Just International

Iran war: Trump can continue the same failed policies – or shape a historic legacy

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Bombing and sanctions have not worked. The US president must seize this moment to establish a comprehensive regional security framework

In recent days, several high-level regional diplomatic initiatives have signalled an effort to revive US-Iran negotiations.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, travelled to Tehran last month, followed by the foreign ministers of Oman and Qatar, each seeking to preserve the Islamabad memorandum of understanding signed by US President Donald Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, in June.

According to Iranian officials, Tehran delivered a consistent message to all three mediators: Washington should return to the Islamabad memorandum and work towards ending the wars across all regional fronts as the basis for renewed negotiations.

Yet while Iran and Oman have reached an agreement to open a temporary new shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington rejected Tehran’s proposal to return to the Islamabad agreement, and resumed military escalation by striking rocket launchers on Larak Island.

Iran responded with missile attacks on US bases in Jordan, reinforcing the cycle of confrontation, and signalling that the US remains more committed to coercion than diplomacy.

Eight years ago, Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, widely regarded as former President Barack Obama’s signature diplomatic legacy. But the Islamabad memorandum is Trump’s own diplomatic legacy.

If Washington is now prepared to walk away from an agreement that bears the signature of its own president, it sends a far broader message: the US is no longer merely abandoning the legacy of previous administrations – it is also abandoning its own. That is a strong indication that Washington has reached the end of its Iran playbook.

Conflicting calculations

Trump’s decision to launch “Economic D-Day” against Iran thus marks a final, decisive economic offensive, which aims to achieve through financial coercion what diplomacy, sanctions, covert action and military force have all failed to accomplish.

The current impasse is sustained not only by conflicting interests, but also by conflicting strategic calculations.

Washington appears to believe that, after several rounds of military confrontation and the extensive damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear, missile, military and economic infrastructure, the imposition of the most comprehensive financial and commercial embargo in the history of US-Iran relations will ultimately compel Tehran to accept American terms.

This assumption was reflected in recent remarks by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who declared: “We are going to collapse this regime. It is time for our allies and the rest of the world to make a decision. You are either with us or against us.”

Tehran’s strategic assessment is markedly different. Based on an analysis I recently heard from an Iranian strategist, Iran’s leadership now views the confrontation with the US as an “existential war” that will shape not only Iran’s future, but also the regional order.

In this assessment, the Iran war has weakened US military readiness, depleted critical weapons stockpiles, exposed the vulnerability of the global energy system through the Strait of Hormuz, and imposed growing political costs on both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Consequently, Tehran appears determined to withstand the current economic offensive and, if necessary, escalate militarily rather than accept another temporary arrangement.

Washington might be underestimating the most significant shift in Tehran’s strategic thinking. Many within Iran’s current leadership appear to have reached what Persians describe as “death once, moan once” – a mindset best captured by the English proverb: “A man can die but once.”

They increasingly believe it is better to resolve the fundamental confrontation with the US once and for all, rather than endure another generation of sanctions, military threats and recurring crises.

Strategic outlook

The Islamabad memorandum was widely seen in Tehran as a potential turning point, but renewed US military operations, followed by an unprecedented campaign of economic warfare and public calls for regime change, have reinforced the conviction that Washington remains committed to overthrowing the Islamic Republic, regardless of diplomacy.

This mindset is also reflected in the composition of Iran’s current leadership. The new supreme leader belongs to the generation forged by the Iran-Iraq War, having served as a young soldier on the frontlines. He also carries a legacy of the recent conflict, in which his father, wife and son were killed in US-Israeli military operations.

Meanwhile, influential figures shaping Iran’s postwar strategy – including parliament speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei – are veteran commanders of the Iran-Iraq War, whose wartime experiences continue to shape Tehran’s strategic outlook.

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4IVPuvIaX4]

The critical issue is that Washington may now be confronting an Iranian leadership that calculates risk very differently than in years past.

The current crisis has reached what military strategists would describe as a strategic deadlock. Neither Washington nor Tehran possesses a politically acceptable pathway to victory. Although the US can sustain economic warfare far longer than Iran may withstand it economically, such coercion alone is unlikely to achieve Washington’s political objectives or compel Tehran’s surrender.

Iran, meanwhile, retains the ability to impose disproportionate costs on regional stability through maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, regional military escalation, and disruptions to global energy markets.

In short, both sides retain the capacity to inflict pain, but neither possesses the ability to impose a durable political settlement by force.

Defining choice

Trump now faces a defining strategic choice. Across his two presidencies, he has left three distinct legacies in US-Iran relations: “maximum pressure”, several military confrontations, and the Islamabad memorandum of understanding. He cannot preserve all three.

A train cannot run on three different tracks at the same time. If Trump wants history to remember him as the American president who achieved peace with Iran rather than prolonged conflict, he should choose his own diplomatic legacy – the Islamabad memorandum – and transform it into a comprehensive settlement capable of ending nearly five decades of hostility.

Such a grand bargain should concentrate initially on the two issues driving today’s confrontation. The first is the Strait of Hormuz. Rather than allowing the waterway to remain a recurring flashpoint, Washington, Tehran, Muscat and the Arab states in the Gulf should negotiate a permanent maritime security arrangement guaranteeing freedom of navigation, ending maritime confrontation, and recognising the responsibilities of the littoral states under international law.

The second is the nuclear issue. Instead of another temporary political understanding vulnerable to changing administrations, both governments should negotiate a bilateral treaty under which Iran would permanently renounce nuclear weapons while preserving its legal and internationally recognised rights to peaceful nuclear technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the US would permanently remove nuclear-related sanctions. Ratification by both the US Congress and the Iranian parliament would provide a degree of political durability that previous agreements lacked.

Virtually every major strategy pursued over the past five decades- engagement, sanctions, maximum pressure, covert operations, targeted assassinations, regime-change policies, and ultimately three wars – has failed to produce a stable peace.

The only major strategy that has never been seriously tested is comprehensive diplomacy aimed at building a durable and healthy US–Iran relationship.

The real question is no longer whether coercion has reached its limits – it has.

The alternative is not victory, but a prolonged war of attrition that risks devastating the critical infrastructure of Iran, Israel, and the wider Middle East, deepening regional instability, disrupting global energy markets and international commerce, and further undermining international security.

The question now is whether Washington and Tehran possess the strategic vision and political courage to seize what may be their last opportunity to replace perpetual confrontation with sustainable peace.

Trump has a rare opportunity to shape a historic legacy. He could help to establish a comprehensive regional security and cooperation framework between Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf, transforming one of the world’s most volatile regions into a more stable foundation for global energy security.

He also has a unique opportunity to facilitate a strategic understanding between Iran and Israel – not necessarily diplomatic normalisation, but a durable arrangement under which both sides would end their mutual military, security and existential threats, replacing “permanent deterrence by crisis” with “stable deterrence by agreement”.

Such achievements would constitute not merely a diplomatic breakthrough, but a fundamental restructuring of the Middle East’s security architecture – one with lasting benefits for regional stability, global commerce and American strategic interests.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Visiting Research Collaborator with Princeton University and a former Chief of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee.

2 September 2026

Source: middleeasteye.net

The Battle for Hormuz Treasure Trove

By L Ali Khan

The world is curious, even nervous, about how the US-Iran war will end. Many views compete for attention. Even if the US tries to get out of the war, it is caught in an escalation trap, a thesis presented by Professor Robert Pape. The US has been drawn into the war by the Israelis, who dream of building Greater Israel by weakening the region, a thesis advanced by Professor John Mearsheimer. Some commentators argue that the war would end after President Trump and the Republicans lose the 2026 midterms. Others insist that the US will simply leave the region, as it lacks the resources or the stomach to fight a prolonged war. The optimists opine that Democrats will defund the war, forcing its termination. The most explosive conjecture casts President Trump as a willful warrior who can do anything, anytime.

The US-Iran war has become a hard test of US hegemony in the region, one that requires subduing Iran, the only state left in the Gulf that opposes US dominance. This war is best understood as part of a broader US effort to control the region and the Gulf’s resources, especially as China becomes the principal beneficiary. Since Iran, on the front line, and China, in the rear, are formidable foes, the US may not win the war against Iran and may have to roll back its Gulf military bases in the worst case.

The Hormuz Treasure Trove

The Strait of Hormuz is much more than a shipping passageway from the Persian Gulf to the open seas. The Gulf waters and the eight nations surrounding the Gulf—Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman—contain trillions of dollars in resources we can call the Hormuz Treasure Trove (HTT). These eight nations contain close to 50% of the world’s proven oil reserves; Iran and Qatar share the world’s largest natural gas field, with Qatar converting the gas into liquefied natural gas for export. The HTT also produces huge quantities of petrochemical feedstocks such as ethane and propane, sulfur for making plastics and fertilizers, helium used in semiconductor manufacturing, and minerals and marine resources. To make most of these natural and processed resources available to the rest of the world, the Strait of Hormuz is the primary and the cheapest gateway out of the treasure trove. It is also a chokepoint because no other waterway reaches or exits the Gulf.

In the years before the war, nearly 75% of crude and condensate leaving Hormuz went to China, India, Japan, and South Korea, without US permission. Washington would like to change that and exercise a veto. President Trump’s statement that he views Hormuz as “an American territory” is not a joke, but a desire to control the gateway and the Gulf resources. Control over the HTT, however, requires more than naval access to the Strait; it requires cooperation from the states that possess its resources.

Compliant Gulf States

For decades, US hegemony over the HTT has been nearly complete, except in non-cooperative Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) and in Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. A persistent pattern in US policy across administrations (deep script) has been to preserve and expand US predominance over the HTT, a priority that has become even more critical as China increasingly benefits from HTT resources.

The six Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, have been US allies and security partners partly out of national interest, and partly because of US pressure. These states have allowed US armed forces to build bases in their territories for troops and military equipment. Qatar serves as a forward base for US Central Command, and Bahrain hosts the Fifth Fleet. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE also host US bases with troops, aircraft, and missiles.

The compliant states also protect and strengthen the US dollar. Gulf states trade HTT resources in dollars, supporting the dollar and keeping their surpluses in dollar-denominated assets, including US Treasury securities. Known as the petrodollar, the pricing of Gulf commodities in dollars reinforces the dollar as the world’s premier currency, especially after the US removed gold as the dollar’s backup commodity in 1971.

Dollar-denominated trades serve US hegemony, allowing the US to freeze dollar accounts when needed, such as for economic sanctions, as the US has frozen Russian and Iranian accounts. Many international dollar transactions pass through US-linked banks and dollar-clearing systems. The US closely monitors Iraqi (and Venezuelan) dollar accounts generated through oil sales and retains the option to delay or deny dollar withdrawals. Iran defies US hegemony because it can sell, particularly to China, the principal buyer, outside the dollar clearing system.

The history of US hegemony over the HTT can therefore also be understood through its dealings with the two states that resisted compliance: Iraq and Iran.

Subduing Iraq

Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) and Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution posed the greatest threat to the enforcement of US hegemony. First, the US adopted a policy of decimating both enemies by making one fight the other. In 1982, the US started supporting Saddam Hussein, a Sunni dictator in a Shia-majority Iraq, when he faced pushback in the war with Iran. To fuel the war, US policymakers exploited the Shia-Sunni and Iran-Arab binaries to cast the Iraq-Iran war as a clash of historical identities. The war, which stretched over eight years, proved fruitless, and US hegemony over the HTT remained incomplete.

In 1991, the US decided to eliminate the Iraqi threat to the HTT hegemony through direct military action. The US ambassador to Iraq gave conflicting signals to Saddam Hussein about taking Kuwait by force, as Iraq had claimed it was an integral part split off by British colonists. As Iraq invaded a “sovereign state,” a member of the United Nations, international law came into action, as it does in select cases sponsored by the US and other Western nations acting as a bloc.

With the cover of the UN Security Council authorization, Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait. However, Saddam Hussein remained in power. What President George H. W. Bush could not accomplish, President George W. Bush made a priority. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a perfect geopolitical climate to conquer Iraq by force. To make matters worse, Saddam Hussein threatened to decouple oil sales from the dollar, compromising the dollar’s paramountcy in global trade.

In 2003, the US promoted the false claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, and the world must not allow the most dangerous man to have weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear fear, when properly packaged, sells easily. The US orchestrated a powerful PR campaign to justify the war against Iraq.

Despite the 9/11 attacks and the campaign that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the UN Security Council did not authorize military action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. President George W. Bush nevertheless attacked Iraq, deposed Saddam Hussein, and installed a compliant Shia government. Since 2003, Iraq has had to conduct oil trades in dollars channeled through the US banking system, giving the US leverage: if Iraq misbehaves, the US can delay or freeze its assets. That threat still exists today. This is how Iraq has been compelled to subscribe to US hegemony.

Subduing Iran

After Iraq, the remaining challenge to completing US hegemony over the Gulf has been Iran, the region’s principal non-compliant state. Iran is much larger than Iraq in both size and population and spans the entire eastern Gulf border. In attacking Iran, the US offers two distinct grounds. The first concerns nuclear weapons; the second concerns the oppressive government. However, behind these stated rationales lies a broader geopolitical objective: bringing Iran into the US-centered regional order.

Iran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits the development of nuclear weapons but allows the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The US, however, argues that NPT membership is insufficient and that Iran must provide additional assurances that it will not develop nuclear weapons. Iran provided such assurances in 2015, and the major powers, including Russia and China, became parties to those assurances, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement also endorsed by the UN Security Council.

But even the JCPOA assurance has not been good enough because the non-cooperative Iranian government continues to defy the US hegemony. In 2018, the US abandoned the JCPOA, even though Iran still did not denounce the NPT. Nuclear fear in the case of Iran is more credible, since it has been developing nuclear energy for decades and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued reports stating that Iran is noncompliant with safeguards obligations.

The second US rationale smells of bad faith. Iran’s constitutional structure is somewhat authoritarian, though it is more democratic than the monarchies in other Gulf states. The Iranian parliament and the President are popularly elected, though a screening mechanism prevents certain candidates from running. The Supreme Leader is not popularly elected but selected by the Assembly of Experts. This office is not hereditary. In highlighting oppression, the US is speaking to dissidents, the Western Iranian diaspora, and even to Sunnis in Iran and the region, arguing that the Shia-dominated Iranian government is oppressive and must be overthrown.

The war has failed to dislodge the Iranian constitutional system, and despite the assassination of the Supreme Leader, the system has survived and elected a new Supreme Leader.

In addition to being a non-compliant state, Iran has been cultivating relations with China, which is fast emerging as an economic superpower and a major consumer of hydrocarbon energy. Thus, the struggle over Iran cannot be separated from the geopolitical question of China’s access to the HTT resources.

The US-China Cold War

China’s rise as an economic superpower has been spectacular. In the past ten years, it has become clear to the US, Europe, Russia, and India that China is unstoppable as an economic superpower; a war with China is an invitation to self-destruction. So engaging China directly in armed conflict, whether over Taiwan or the South China Sea or the border dispute with India, will bring nothing but ruin to the world.

Ruling out a full-fledged hot war, the US has commenced a cold war with China, which will likely intensify and be peppered with proxy wars, such as those with Iran. The cold war with China aims to primarily undermine its economy by making it harder to acquire natural resources, particularly oil, which China lacks.

In the American hemisphere, the US made sure China did not control the Panama Canal, which connects the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean. The Panama Supreme Court ousted a Hong Kong company that managed the ports on each end of the Panama Canal. Initially, the US even threatened to reclaim control of the Panama Canal. However, ousting the Chinese company from the Panama Canal has pacified Washington for now.

In early 2026, the US seized and removed President Nicolás Maduro from power to bring Venezuela, a major energy producer, under control, as he was developing close energy and commercial ties with China. Maduro has been indicted on drug-trafficking charges.

Seizing the president of a sovereign state violates international law and will likely be one of the most visible casualties of the cold war between the US and China.

Russia is another major energy source for China. Given the Ukraine-Russia war, the US has been unable to woo Russia away from China, even though the Trump administration considered the possibility; however, given the intense Russia-Europe rivalry, turning Russia against China has become unattainable. Long before the Iran war, Russia and China leveraged the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and spearheaded the expansion of BRICS to challenge the dollar’s global primacy.

As Russia became increasingly aligned with China, the strategic significance of HTT resources in the US-China cold war grew even greater, even though the US does not rely on these resources. China imports a significant amount of energy from the Gulf states, particularly Iran. To check China, it was ideal to topple the Iranian government and install another “Shah,” as the US and Britain did in 1953 by overthrowing the democratically elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh after he nationalized Iranian oil. The US desires to turn Iran into a compliant state.

The HTT hegemony would give the US substantial leverage over energy flows to both China and India, both of which are competing to become the top economic powers and are projected to surpass the US around 2050.

Playing India and China against each other, just like Iraq and Iran, was also seriously considered under the Obama administration, which wooed India into the US orbit. However, much like Iran, India could foresee the downside of aligning with the US against China, its geographical neighbor. Frustrated with India, the US returned to warm relations with Pakistan as a possible foothold in South Asia.

Great powers cannot fight the contest over the HTT alone; both Washington and Beijing depend on regional states whose interests may or may not align neatly with either patron. Pakistan and Israel offer a contrast in the battle over the HTT.

Pakistan’s Dilemma

Pakistan, an economically weak country with a narrow export base, maintains strategic ties with China—jointly manufacturing combat aircraft like the JF-17 for export to third countries. Pakistan is also a geographic neighbor to both China and Iran and has deep cultural and linguistic ties with Iran. At the same time, Pakistan has been close to the US since its birth in 1947, though with bitter interruptions. Since the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA, MI6, and the ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence agency) worked closely below the surface in ways their governments could not. It is unclear whether they still do.

In mediating between Iran and the US, Pakistan is playing a dangerous game without fully understanding the consequences. Field Marshal Asim Munir, the de jure chief of the armed forces and de facto ruler of Pakistan, has become the most prominent person in the mediation efforts, even though the civilian government also plays a supportive role.

A mediator, by definition, is neutral between disputants, which is why the parties trust the mediator. However, the realities on the ground are irreconcilable and challenge Pakistan’s neutrality. On one hand, Pakistan is closely tied to China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar Port, connected to China by the Karakoram Highway. On the other hand, Pakistan needs the US because it relies on loans from the IMF and the World Bank, both of which are influenced by the US.

Pakistan will be unable to mediate if the conflict escalates to one between the US and China. If either patron believes Islamabad is playing on both sides, the diplomatic and economic cost will be monumental. Losing either China or the US will be catastrophic for Pakistan. In fact, if the US-Iran war intensifies, the US will force Pakistan to close its borders with Iran to maximize economic pressure on Iran, a course of action unacceptable to China. It is uncertain how Pakistan will navigate such a bind.

Israel’s Commitment

If Pakistan is a conflicted partner, Israel provides resolute support for US hegemony. Professor Mearsheimer’s claim that Israel manipulated the US into starting a war with Iran is popular in some opinion circles. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and wealthy pro-Israel billionaires have been blamed for forcing the US-Iran war. This claim has some truth to it. However, Professor Mearsheimer underestimates the US desire for hegemony over HTT. Israel did not author US Gulf strategy. It is the partner that can fight on short notice.

Some extremists in Israel, including some in the government, dream of Greater Israel stretching to parts of Syria, Egypt, and even Saudi Arabia. This desire of the few can be stretched to argue that Israel prefers wars to weaken its neighbors so that it can expand its territory. Yet, the suggestion that the US President is at the mercy of Israeli leaders is a view that fails under the weight of US foreign policy. Jewish influence does not mean that the US government acts according to a Jewish wish list.

Nonetheless, Israel is an integral part of the US strategy to control the HTT. The US has equipped and used Israel to keep the region in line. Israeli governments have dutifully complied, ignoring the larger interests of their people. Israel has been a vocal critic of Iran and its ideological government, partly for existential reasons and partly to promote the US agenda. However, the thesis that the US was drawn into war with Iran because of Israeli advocacy is something US policymakers might cite to mitigate their own responsibility for Middle East wars. Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen attack Israel to weaken its role as the US proxy. Consequently, by supporting the US strategic hegemony, Israel has pursued its interests in synergy with those of its patron.

Yet neither Israel nor the other US partners can resolve the central problem: Iran has so far refused to accept the regional order that Washington seeks to preserve.

Hard Choices

After several months of military strikes, economic sanctions, and mediation, the US has been unable to achieve a victory over Iran. US policymakers might have thought that the Iranian government was an easy target if they could kill the Supreme Leader and others in charge. They assumed that because the Iranian people are dissatisfied with the government, they would rebel and welcome a US attack that dislodges the government. Once the presumed easy win did not occur, a harder victory through a protracted fight became the default option.

We must ask a simple question: now that the easy win did not happen, how will the US-Iran war end? If the war is about US hegemony over the HTT, it can end in two scenarios. First, the US leaves the region with the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian control, partly shared with Oman. Second, the US escalates the war to defeat the Iranian government by force, as it defeated Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The first scenario seems highly improbable because the US, with its most lethal armed forces, will not accept defeat, leaving the HTT for China to use without hindrance. Under this scenario, the US might also have to close its military bases located around the Gulf.

The second scenario seems more likely. Professor Robert Pape calls it the escalation trap, a somewhat problematic phrase, especially when combined with Professor Mearsheimer’s thesis that Israel forced the US’s hand into the war. The term implies that the US has fallen into a war it must escalate. Both professors, eminent in their field, convey US helplessness in both initiating and executing the war.

A more accurate explanation would be an escalation strategy, a term more consonant with US agency, under which, if one type of force does not work, the US employs another. If economic sanctions do not work, air power is used, and finally ground troops are used to close the deal. This incremental approach is rational, economical, and effective because it weakens the enemy in stages. This sequence was also used in Iraq: economic sanctions for decades, air power, and then ground troops to occupy and establish a compliant state.

If HTT hegemony is the goal, the US will escalate the war, not out of compulsion but as a rational strategy to topple the Iranian constitution, install a compliant government, and rehabilitate the military bases in the Gulf states. If Iran continues to resist compliance, US ground troops will be necessary to complete the job. If the Iranian resistance is intense and severe with assistance from China, causing US deaths, Washington might contemplate the unthinkable: deploying tactical nuclear weapons. “This cannot happen” is the response from optimists, moralists, and those who look the other way to avoid what they think is wrong.

The proposition that the US will accept defeat because it can no longer tolerate American deaths is neither new nor outlandish: that is exactly what happened in Vietnam. The US left the war without achieving its geopolitical objectives. The same could happen with Iran. However, the probability is low because, if the US loses this war, it will deal a severe blow to American hegemony not only in the region but also more broadly. No superpower relents easily, and the US is unlikely to fold its cards and hand victory to Iran and China.

Conclusion

The stated US justification for the war with Iran centers on rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. This objective enjoys international support, as evidenced by the broad endorsement of the 2015 JCPOA, ironically designed to prevent war. However, Washington’s objective to overthrow the Iranian constitutional system has very little backing in the region or globally. The US would prefer a compliant government in Iran that reinforces US hegemony over the Hormuz Treasure Trove. A broader US objective is to limit China’s unchecked access to Gulf energy while preserving the dollar’s primacy. Iran under its current political structure is unlikely to yield to the US. One thing is certain: the US-Iran war is a proxy war in the intensifying cold war between the US and China. The war ends when China retreats from the contest over the Gulf or when the US realizes it cannot turn Iran into a compliant state. It is hard to predict how long the stalemate will last.

L Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy LLC, has thirty-five years of experience in teaching international law, arbitration, and commercial law.

4 September 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Iran War and Image of the US as a Superpower!

By Nilofar Suhrawardy

Six months have failed to let President Donald Trump have his way on the Iran-front. Now even prospects of his victory, with United States’ command over Strait of Hormuz, have ceased to prevail. His rhetoric would have certainly carried substantial weight if they were not being questioned in numerous quarters, including outlets of media, which are not dominated primarily by only what he seeks. From day one, the tiding has not totally favored Trump and/or have taken turns hardly desired by him and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Perhaps, the situation would have been different, if at his desire, the rest of the world- particularly western and Arab powers had joined US and Israel in their war against Iran. But they chose not to.

Trump probably never envisaged prospects of his being isolated by his own allies on the Iran-front. He was apparently guided by the assumption that the superpower could not be ignored. What United States said was supposed to be yielded to, at least in his view? Certainly, it would be wrong to assume that this has never happened. It would be equally erroneous to assume that “dictates” of US are not considered. They are, but not just from Trump’s angle or from that of US and Israel, where the Iran-war is concerned. Now, their priority is considering them from their own angle, in context of their respective national interests.

Trump was not prepared for Iran-war to extend beyond six months. He had not envisaged limited reach of his own diplomatic pursuits. What he perceived and calculated was probably only from the angle of one and only superpower in the world. This left little ground for considering that the same could be questioned, opposed and also openly retaliated again. Well, this is what has been faced by his Iran-war. Perhaps, Trump did not spend much time to deliberate over Israel’s stand on Iran-war. Israel has been aiming for this for quite some. It’s a part of Israel’s “ambitions” of expansion. Perhaps, he yielded to pressure from Netanyahu and/or that of Jewish lobby. But he did.

When he asked his “allies” to join US against Iran, perhaps little importance was given to certain hard and fast rules guiding a considerable number of them. All don’t give Israel the same importance that US chooses to give. All are also not as close to Netanyahu as Trump is. Netanyahu probably wouldn’t have considered aligning with any other country to target Iran. In contrast, most Arab countries have no or limited chances of aligning with Israel, giving no importance to superpower being in alliance against Iran. In addition, the other countries have given priority to the war being too costly for them to take the risk of joining it. So what if this amounted to saying “No” to US.

Paradoxically, Trump has not maintained any uniform approach throughout the six-month period. It has been marked by issuing threats of more devastating strikes against Iran as well as few ceasefires, the most significant of which was reached on June 17, for a period of six months. This ceasefire- Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)- was also violated from both sides and since its expiry on Aug 17, little importance has been given to resuming talks. Against this backdrop, it would not be wrong to assume that Trump has lost trust on this front.

Little importance was given by Trump to economic problems it could lead to for the region as well as the world. Had Iran been defeated in just a few days, the result would have been probably different. Trump probably assumed control of Iranian oil refineries to be in United States’ hand just as he has recently announced that of Venezuela’s. The deal with Venezuela gives US control of its 65 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves. This still remains a distant, practically illusive, goal on the Iran-front for Trump.

On their part, it seems other countries have become sharper and wiser about pursuit of their respective diplomatic approaches, without choosing to be only and/or predominantly dependent on US. With respect to Gulf states, during the course of Iran-war, alliance with US proved to be of no help to them. It failed to provide them the needed security. The Mecca Pact signed on Aug 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan in Riyadh appears to have been reached to enhance prospects of stronger regional coordination and unity for regional security. Options are being reportedly considered for inclusion of more countries in the pact.

Iran has not refrained from spelling out importance of national and regional unity among various nations. Of late, it has been engaged in talks with Qatar, Oman and Pakistan for reopening Strait of Hormuz. This also raises questions about the degree other countries may be willing to abide by Trump’s threat of economic sanctions against those engaged in ties with Iran. On the other hand, Iran has not been diplomatically and/or economically isolated as desired by Trump. Rather, Trump hasn’t secured the support he has tried for against Iran, economically as well as diplomatically. Symbolically, he has tried to play the role of a superpower, but has not succeeded.

During the present phase, this reality has surfaced on another front, that is the Canadian. Yes, this refers to Canada’s decision to indulge in a trade-war, practically equivalent to one begun by Trump against it. In retaliation against levies imposed by Trump on imports from Canada, it has announced counter-tariffs on a series of US goods. Rather than remaining quiet and not retaliating against US levies, Canada has reacted strongly. In other words, Canada has refused to be bullied by US. This is also suggestive of superpower’s image being hardly as commanding as probably Trump has desired. The explanation is simple. This image has ceased to prevail for a significant number of countries. These include Gulf countries who have chosen to strengthen their diplomatic bindings within their own region also. These have learned a strong lesson from the US-Israel war against Iran. US cannot be trusted or relied upon from their respective angles. Besides, continuity of the war for more than six months, without spelling victory for any country, has proved to be fairly costly for United States’ image as a superpower!

Nilofar Suhrawardy is a senior journalist and writer with specialization in communication studies and nuclear diplomacy.

30 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Slander and Impunity: The World Central Kitchen Killings in Gaza

By Dr. Binoy Kampmark

In September 2025, nine countries launched the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel. Australia explained its important if dark inspiration in pursuing it: the slaying of Zomi Francken, along with six of her colleagues from the World Central Kitchen charity on April 1, 2024 by Israeli forces in Gaza. All perished to an attack consisting of three missiles fired from a Hermes 450 drone in a stated “deconflicted” zone, despite clear logo markings on the convoy vehicles and extensive coordination regarding their movements with the Israeli authorities.

The declaration, while lacking teeth, is at least a concession that individuals dedicated to protecting and preserving the vulnerable in conflict deserve a heftier shield of protection in international humanitarian law. It is all the more important given the systematic, weasel-worded libelling that the IDF have pursued against the WCK workers. Behind the cover of bureaucratic plausibility and spread-sheet analysis, the Israeli authorities have conveniently packaged the charity worker with combat or terrorist groups, giving them equal standing in targeting.

The disgraceful nature of this is evident in the refusal to consider any legal action for the events of that April. On August 19, the IDF announced that it had found “no reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct that would justify opening a criminal investigation or the taking of additional measures against any of those involved in the incident”. The spokesperson’s remarks initially gave ballast to the worthiness of the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism (FFAM), charged with making “factual assessments of exceptional operational incidents, while using a range of tools and methodologies.” It became very clear that these methodologies were heavily slanted to conflating combatants and humanitarian workers on mere inferences.

Consider, for instance, the IDF’s alleged identification of “a gunman on a truck in the humanitarian aid convoy while it was on route to a warehouse for the unloading of the aid.” The troops had “identified vehicles surrounding the trucks in a manner that, in their assessment, and based on accumulated operational experience, corresponded to a scenario in which the Hamas terrorist organization had taken control of the convoy.” Despite “serious failures in the process that led to the assessment that Hamas operatives were travelling in the vehicles”, the decision to strike the convoy raised no “reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct”. There had been, in the circumstances, a sufficient number of “suspicious indicators”.

Much is done to shift the blame to the humanitarian workers. They had, for instance, “hired an armed security force to accompany the convoy until the completion of the operation in order to protect it from seizure by armed actors in Gaza.” This “was not coordinated with the IDF authorities.” The IDF had also “attempted to contact WCK representatives in order to verify their assessment that the people in the vehicles were indeed not members of WCK.” These efforts – so it is claimed – were made during the half-hour period that the vehicles were being tracked. (The assumption had already been made that they were Hamas operatives or workers in league with them.) The someone sickening insinuation here is that these humanitarians brought it upon themselves.

Much the same view was expressed by the chief commander who ordered the strike, Colonel Nochi Mendel. He has faced no legal proceedings, merely administrative action in the form of dismissal from his role as chief of staff of the Nahal infantry brigade. Mendel had been remiss on the IDF’s rules of engagement and standard operating procedures.

In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation conducted in October 2025, Mendel had not favoured killing the WCK employees but was “not sorry” for what happened. Echoing the eventual findings of the investigation, the Colonel blamed “an intermingling between the WCK and Hamas operatives” that took place in an environment of evolving complexity. The suggestiveness, and the euphemisms, are all standard: that WCK had also made mistakes; that it was not “really a neutral organisation. Not really an organisation you can say is innocent and completely clean.” This lack of political sanitation was evidenced by “ties to Hamas.”

The apologia is accordingly built up and inflated: operational fuzziness, the expediency that a conflict situation demands. No mention of the protocols governing such humanitarian convoys seemed to warrant discussion. Instead, Mendel could see, in a video feed, “armed terrorists getting out and firing from the trucks.” After the convoy arrived at a warehouse at Deir al Balah to unload the aid, “We see them all mixed together – both the WCK guys and the Hamas terrorists with weapons.” He cites a claim to being noble: that he could have ordered the attack there and then but preferred to wait “so as not to harm the WCK.” That turned out to be a cautionary note with little effect.

Mendel then claims that the IDF did contact the WCK – but not those in the convoy. A WCK representative from Europe was reached. The answer came: “there aren’t supposed to be armed guards.” The WCK personnel, after leaving the warehouse, then deviated from a coordinated prearranged route – so says Mendel. This aided the decision to strike, but an investigation into the events by Australian Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin suggests that the decision had already been reached by that point. It came as no surprise that WCK, in a statement on Mendel’s ruminations, regarded them as “slanderous” and lacking “credibility”.

The decision not to initiate criminal proceedings, or to conduct a truly independent inquiry, baffled the governments whose nationals had died in the attack. The Israeli ambassadors of several countries were called in to give answers. A joint statement by the foreign ministries of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom called the decision to close the case “shameful”. The Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski was almost livid. “Partnership requires respect,” he stated. “The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, as well as the failure of accountability for IDF’s excessive use of force are undermining public support in even pro-Israel nations.”

The goal of these operations, irrespective of the deaths they cause, is ultimately captured in chilling words by Mendel. There was no room to feel remorse here. The situation was “very complex”. Besides, the IDF had gone into Gaza “to win, to eradicate this evil from the whole world, not just for ourselves.” They were doing it for us. How easily does the righteous rhetoric of civilization justify the unspeakable.

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.

3 September 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

The Meaning of Tell: Why the West Bank May Be Nearing a Breaking Point

By Dr. Ramzy Baroud

The events in Tell, southwest of Nablus, were not an isolated act of violence. They were a warning.

For years, Israel has treated Palestinian villages in the occupied West Bank as open spaces for military raids, settler invasions, land theft and collective punishment. The expectation was that Palestinians would endure the violence, bury their dead and return to the same unbearable routine.

In Tell, however, that carefully maintained equation was briefly disrupted.

The confrontation began when armed Israeli settlers entered the area near the village, attempting to attack Palestinian homes. Villagers confronted them. Israeli soldiers and armed settlement personnel then intervened, transforming the settler attack into a broader military assault.

During the confrontation, a Palestinian man seized an Israeli weapon and opened fire. Two Israelis were killed, while four Palestinians from the Ramadan family were also killed. What followed was a sweeping campaign of punishment against the entire village.

Israeli forces sealed Tell, stormed many homes and interrogated scores of residents. More than 70 Palestinians were detained in the initial crackdown. The Israeli violence soon spread to surrounding communities, where armed settlers attacked homes, vehicles and set mosques on fire.

The meaning of Tell, therefore, does not lie solely in the number of dead. It lies in the fact that Palestinians, confronted by armed settlers and soldiers, refused to retreat.

Tell may or may not become the immediate spark of a broader uprising. But it revealed that beneath the outward appearance of Israeli control, the West Bank is reaching a breaking point.

Since the beginning of the genocide in Gaza in October 2023, Israel has transformed the West Bank into another major battlefield. More than 1,180 Palestinians have been killed, approximately 13,000 wounded and over 24,600 detained, including hundreds of women and nearly 2,000 children.

The assault is not limited to military raids. It is an integrated system involving the occupation army, armed settlers, military courts, settlement councils, demolition authorities and ministers who openly advocate annexation.

In 2026 alone, thousands of Palestinians have been displaced through settler attacks, demolitions and Israeli restrictions on Palestinian construction. By July, the rate of displacement had reached an average of 17 Palestinians every day—twice the daily average recorded during the previous three years.

Of course, none of this is random violence, but a deliberate policy.

Benjamin Netanyahu has effectively handed the West Bank to the most extreme elements of his coalition. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has used his governmental authority to accelerate illegal settlement construction, legalize illegal outposts and transfer powers over occupied territory from the military administration to Israeli civilian institutions—a fundamental step toward formal annexation.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, has provided political protection to settler movements while repeatedly provoking Palestinians at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

In exchange, Netanyahu receives what he needs most: the continued survival of his government.

With Israel’s general election scheduled for October 27, the West Bank is likely to become even more central to Netanyahu’s campaign. His political message to the Israeli right is not merely that he can provide “security,” but that he can permanently alter the geography of Palestine.

Palestinians are thus trapped in a brutal equation. If they do not resist, the army and settlers advance. If they fight back, Israel invokes “Palestinian terrorism” to intensify the very policies that produced the resistance in the first place.

Tell exposed that equation, but it also demonstrated its limitations. Indeed, Israel can demolish homes, close roads and arrest entire families. It can empty refugee camps, as it has attempted to do in Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur Shams. It can maintain the illusion that overwhelming violence has pacified the Palestinian people.

But military domination is not real control. Netanyahu and his extremist ministers have so far benefited from what Naomi Klein described as the “shock doctrine”: the exploitation of collective trauma and disorientation to impose political realities that would otherwise face greater resistance.

Gaza was subjected to unprecedented ‘shock and awe’, while the West Bank was rapidly transformed under the cover of that catastrophe. Shock, however, has a limited lifespan. Eventually, fear gives way to anger, and anger begins searching for a collective political expression.

Palestinian history has repeatedly demonstrated this pattern. Neither Intifada began according to the calculations of political parties or intelligence agencies. Both erupted when accumulated humiliation, economic strangulation and military violence reached a point at which ordinary Palestinians were no longer willing to accept the existing order.

The next uprising, should it occur, may also begin with an event that appears small when viewed in isolation: a village defending itself, a refugee camp refusing another invasion, or a community confronting settlers attempting to seize its land.

Al-Aqsa Mosque and occupied East Jerusalem remain particularly significant. They are among the few places capable of immediately uniting Palestinians across Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and historic Palestine.

On July 23, thousands of Israeli settlers stormed the Al-Aqsa compound under heavy police protection. Ben-Gvir joined them, while participants waved Israeli flags, sang the Israeli anthem and, once again, openly violated the long-established status quo governing the holy site.

Israel should understand the historical significance of such provocations. Ariel Sharon’s incursion into Al-Aqsa in September 2000 helped ignite the Second Intifada. The attacks on Al-Aqsa and the threatened expulsion of Palestinian families from Sheikh Jarrah contributed to the Palestinian uprising of May 2021.

There is still time for meaningful international action. Palestinians would have no reason to rise if their land were protected, their prisoners freed, their communities allowed to live and their fundamental rights respected.

But if international governments continue to protect Israel from accountability, the question will no longer be whether the West Bank will rise.

It will be when, where—and what single event will finally provide the spark.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

7 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Venezuela: Don’t Blame the Victim

By Roger D Harris, Francisco Dominguez and María Paez Victor

“Nothing is easier than to be idealistic on behalf of others.” – Karl Marx, 1858

Under cover of night, the US military kidnapped the lawful Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and National Assembly deputy Cilia Flores on January 3, 2026. Collateral damage included over 100 fatalities of civilians and Cuban and Venezuelan guards.

This unprovoked surprise attack flagrantly violated international law. The hegemon acted in full expectation that it could operate with impunity. Even the neighboring left-leaning governments of Brazil and Colombia offered only mild rebukes. Then Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil said, “we found ourselves alone.” That is the context in which subsequent developments need to be understood.

The egregious military action culminated a quarter of a century of US and allied (particularly Canada and the UK) machinations against Venezuela: asphyxiating sanctions, stolen assets, diplomatic isolation, cyber-attacks, assassination attempts, mercenary invasions, and establishing an ersatz parallel government. For the two months preceding the invasion, the US navy blockaded oil shipments. Still the empire’s goal of regime change was not achieved.

The revolution’s resilience compelled the US to escalate

Washington and its allies failed to destroy Chavismo, the movement founded by Hugo Chávez and carried forward by his successor Nicolás Maduro. Venezuela did not collapse or degenerate into chaos after the decapitation. Domestic peace prevailed.

The US-backed and funded far-right opposition did not seize power, but found itself ever more marginalized and in disarray.

The Chavista leadership continued in a seamless constitutional succession with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez sworn in as acting president. The unity of the top command held firm, backed by the National Assembly and supreme court. Likewise, the civic-military union and the communes and grassroots Chavista institutions fully supported the government.

Relying on its overwhelming military superiority, Washington made a Mafia-style offer you can’t refuse. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Rodríguez on that day of infamy and delivered an ultimatum to collaborate with the US or face the country’s military destruction and the murder of her and other leaders. Variations of this scenario are corroborated by both the corporate press and Chavista sources.

Trump explicitly threatened: “There is more where that came from.” The alternative was the devastation currently being rained down on Iran, a country with far greater military capacity. With US forces deployed throughout the region and off its coast, a military confrontation would have meant annihilation, including the destruction of the oil industry. Rodríguez did what any responsible leader would do given the existing options; she made a tactical retreat in the face of overwhelming force.

Venezuela did not surrender

All the Chavista state institutions and the powerful universe of grassroots organizations that sustain the revolution remain intact. Yet US imperialism, by having a gun pointed to the government’s head, is in a position to exert substantial coercion leading to unpalatable decisions, such as Alex Saab’s deportation.

These accommodations reflect pressures that those of us on the outside can only imagine. How the solidarity movement should respond is a central question.

Former Chávez official Sergio Rodríguez Gelfenstein describes the current negotiations as an exercise in essential national self-preservation. He observes: “What is at stake is the survival of the State and the republic, which if lost, would make the discussion on any other topic banal.” As former Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza said, “everything is now negotiated,” with Washington obliged to be in daily give-and-take with Caracas.

Legislative reform had long been on Maduro’s agenda. However, revisions to laws governing the exploitation of hydrocarbons and hard minerals involved offering generous conditions to international capital in order to attract much-needed foreign investment (which Cuba is also doing).

The new amnesty law, another planned initiative, is a key instrument promoting reconciliation and denying extremist elements arguments to incite violence. The law strictly excludes “anyone who has committed war crimes, human rights violations, homicide, drug trafficking, or treason.”

The government is in negotiations with the moderate opposition. Such successive rounds of dialogue were a recurring feature of the Maduro presidency.

Rodríguez has counseled prudence and strategic patience. Notably, the core Chavista leadership, the military, Socialist Party, and communal formations have remained united under tremendous pressure – pressure designed to fracture that unifying accord.

Long-sought gains achieved

The US has reversed itself and in practice recognizes the Venezuelan government as legitimate. The Bolivarian project has not only persisted but forced its greatest adversary to come to some accommodation.

Not since 2019 had the US allowed transactions with Venezuela’s central bank and major state banks. US restrictions had previously cut Venezuela off from the global financial system, preventing access to dollar-denominated transactions and US financial channels. Oil sales to the US have resumed, with some revenues returning to the domestic economy. The US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) is again engaged with Venezuela. Rodríguez has stated that Venezuela is not seeking IMF loans, but access to its own frozen funds.

Although sanctions largely remain in place, special licenses and a temporary easing of economic restrictions for earthquake relief have provided some breathing room for Venezuela’s besieged economy while also facilitating oil flows to the US. The concessions are limited and reversible, leaving the broader structure of US economic warfare intact. Still, the arrangement is preferable to the total oil blockade imposed immediately before the January 3 assault.

Rodríguez has repeatedly demanded that Venezuela be free of sanctions, while formally seeking the release of Venezuelan assets abroad to address the devastation caused by the earthquakes. She has even appealed to King Charles III for the return of 31 tons of Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England.

Changed political landscape

The balance of forces confronting today’s Venezuelan leadership is substantially less favorable than under Chávez, so judging its compromises by an idealized Chávez-era standard is mistaken.

Some internationals invoke Chávez to discredit the current leadership. Overlooked is that during Chávez’s presidency, Venezuela sold oil almost exclusively to the US, when dependency was significant. Ignoring the changed context, infantile leftist claims are made that Chávez never compromised and that “one does not negotiate with the enemy,” forgetting the famous advice from Fidel Castro during the 2002 coup: “Don’t immolate yourself, Hugo.”

Chávez governed during a commodities boom that provided the Bolivarian project with resources for material benefits markedly unavailable today under sanctions. The geopolitical context has shifted significantly since Chávez’s time, especially under the present “Donroe Doctrine.” Not since Maduro’s victory in July 2024 has a left-leaning candidate won in Latin America. The last seven presidential elections have been swept by the right. Until this broader reactionary trajectory is reversed, further retreats are likely.

The purpose and cumulative impact of the illegal unilateral coercive measures have been to erode public support for the government. Years of comprehensive sanctions – despite the 2021-2025 economic recovery following an approximately 75% GDP contraction – have left Venezuela in a vulnerable position. Currently the Venezuelan economy is operating at roughly 30% of its pre-sanctions level.

The Rodríguez government is trying to buy time to recover the economy, although the June 24 earthquakes dealt a terrible blow. According to the United Nations, direct physical damage is estimated at over $37 billion, representing over a third of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

Most Venezuelans want domestic peace and a return to prosperity, not a confrontation with the empire.

“Unity is the most important thing – without it, nothing is possible; with it, everything is possible.”

Those were the words of Fidel Castro as he was organizing the Cuban Revolution in 1956. Most dangerous for the sister Bolivarian Revolution is the suggestion that the current leadership has betrayed the cause and that a truly leftist “third way” can be fostered to replace them. There have always been competing factions within the Bolivarian movement. But political choices must ultimately be resolved within Venezuela itself, without interference from internationals.

These “third way” analyses, rejecting both Caracas and Washington, typically fail to address what Venezuelans could realistically do at this historical juncture – long on what’s wrong but short on viable alternatives.

It was not so long ago that it was the likes of far-right María Corina Machado who highlighted “cracks and fissures within the Chavista ranks” and anticipated “the beginning of a social explosion” against the elected Venezuelan government. Now some solidarity activists are saying the same.

The “tragic essence” of left disunity in Bolivia should be a cautionary lesson of what could happen in Venezuela. The Chavista leadership is painfully aware of this, hence their vigorous effort to establish the broadest united front against US colonization. Rather than being traitors to the cause, the Rodríguezes and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello represent the most militant Chavistas – fighters from the very inception of the revolution.

What solidarity requires

Constructive criticism and solidarity activism need not be counterposed. Dissident opinions are appropriate when contextualized and given as part of a collaborative effort to advance common goals – not as individualistic venting.

Some among the left have appointed themselves as guardians of the faith judging negatively from afar the very difficult and risky tactical retreat undertaken by the Bolivarian leadership, even though it prevented a suicidal military confrontation with US imperialism.

The international left’s angst and disappointment regarding Venezuela’s retreats is understandable. But the Global South is not about to fulfill the revolutionary aspirations of those living in the belly of the beast. That, it should be clear, is the task for people in the imperial core.

As a Venezuelan activist friend said: “You gringos tell us how to make our revolution when our problem is you have failed to make yours.”

Venezuelans will determine their path without foreign interference, either right or left. Solidarity necessitates efforts to accompany and uplift, not dictate. Internationals living in the US, Canada, and the UK need to place the primary focus on our own imperialists. All other contradictions are secondary.

The solidarity movement must unite in the broadest alliance around the defense of national sovereignty and the right to self-determination, strongly opposing the farcical New York trial of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, demanding the lifting of all sanctions, and calling for the return of stolen assets.

El pueblo unido jamás será vencido.

(A united people will never be defeated.)

Roger D. Harris is a founder of the Venezuela Solidarity Network in North America.

Francisco Dominguez is the national secretary of the Venezuela Solidarity Campaign in the UK.

María Paez Victor is the founder Louis Riel Bolivarian Circle in Canada.

13 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Paper Tiger: The Failure of America’s Trillion-Dollar War Machine

By Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J S Davies

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States spent $21 trillion on its military between 2001 and 2024 (in constant 2024 dollars), equal to the combined military spending of the next eighteen countries. Iran barely made that list at all, spending only 2% of what the US did, and SIPRI estimated Iran’s 2025 military budget at only $7.5 billion. So how is Iran holding its own against the multi-trillion-dollar US war machine?

A critical difference between the US war on Iran and previous US and allied bombing campaigns against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and now Gaza, is that the US and Israel have failed to destroy Iran’s air defense system and cannot fly warplanes over Iran without risking the loss of planes and pilots to enemy fire. Iran has wisely built its critical defense infrastructure underground, with arms factories, weapons stockpiles and launch sites sheltered safely beneath its impenetrable mountainous terrain.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth claimed on March 10th that the US had “total air dominance” over Iran, but that is still not true. Instead, US forces are mainly attacking Iran with stand-off weapons from outside Iran’s borders, radically depleting US stockpiles of extraordinarily expensive weapons.

Even though US warplanes avoid entering Iranian airspace, the Congressional Research Service has reported that the US has lost at least four F-15 fighters, an F-35, an A-10, seven KC-135 refueling planes, an E-6 AWACS plane, two MC-130J special operations aircraft, a helicopter, a high-altitude Triton drone and 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones.

By contrast, during the full-scale invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces lost only one A-10 and six helicopters, after systematically destroying much of Iraq’s air defenses through a low-intensity bombing campaign conducted under cover of the so-called no-fly zones, which the US, UK and France unilaterally imposed after the First Gulf War in 1991.

In 2003, the US Armed Forces dropped 13,000 tons of bombs and missiles on Iraq in the first 30 days of the war. But only 800 tons, or 6%, of those munitions, were cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons like the ones the US is now relying on against Iran.

The US has already depleted a third of its stand-off and air defense weapons stocks, including JASSM and Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-2, -3 and -6 anti-aircraft missiles, as well as half its stocks of Patriot and THAAD interceptors and the new Precision Strike Missiles that are replacing the shorter-range ATACMs. These missiles range in price from $700,000 each for JASSMs up to $12 million each for THAAD interceptors, and many will take years to replace.

So the US is using multi-million dollar missiles that are irreplaceable in the short term to try, and often fail, to interceptShahed drones that cost Iran between $20,000 and $50,000 each. This is a stark contrast from Iraq in 2003, when the US weapon of choice was its 500 lb. GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb, which cost only $22,000, and the 7,000 bombs used to attack Iraq were easily restocked.

To make up for the Navy’s dwindling missile stocks in the war zone, the US is flying B-1 bombers from a British airbase at Fairford in England to fire Tomahawk missiles at Iran. So many planes are now flying from so far away to attack Iran that the US has also had to send dozens more aerial refueling planes to reinforce the sixty it already hadstationed in Israel.

The Russians have demonstrated in Ukraine that the capacity to quickly ramp up production of relatively inexpensive artillery shells and drones can be more critical in a war than spending trillions on big-ticket weapons programs. Meanwhile, the corrupt US military-industrial complex has built a gold-plated revolving door between the US arms industry, the Pentagon top brass and a captive, co-opted civilian government. It has produced ever more expensive weapons, but it has lost nearly every war it has fought.

The only wars the US has won since 1945 were three short wars to recover small neocolonial outposts in Grenada, Panama and Kuwait, as the US took advantage of the weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Otherwise, from Korea in the early 1950s to Iran today, the U.S. armed forces have lost every single war, while inflicting mass destruction on countries and people the US government claimed to be liberating. As the saying goes, “With friends like us, who needs enemies?”

Like many US industries, the post-Cold War US arms industry has become consolidated around a cabal of five firms(Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon (now RTX), General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman), whose continued growth depends on ever-greater profits from increasingly expensive warships, warplanes and weapons, while endless wars and “threats” serve to justify siphoning more and more of America’s national wealth into their coffers.

The US government and corporate media have told Americans for decades that these extraordinary military expenditures and endless wars are something to be proud of, and many Americans have swallowed this perverted myth of US military prowess. The Pentagon works hard to bolster its public image, spending $2 billion per year on recruitment and retention, and $1.14 billion on advertising contracts in 2023 alone.

But that narrative is beginning to crack. As with many aspects of the US political and economic system, more and more Americans are questioning what they have been taught about the US military, and veterans themselves are often the most outspoken critics.

Writing in Business Insider about the problems facing US military recruiters, Kelsey Baker reported that many veterans of the “Global War on Terror” now discourage their own children from joining the military. Three of the recruiters Baker spoke to said guns had been drawn on them by the parents of teenagers they were targeting for recruitment, and one recruiter recalled an irate parent calling him a “baby killer” and a government slave.

In Iran, the United States is caught between escalating a catastrophic, unwinnable war it should never have started and the urgent need to rethink the illegal, corrupt, policy of aggressive war it has pursued since 2001.

The September 11 attacks were carried out by 19 al-Qaeda hijackers—not by the countries that the United States went on to invade and occupy. Yet our leaders responded to those horrific crimes with a multi-trillion-dollar investment in new weapons and imperial military expansion—a decision driven by precisely the “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower warned against in his farewell speech in 1961.

US occupation forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were defeated by lightly-armed resistance forces defending their own countries. Yet America’s leaders ignored their own failures and defeats, continuing to blindly climb the escalation ladder—first confronting Russia through the war in Ukraine and now taking on Iran in its own territory.

We should note that it was under Democratic administrations that the US backed a coup in Ukraine in 2014 and then rejected a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine in April 2022, while Trump, a Republican, assassinated Iran’s top military leader in 2020 and launched wars on Iran, in cahoots with Israel, in 2025 and 2026. The US-Israeli genocide in Gaza, like the illegal occupation that spawned it, still enjoys bipartisan support in Congress, but not from the American people its members claim to represent.

Many Americans understood the dangers of the United States’ militarized response to the crimes of September 11th, 2001, even before the Pentagon embarked on its spending spree and unleashed mass destruction on country after country.

Chalmers Johnson wrote his prescient and widely-acclaimed book, Blowback, in 1999, explaining how US militarism and imperialism inevitably sow the seeds for cataclysmic events like the 9/11 attacks. He followed it with three more books in his American Empire Project before his death in 2010.

Former Nuremberg prosecutor Ben Ferencz told NPR a week after 9/11, “It is never a legitimate response to punish people who are not responsible for the wrong done…We must make a distinction between punishing the guilty and punishing others. If you simply retaliate en masse by bombing Afghanistan, let us say, or the Taliban, you will kill many people who don’t approve of what has happened.”

By the time the United States was preparing to invade Iraq in 2003, international outrage was so widespread that it produced the largest global street protests in history, with up to 36 million people protesting in 60 countries. But US leaders ignored the world’s rejection of their lies, both at the UN and in the streets, and insisted on pretending that Iraq had chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons, and was somehow responsible for the crimes of September 11th.

The brainwashing of US occupation troops in Iraq was so complete that, even three years into the war, in February 2006, 85% of US occupation forces in Iraq told a Zogby poll that their main mission there was to “retaliate for Saddam’s role in the 9/11 attacks.”

The lies, brainwashing, torture, civilian massacres and other war crimes that have corrupted the last 25 years of American military history—together with the outrageous cost—have turned the American people squarely against more new wars. But incredibly, they have failed to persuade Members of Congress to exercise their constitutional responsibility to stop feeding the out-of-control US military-industrial complex with record amounts of money, weapons and false pretexts for war.

Trump has requested a record $1.5 trillion in military spending for FY2027. The House-passed NDAA authorizes $1.15 trillion in discretionary military spending, with additional funding outside the NDAA bringing the administration’s overall military-spending plan to $1.5 trillion. The Senate has so far blocked its version of the NDAA.

The draft NDAA also includes unprecedented provisions to further integrate US and Israeli weapons production and intelligence sharing.

Trump’s frustration over the US-Israeli failure to defeat Iran stems from the same delusion of US military supremacy that infected his predecessors, especially since the end of the Cold War.

But in his 2018 book Losing Military Supremacy: the Myopia of American Strategic Planning, Andrei Martyanov warned that huge US investments in aircraft-carriers and other big-ticket warships and warplanes were rapidly being rendered obsolete by a new generation of Russian and Chinese missiles capable of traveling much faster and farther than the most advanced missiles in the US arsenal.

Now Iranian missiles and drones have fundamentally altered the military balance in the Middle East. They have driventhe US military out of its bases in the Persian Gulf and are forcing US aircraft carriers to stay 1,000 miles from the coast of Iran. US Central Command has had to relocate its regional headquarters from Qatar to Jordan, but Iran has attacked it there too.

Now the United States is repositioning more of its forces in the Middle East to Israel. This raises the stakes, and increases the risks, of any future escalation in the war on Iran, and it further expands the entangling US military alliance with the genocidal state of Israel, which most Americans now oppose.

On August 8, Iran reiterated six points from the Memorandum of Understanding that Trump already signed on June 17, and insisted that the United States must comply with them before it will reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping.

Western commentators have described these as tough new conditions, but they are neither new nor tougher than before. They simply make explicit what was already implicit—for example, by specifically mentioning Palestine and Yemen, whereas the original memorandum merely called for ending the war “on all fronts, including Lebanon.” The United States and Israel started this war, and the United States has the power to end it by negotiating in good faith, based on the memorandum it already agreed to.

The American people have sacrificed enormously to pay for this obsolete, overpriced, and ineffective war machine. Many have paid with their lives, their limbs or their health. All of us pay the opportunity cost of our leaders’ warmongering and reckless squandering of our national wealth, leaving us without the basic support systems that our neighbors in other developed countries take for granted, from universal free healthcare and quality public education to living wages and paid vacation time.

The US government’s corrupt priorities leave our most serious problems unaddressed, while undermining global efforts to address them, from the destruction of the climate and the natural world to the ever-present danger of nuclear war.

As this year’s primary election results suggest, most Americans want a society that cares for its people, with a government that addresses our most urgent needs. That must surely include dismantling this failed, corrupt, out-of-control and absurdly expensive war machine.

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J. S. Davies are the authors of War In Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict, now in a revised, updated 2nd edition.

13 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Gaza Among Iran’s Conditions to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

By Quds News Network

Iran has made ending Israel’s genocide in Gaza one of its conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil shipping route, a senior Iranian official has said, tying the fate of the strategic waterway directly to Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the strait would not be reopened unless the United States changed its conduct and accepted Tehran’s conditions. Among those conditions, he said, Washington must end its wars across the entire region, including in Gaza and Lebanon, release frozen Iranian funds, and meet further demands conveyed through mediators.

Rezaei said the United States is being the source of instability in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, and said the waterway would remain closed until Washington altered its behavior. He added that any agreement reached between Iran and Oman over passage through the strait would be treated separately from the broader question of its closure.

The inclusion of Gaza in Iran’s demands links the reopening of a waterway through which a large share of the world’s oil and gas passes to the halting of Israel’s genocide in Gaza. It signals that Tehran intends to keep the war on Gaza at the center of any regional settlement, using its leverage over global energy routes to press the United States to rein in Israel and end its attacks not only on Gaza but across the region, including in Lebanon.

13 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

Cuba after Six Months of the Oil Blockade: Crisis and the Road to Recovery

By Vijay Prashad

For more than six decades, the United States has attempted to make the Cuban people pay for their decision to pursue an independent, socialist path. The latest phase of this economic war has targeted the island’s most vulnerable artery: its energy supply. Six months after Washington intensified pressure on countries and companies supplying oil to Cuba, the policy has not produced democracy or improved the lives of ordinary Cubans. It has produced darker homes, immobilised buses, interrupted hospitals, and greater difficulty in moving food from farms to cities.

The immediate task is to prevent a humanitarian disaster. The larger task is to replace coercion with sovereign cooperation and to help Cuba build an energy system that cannot again be strangled by a foreign power.

Six Months of Deepening Crisis

On 29 January 2026, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order establishing a mechanism for additional tariffs on goods from any country that directly or indirectly supplied oil to Cuba. Washington presented the measure as a defence of US national security. Its practical purpose was unmistakable: to force third countries to choose between a small, economically distressed Caribbean nation and access to the enormous US market.

The tariff actions authorised under this, and several other emergency orders were terminated on 20 February. But the declared emergency remained in force, as did the wider sanctions system, threats against suppliers and uncertainty surrounding ships bound for Cuba. The result has been described as an effective oil blockade: not necessarily a permanent line of US warships, but a system of secondary pressure capable of frightening governments, banks, insurers, shipping companies, and traders away from legitimate commerce with Cuba. The blow fell on an economy already under extraordinary strain. Cuba had long depended on imported petroleum, particularly from Venezuela, while producing only part of its requirements. Venezuelan deliveries declined after the US attack on that country on 3 January 2026, Mexican supplies came under US pressure, and Cuba lacked the foreign exchange to buy sufficient fuel elsewhere. Ageing thermal plants, delayed maintenance, hurricanes, inflation and the loss of tourism income compounded the damage.

Fuel scarcity spread through every part of social life. Technical failures in the fragile grid repeatedly became island-wide blackouts. Electricity cuts stopped water pumps, while refrigerators failed, spoiling scarce food and medicines. Families were forced to cook, study, and sleep in extreme heat without dependable power.

Transport was similarly paralysed. Fewer public buses operated, petrol stations closed or rationed supplies, and workers struggled to reach their jobs. When diesel is unavailable, crops cannot easily be harvested, and food cannot be transported from rural producers to urban consumers. Garbage collection and sanitation deteriorate. Ambulances, hospitals, and clinics must ration generator fuel even as shortages of medicines and basic supplies grow. Flights were cancelled or rerouted because Cuban airports could not guarantee aviation fuel, further damaging tourism – one of the country’s principal sources of hard currency.

The burden is unequal. Households with dollars can sometimes obtain food, transport, batteries or solar equipment; workers and pensioners dependent on pesos have far fewer options. Women carry much of the additional unpaid labour of finding food and water and caring for relatives. Rural communities, persons with disabilities and patients requiring refrigerated medicines face particular risks. The central victims of the US policy are all the Cuban people.

An Exit Based on Peace, Sovereignty, and Reconstruction

The way out must begin with an immediate humanitarian energy arrangement. Cuba requires predictable deliveries, not occasional cargoes dependent on political permission. The United Nations, together with willing Latin American and Caribbean governments, should establish a monitored fuel corridor. Shipments could be earmarked for power generation, hospitals, water and sanitation, food production, public transport, and disaster preparedness.

An exemption is meaningless if banks do not process payments, insurers do not cover vessels, and shipping companies fear punishment. Participating governments should provide payment guarantees, insurance and legal protection for humanitarian suppliers. The United States should issue durable, general licences rather than case-by-case waivers.

Second, emergency relief must open the door to negotiated de-escalation. Washington and Havana should begin structured talks, supported where useful by CARICOM, CELAC, Mexico, and other trusted intermediaries. The principle must be reciprocity without coercion. The United States should suspend measures that punish third-country trade and set out a verifiable timetable for lifting sanctions. Negotiation cannot mean demanding regime change as the price of allowing a population to meet its elementary needs. Nor should humanitarian necessities be held hostage to every unresolved dispute between the two governments.

Third, Cuba has already begun to diversity its suppliers and energy system. Contracts with several producers, joint purchasing with Caribbean partners and regional storage reserves could reduce costs and cushion sudden interruptions. Technical cooperation could help stabilise old generating equipment while new capacity is built. Over the medium term, the most durable answer lies in renewable and decentralised energy. Cuba has abundant sunlight and significant potential for solar power, biomass and carefully located wind generation. Rooftop solar systems on clinics, schools, farms and apartment buildings, coupled with batteries, would reduce demand on the national grid. Community microgrids could keep water pumps, refrigeration and communications operating when a major plant fails. Bagasse from the sugar industry and agricultural residues can contribute to generation if projects are managed sustainably. Renewables must not become a slogan that ignores material constraints: projects need finance, spare parts, trained technicians, batteries, and recycling systems.

For countries of the Global South, Cuba’s predicament is not a distant bilateral quarrel. Secondary sanctions and tariff threats establish the dangerous principle that a powerful state may dictate the lawful trading partners of every other nation. Defending Cuba’s right to purchase energy is therefore part of defending a democratic international order. The Global South should oppose extraterritorial coercion, support humanitarian supplies and renewable-energy cooperation, and work with other states to insulate legitimate trade from unilateral sanctions.

The Cuban people have survived six decades of pressure through social organisation, international solidarity and remarkable endurance. Endurance, however, should not be romanticised. No people should be required to live indefinitely without reliable electricity, transport, food or medicine to prove their commitment to sovereignty. The just exit is neither capitulation nor isolation. It is the lifting of collective punishment and international cooperation based on equality. That path can bring the lights back on while preserving Cuba’s right to determine its own future.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa.

14 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org

The Mecca Agreement 2026 raises the question: Is it a Muslim NATO, and if so, against whom?

By Syed Mohammad Raghib

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, represents one of the most consequential developments in the security architecture of the Muslim world in recent years. Its central principle is strikingly similar to NATO’s Article 5: an armed attack against one member is to be treated as an attack against all three. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has explicitly compared the arrangement to NATO’s collective-defence principle, while Pakistani officials have described it as a “purely defensive” arrangement that is not directed against any particular country. Yet the agreement immediately raises a larger geopolitical question: Is this the beginning of a “Muslim NATO”? and if so, against whom? The answer is more complicated than either its supporters or critics suggest. The agreement is not formally an anti-Iran, anti-Israel, anti-India or anti-Western alliance. Nevertheless, its strategic logic is clearly shaped by the rapidly changing security environment of the Middle East and South Asia.

A New Security Triangle

The significance of the Mecca Agreement lies partly in the extraordinary combination of capabilities represented by its three members. Pakistan contributes a large, experienced military and is the Muslim world’s only acknowledged nuclear-armed state. Türkiye contributes one of NATO’s largest armed forces, substantial defence-industrial capabilities and rapidly expanding expertise in drones, electronic warfare and advanced military technologies. Saudi Arabia contributes enormous financial resources, strategic geography, energy power and considerable influence in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The three countries therefore bring together military manpower, nuclear deterrence, technology, finance and strategic geography. This combination is considerably more significant than a conventional diplomatic partnership.

The global military environment also makes the agreement understandable. As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that global military expenditure already reached approximately $2.9 trillion in 2025, following another substantial increase in defence spending. Türkiye’s military expenditure rose by 7.2% in 2025 to about $30 billion, while Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest military spenders. Saudi Arabia has particularly strong reasons to reconsider its security architecture. Riyadh has historically relied heavily on American military protection, but repeated regional crises have encouraged Saudi policymakers to diversify their strategic partnerships. The Mecca Agreement can therefore be understood partly as an effort to build greater regional strategic autonomy.

Why Pakistan?

For Pakistan, the agreement represents an opportunity to strengthen its strategic position in both the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. Pakistan has longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia. Pakistani military personnel have historically provided training and security assistance to the Kingdom, while Saudi Arabia has remained an important economic and diplomatic partner for Islamabad. The 2026 trilateral agreement expands this relationship into a broader multilateral security framework. Pakistan’s most important strategic asset is its nuclear deterrent. The inclusion of a nuclear-armed country gives the agreement a psychological and strategic weight that most proposed Islamic security organisations lack. But Pakistan also has to be careful. Its geography places it between India, Afghanistan, Iran and the Arabian Sea. Islamabad cannot afford to become militarily committed to every conflict involving Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. A collective-defence clause could therefore create difficult choices if one member enters a conflict that another member considers unnecessary or dangerous.

Why Saudi Arabia and Why Türkiye?

For Saudi Arabia, the Mecca Agreement is perhaps the most important component of its emerging strategy of security diversification. The Kingdom possesses enormous financial resources and has invested heavily in advanced aircraft, missile defence, drones and other military systems. Yet sophisticated weapons do not automatically create an independent military-security architecture. Saudi Arabia therefore needs partners with military experience, technology and strategic depth. Pakistan offers military manpower and nuclear deterrence. Türkiye offers advanced defence technology and a growing indigenous military-industrial complex. The arrangement consequently gives Riyadh access to two major Muslim military powers without requiring the Kingdom to abandon its existing relationships with the United States. This point is crucial: the Mecca Agreement does not replace Saudi-American security relations. Turkish officials have stressed that the new arrangement complements existing alliances rather than replacing them. Saudi Arabia is therefore attempting to move from dependence toward strategic diversification.

Türkiye’s participation gives the agreement an entirely different dimension. Türkiye is already a NATO member. It therefore occupies a unique position: it belongs simultaneously to the Western military alliance and to an emerging Muslim security arrangement. Rather than indicating that Ankara is abandoning NATO, the Mecca Agreement demonstrates Türkiye’s increasingly multidirectional foreign policy. Türkiye has developed a significant defence industry, particularly in unmanned aerial systems, naval platforms, missiles, electronic warfare and other military technologies. The new pact envisages joint exercises and deeper cooperation in areas including unmanned systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and defence production. For Ankara, the agreement also expands its influence across the Arab world and strengthens its role as a security actor beyond NATO’s traditional geographical framework.

Is It Really a Muslim NATO?

Calling the Mecca Agreement a “Muslim NATO” is politically attractive but analytically premature. NATO is a highly institutionalised organisation with 32 members, permanent structures, integrated military commands, common planning mechanisms and decades of operational experience. The Mecca arrangement currently consists of only three countries. Its institutional mechanisms are still being developed, including a ministerial committee and a Saudi-based secretariat. Moreover, the three countries do not share identical strategic interests. Pakistan’s primary security concern remains India and its regional environment. Saudi Arabia is primarily concerned with Gulf security, missile and drone threats, maritime security and regional instability. Türkiye has interests stretching from the Black Sea and Mediterranean to Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus and the wider Middle East. Thus, the agreement is better described initially as a trilateral collective-defence framework rather than a fully developed Muslim NATO. However, its potential evolution is important. Türkiye has indicated that the arrangement could eventually expand, with Egypt mentioned as a possible future participant. If Egypt and other significant Muslim states eventually join, the character of the organisation could change dramatically.

Is this against Iran and Israel?

The most immediate question is whether Iran is the unnamed target. Officially, the answer is no. Pakistani and Turkish officials have explicitly rejected the idea that the agreement is directed against Iran or another particular state. Strategically, however, Iran is impossible to ignore. The agreement emerged during a period of intense regional tensions involving Iranian missile capabilities, attacks and counter-attacks, and broader instability surrounding the Gulf and Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has serious security concerns about Iranian missile and drone capabilities, while Türkiye and Pakistan have their interests in maintaining regional stability. Nevertheless, an explicitly anti-Iranian alliance would be extremely risky. Iran is itself a major regional power and a Muslim country. A Sunni-led military bloc explicitly organised against a Shia-majority Iran could transform a geopolitical rivalry into a sectarian confrontation. That would be disastrous for the Muslim world.

Israel is another possible interpretation. The political environment surrounding the agreement includes continuing disputes over Gaza, Palestine and Jerusalem. In April 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and other Muslim-majority states jointly condemned Israeli actions affecting the status quo at Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif and criticised settlement expansion. Consequently, the three countries share important political positions concerning Palestine. But the Mecca Agreement does not establish a military commitment to fight Israel. Turning it into an explicitly anti-Israeli alliance would immediately create enormous strategic complications for Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, both of which maintain important relationships with Western states. Its deterrence value may therefore be more important than an offensive purpose.

What about India?

For India, the agreement deserves careful attention but not alarmism. Pakistan’s participation naturally creates concerns in New Delhi because Islamabad’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are already strategically important. If the agreement develops into a broader military organisation, India will have to examine whether it affects the regional balance of power. Yet Saudi Arabia has extensive economic relations with India, while Türkiye also maintains substantial commercial ties with New Delhi. There is no evidence that the Mecca Agreement is designed as an anti-India military alliance. The key concern for India would arise only if collective defence becomes operationally linked to Pakistan’s bilateral conflicts. That would fundamentally alter the character of the agreement. In a recent interview with Karan Thapar in the Wire, former Indian diplomat Mr Shayam Saran said that each of them has different objectives, but New Delhi also keeps eyes on the development in the region, as 9 million Indians are working in the Gulf countries.

The Nuclear Question

The most sensitive issue is Pakistan’s nuclear capability. A trilateral defence pact involving a nuclear-armed state inevitably raises questions about escalation. If an attack on Pakistan were automatically treated as an attack on Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, the crisis could potentially acquire a much wider strategic dimension. Conversely, Pakistan’s nuclear capability may provide the alliance with a deterrent effect. The fundamental logic is that potential adversaries may hesitate before attacking any one member because they could face a coordinated response from three major military powers. This is the classic logic of collective deterrence, but it also creates the danger of entrapment. One member’s conflict could potentially draw the others into confrontation.

The Real Purpose: Strategic Autonomy

The most convincing interpretation of the Mecca Agreement is therefore neither “Muslim NATO against Iran” nor “Muslim NATO against Israel”. It is an attempt to build greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly uncertain international system. The United States remains enormously powerful in the Middle East, but regional states increasingly recognise that external security guarantees can never be completely predictable. The wars and crises of recent years have encouraged regional powers to develop their own partnerships. The Mecca framework provides Saudi Arabia military depth, Pakistan economic and strategic opportunities, and Türkiye a new platform for regional leadership. It also reflects a broader transformation: Muslim-majority countries are increasingly seeking to become security providers rather than permanent security consumers.

Conclusion

The Mecca Agreement of 2026 is undoubtedly historic, but calling it a fully operational “Muslim NATO” today would be a premature conclusion. Its importance lies in its potential rather than its current institutional strength, which is limited by the lack of a headquarters and other necessary structural setups. The agreement is officially defensive and is not directed against a named country. Yet its strategic environment reveals three major concerns: Iranian regional power, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and uncertainty about external security guarantees, particularly American ones. India is an important indirect consideration because of Pakistan’s membership, but there is currently no evidence that the pact was created as an anti-India alliance. The more profound question is what happens next. If the pact remains limited to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, it will function primarily as a powerful trilateral security arrangement. If Egypt and other major Muslim countries join, it could evolve into something much larger, a genuinely new collective-security organisation for the Muslim world. The greatest challenge will be maintaining unity without creating a new cycle of bloc confrontation. The Mecca Agreement may therefore be less about “Muslim NATO against whom?” and more about “Can Muslim states finally create a collective security system of their own” after six months long US-Iran war. That is the real strategic test of Mecca h Agreement 2026.

Dr Syed Mohammad Raghib completed his PhD from the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi.

14 August 2026

Source: countercurrents.org