Just International

Infant Freezes to Death in Gaza, Fifth Child to Die in Days Amid Israeli Aid Restrictions

By Quds News Network

Gaza (QNN)- A Palestinian infant has frozen to death in Gaza, becoming the fifth child to die in recent days as Israel continues to restrict the entry of shelter materials and other humanitarian aid despite the harsh winter conditions there and ceasefire.

The Palestinian Health Ministry confirmed on Thursday that one-month-old Saeed Abdeen died from extreme cold amid a severe lack of heating and adequate living conditions.

[https://twitter.com/QudsNen/status/2001557138435440963]

Since a huge storm hit the Palestinian enclave last week and winter set in, at least 20 Palestinians have died from cold exposure and collapsing buildings, including five children (all children from cold), medical sources and local authorities said.

Despite being battered by heavy rainfall and early winter storms for several weeks now, “winterisation supplies” remain “limited” in Gaza, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Ocha) said in its daily report.

Civil Defense Spokesperson Mahmoud Basal said Tuesday that winter rains flooded 90 percent of tents in the war-torn enclave, leaving thousands of families without shelter.

The Civil Defense teams said they received more than 5,000 calls for help from residents since the storms began affecting the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s two-year war has destroyed more than 80 percent of the structures across Gaza, forcing hundreds of thousands of families to take refuge in flimsy tents or overcrowded makeshift shelters.

Now, the humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate as winter deepens amid the Israeli blockade despite the ceasefire which took effect on October 10. With limited access to shelter materials, fuel, and medical care, displaced Palestinians fear that the coming weeks will bring even greater hardship.

This week, the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees UNRWA said the Israeli occupation government has blocked it from bringing aid directly into Gaza.

“People have reportedly died due to the collapse of damaged buildings where families were sheltering. Children have reportedly died from exposure to the cold,” UNRWA said in a social media post on Tuesday.

“This must stop. Aid must be allowed in at scale, now,” adding Palestinians across the territory are “freezing to death”.

Aid groups have called on the international community to press Israel to lift restrictions on aid entering the war-torn Gaza Strip, warning that life-saving operations risk collapse.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, the Humanitarian Country Team, which brings together senior UN officials and more than 200 local and international aid groups, referred to a new registration system for international non-governmental organisations, introduced earlier this year.

Aid groups say the process is “vague, politicised and impossible to meet without breaching humanitarian principles” as dozens of organisations face deregistration by the end of December, followed by the forced closure of their operations within weeks.

18 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

VB–GRAM G Bill Passed — A Dark Day for Workers’ Rights; A rollback of the Right to Work

By Right To Food Campaign

The Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) (VB–GRAM G) Bill, 2025 marks a significant rollback of hard-won statutory guarantees for workers’ rights. The Right to Food Campaign condemns the repealing of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) through this new Act which undermines the right to work of people and all principles of decentralisation, community participation and federalism.

This Bill does not reform employment guarantee; it destroys it.

By repealing the MGNREGA, the government has converted a demand-based legal right to work into a centralised, discretionary, budget-capped scheme, fully controlled by the Union Government. Employment is no longer guaranteed by law but subject to annual allocations, political priorities, and fiscal arbitrariness. This is a betrayal of rural workers, especially women, landless households, Dalits, Adivasis, and migrants who depend on MGNREGA for survival and dignity.

The government’s claim that this new legislation signifies an improvement as it provides 125 days of employment in place of 100 is just an illusion. Under the MGNREGA, on average only about 50 days of work per household has been provided per household – with the entitlements being undermined through delayed payments, low wages, digital exclusions and so on. The VB–GRAM G makes it worse by including state-wise “normative allocations” imposed by the Centre. Any expenditure above these allocations are to be borne entirely by

the state government. With such restrictions, the amount of work provided will only decrease further.

The fiscal burden on state governments will in any case increase with the shift to a 60:40 cost-sharing ratio for wages, which is a shift from the MGNREGA which obliges the Centre to fund the entire wage bill and 75% if the material costs. This changed cost-sharing norms increases the burden on the already fiscally starved state governments and would disproportionately harm poorer states where the capacity to spend is low.

The proposed 60-day blackout period during peak agricultural seasons could further weaken the bargaining power of women and marginalised workers.

The Bill systematically erodes all principles of decentralisation by shifting most decision making powers to the central government. Aligning demand-based rural works schemes with centrally driven schemes like the PM Gati Shakti and National Rural Infrastructure Stack undermines local decision making by the Gram Sabhas and Gram Panchayats. Plan. Increased technocratic control through biometric authentication and digital surveillance ignores overwhelming evidence of exclusions caused by Aadhaar-based payments and digital attendance systems. Corruption will not be eliminated through technology imposed from above, but through transparent, community-led social audits, which this Bill sidelines.

The MGNREGA has been systematically undermined over the last decade through various administrative interventions. A number of reforms were needed towards strengthening the MGNREGA and enabling it to take us towards a true right to work, however the VB-GRAM G by rolling back the MGNREGA is taking us even further away from this ideal. What was required was strengthening the MGNREGA by increasing the wage rate, withdrawing mandatory digital attendance and aadhaar-linked payments, strengthening social audits, empowering local communities and so on. Instead, what we have now is the VB-GRAM G which represents a rollback of hard-won workers’ rights, centralises authority, and leaves the most vulnerable behind.

Right to Food Campaign stands with the NREGA Sangharsh Morcha, trade unions, agricultural workers unions, women’s organisations, and people’s movements across the country in their struggle for the Right to Work.

The VB- GRAM G Bill which repeals MGNREGA and affects millions of workers, was brought to Parliament in total secrecy. In flagrant violation of basic democratic norms & provisions of the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, the government did not make public the proposed legislation and did not hold any public consultations. Further, the tearing hurry with which the bill was railroaded through Parliament prevented any meaningful deliberation and parliamentary scrutiny. A legislation with such grave consequences for the rights of people should have been referred to a parliamentary committee for examination.

We call upon the Hon’ble President of India to withhold assent to this regressive legislation. Instead, MGNREGA must be strengthened as a universal, rights-based, and fully funded employment guarantee law. Any attempt to repeal or dismantle MGNREGA without the consent and participation of workers will be met with united, sustained, and nationwide resistance.

MGNREGA was won by the people — and the people will defend it. Steering Committee of Right to Food Campaign

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

Terrorism & Religious Labels!

By Nilofar Suhrawardy

Whether it is killing/injuring of one person or more, be it in Bondi Beach (Sydney, Australia) or elsewhere, whatever be the ethnic background of victims and/or of suspect criminals, the crime doesn’t stand justified in retaliation of any activity in any part of the world. It is not simply because victims remain innocent of whatever they may have been targeted for. Their murder doesn’t resolve whatever the issue/design/plan the suspects may have considered. Instead, chances of it having the reverse impact seem greater. Ironically, the manner in which these incidents are projected may have the same impact. In addition, perhaps, some consideration also needs to be given to role that reaction to these crimes plays. Give a thought. As soon as religious identity of suspects of killings in Bondi killings became clear, it took little time for them to be linked with extremist Islamist, in other words- “Islamic” terrorism. Around the same time, Brown University in USA was targeted by a suspect Benjamin Erickson. He was not described as a terrorist but as someone suffering from mental illness. Later, he was released from custody and search for alleged “shooter” resumed. Of course, it is a little puzzling as it why was he was viewed as suffering from some mental illness at the time when he was regarded as a suspect. Nothing seems to be said about his “mental illness” when this allegation was dropped.

In case, Benjamin was identified as a Muslim, he would have probably been instantly labelled as a terrorist and may still have been held as a suspect. Soon after Benjamin’s name was dropped, possibility of Brown shooting being linked with Palestine began being floated. What an irony. Without any investigation having been completed, the ease with which certain labels are linked with shooting cases cannot be ignored. There is nothing surprising about this. Nowadays, anti-Semitism and that too because of extremist Islamists appears to be given quite a lot of coverage at various levels, including diplomatic, political and of course media. It is possible, it is linked with, despite the so-called ceasefire, Israel’s war strikes against Palestinians. Undeniably, Israel’s offense against Palestinians does not justify any criminal or terrorist action in any part of the world, which can only be condemned. What demands attention is the alacrity with which with certain sections are instantly labelled as “terrorists” and substantial restraint is exercised in not using the same strategy for others. The division is fairly obvious. Christians, Jews and Whites in general are not described as terrorists, however horrendous their activities may be. But Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Browns and Blacks are usually instantly labelled as “terrorists” even if they remain only suspects and not guilty. Who should be blamed for continuation of such labelling? After all, in the case of Bondi-case, true the religious identity of alleged criminals was Islam, who apparently targeted primarily a Jewish celebration. However, criminals/terrorists do not represent even a percentage of world’s Muslim population. So, why should their religion- Islam be linked with terrorism? But sadly, when it is, it amounts to encouraging more criminals to resort to the same strategy to promote their moves. When leaders/power-holders choose to criticize them on ground of their identity (whether religious, nationality or any other) and sympathize with victims on basis of theirs, it tends to exploitation of “religious” card leading to polarization along communal lines. This does not contribute to decline of terrorism but tends to enhance it, by those criticizing it along religious as well as from the few choosing to justify for religious reasons.

It is strange, but the manner in which religious-cards tend to be used in contrary manners cannot be ignored. This refers to greater importance probably being given to economic worth of those being elevated and/or targeted. The religious identity of majority of oil-rich Arab rulers bears a different meaning diplomatically and of course- economically- for leaders of other countries where Muslims constitute economically weak minority. Where money acts as a magnetic force, religious identity despite being displayed prominently by rulers tends to be refrained from being linked with terrorism by leaders of most non-Muslim countries. And yet, those hailing from the same religion, but with little/no economic power, are easily/instantly linked with terrorism by the same leaders. This stands true in the East, the West and also in countries boasting of secularism, including United States and India.

Now, with respect to incidents being linked with anti-Semitism and Palestine, what does this really suggest? When leaders indulge in such language, it primarily amounts to their promoting/spreading/advertising what they’d prefer greater part of the world to believe in. It also amounts to justifying their war-games. It may be noted, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not take long to indulge in such language after the Bondi-killings. That is apparently is his way of “justifying” Israel’s war-exercises against Palestinians, which also amount to repeated violations of the so-called ceasefire.

The tragedy is the alacrity with which these “justifications” are given importance diplomatically as well as in the media. The saving grace is that nowadays common people have begun giving little importance to such attempts being made to spread and enhance communal polarization, particularly along religious lines. The majority have understood that leaders who have little else to boast about tend to exploit/use/abuse religious-cards in a bid to advertise their own power/strength and win support for their war-games/communal activities. As suggested, sections of people have risen above these moves. This is marked by recent victory of Zohran Mamdani (a Muslim) as Mayor-elect of New York City. In Australia, Ahmed Al-Ahmed, Australian Muslim of Syrian-origin, succeeded in disarming one of the attackers at Bondi Beach. He has been hailed as a hero of heroes by Australians and has also been complimented by several leaders, including US President Donald Trump. What needs to be noted is not just Mamdani’s religion or that of Ahmed but that people voting for the former and those hailing the latter have not let any leaders’ communal polarization decide their moves. But people still have a long way to go in defeating communal leaders spreading terrorism with “religious” labels!

Nilofar Suhrawardy is a senior journalist and writer with specialization in communication studies and nuclear diplomacy. She has come out with several books.

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

US Blockades Venezuela in a War Still Searching for an Official Rationale

By Roger D. Harris

In our Donald-in-Wonderland world, the US is at war with Venezuela while still grasping for a public rationale. The horrific human toll is real – over a 100,000 fatalities from illegal sanctions and over a hundred from more recent “kinetic strikes.” Yet the officially stated justification for the US empire’s escalating offensive remains elusive.

The empire once spun its domination as “democracy promotion.” Accordingly, State Department stenographers such as The Washington Post framed the US-backed coup in Venezuela – which temporarily overthrew President Hugo Chávez – as an attempt to “restore a legitimate democracy.” The ink had barely dried on The New York Timeseditorial of April 13, 2002 – which legitimized that imperial “democratic” restoration – before the Venezuelan people spontaneously rose up and reinstated their elected president.

When the America Firsters captured the White House, Washington’s worn-out excuse of the “responsibility to protect,” so beloved by the Democrats, was banished from the realm along with any pretense of altruism. Not that the hegemon’s actions were ever driven by anything other than self-interest. The differences between the two wings of the imperial bird have always been more rhetorical than substantive.

Confronted by Venezuela’s continued resistance, the new Trump administration retained the policy of regime change but switched the pretext to narcotics interdiction. The Caribbean was cast as a battlefield in a renewed “war on drugs.” Yet with Trump’s pardon of convicted narco-trafficker and former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández – among many other contradictions – the alibi was wearing thin.

Venezuelan oil tankers blockaded

The ever-mercurial US president flipped the narrative on December 16, announcing on Truth Social that the US would blockade Venezuelan oil tankers. He justified this straight up act of war with the striking claim that Venezuela had stolen “our oil, our land, and other assets.”

For the record, Venezuela had nationalized its petroleum industry half a century ago. Foreign companies were compensated.

This presidential social media post followed an earlier one, issued two weeks prior, ordering the airspace above and surrounding Venezuela “closed in its entirety.” The US had also seized an oil tanker departing Venezuela, struck several alleged drug boats, and continued to build up naval forces in the region.

In response to the maritime threat, President Nicolás Maduro ordered the Venezuelan Navy to escort the tankers. The Pentagon was reportedly caught by surprise. China, Mexico, Brazil, BRICS, Turkey, along with international civil society, condemned the escalation. Russia warned the US not to make a “fatal mistake.”

The New York Times reported a “backfire” of nationalist resistance to US aggression among the opposition in Venezuela. Popular demonstrations in support of Venezuela erupted throughout the Americas in Argentina, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and the US.

Trump’s phrasing about Venezuela’s resources is not incidental. It reveals an assumption that precedes and structures the policy itself: that Venezuelan sovereignty is conditional, subordinate to US claims, and revocable whenever it conflicts with Yankee economic or strategic interests. This marks a shift in emphasis, not in substance; drugs have receded from center stage, replaced by oil as the explicit casus belli.

The change is revealing. When Trump speaks of “our” oil and land, he collapses the distinction between corporate access, geopolitical leverage, and national entitlement. Venezuelan resources are no longer considered merely mismanaged or criminally exploited; they are portrayed as property wrongfully withheld from its rightful owner.

The day after his Truth Social post, Trump’s “most pointless prime-time presidential address ever delivered in American history” (in the words ofrightwing blogger Matt Walsh) did not even mention the war on Venezuela. Earlier that same day, however, two House resolutions narrowly failed that would have restrained Trump from continuing strikes on small boats and from exercising war powers without congressional approval.

Speaking against the restraining resolutions, Rep. María Elvira Salazar – the equivalent of Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen and one of the far-right self-described “Crazy Cubans” in Congress – hailed the 1983 Grenada and 1989 Panama invasions as models. She approvingly noted both were perpetrated without congressional authorization and suggested Venezuela should be treated in the same way.

The votes showed that nearly half of Congress is critical – compared to 70% of the general public – but their failure also allows Trump to claim that Congress reviewed his warlike actions and effectively granted him a mandate to continue.

Non-international armed conflict

In this Trumpian Wonderland, a naval blockade with combat troops rappelling from helicopters to seize ships becomes merely a “non-international armed conflict” not involving an actual country. The enemy is not even an actual flesh and blood entity but a tactic – narco-terrorism.

Trump posted: “Venezuelan Regime has been designated a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.” Yet FTOs are non-state actors lacking sovereign immunities conferred by either treaties or UN membership. Such terrorist labels are not descriptive instruments but strategic ones, designed to foreclose alternatives short of war.

In a feat of rhetorical alchemy, the White House designated fentanyl a “weapon of mass destruction.” Trump accused Venezuela of flooding the US with the deadly synthetic narcotic, when his own Drug Enforcement Administration says the source is Mexico. This recalls a previous disastrous regime-change operation in Iraq, also predicated on lies about WMDs.

Like the Cheshire Cat, presidential chief of staff Susie Wiles emerges as the closest to a reliable narrator in a “we’re all mad here” regime. She reportedly said Trump “wants to keep on blowing boats up until Maduro cries uncle,” openly acknowledging that US policy has always been about imperial domination.

The oil is a bonus for the hegemon. But even if Venezuela were resource-poor like Cuba and Nicaragua, it still would be targeted for exercising independent sovereignty.

Seen in that light, Trump’s claim that Venezuela stole “our” oil and land is less an error than a confession. It articulates a worldview in which US power defines legitimacy and resources located elsewhere are treated as imperial property by default. The blockade is not an aberration; it is the logical extension of a twisted belief that sovereignty belongs to whoever is strong enough to seize it. Trump is, in effect, demanding reparations for imperialists for the hardship of living in a world where other countries insist their resources belong to them.

Roger D. Harris is a founding member of the Venezuela Solidarity Network and is active with the Task Force on the Americas and the SanctionsKill Campaign

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

Two months on, ceasefire feels like siege

By Hassan Abo Qamar

Two months after the US-brokered ceasefire-that-is-not-a-ceasefire came into effect, Gaza appears calm – but it is not at peace.

The bombs no longer fall daily, yet some nights are still pierced by airstrikes. In late October, one such bombardment killed at least 104 Palestinians.

In total, since 10 October, when the agreement went into effect, Israel has killed at least 394 people, according to Gaza’s health ministry, while violating the ceasefire agreement over 738 times.

Israel’s military violence is just one side of the coin. Gaza is devastated. Over 80 percent of Gaza’s buildings have been damaged or destroyed, creating what the UN estimates is 61 million tonnes of rubble. Entire neighborhoods have been flattened.

Hospitals, homes and businesses all lie in ruin. Gaza’s education system has been all but erased: more than 95 percent of school buildings and 79 percent of higher education campuses have been damaged or destroyed.

One of the key planks of the October ceasefire agreement was a commitment to rebuild what has been destroyed. Yet, so far there has been no meaningful reconstruction, leaving people to face the winter storms and rains in whatever tents and shelters they currently have.

In practice, the October agreement has merely extended Israel’s siege by other means. Israel maintains full control over Gaza’s crossings – now, as before genocide, its preferred weapon of domination – and thus the delivery of aid, the movement of people and the most basic conditions for survival, including electricity, water, food and medical supplies.

Deepening occupation

This control now extends to Gaza’s internal geography. As per the ceasefire plan, the Israeli military has established effective control over more than half of the Gaza Strip, including much of its remaining agricultural land and the border crossing with Egypt. The so-called “yellow line,” which divides Gaza, is now being presented not merely as a temporary armistice line, but as a “new border,” according to Israel’s military chief, a clear violation of the US plan.

Not a truck nor a convoy moves without the Israeli military’s approval. Aid convoys carrying food or medical supplies must obtain permission. Many convoys are delayed or denied without explanation. And aid deliveries continue to fall far short of the 600 aid trucks daily agreed under the October deal, with the UN estimating that, until 7 December, just 113 trucks have been allowed through on average every day.

As a direct result, prices of basic goods remain painfully high in Gaza’s markets, a situation compounded by the absence of any governing authority to regulate trade, allowing a small number of traders and smugglers to monopolize commercial trucks, restrict supply and inflate prices.

Liquidity restrictions also persist, forcing Gazans to pay cash withdrawal fees of 20 percent, which further drives inflation and erodes the value of money.

Rescue teams in Gaza, meanwhile, suffer shortages of fuel, heavy machinery and specialized equipment whose entry Israel prohibits. This not only prevents any reconstruction efforts, it undercuts attempts to clear rubble, open streets and retrieve bodies buried under destroyed buildings.

The Palestinian Civil Defense estimates that around 9,000 corpses remain buried beneath rubble.

The shortage of fuel and equipment has also worsened displacement. As of mid-October, nearly 800,000 people have returned to their areas, over 650,000 of them to northern Gaza, many to find nothing but total devastation. Entire neighborhoods have been erased, and water pipes, power lines and sewage systems lie unrepairable under rubble that cannot be shifted.

The so-called “reconstruction phase” – supposedly part of the second stage of the US-brokered deal – remains an empty slogan. For most families, “returning home” means pitching tents beside the ruins of their houses.

Healthcare as a weapon

Displacement camps have turned into semi-permanent cities of fabric and dust, and most displaced households still lack reliable access to food and clean water, leaving the displaced at the mercy of the cold and the wet and the diseases these bring.

Gaza’s healthcare sector faces immense challenges after the ceasefire, however, from a lack of medicine and equipment to the inability to treat the wounded and rebuild hospitals and health care centers.

According to the UN after the ceasefire came in, just 34 percent of “health service points” – that is hospitals, clinics, field hospitals, primary health care centers – are still functioning in Gaza.

Gaza’s health sector has received virtually no aid or donations since 10 October, according to Raafat al-Majdalawi, director-general of the Al-Awda Hospital in Jabaliya in the north. He told Al-Jazeera Arabic that everything is needed in Gaza – from medical supplies and generators to beds and sheets and advanced medical equipment.

The World Health Organization reports that around 18,500 patients, including 4,000 children, urgently need medical treatment unavailable inside Gaza. Yet since US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire began, only a handful of medical cases have been allowed to leave. The first medical evacuation, on 22 October, included just 41 patients and 145 companions, though that has since risen to a total of 260 evacuations.

Thousands remain on waiting lists, and many die while waiting for permission to cross. Israel’s control over medical evacuations has effectively turned healthcare into a bargaining chip.

Managed decay

Israel’s strategy since the ceasefire has not been to rebuild Gaza, but to manage its collapse. By controlling what enters and leaves, Israel dictates the pace of Gaza’s decay. It maintains the illusion of progress – a few aid convoys here, a photo opportunity there – while ensuring that no real recovery can take root.

This is not a failure of the ceasefire-that-is-not-a-ceasefire. It is its essence. Gaza’s reconstruction has been framed as a privilege, not a right – tied to political conditions meant to weaken Palestinians and deepen the political divide between Gaza and the West Bank. Each truckload of cement or fuel becomes a tool of negotiation, each travel permit a reminder of dependency.

The result is a warped form of “peace” in which Gaza remains trapped in its own ruins. For Israel, this is a comfortable calm, one that avoids international outrage over its indiscriminate bombing while keeping Palestinians subdued under economic and humanitarian pressure.

For Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, the ceasefire-that-is-not-a-ceasefire has created a situation where he can escalate the situation in Gaza at will, just like in Lebanon.

This may prove useful to Netanyahu if he feels heat from his coalition partners or is threatened by pending corruption charges, for which Trump wants Netanyahu pardoned.

The ceasefire was supposed to mark the end of war. Instead, it has revealed the depth of Gaza’s destruction and the cruelty of a system built to keep it impoverished, dependent and wrecked.

It is a deliberate and cynical policy to keep Gaza broken – suspended in uncertainty, awaiting decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv, completely indifferent to the lives of those who remain trapped inside.

Hassan Abo Qamar is a writer based in Gaza.

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

The Three Narratives: Gaza as the Last Moral Frontier against Israel’s Policy of Annihilation

By Dr. Ramzy Baroud

Three dominant narratives contend for the future of Gaza and occupied Palestine, yet only one is being translated into consequential action: the Israeli narrative of domination and genocide. This singular, violent vision is the only one backed by the brute force of policy and fact.

The first narrative belongs to the Trump administration, largely embraced by the US Western allies. It rests on the self-serving claim that US President Donald Trump personally solved the Middle East crisis, ushering in a peace that has supposedly eluded the region for thousands of years. Figures like Trump, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, and US-Israel Ambassador Mike Huckabee are presented as architects of a new regional order.

This narrative is exclusive, domineering, and US-centric. It was exemplified by Trump himself when he declared the Gaza conflict “over” and presented a “peace plan” that strategically avoided any clear commitment to Palestinian statehood. The entire vision is built on transactional diplomacy and a dismissal of international legal consensus, positioning US approval as the sole measure of legitimacy.

The second narrative is that of the Palestinians, supported by Arab nations and much of the Global South. Here, the goal is Palestinian freedom and rights grounded in international law and humanitarian principles.

This discourse is frequently shaped by statements from top Arab officials. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, for example, asserted last April that the two-state solution is “the only way to achieve security and stability in this region”, adding a warning: “If we disregard international law, (…) this will open the way for the law of the jungle to prevail.” This narrative continues to insist on international law as central to true regional peace.

The third narrative is Israel’s—and it is the only one backed by concrete, aggressive policy. This vision is written through sustained, systematic violence against civilians, aggressive land seizures, deliberate home demolitions, and explicit government declarations that a Palestinian state will never be permitted. Its actors operate with chilling impunity, rapidly creating irreversible facts on the ground. Crucially, the failure to enforce accountability for this pervasive violence is the primary reason Israel has been able to sustain its devastating genocide in Gaza for two full years.

This narrative is not theoretical; it is articulated through the chilling acts and legislative pushes of the highest-ranking government officials.

On December 8, Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir appeared in a Knesset session wearing a noose-shaped pin while pushing for a death penalty bill targeting Palestinian prisoners. The minister stated openly that the noose was “just one of the options” through which they would implement the death penalty, listing “the option of hanging, the electric chair, and (…) lethal injection”.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, meanwhile, announced an allocation of $843 million to expand illegal settlements over the next five years, a massive step toward formal annexation. This unprecedented funding is specifically earmarked to relocate military bases, establish absorption clusters of mobile homes, and create a dedicated land registry to formalize Israeli governmental control over the occupied Palestinian territory.

This policy of territorial expansion is cemented by the ideological head of government, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself made it clear that “There will not be a Palestinian state. It’s very simple: it will not be established,” calling its potential creation “an existential threat to Israel.” This unequivocal rejection confirms that the official Israeli government strategy is outright territorial expansion and the permanent denial of Palestinian self-determination.

None of these Israeli officials shows the slightest interest in Trump’s “peace plan” or in the Palestinian vision of statehood. Netanyahu’s core objective is ensuring that international law is never implemented, that no semblance of Palestinian sovereignty is established, and that Israel can contravene the law at a time and manner of its choosing.

The fact is, these narratives cannot continue to coexist. Only real accountability — through political, legal, and economic pressure — can halt Israel’s advance toward continuing its genocidal campaign, destruction, and punitive legislation. This must include the swift imposition of sanctions on Israel and its top officials, comprehensive arms embargoes against Tel Aviv to end ongoing wars, and full accountability at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ).

As long as the pro-Palestine narrative lacks the tools to enforce its principles, Israel and its Western backers will see no reason to alter course. States must replace symbolic gestures and prioritize aggressive, proactive accountability measures. This means moving beyond simple verbal condemnation and applying concrete legal and economic pressure.

Israel is now more isolated than ever, with public opinion rapidly collapsing globally. This isolation must be leveraged by pro-Palestine forces through coordinated, decisive diplomatic action, pushing for a unified global front that demands the enforcement of international law and holding Israel and its many war criminals accountable for their ongoing crimes.

A lasting peace can only be built on the foundation of justice, not on the military reality established by an aggressor that does not hesitate to employ genocide in the service of its political designs. This is the undeniable moral frontier: confronting and dismantling the impunity that allows a state to pursue extermination as a political tool.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. 

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

Israel Bombs Wedding in Gaza School, Killing at Least Five Displaced Civilians

By Quds News Network

Gaza (QNN)- Five displaced civilians, including children, were killed in an Israeli strike on a school sheltering displaced people in the Tuffah neighborhood, east of Gaza City, on Friday. The school lies within the yellow line and is not under Israeli military control.

The attack occurred during a wedding celebration for two displaced residents. The joyous event quickly turned into a scene of bloodshed. Pictures and video footage show that bodies were severely mutilated in the Israeli brutal attack.

The Israeli military shelled the school and prevented medics from reaching the site. Civil defense teams, after coordinating with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), recovered five of the dead and injured from inside the school. Survivors were rushed to available hospitals for treatment.

[https://twitter.com/QudsNen/status/2002113683183558699]

The Civil Defense condemned the brutal attack, stating that it violates international humanitarian law. They called on the international community and UN agencies to act immediately to protect civilians and safeguard shelters and humanitarian teams.

The strike comes as part of ongoing Israeli assaults across the Gaza Strip. On Thursday, Israeli forces targeted a woman inspecting her home in eastern Khan Younis. Four young men who tried to help her were killed, and their bodies remain on the streets.

According to sources in Gaza hospitals, since the ceasefire took effect in October, Israeli violations of Trump’s ceasefire have killed over 400 Palestinians.

20 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

Chile: Pinochetism Returns to Power 

By Atilio A. Borón

José A. Kast’s resounding victory in the runoff election is bound to have a profound influence on Chile. A solid, neo-fascist, extreme right-wing force consolidated as a result of the convergence of two radical variants of Pinochetism —one led by Kast and the other, even more extreme, by Johannes Kaiser— to which rushed to join the standard-bearer of a political fiction called the “democratic right,” embodied by the former mayor of Providencia, Evelyn Matthei, the supposed heir to Sebastián Piñera’s legacy.

According to Chilean political analyst Jaime Lorca, compulsory voting—previously optional in Chile—channeled social discontent with Gabriel Boric’s government toward Pinochetism and its allies. Keep in mind that Boric’s approval ratings in the second half of his term hovered around a meager 30 percent. Issues such as insecurity, hatred of immigrants Trump style (especially Venezuelans), and inflation —close to 4 percent annually— were stirred up demagogically by Kast, a man as careless with figures and statistics as Javier Milei.

In an attempt to convince voters of the catastrophic dimensions of insecurity, he went so far as to say in his debate with the ruling coalition candidate Jeannete Jara that in Chile “1.200.000 people are murdered every year.” When he realized his mistake, he spoke then of 1.2 billion people murdered in Chile, whose total population is 19 million. The actual figure for 2024 was 1,207 homicides, a rate of 6.0 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants, a figure comparable to that of the United States and slightly higher than that of Argentina.

Despite this, the mainstream media on both sides of the Andes exaggerate insecurity in order to use fear to attract votes to the fascist parties and organizations in both countries. In any case, blunders of this kind were common in Kast’s campaign but, as in Argentina, also in Chile there is a large sector of the electorate that votes because it is an obligation. This is a public which is not interested in politics at all and is not bothered by the nonsense that a candidate may utter. Issues such as those we are analyzing account for the surprising number of votes obtained in the first electoral round by the People’s Party, led by Franco Parisi, which scraped together 20 percent of the votes and was just four percentage points behind Kast. A large part of this electoral turnout —85 percent of the registered voters— made up mainly of new voters who go to the polls because voting is compulsory, is deeply influenced by the ideology of anti-politics, hyper-individualism, and contempt for anything that smacks of collective action, and in the runoff they leaned in favor of Kast. Some, perhaps, threw aside the deep-rooted anti-communism that prevails in Chile and supported Jara’s candidacy, but not to the extent necessary to prevent a catastrophic defeat.

What can we expect from a government headed by a fascist like Kast? Brutal cuts in social spending, a re-evaluation of the progress made in relation to women’s rights, and a redefinition of Chile’s international alliances. He will surely attempt to deepen the economic model developed during the Pinochet dictatorship, the foundations of which remained untouched by Chile’s long and unfinished democratic transition. Unfinished because the power relations and concentration of wealth that emerged after the fateful September 11, 1973, far from being reversed by the exercise of democracy, were consolidated and reinforced by successive governing coalitions. But in the context of the new US National Security Doctrine, Kast will be pressured by Washington to undertake the arduous task of cooling his country’s warm relations with China. But the Asiatic giant is Chile’s largest trading partner and the one with which a key Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2005.

On the other hand, the composition of the Chilean parliament could be a significant obstacle able to curb Kast’s foreseeable excesses. The Senate is divided equally, in two halves and it would be extremely difficult for Kast to obtain the 4/7 of the votes (57 percent) needed to reform the Constitution in the Chamber of Deputies. In any case, the formation of a government of this type represents an enormous challenge for the ruling -and almost defunct- Frente Amplio (Broad Front) and the extremely heterogenous progressive camp in general. As in Argentina after Milei’s victory, these forces face a fundamental challenge: redefining a global project for the country, devising a new narrative, designing a concrete agenda for government, revitalizing grassroots organizations, mobilizing their members, and resolving the always thorny issue of political direction and leadership.

These are urgent tasks that cannot be postponed, because any delay will result in the creation of a set of historical and structural conditions for the relaunch of a long-lasting neo-fascist political cycle that will cause serious harm to our peoples. Yet, it would be a crucial mistake to give in to pessimism and believe that yesterday’s defeat is definitive. However, such a resounding setback requires an effort of self-criticism that, among other things, realizes that the formula of “light progressivism” that invite our peoples to politically advance along an illusory “wide middle avenue” equidistant from the left and right only serve to produce further frustrations and throw open the doors of the democratic state to the advent of the extreme right or colonial neo-fascism. In times as immoderate as these, marked by a profound capitalist crisis and the imperialist offensive and the brutal Trump Corollary hanging over the heads of our peoples, moderation, far from being a virtue, becomes an unforgivable vice.

Atilio A. Borón is an Argentine sociologist, political scientist, professor, and writer. PhD in Political Science from Harvard University.

17 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

In step toward war, Trump orders “a total and complete blockade” of Venezuelan oil

By Andre Damon

US President Donald Trump announced Tuesday evening that he is ordering “a total and complete blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers going into, and out of, Venezuela.” This is an act of war aimed at devastating the Venezuelan economy and overthrowing the government of President Nicolás Maduro.

Trump’s blockade and the series of murders American imperialism has carried out on the high seas off the coast of Venezuela are part of a campaign aimed at subjugating Venezuela, and all of Latin America, to colonial slavery in order to seize their energy and mineral resources.

In his statement on Truth Social, Trump declared: “Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest Armada ever assembled in the History of South America. It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before.”

Trump demanded that Venezuela “return to the United States of America all of the Oil, Land, and other Assets that they previously stole from us.” He wrote that he had designated the Venezuelan government a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.”

Trump’s statement dispenses with his earlier pretense that the US military campaign is aimed at combating drug trafficking. Trump is openly demanding that Venezuela hand over its oil and “land” to the United States in an act of colonial plunder.

The United States has no claim to any Venezuelan territory or resources. Trump’s claim that Venezuela “stole” US assets is a fraud: The country has stolen nothing from the United States. Trump acts as a gangster running a protection racket, but he speaks on behalf of a criminal oligarchy that believes that it can steal anything by force.

The administration also announced Tuesday that Trump will deliver a national address Wednesday evening, though there was no indication as to the specific content of his planned remarks.

Trump’s blockade announcement follows a week of escalating threats. In an interview with Politico last Tuesday, Trump declared that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s “days are numbered.” On Friday, Trump announced that US ground attacks in the Caribbean would begin “pretty soon.”

In an interview with Vanity Fair published earlier Tuesday, White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles made clear that the Trump administration’s attacks on boats off the coast of Venezuela, far from being an effort to stop the flow of drugs, aim to facilitate regime change. “He wants to keep on blowing boats up until Maduro cries uncle,” Wiles said. “And people way smarter than me on that say that he will.”

Trump’s political allies are openly calling for regime change. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina said Tuesday: “If he’s still standing when this is over, this is a fatal, major mistake to our standing in the world. If, after all this, Maduro is still in power, that’s the worst possible signal you can send to Russia, China, Iran.”

The blockade announced by Trump would cut off Venezuela’s primary source of revenue. The US hopes that such a blockade would devastate Venezuela’s economy, which depends on overseas oil sales, primarily to China. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves—more than 300 billion barrels.

The Pentagon has deployed more than 15,000 troops, a dozen warships including the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, F-35 stealth fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets to the region—the largest US military mobilization in the Caribbean since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The administration has already established a de facto blockade of Venezuela: US forces seized a Venezuelan oil tanker last week and have killed at least 95 people in 25 separate strikes on boats since early September.

The US economic strangulation of Venezuela is already taking effect. Following the seizure of the oil tanker last week, an armada of four supertankers originally headed for Venezuela reversed course. Venezuela’s supply of dollars—almost all tied to crude sales—has fallen 30 percent in the first 10 months of 2025. Annual inflation is expected to top 400 percent by year’s end.

Trump’s threats against Venezuela are part of a broader strategy outlined in the his administration’s National Security Strategy, released last month. The document proclaims a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the United States will “deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to … own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” The strategy identifies Latin America’s “strategic resources”—including oil and critical minerals—as targets for “acquisition and investment opportunities for American companies.”

The Democratic Party has refused to oppose the administration’s war preparations. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, asked last week whether he opposes regime change in Venezuela, replied: “You know, obviously, if Maduro would just flee on his own, everyone would like that.”

Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, appeared on ABC’s This Week on Sunday. When host Martha Raddatz asked Warner whether he agreed with Trump’s “effort to oust the dictator” Maduro, Warner replied: “I agree that the Venezuelan people want Maduro gone.”

Trump’s announcement Tuesday came hours after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth refused to release video footage of the September 2 missile strike in the Caribbean that killed two people clinging to the wreckage of a destroyed boat.

“In keeping with long-standing Department of Defense policy, of course we’re not going to release a top-secret, full, unedited video of that to the general public,” Hegseth told reporters after delivering a classified briefing to senators.

Since early September, US forces have killed at least 95 people in 25 separate strikes on boats the administration claims are smuggling drugs. On Monday alone, the military announced it had struck three more vessels in the Eastern Pacific, killing eight people.

The September 2 strike consisted of four separate attacks on a single vessel. The first strike killed nine people on board. As the smoke cleared, two survivors could be seen clinging to the hull of the capsized boat. A second strike killed both survivors. The third and fourth strikes sank the vessel.

After the meeting, Schumer did not call for the video to be released to the public, only for senators to view it in a classified setting. Last week, the Democratic congressional leadership joined with Republicans to pass the largest military budget in US history—over $1 trillion when combined with supplemental funding.

17 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

Provisional Bondi Truths: Containment, Power, and the Struggle to Name Palestine on Wikipedia

By Rima Najjar

Introduction: Why Naming Never Ends

The reasons why disputes on Israel/Palestine on Wikipedia don’t end are the same reasons the conflict itself endures without closure. You cannot pin the meaning down for long. As soon as language sharpens or clarity emerges, a procedural mechanism intervenes to pull it back into a more tightly constrained frame. Instead of a resolution, the result is managed equilibrium — a pause that holds only until the next event, the next challenge, the next naming war.

Before the Bondi-naming war that is currently raging on Wikipedia, there were the high-profile naming wars — “Israel–Hamas war” vs “Gaza war,” “massacre” vs “battle,” “ethnic cleansing” labels, “hostage-taking” vs “capture,” “settler violence” vs “clashes,” “apartheid” vs “system of differential treatment.”

In each case, the lead wording was rewritten repeatedly, not because editors discovered new facts but because the meaning of events was being renegotiated in real time. The current phrasing for each is ever changing, depending on ongoing judgments about intent, motive, and broader social context.

Rather than resolving disagreements, Wikipedia manages the Israel/Palestine conflict by constricting the boundaries of permissible speech.

The Bondi Naming War and the Problem of Fixing Meaning

Consider the Bondi Beach case — the December 14, 2025 shooting at a Hanukkah celebration on Sydney’s shoreline. Within 48 hours, the page stabilized with “terrorist mass shooting” in the lead, “mass shooting” as type, and “antisemitism inspired by ISIS/Islamic State, which Wikipedia later reframed as ‘Islamic Statism,’ as motive”— terms drawn directly from police and government statements. Each of these terms has its own talk-page subsection, its own archive of objections, and its own history of reversion.

A move request to remove the year from the title — an early attempt to canonize the event’s name — has already been initiated by an editor, though such stabilization rarely succeeds while facts remain fluid.

The page has already undergone several partial rewrites as editors attempt to align wording with breaking news, police briefings, emerging evidence, and public interpretations of radicalization. Right now, in the naming of the Bondi Beach shooting, Wikipedia is not only debating “shooting vs attack”; it is also debating what constitutes premature assertion (“motive,” “labels,” “names”), what crosses the threshold into loaded language for an encyclopedia lead (“assassins” vs “shooters” vs “gunmen”), and what degree of contextualization fits within Wikipedia’s strict rules governing lead sections.

The page lends itself to an examination in real time of how, in moments treated as threats, Wikipedia sharply limits what else may be said, when, and by whom.

In this case, even clearly attributed discussion of how the attack was used by politicians or security actors to justify tighter policing or speech controls was treated as premature.

Comparisons to earlier attacks or to well-established research on how such violence is framed were reverted as “editorial,” despite being routine once events are no longer live.

Brief, sourced background on radicalization pathways or transnational jihadist symbolism was excluded unless it came directly from official security voices.

Editors also avoided language that separated antisemitic violence from the political agendas attached to it, effectively collapsing the two.

Finally, early references to the effects such attacks have on Palestinian advocacy, Muslim communities, or protest policing were dismissed as speculative, even though similar patterns are well documented after comparable events.

This dynamic reflects a long-standing governance logic on Wikipedia, most visible in Israel/Palestine coverage, where politically charged topics are managed through timing, attribution, and deferral — determining not only what may be stated, but when claims become speakable and whose framing is allowed to appear as neutral knowledge.

How the Bondi Beach Incident Is Being Labeled — Media vs Wikipedia

The dynamics visible in the Bondi editing dispute are a condensed expression of how Wikipedia has long governed Israel/Palestine as a permanently “contentious topic.”

In the mainstream English-language press, the narrative solidified almost immediately: government briefings and police statements framed the event as a “terrorist attack,” an “antisemitic attack on a Hanukkah celebration,” a “mass shooting,” and, within hours, potentially “ISIS-inspired.”

Most outlets adopted this vocabulary, some hedging briefly as details about the gunmen’s backgrounds emerged, others moving quickly to definitive language once political leaders signaled the preferred frame.

On Wikipedia, the process unfolded differently but with a recognizably patterned logic. From the moment the page appeared, editors debated which elements of the media framing could enter the lead without triggering policy challenges, and which required attribution, delay, or exclusion— whether “ISIS-inspired” met sourcing thresholds or should be softened to “radicalized,” whether antisemitism could be stated as motive in Wikipedia’s voice, how to prioritize competing descriptors, and whether information about Islamophobia, policing justified by a security frame, or actors reshaping the issue to function as political leverage belonged in the opening paragraph.

Even the handling of circulating misinformation prompted disagreement over whether a dedicated subsection was necessary or premature.

What is emerging is not consensus but early containment. This is how it happens:

Official statements are elevated to anchor the framing; structural or contextual analysis is pushed downward; contested interpretations are withheld pending “further verification.” The lead language contracts to what carries the least procedural risk, even when that narrowing strips the event of the structural context that gives it meaning.

The ‘structural context’ deferred in the Bondi case includes the securitization of Muslim communities in Western states, the global instrumentalization of the Israel-Palestine conflict in domestic politics, and the longstanding alignment between counter-terrorism frameworks and specific geopolitical stances — all of which are excluded as ‘undue’ or ‘non-encyclopedic’ to preserve the contained, event-focused frame.

The Bondi page has thus entered the same long-running pattern visible across Israel/Palestine topics: fixation on state-issued terminology, hesitancy around naming deeper dynamics, and progressive tightening of the narrative frame until only those formulations that are procedurally defensible, politically low-risk, and aligned with the narrowest interpretation of Wikipedia policy survive the containment cycle.

It is the encyclopedia’s version of crisis management — stabilizing the surface while deferring everything that might disturb it.

My Own Earlier Encounter

I first saw this machinery at work years ago in a much smaller episode that nevertheless revealed the structure with unusual clarity. On the Wikipedia Quora page, a brief mention of my lawsuit against Quora — filed after my account was banned for posting Palestine-related content — was added to the page.

It lasted only weeks. Editors challenged not the fact of the lawsuit but the legitimacy of acknowledging it: whether it was “notable,” whether sources were “independent enough,” whether its inclusion created “undue emphasis.”

The reference was removed because the platform’s conventions obscure, rather than acknowledge, politically sensitive forms of censorship.

Wikipedia had no procedural space for harms that lacked institutional validation, and censure undertaken by a private corporation — especially one targeting Palestinian speech — fell easily into the category of what could be made to disappear.

Variations of this pattern appear everywhere. When major human rights organizations began issuing detailed reports classifying Israeli rule as apartheid, editors did not contest the evidence; they contested whether the findings were authoritative enough to appear in Wikipedia’s voice.

The reports were pushed into attributed form, prevented from anchoring lead sections, and effectively quarantined from the narrative structure of the main conflict pages. The facts could survive, but their meaning could not.

The same dynamic governs attempts to document digital censorship. Numerous reports by digital rights organizations — and even UN Special Rapporteurs — have tracked the systematic removal of Palestinian content by Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, especially during periods of heightened violence.

These findings struggle for stable placement on Wikipedia because they lack the kind of state-backed institutional framing the platform privileges.

The documentation is credible, the pattern clear, yet the harms remain narratively fragile: acknowledged only on the margins, never permitted to redefine the main account.

A similar narrowing occurs in pages addressing the suppression of protest. The mass arrests of Palestinian citizens of Israel during the 2021 Unity Intifada were widely reported, litigated, and investigated by Israeli and international NGOs.

Yet integration of this episode into the main conflict timeline was repeatedly pared back, shifted to footnotes, or rendered as attributed claims rather than encyclopedic statements. Again, the events were not disproven; they were structurally minimized.

All of this clarifies something essential. Wikipedia’s governance does more than referee disputes. It determines which harms are granted public standing, which may be acknowledged only through attribution, and which dissolve into procedural silence.

The issue on the Wikipidia Quora page was the realization that the encyclopedia’s sourcing hierarchy, notability rules, and deference to institutional authority operate as filters that decide which experiences of repression enter the global record and which remain invisible.

Wikipedia does not merely adjudicate truth claims; it organizes visibility. And in the terrain of Israel/Palestine, that organizational power defines the boundary between what the world is permitted to recognize and what it is trained, systematically, to overlook.

Wikipedia’s Governance Structure and the Logic of Containment

In practice, such Wikipedia governance means an expanded toolkit of control: extended-confirmed protection (limiting edits to veteran accounts), one-revert-per-day rules, discretionary sanctions, topic bans, and arbitration enforcement that can be triggered without a new community vote.

These measures are presented as neutral conflict management, but they function asymmetrically. They privilege editors already embedded in the system, fluent in policy, and disciplined in the rhetorical norms of “neutrality,” while disadvantaging those attempting to introduce language that reflects legal findings, lived experience, or emergent realities.

Crucially, these mechanisms do not decide who is right. They decide what can safely be said. As a result, outcomes are rarely final. They are stabilized pauses — language frozen at the least disruptive point — until the next event forces renegotiation.

This is why debates over terms like occupation, apartheid, settler colonialism, and genocide never truly end on Wikipedia. They cycle, reappear, and are re-policed under the same procedural logic.

Wikipedia often treats stability as if it were consensus. Stability reflects the moment at which procedural tools have halted further change, while consensus requires a shared judgment about meaning.

In contentious topic areas, the two rarely align, yet the platform’s governance treats the former as evidence of the latter.

The outcome is almost always provisional: a temporary equilibrium enforced by procedure rather than persuasion.

High-Profile Naming Wars on Palestine/Israel and Their Provisional Outcomes

This logic of containment is evident in the major naming disputes that have shaped Israel/Palestine coverage on Wikipedia over the past two decades. These rarely achieve resolution based on evidence or scholarly consensus; instead, they reach managed pauses that favor narrower, less structural framings.

Key examples include:

War title: The ongoing conflict remains titled “Israel–Hamas war” on Wikipedia — a designation repeatedly contested since October 2023. Alternatives such as “Gaza war,” “2023–25 Gaza war,” “Gaza genocide,” and similar formulations have been proposed by editors seeking to reflect scope, geography, or legal findings. These proposals have triggered extended debates but have not succeeded in moving the title. As with earlier naming disputes, the current title persists not because it captures scholarly or legal consensus, but because it represents the least procedurally risky option: a framing anchored in state and media terminology that sidesteps structural language and avoids acknowledging broader patterns of violence.
Genocide and apartheid: Both terms are largely confined to attributed claims or separate spin-off articles (e.g., “Gaza genocide”), despite reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, B’Tselem, and ICJ advisory opinions on illegal occupation and discrimination. Direct use in Wikipedia’s voice on main conflict pages remains restricted.
Occupation, settler colonialism, and Nakba: “Occupation” is continuously challenged or hedged; “settler colonialism” is treated as a viewpoint rather than a scholarly framework; the Nakba is acknowledged on its dedicated page but partitioned from central narratives, avoiding discussion of intent in the main 1948 war article.
Terrorism and violence descriptors: “Terrorism” is applied readily to Palestinian actions but tightly regulated for Israeli state or settler violence, creating narrative asymmetry defended as neutrality.
Specific events: Incidents like Deir Yassin, Tantura, Jenin (2002), or the Great March of Return cycle between “massacre,” “battle,” “operation,” or “incident,” with stronger terms permitted only where supported by Israeli acknowledgment or heavy attribution.
This pattern — early anchoring of official terminology, deferral of structural context, and stabilization at the least disruptive point — repeats across terms like “blockade,” “collective punishment,” “ethnic cleansing,” or settlement expansion. The Bondi Beach incident follows suit, rapidly incorporating state-framed labels while marginalizing deeper dynamics.

The pattern reveals a burden of proof inversion. Palestinian harms must be repeatedly attributed, qualified, or framed as claims awaiting verification, while Israeli state or settler violence is treated as uncertain until disproven.

The procedural language of caution becomes a gatekeeper regulating which experiences receive immediate legitimacy.

Wikipedia as a Managed Battlefield: The Institutionalization of Hasbara

Against this backdrop, it would be naïve to treat Wikipedia as a neutral arena merely struggling with polarization. For well over a decade, Wikipedia has been a recognized site of organized hasbara.

Israeli government bodies and aligned organizations have openly acknowledged recruiting, training, and coordinating editors to “correct” content, monitor pages, and enforce a Zionist narrative under the banner of neutrality and balance.

In 2010, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the “Wikipedia Academy,” explicitly aimed at training volunteers to influence Israel-related pages. By 2013, the Israeli government was openly funding programs through the National Union of Israeli Students to compensate volunteers for “editing Wikipedia articles to improve Israel’s image.” NGO-linked projects — such as StandWithUs’s Digital Diplomacy initiative, the Hasbara Fellowships, and the Yesha Council’s media training programs — identified Wikipedia as a strategic arena. These efforts were neither marginal nor clandestine. They were presented domestically as a vital front in the information struggle.

When I taught at al-Quds University, students there and at Birzit University circulated calls for Wikipedia engagement, recognizing it as a key battleground for global narrative authority. They understood that Wikipedia was the default reference for journalists, policymakers, educators, and algorithmic systems. Losing ground there meant ceding narrative power at global scale.

What distinguishes the Israeli case is not participation per se — many states attempt to influence representation — but the degree of institutionalization. Hasbara on Wikipedia has been systematic, multilingual, policy-literate, and patient. It works less by inserting overt propaganda than by mastering procedural leverage: invoking undue weight, demanding attribution, challenging source reliability, reverting early, and exhausting challengers through process.

These dynamics echo a broader scholarly understanding of platform governance. Work by Tarleton Gillespie, Nicolas Suzor, and Nathaniel Tkacz has shown how moderation systems, sourcing hierarchies, and procedural norms shape what becomes publicly knowable. Wikipedia’s own history reinforces this.

Between 2015 and 2024, the platform faced repeated controversies over state-aligned editing campaigns — from Turkey and China to Saudi Arabia — each exposing how political actors exploit procedural gaps. Even the Wikimedia Foundation’s 2022 report on coordinated disinformation highlighted the platform’s structural vulnerability to organized influence. The Bondi Beach dispute sits squarely within this lineage.

Over time, this produces what academics call discursive gravity: a center of acceptable language around which all else must orbit. On pages dealing with Gaza, occupation, or Palestinian political structures, this gravity shows up as tight policing of terminology; rigid demands for “secondary academic consensus” even when international legal bodies have reached clear conclusions; and near-automatic suspicion toward Palestinian testimony, civil society reporting, or human rights documentation unless echoed by state actors.

Seen in this light, the Bondi Beach naming dispute is a window into how meaning is managed when violence intersects with power.

Wikipedia manufactures stability under pressure. And when the subject is Israel/Palestine, that stability has long tilted toward a narrative that treats Israeli state violence as complex, contested, or debatable — while casting Palestinian resistance, protest, or naming itself as inherently suspect.

Each provisional settlement instructs editors — and readers — on the limits of permissible truth: which claims may be stated plainly, which must be softened, and which will be deferred indefinitely — echoing the Oslo framework, where Palestinian statehood was always acknowledged in principle, hedged in practice, and deferred in implementation.

The cumulative effect is a system that controls what counts as knowledge, regulating not only what can be said, but when, how forcefully, and under what constraints. Wikipedia’s procedural culture — deferential to narrowly defined “reliable sources,” wary of structural naming, cautious about motive and intent, committed to symmetrical framing in asymmetrical situations — becomes a way of controlling how violence can be narrated.

When Israeli state actions are under scrutiny, Wikipedia’s norms of caution and attribution activate fully. When Palestinian actions or movements are under scrutiny, those same safeguards often relax, permitting early classification and direct importation of police or governmental language.

This is the predictable behavior of an editing environment structured around procedural asymmetry.

Bondi Beach has simply made this visible again. Because the event touched anxieties deeply embedded in Western political culture — antisemitism, Muslim radicalization, communal vulnerability — editors moved quickly to codify the safest interpretive frame.

The rapid consolidation of “terrorist attack” was unsurprising. Nor were the swift reversions of attempts to contextualize the perpetrators’ background, their possible grievances, or the political uses of the event for political threat policing.

Wikipedia followed its established pattern: settling early on the formulation with the least political risk, anchoring it in official statements, and relocating structural context to sections future editors can prune or dilute. This is how containment works.

And like every containment, much as the Trump ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan seeks to manage Palestinians through permanent deferral rather than resolution, it will hold only until it no longer can.

As more information emerges — about the perpetrators’ affiliations, motives, networks, or the political uses of the event — editors will revisit the lead, argue, revert, invoke policy, and eventually stabilize a new, equally provisional formulation.

CONCLUSION: How Containment Becomes Knowledge

The Bondi Beach shooting — rapidly framed on Wikipedia as a “terrorist mass shooting” with “antisemitism inspired by Islamic Statism” as motive — exemplifies a deeper structural pattern in Israel/Palestine coverage. Within days of the December 14, 2025, attack, the page stabilized around official Australian and police terminology, while broader contextualization remains marginal or contested.

Wikipedia’s policies, intended to manage volatility, function in this contentious topic area as a regulatory mechanism: deferring structural terms (“genocide,” “apartheid,” “settler colonialism”), demanding exhaustive attribution even amid scholarly or legal consensus, and privileging state-sourced framing. The result is a controlled limit on what can be understood— provisional formulations that endure procedural challenge rather than reflect evidential clarity.

This architecture produces asymmetry: Israeli state actions often receive hedged, contested treatment, while Palestinian actions or related events (like Bondi) see swift classification. Reinforced by extended-confirmed protections, revert limits, and recent arbitration measures (including recent ArbCom topic bans affecting pro-Palestinian editors), the system rewards sticking it out over saying something meaningful.

Consequently, Wikipedia does not merely document the Israel/Palestine conflict; it reproduces it at global scale — through search engines, education, and journalism — by stabilizing narratives that postpone naming power imbalances.

The Bondi Beach naming war, like its predecessors, reminds us that the struggle over Palestine persists not only in territory or courts, but in the digital infrastructures that shape what the world is permitted to know and name as true.

Rima Najjar is a Palestinian whose father’s side of the family comes from the forcibly depopulated village of Lifta on the western outskirts of Jerusalem and whose mother’s side of the family is from Ijzim, south of Haifa.

17 December 2025

Source: countercurrents.org