By Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan
When Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017, many in New Delhi saw an opportunity.
Trump’s brash personality, transactional diplomacy, and open embrace of populist politics looked compatible with Narendra Modi’s own style. Both men branded themselves as strong nationalists, unafraid of political correctness, and eager to project toughness on the global stage.
The “Howdy Modi” event in Houston in 2019, where Modi endorsed Trump before a massive diaspora crowd, symbolized this apparent closeness. Trump, in turn, visited India in 2020 and was greeted with stadiums full of cheering Indians. On the surface, it seemed like a partnership of equals, rooted in personal chemistry and strategic convergence.
But beneath the optics, the Modi–Trump relationship exposed the deep contradictions in U.S.–India ties. Modi was not a partner who delivered on promises. He used America’s goodwill for his own political and economic gains, but offered little in return. Trump, despite his willingness to court Modi, left the presidency with little to show in terms of real concessions from India. The episode demonstrated, once again, that India is not a reliable friend for America—nor for any other partner.
Overplaying the Friendship
Trump hoped to leverage Modi’s popularity among the Indian-American community to secure electoral dividends. Modi, aware of Trump’s vanity and hunger for public displays of loyalty, overplayed his hand. By offering personal endorsements and extravagant receptions, Modi gave Trump the illusion of a special relationship. But this was nothing more than theater.
On substantive issues, India stood firm on its own narrow interests. Modi secured defense deals, favorable treatment in strategic dialogues, and political support against Pakistan. Yet when it came to American demands, India resisted. Trade concessions? Denied. Strategic alignment against China? Limited. Market access for U.S. goods? Minimal. Trump soon realized that Modi’s promises were more rhetoric than reality.
The Trade Disputes
One of Trump’s central campaign themes was correcting trade imbalances. He repeatedly targeted countries that ran large surpluses with the United States, and India was no exception. In fact, the U.S. trade deficit with India hovered around $25–30 billion annually during Trump’s tenure.
Trump removed India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2019, citing unfair practices. Washington demanded greater access for American agricultural goods, medical devices, and technology firms. India stonewalled. Despite Trump’s repeated attempts to negotiate a trade deal, none was achieved.
Here lay the contradiction: Modi marketed himself as Trump’s close ally, but on the issue most important to Trump—trade fairness—he refused to compromise. Instead, India continued to protect its domestic markets while expanding its exports to the United States. In other words, Modi used Trump’s goodwill without giving anything in return.
Divergence on China
Another sharp difference emerged in strategy toward China. Trump adopted an openly confrontational stance against Beijing—whether on trade wars, technology restrictions, or Indo-Pacific security. He expected India to align more decisively with Washington’s containment agenda.
Modi, however, was cautious. While India clashed militarily with China in Ladakh in 2020, New Delhi still avoided becoming a full American proxy. India maintained trade relations with China and resisted joining any formal military alliance. For Trump, this was frustrating. He had imagined India as a frontline partner against China, but Modi preferred strategic ambiguity, extracting benefits from both sides.
This opportunism revealed India’s true foreign policy approach: to take as much as possible from the United States, but never to commit fully.
Defense Deals: Who Benefited?
Trump often boasted about selling billions of dollars’ worth of American weapons to India. Indeed, U.S. defense companies profited. But the broader question is: who benefited strategically?
India diversified its defense purchases, continuing to buy advanced systems from Russia, including the controversial S-400 missile system, despite American objections. Modi secured American technology without abandoning Moscow. Washington had hoped for India’s loyalty, but got only selective cooperation.
This demonstrated that Modi’s “friendship” with Trump was not rooted in trust or reliability—it was transactional, opportunistic, and always tilted in India’s favor.
Human Rights and Silence
Trump’s administration often turned a blind eye to Modi’s domestic policies—the abrogation of Kashmir’s special status, the crackdown on dissent, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and the rise of Hindu majoritarian politics. Modi counted on Trump’s silence, and he got it.
But what did the U.S. gain in return? Nothing. Modi did not support American initiatives at the United Nations. He did not open India’s markets. He did not take Trump’s side on global disputes. All the U.S. got was Modi’s rhetoric, carefully crafted to stroke Trump’s ego.
This silence damaged America’s image as a defender of democratic values, while strengthening Modi domestically. Once again, Modi used America for his own political survival.
The Illusion of Strategic Convergence
For years, analysts in Washington have spoken of a “natural alliance” between the U.S. and India, based on shared democratic values and common concerns about China. But the Modi–Trump years revealed how shallow this narrative truly is.
India’s democracy is increasingly illiberal. Its foreign policy is not aligned with Washington but with its own short-term gains. India wants American technology, capital, and political cover, but it does not want to shoulder burdens or make sacrifices.
Trump, who prided himself on being a dealmaker, discovered that Modi was a master of over-cleverness. India pocketed the benefits and gave nothing of substance in return.
Lessons for America
From a Pakistani perspective, the Modi–Trump episode carries important lessons for the United States. Washington must realize that India is not a dependable partner. It is an opportunist, constantly shifting positions, and unwilling to act on shared commitments.
If Trump was overplayed by Modi, future American leaders must be more cautious. Instead of granting India privileges and exemptions, the U.S. should demand reciprocity. Instead of ignoring India’s domestic authoritarianism, Washington must acknowledge that Modi’s India is not the democratic beacon it claims to be.
Above all, America must recognize that its core interests in South Asia do not fully align with India’s. While the U.S. seeks global leadership and responsibility-sharing, India seeks self-interest and advantage without accountability.
A Divergence of Interests
The so-called U.S.–India “partnership of the century” is, in reality, a relationship of divergences.
- On trade, India protects its markets while exploiting America’s.
- On defense, India buys selectively and hedges with Russia.
- On China, India avoids full confrontation, preferring strategic ambiguity.
- On values, India drifts toward majoritarianism while using American silence to entrench its agenda.
These contradictions cannot sustain a reliable friendship. Modi’s opportunism may have dazzled Trump for a time, but the reality is clear: India is not a sincere ally.
The Illusion Shattered
Trump wanted to be seen as a peacemaker, a dealmaker, and a global leader. Modi offered him crowds, slogans, and handshakes. But when the dust settled, Trump realized he had been played. America gave much—defense deals, political support, diplomatic cover—while India gave little in return.
For Pakistan, this outcome is not surprising. India has always projected over-cleverness in its dealings, presenting itself as indispensable while contributing little to global stability. The Modi–Trump years are simply another example of India’s opportunistic diplomacy.
As the world reassesses alliances in the era of shifting power, the United States must ask: is India a partner worth trusting, or merely a player exploiting American generosity? The answer, as Trump’s experience shows, leans toward the latter.
Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan, Founding Chair GSRRA, Sinologist, Diplomat, Editor, Analyst, Advisor, Consultant, Researcher at Global South Economic and Trade Cooperation Research Center, and Non-Resident Fellow of CCG. (E-mail: awanzamir@yahoo.com).
21 August 2025
Source: globalresearch.ca