsheimer acknowledges the stopping power of water but primarily as a constraint on power projection, not as an instrument of asymmetric leverage. Keohane’s institutionalism addresses interdependence but assumes it operates through diffuse market mechanisms rather than through concentrated geographic bottlenecks.

The Strait of Hormuz is the empirical refutation of these assumptions. The Council on Foreign Relations’ February 2026 report identified Hormuz as the single most consequential chokepoint in the global energy system.[19] Its disruption produces immediate, non-linear, and disproportionate effects: oil prices surge, insurance markets freeze, shipping reroutes, and downstream supply chains across Asia, Europe, and Africa absorb cascading shocks.[20]

Chokepoint warfare introduces a dimension that classical IR theory has systematically undertheorised: non-territorial leverage. Iran does not need to project power across oceans or defeat superior military forces. It needs only to threaten a geographic bottleneck to impose costs on the entire global economy. This represents a form of strategic power that is invisible to Waltz’s capability metrics, orthogonal to Mearsheimer’s great power competition framework, and corrosive to Keohane’s cooperative interdependence. Chokepoint warfare is, in this sense, a theoretical blind spot of Western international relations — and the 2026 war has made it impossible to ignore.

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  1. Iran and the Architecture of Distributed Power

Classical international relations theory is state-centric. It measures power at the level of the unitary state: GDP, military expenditure, population, nuclear capability. Iran’s strategic model operates on a fundamentally different logic.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2026 provides the most detailed open-source assessment of Iran’s proxy network: Hezbollah in Lebanon (estimated 30,000–50,000 fighters and a precision missile arsenal), the Houthis in Yemen (with demonstrated anti-shipping capability), and a constellation of allied militias across Iraq and Syria.[21] This network creates strategic depth without territorial expansion, resilience against conventional strikes (degradation of one node does not disable the network), and elastic escalation capacity (the ability to activate pressure across multiple theatres simultaneously).

This model cannot be fully explained by Waltz’s state-level structural analysis, by Mearsheimer’s great power competition framework, or by Keohane’s institutional cooperation paradigm. It reflects something new: power as networked architecture rather than centralised capacity. The 2026 war demonstrates that a state with a military budget 134 times smaller than its adversary’s can sustain strategic resistance and impose escalating costs — not because it is stronger in Waltzian terms, but because it operates through a different organisational logic.

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  1. Fragmented Multipolarity — Naming the New Condition

The concept introduced in this article — fragmented multipolarity — requires precise definition and differentiation from existing alternatives.

7.1 Definition

Fragmented multipolarity describes a systemic condition in which multiple centres of power coexist without producing equilibrium, in which interdependence transmits instability rather than cooperation, and in which no single actor or coalition possesses the capacity to impose systemic order. Unlike classical multipolarity, which implies a balance among roughly equivalent great powers, fragmented multipolarity is characterised by radical asymmetry of capabilities, heterogeneity of power forms (conventional military, networked proxy, economic leverage, chokepoint control), and persistent systemic instability as a structural feature rather than a transitional phase.

7.2 Differentiation from Existing Concepts

Amitav Acharya’s multiplex world captures the plurality of actors and the decline of liberal hegemony but retains an essentially optimistic assessment of institutional adaptation.[22] [23] Acharya envisions a world of overlapping, coexisting orders in which regional governance mechanisms compensate for the decline of American hegemony. Fragmented multipolarity does not share this optimism. The 2026 war demonstrates that regional orders are themselves sites of fragmentation, not compensation.

Richard Haass’s nonpolarity identifies the diffusion of power away from states to non-state actors — a valid observation — but treats this diffusion as relatively benign, a feature of globalisation’s complexity.[24] Fragmented multipolarity, by contrast, insists that the diffusion of power produces not complexity management but systemic instability. The 2026 Hormuz crisis is not a governance challenge to be managed. It is a structural rupture.

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security complex theory provides a valuable disaggregation of global security into regional subsystems.[25] But it assumes that regional complexes are analytically separable — that events in the Persian Gulf can be analysed as a Middle Eastern security complex with defined boundaries. The 2026 war demonstrates the opposite: Hormuz disruptions cascade through global energy markets, Chinese strategic calculations, European supply chains, and African food prices simultaneously. The boundaries between regional complexes have become analytically untenable.

Fragmented multipolarity differs from all three in its insistence on three features: the structural permanence of instability, the heterogeneity of power forms, and the transmission of disruption across previously separable domains. It is, in this sense, a more pessimistic — and, the evidence suggests, more accurate — diagnosis of the present condition.

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  1. The Civilisational Dimension — Ibn Khaldun, Gramsci, and the Deeper Rupture

The limits of Western IR theory are not merely empirical but epistemological. The exclusion of non-Western analytical traditions from the canonical frameworks of international relations has produced a discipline that is structurally incapable of recognising certain forms of systemic transformation. Two thinkers — one from the fourteenth-century Maghreb, one from an Italian prison — illuminate dimensions of the 2026 crisis that Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Keohane cannot reach.

8.1 Ibn Khaldun and the Erosion of ‘Asabiyya

Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah (1377) proposed a cyclical theory of civilisational rise and decline centred on the concept of ‘asabiyya — group solidarity, cohesion, collective purpose.[26] In Ibn Khaldun’s model, political entities rise when ‘asabiyya is strong — when a group possesses sufficient internal cohesion to act collectively, project power, and establish authority. They decline when ‘asabiyya erodes: when luxury, complacency, and internal division weaken the bonds that sustained coherent action. Crucially, the decline occurs while material resources persist. The state retains its armies, its treasury, its territory — but loses the cohesive force that made these instruments effective.[27]

The application to the 2026 crisis is precise. The United States retains military superiority by every conventional metric — defence expenditure, technological capability, force projection, nuclear arsenal. Yet the coherence required to translate this superiority into strategic outcomes has demonstrably eroded. Three vetoed Security Council resolutions reflect not the absence of American power but the absence of American capacity to build coalitions. Energy market chaos reflects not the weakness of global institutions but their inability to coordinate collective responses. The Western-led order retains its material infrastructure but has lost the ‘asabiyya — the solidarity, legitimacy, and collective purpose — that made that infrastructure function as a system of governance.

Ibn Khaldun’s model captures what Waltz’s structural realism misses: the possibility of structural persistence without functional coherence. A system can remain structured — capabilities distributed, anarchy intact — and still lose the capacity for equilibrium, because the social bonds that enabled coordination have decayed.

8.2 Gramsci’s Interregnum

Antonio Gramsci, writing from a Fascist prison in the early 1930s, diagnosed a condition that resonates with extraordinary precision in 2026: the interregnum.[28]

‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’[29]

The ‘old’ in 2026 is the post-1945 Western-led order: its institutions (the UN, Bretton Woods, NATO), its norms (non-proliferation, civilian protection, freedom of navigation), and its theoretical frameworks (realism, liberalism, constructivism as developed within Western academies). This order is not yet dead — its institutions persist, its norms are invoked, its theories are taught — but its capacity to organise, regulate, and stabilise the international system has manifestly declined.

The ‘new’ has not yet been born. China proposes alternatives (the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative) but has not constructed a substitute order. The Global South asserts agency but lacks institutional coherence. Iran demonstrates resilience but offers no systemic alternative. The new order is gestating but unformed.

The ‘morbid symptoms’ are visible everywhere: proxy wars, energy weaponisation, institutional paralysis, the return of atavistic territorial logic, the recoding of geopolitical conflicts as eschatological struggles. The 2026 Iran war is, in Gramscian terms, the quintessential morbid symptom of the interregnum.

Gramsci’s diagnosis cuts across the realism–liberalism divide. It is not, strictly speaking, a theory of international relations. It is a theory of historical transition — and that is precisely what is needed. The 2026 crisis is not a puzzle within an existing paradigm. It is evidence that the paradigm itself is in transition.

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  1. China and Civilisational Readiness — A Bennabi Reading

China’s posture in the 2026 conflict defies classification within Western theoretical frameworks. It avoids direct confrontation (contradicting Mearsheimer’s prediction of inevitable great power conflict). It leverages interdependence without stabilising it (inverting Keohane’s expectations). It operates within the existing structure but reshapes it indirectly (exceeding Waltz’s structural constraints).

Malek Bennabi, the Algerian thinker whose work on civilisational dynamics remains underappreciated in Western academies, offers a more illuminating framework.[30] Bennabi’s central concept — colonisabilité — posits that civilisational vulnerability is an internal condition that precedes and enables external domination.[31] Conversely, civilisational readiness — the alignment of ideas, people, and material resources within a coherent social project — is the precondition for effective action in the world.

China’s behaviour in 2026 exhibits the characteristics of Bennabi’s civilisational readiness. Beijing does not seek to dominate the 2026 crisis. It seeks to outlast it.[32] China continues to diversify its energy supply routes, accelerate domestic technological development, strengthen alternative payment systems, and build parallel institutional architectures (BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). It absorbs the shocks of the 2026 conflict — including potential Hormuz disruptions that threaten its oil imports — not by confronting the United States militarily but by constructing the internal conditions for long-term strategic autonomy.[33]

This is power as temporal advantage rather than immediate dominance. It is legibility not through Waltz, Mearsheimer, or Keohane, but through Bennabi: the patient construction of civilisational capacity as the foundation for eventual systemic influence. Where the West escalates and fragments, China builds and waits. Bennabi’s framework — developed in the context of decolonisation, not great power competition — proves unexpectedly apt for describing the most consequential strategic posture of the twenty-first century.

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  1. Toward a New Analytical Framework

The 2026 war demonstrates that the construction of an adequate analytical framework for contemporary geopolitics requires a synthesis that no single existing theory provides. The elements of such a framework, drawn from the analysis above, include:

Systemic interdependence as instability vector. Keohane was right that interdependence is a defining feature of the international system. He was wrong that it produces cooperation. Under conditions of concentrated geographic dependency (chokepoints), interdependence transmits and amplifies disruption. A new framework must theorise interdependence as a dual-valence variable: cooperative under diffuse conditions, destabilising under concentrated ones.

Networked power structures. Classical theories measure power at the state level. Iran’s proxy network demonstrates that power can be exercised through distributed, non-state architectures that resist conventional military degradation. A new framework must incorporate network analysis as a core methodological tool — not as a supplement to state-level analysis but as an alternative mode of strategic organisation.

Chokepoint geopolitics. Geography is not merely a constraint on power projection (Mearsheimer) or a background condition (Waltz). It is an active instrument of strategic leverage. A new framework must place geographic chokepoints — Hormuz, Malacca, Suez, Bab-el-Mandeb — at the centre of systemic analysis, not at its periphery.

Non-linear escalation dynamics. Classical deterrence theory and offensive realism assume rational escalation with predictable consequences. The 2026 war demonstrates that escalation in a networked, interdependent system produces non-linear effects: disproportionate consequences, cascading disruptions, and loss of strategic control by all parties. A new framework must integrate complexity theory and non-linear systems analysis.

Civilisational temporality. Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical model and Bennabi’s concept of civilisational readiness introduce a temporal dimension absent from Western IR theory. Waltz’s structure is essentially static; Mearsheimer’s competition is perpetual; Keohane’s cooperation is ahistorical. A new framework must account for the fact that civilisations operate on different temporal scales — that China’s patience, Iran’s resilience, and America’s urgency reflect not merely different strategies but different civilisational temporalities.

Classical Western theories remain necessary for any serious analysis of international relations. But they are insufficient. The task ahead is not to discard Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Keohane but to embed them within a broader, more pluralistic intellectual architecture that draws on the full range of global analytical traditions — including those systematically excluded from the Western academy.

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  1. Conclusion — The End of Strategic Monopoly

The war against Iran does not signal the collapse of Western power. The United States remains the most formidable military force on earth. Its alliance networks, technological capabilities, and economic weight are undiminished in absolute terms. What the 2026 war signals is something different and, in some respects, more profound: the end of the West’s strategic and theoretical monopoly over the interpretation and organisation of international order.

Waltz explains structure — but not why structure no longer stabilises. Mearsheimer explains the drive for power — but not the loss of control that power produces. Keohane explains cooperation — but not its inversion under conditions of concentrated interdependence. Ibn Khaldun explains the decay of cohesion within materially powerful civilisations. Gramsci names the interregnum in which old orders persist without governing and new orders gestate without being born. Bennabi illuminates the patient construction of civilisational capacity that underlies China’s strategic posture. Fanon and Mbembe remind us that the current order was always, for much of the world, experienced not as liberal governance but as structured domination.[34][35]

The emerging system is structurally constrained, strategically unstable, and theoretically underdefined. It is a system in which power persists but control dissipates, in which institutions endure but do not regulate, and in which the analytical frameworks inherited from the twentieth century illuminate fragments of the whole without comprehending it.

The world is no longer governed by a single paradigm — but by competing logics. The task of the next generation of scholarship is to build a framework adequate to this complexity: one that integrates structural analysis with civilisational temporality, network theory with chokepoint geopolitics, and Western canonical traditions with the intellectual resources of the Global South. This is not an act of intellectual charity. It is a condition of analytical survival.

K.M. Panikkar, writing in 1953, argued that the Vasco da Gama epoch — the period of Western maritime dominance over Asia — had ended, and that its end would compel a fundamental reorientation of world history and world politics.[36] Seven decades later, the intellectual reorientation he called for has barely begun. The 2026 Iran war makes it not merely desirable but unavoidable.

Laala Bechetoula is an Algerian historian, journalist and geopolitical analyst based in Laghouat, Algeria.

5 April 2026

Source: countercurrents.org