Just International

Twenty-Seven Hours: Donald Trump in Israel

By Dr Binoy Kampmark

It was time to do the Zionist boogie within a mere period of 27 hours, and anyone wishing to see two muggers of history enjoying each other’s company found themselves peering at Donald Trump of the United States, and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, nearly arm in arm on the recent tilt in US policy.  “We understand each other,” effused the Israeli leader, “and so much of the things that we wish to accomplish for both our countries.”

Not that Washington had been that savage in reneging on its general policy on Israel during the Obama years. Israel was still deemed firm bosom pal and supposed beacon of democracy in a sea of Arab savagery. One could hardly count the various gestures on the part of the Obama administration, notably those taken in the second term, as firm, sharp turns.

True, the Obama administration had veered at points, paying lip service to international law and the questioned status of the Israeli settlements.  There had been a registered abstention in the UN Security Council.  But effectualness was nowhere to be seen.

Notwithstanding that, the actions of the administration even as Trump was readying to move into the White House provoked Netanyahu, who was also in a habit of turning on the issue of whether the two-state solution ever had legs.

Any Trump promise comes with hazards, the most notable of which is flipping rapid change.  It soon became clear, even within the short time the president was going to spend in Israel, that dangerous, even scandalous excitement was looming.

The issue about whether Trump had disclosed classified material to Russian delegates on Israeli intelligence capabilities reared its curious head, and was beaten down.  “Just so you understand, I have never mentioned the word or the name Israel.”[1]

Nothing about Trump is ever lofty.  The philosophy of the gut and instinct prevail, a situation that is bound to provoke controversy.  The supremely vulgar Israeli MP Oren Hazan, being a bird of such a feather, ploughed through in a successful effort to take a “selfie” with Trump.  Not even Netanyahu could stop him.

Nor should he have.  Hazan had been accused in a televised report in 2015 of pimping and drug taking, a situation which led to his suspension as deputy speaker of the Knesset.  In December that same year, he was suspended for one month from any parliamentary activity after unwarranted behaviour towards a colleague with a disability.  Such a fine resume would sail well in Trumpland.

The gut philosophy is certainly baffling seasoned operatives on the ground.  Having expressed, in warm terms, his desire that the Israeli capital move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, doubts have crept in.  An unnamed senior White House official told Bloomberg that, “We don’t think it would be wise to do it at this time.”[2]  There would be no provocations at a time “when everyone’s playing real nice.”

Nathan Thrall, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, suggests that “both Israeli and Palestinian leaders – including Netanyahu – are made very nervous by Trump.”[3]  The baby risks being thrown with the bath water, and the diplomats and various politicians find themselves at odds with the status quo which emphasised paralysis over effort.  The only thing to do is utter niceties and sweet words – for the moment.

Worried that the ground might be shifting before the spectre of the “ultimate deal” on peace, former Likud member Moshe Feiglin fears that the Trump-Netanyahu association would spell doom for Israel, fuming at his prime minister for pushing “Israel’s strategic situation into the depths of an abyss that we have never known.”[4]  Such dabbling with Trump would thrill the progressives.  “Only Likud can fulfil the dreams of the most radical left.”

On this reality show in the Holy Land, the Trump display reduces history to show and spectacle, usually within the shortest of bursts.  This all came to a delightful head in the visit to Yad Vashem, where heads of state are scrutinised for their obeisance to the Holocaust credo.  What words of grave import would Trump come up with?  In all likelihood, it would have to be in less than 140 characters.

As a Presidential candidate, Barack Obama visited the memorial in 2008, and got on the horse of history to survey the world. The words in the guest book were lengthy, contemplating this “powerful reminder of man’s potential for great evil, but also our capacity to rise up from tragedy and remake our world.”

In his 2013 speech at the memorial, now as president, Obama spoke of how “our sons and daughters are not born to hate, they are taught to hate.  So let us fill their young hearts with the same understanding and compassion that we hope others have for them.”

Trump, in contrast, delivered a more trimmed version, still sneaking in the necessary punch of horror: “Millions of wonderful and beautiful lives, men, women and children were extinguished as part of a systematic attempt to eliminate the Jewish people.”  Netanyahu’s response almost broke the solemnity with unintended satire, thanking the US president for a speech “that in so few words said so much.”

In the guest book of Israel’s national Holocaust memorial were penned words seemingly screaming in their self-referential, adolescent awe: “IT IS A GREAT HONOR TO BE HERE WITH ALL OF MY FRIENDS – SO AMAZING & WILL NEVER FORGET!”

As Amir Tibon would conclude at the end, the first visit to Israel as the president of the United States saw Trump offer a diet to the Israeli people irresistible though unhealthy.  “It consisted almost entirely of sugar and sweets, with very little ‘protein’ in the form of actual substance.”[5]

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.  Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

[1] http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/22/politics/trump-israel-russia-intelligence/

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-17/trump-said-to-rule-out-moving-israel-embassy-to-jerusalem

[3] https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/trumps-constant-embarrassing-gaffes-in-israel-wont-hurt-him

[4] https://www.facebook.com/JewishLeadership/posts/10154967988673058

[5] http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.791207

24 May 2017

Muslim Perceptions of Buddhism and Buddhists in Malaysia.

A Summary for Reflection of Peace : Muslim-Buddhist Dialogue

organised by Centre for Civilisational Dialogue, University of Malaya

held at Akademi Pengajian Islam UM on 16 May 2015

As two religious communities, Muslims and Buddhists in Malaysia have lived in relative peace and harmony for centuries. There has been no inter-religious conflict between the two. Buddhists are accepted as part of the local landscape. Even in predominantly Muslim states like Kelantan and Kedah, Buddhist places of worship and imposing statues of the Buddha have not evoked any negative reaction from the Muslim populace. On the contrary, they regard them as legitimate dimensions of the state’s identity.

There are reasons for this. Accepting the religious other is integral to Islamic teachings. Neither Buddhism nor Buddhists is seen as a threat to Islam or Muslims. The general perception among Muslims is that Buddhism as a religion is non-aggressive and non-proselytizing. Besides, it is seen as a religion inclined towards works of charity.

If there are issues that create uneasiness between those who profess Buddhism and those who profess Islam, they are related to ethnicity rather than to religion. Many Chinese and many Malays have different positions on some of the ethnic challenges that face the nation. But they have not influenced Malay perceptions of Buddhism even though the majority of Malaysian Buddhists are Chinese. However if Chinese chauvinism is channeled through Buddhism — which has not happened until now — then Malay attitudes towards the religion may change.

At this juncture, the greater danger to Buddhist-Muslim relations in Malaysia emanates from Myanmar where the Muslim minority especially the Rohingyas has been subjected to systematic persecution by segments of the Buddhist majority community. If justice is not done to the Rohingyas sooner than later, anger and unhappiness over the treatment of their fellow Muslims may impact adversely upon Muslim relations with Buddhists here in Malaysia especially since thousands of Rohingyas are seeking shelter in our country.

On the Rohingya tragedy, as with other issues confronting Muslims and Buddhists, both communities should be made aware of what the actual situation is in order to check misperceptions and misconceptions from taking root. More importantly, influential institutions and individuals among Muslims and Buddhists should highlight those values and principles that Islam and Buddhism share in common which cover so many aspects of life and living. They should realize that as Malaysians and as human beings living in an increasingly borderless world, what unites them is far more significant than what divides them. In the ultimate analysis, it is this human bond that transcends even our Muslim and Buddhist religious identities.

Dr. Chandra Muzaffar.
14 May 2015.

 

Kashmir: Idea, Not leaders!

By Mohammad Ashraf

(Kashmir’s new revolution is following an idea and not any particular leaders!)

Recently, there was a sting operation conducted by a TV network regarding money being received by some of the leaders of the present movement for “Azadi”. In fact, the discovery was proclaimed all over the country like the discovery of the principle of floatation by Archimedes who ran naked from his bath tub shouting “Eureka” (I have found it!). The receipt of funds by various parties in Kashmir from both sides of the border has been going on right from 1947. In fact, the flow of money from across the border started immediately on the ouster and imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953. A Pakistani spy named Jahangir Khan used to bring money from across and deliver the same to Begum Abdullah and others. On this side the former RAW Chief Dulat in his book has given details of how money was given to mainstream leaders and others by him and many agencies. In fact, General V.K.Singh had also once disclosed that the Army too had been giving money to Kashmiri politicians. He had even named a particular politician whom he had allegedly given couple of crores. There have been allegations from many leaders of the present ruling set up in New Delhi that the stone pelters are being paid Rs 500 for throwing stones. Following the sting operation recently telecast on National TV channel, a team from the National Investigation Agency came to Srinagar to question various leaders regarding the receipt and distribution of foreign money. The entire exercise is aimed at discrediting these leaders in order to suppress the present popular movement. However, if one studies the present unrest in Kashmir, all types of leaders seem to be irrelevant as it is no longer a political movement but a “Revolution”. The main moving factor of any revolution in the world has always been an idea. It is an idea which gives rise to a revolution and it does not depend on leaders. In fact, on the contrary, every revolution throws up new leaders.

Kashmir’s history, both the ancient and the recent is full of tragedies, misfortunes and disasters. Famines, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the political upheavals have always been there. In spite of all these misfortunes, Kashmiris have been surviving for last few thousand years and hopefully, will survive as long as human civilization exists on this planet or for that matter in the universe if man starts planetary travel and colonization! In the recent past, the worst misfortune for Kashmir has been its confused leaders who have been leading people from the proverbial pillar to the post! No leader has given a very concrete objective of where a Kashmiri can lead a life of honour and dignity, unmolested by oppressors and how he can get there! It is because of this that the new generation is following an idea and not any particular leaders.

In the long history of external subjugation, Kashmiris have risen many times but have always been crushed brutally. Almost after four centuries of subjugation, they did wake up from the deep slumber to which the foreign oppressors had put them. They also threw up a very tall and forceful leader but unfortunately after sometime he got confused and fatigued leaving his followers too confused and bewildered! There have been other leaders too but none like the colossus we had produced through the uprising of 1931. One cannot belittle the contribution he made along with his followers, one and all towards the ultimate emancipation of the down trodden people. Every Kashmiri in his heart cherishes the ultimate goal, which is to lead a life of honour and dignity which they call “Azadi”! However, so far the oppressors have proved stronger and crafty. Utilizing the weaknesses of the character of a Kashmiri and employing the harshest means they have succeeded in keeping him in perpetual bondage.

The new generation of Kashmiris does not believe in political jargon, dialogues, referendum, interlocutors, mediators, and political processes. They have got one universal idea, “Azadi”. The slogans are, “Go India, Go Back” and “We want Azadi”! Recently, many political leaders, intellectuals and others have opined that India has lost Kashmir. That is not correct. How can Kashmir be physically lost to India when it is held in place by half of the world’s third largest Army? Yes, India has lost Kashmiris. The land is still with them. A BJP leader has declared that the present unrest is in just three and half districts of Kashmir Valley. He needs to be corrected. Yes, the three and a half districts have been completely lost! The unrest is in all the twenty districts and even across the Pir Panjal Mountains. Incidentally, there is also a continuous refrain about talking to stakeholders. One needs to clarify as to who are the real stakeholders. According to information, 70% population of Kashmir is below 35 years. The most volatile is the generation born and brought up in the turmoil of the nineties of the last century. They are the real stakeholders now. Here one is reminded about Tom Paine’s quotation given in “The Rights of Man”! “There never was, there never can, and there never will be a generation of men which can bind posterity till the end of time! Every generation is free to decide its own future. The idea of ruling beyond the grave is preposterous!” So if one desires peace in Kashmir, the new and the real stake holders have to be taken on board. How that can be done, is the million dollar question!

Mohammad Ashraf, I.A.S. (Retired), Former Director General Tourism, Jammu & Kashmir

27 May 2017

Fear As An Obstacle To Peace: Why Are Israelis Afraid?

By Dr Ramzy Baroud

Bat-Hen Epstein Elias’s long article on Iranian Jews is interesting. Parts of it, in fact, are heartwarming. Yet, despite the lack of any serious evidence, the story is entirely framed in the language of fear.

Entitled, “All the Jews there live in fear that their telephones are tapped,” the story in‘Israel Hayom’ peddles the idea that, although Iranian Jews seem generally content with their lives in Iran as an economically-privileged group, somehow, they are still afraid.

Or, perhaps, Israel needs them to be afraid, despite the fact that the Iranian Jews interviewed in the article expressed little or no fear sentiment at all.

One such character is ‘M’, who, like others asserted: “I never felt like I was being attacked because I was Jewish, or that my religious freedom was harmed.”

His narrative seems positive, if not altogether an encouraging model for co-existence.

For example, ‘M’ said: “I have a good friend, a Muslim, who takes care of me. He takes me to the doctor, and even to the movies and the park, and invites me for meals. Everyone is very good to me and helps me. Before I got sick, I had a lot of money. Medications in Iran are good, a little expensive, but they can be obtained with private insurance and government insurance.”

But then, the fear component is purposely pushed by the Israeli journalist with no clear editorial justification.

Referring to ‘M’, Elias wrote, “Like others, (‘M’) is careful when it comes to talking about the political situation, the nuclear program or the fear of an attack.”

Aside from the fact that Israel Hayom serves, along with other Israeli media, as a major platform for fear-mongering, the need to be afraid is a collective phenomenon in Israel, which it insists on imposing on Jewish communities around the world.

One could in fact argue that ‘fear’ in Israel is an official industry. It helps the government justify its military spending; it helps the military justify its wars; and it further cements the rise of rightwing, religious and ultra-nationalist parties, which now together, rule Israel.

In some way, this is an old, yet ongoing story.

When Israel was established in 1948, it called on all Jews to ‘return’ to the Jewish state, for they, allegedly, could not be safe anywhere else. While many Jewish immigrants throughout the years came to Israel seeking economic opportunities, many were compelled by fear.

That mindset has not changed at all. When militants staged several attacks in Paris in January 2015, Israel Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, called on all French Jews to migrate to Israel.

“We say to the Jews, to our brothers and sisters, Israel is your home and that of every Jew. Israel is waiting for you with open arms,” Netanyahu said.

The statement was strongly criticized by French officials. Many were befuddled by such opportunism during one of France’s most difficult moments in many years.

But for Netanyahu, as for past and present Israeli leaders, inciting or capitalizing on Jewish fears is nothing new.

However, peddling fear is now far more sophisticated, and is deeply embedded in the relationship between the state and Israel’s Jewish population. It has been so internalized to the extent that Israel is incapable of seeing the legitimate fears of the Palestinians and is only obsessed with its own self-induced fears.

A particularly telling story was reported in Israeli media earlier this month when Israeli police officers gave a group of elementary school children a demonstration on “how to kill a Palestinian assailant and verify that he is dead.”

True, the event which took place in Ramat HaSharon on May 8 was not welcomed by all parents, but it was, nonetheless, an example of the training in fear that takes place at a very young age.

Commenting on the story, Jonathan Cook wrote, “Half of Jewish schoolchildren believe these Palestinians, one in five of the population, should not be allowed to vote in elections.”

This, then, is the desired outcome of such methodology, which is constantly fed by the state. Cook adds, “This month the defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, called the minority’s representatives in parliament ‘Nazis’ and suggested they should share a similar fate.”

The use of the word ‘Nazis’ is not merely a widely inaccurate depiction, but such terminology is designed to constantly stir past fears to achieve racially-motivated political objectives.

Yes, Israelis are manipulated to be very afraid. But unlike occupied and oppressed Palestinians, the Israeli fear is self-induced, an outcome of an inherent sense of collective insecurity that is constantly fed by the government, political parties and official institutions.

Despite Israel’s massive military budget, nuclear arms and territorial expansion at the expense of Palestinians and other Arab neighbors, the sense of insecurity it engenders keeps on growing at the same rapid speed as its military adventures.

It is a vicious cycle.

When Netanyahu, for example, drew a red line in a graphic of a bomb during a speech at a United Nations General Assembly session in September 2012, he was, in essence drawing a new parameter of fear for his own society.

Yoav Litvin, a US-based Israeli doctor of Psychology and Behavioral Neuroscience, wrote convincingly on the subject.

His article entitled, “Independence on Nakba Day – Accountability and Healing as an Israeli Aggressor,” critiques the Zionist narrative, explaining how such deeply entrenched ideas of eternal victimization has led to Israel’s current state of permanent aggression and highly militarized society.

“We see that perspective represented by a long line of pro-aggression, exclusivist, expansionist and militaristic Israeli governments that instill and potentiate fear in order to control public opinion and facilitate their political and economic goals,” he wrote.

“In so doing, the Jewish victim narrative, a form of collective Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), sustains the level of aggression and oppression that is a part of daily life in the reality of occupation.”

Writing in the ‘Haaretz’, Daniel Bar-Tal conveys a similar sentiment. However, for Bar-Tal, the Zionist narrative is itself designed, in part, to accommodate existing beliefs pertaining to a collective Jewish experience.

Bar-Tal rites, “Societal beliefs, vis-à-vis security, in Israel are based on past experience and on information disseminated via various channels and institutions, whether with regard to the conflict with the Palestinians or to relations with other actors in the region.” But equally important, “every member of society is also exposed to the collective memory of the Jewish people, by means of social, educational and cultural institutions.”

The Zionist narrative has purposely molded ‘past experiences’ into new political objectives and an expansionist ideology to harness the perpetual support of the Jewish people, in Israel and elsewhere. It has convinced them that their very survival is dependent on the subjugation of Palestinians.

This vicious cycle has, thus, become an obstacle to any peace that is predicated on justice and respect for international law and human rights.

The Zionist narrative, as championed by Netanyahu and Lieberman has zero margins for inclusiveness, and for that ideology to be maintained, fear in Israel must be infused.

However, the stronghold of fear must be broken.

Litvin courageously writes: “We, as Israelis, must break the parasitic bond that Zionist propaganda has created between the Israeli/Zionist collective narrative (the state) and ourselves so that dissent becomes both legitimate and even patriotic as a means of building an inclusive and just society in Israel/Palestine.”

In fact, there can be no other way.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud has been writing about the Middle East for over 20 years. He is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author of several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His books include “Searching Jenin”, “The Second Palestinian Intifada” and his latest “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story”. His website is www.ramzybaroud.net.

25 May 2017

Instability Widens In Mali And The Sahel Region of Africa

By Rene Wadlow

The first foreign visit of the new French President Emmanuel Macron, after a now habitual trip to Berlin, was to Gao in northern Mali as head of the French military. The visit was an attempt to be seen as paying attention to the efforts of French troops in operations in northern Mali and other states of the Sahel region of Africa.

In March 2012, the West African state of Mali was effectively divided into two roughly equal halves, each about the size of France. The northern half was under the control of two rival Touareg groups with additional non-Toureg fighters coming from other Sahel countries and northern Nigeria. The larger Toureg faction was the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). It was larger than its rivals but less well armed. Its main aim was to create an independent state, to be called Azawad, the name for the area in the Toureg language. The leaders of the MNLA quickly declared the political independence of the area.

One Touareg rival was the Ansar Dine “defenders of the faith” which said it wanted to apply Islamic law to all of Mali. In addition to Ansar Dine, there were at least two other Islamist groups, largely composed of non-Malians: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (known by its initials in French, AQMI) and Mujao (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa). The complicated tribal politics of northern Mali and neighboring Sahel areas of southern Algeria, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania has made unity of action difficult.

On January 10, 2013, with outsized ambitions and poor calculations of international reactions, the Ansar Dine and some related allies decided to move toward Bamako, the capital of Mali. The Malian government cried for help. The French government, which has troops and war planes in neighboring states – all former French colonies – responded on January 11 of 2013 with planes destroying armed trucks, thus stopping the advance of the Islamists. French ground troops were flown to Bamako as a fighting, not only a training, force.

The well-trained and equipped French troops moved quickly to take over the cities and larger towns of northern Mali and much of the countryside. The Islamist groups had no desire to fight the more numerous French troops, to which were added Malian forces and small groups of soldiers from other West African countries. Thus, Islamist forces largely melted into the civilian population. Some of the Islamists who were better armed moved north into mountainous areas to live in caves and secluded regions.

The Islamists have integrated a northern Sahel area in which there is an active trade in drugs coming from Latin America. Since cargo and persons coming from Latin America directly to Europe are suspected by officials of being involved in the drug trade, an African stopover has become standard. Planes land in little used airports in Mali or other Sahel areas. The drug cargo is taken by road to ports and then shipped to Europe. Along the way, Malian civil administrators and military are paid to look the other way as the drugs go by. Since salaries are low and often paid late, not much additional pressure is needed to move the drugs. Along with drugs, there is an active trade in arms and in transporting people hoping to go to Europe to find work.

Looking to the north from Gao and Timbuktu to counter the drug and arms trade has left events to the south in Mali largely unnoticed, though trends there may have even more destabilizing consequences. Due in part to the consequences of drought over the last five years, there has been a push south of the Peuls. (Peul is the single person, Fulani is the correct plural, but putting an s on Peul has become common usage). The Peul, probably some 30 million strong are originally from the Sahel zone cutting across parts of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and northern Nigeria. Due in part to the 1972-1983 drought, the Peuls started moving south into southern Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, all the way south to the Central African Republic. Since the Peuls are cattle herders, there have always been conflicts with settled farmers as to when the cattle could come into fields after harvest, the use of water, and so on. In areas where there has been long co-existence, rules have been worked out and dispute settlement mechanisms put into place. With the prolonged drought and new areas of occupation, the old rules and dispute-settlement mechanisms have not been able to cope. This is one of the factors in the armed conflict in Darfur, Sudan, although the Peuls are not directly there.

There seems to be an increasing Islamist current among the Peuls, creating insecurity and tensions both among the Peuls and between the Peuls and other ethnic groups. It is difficult to know from outside what is the place of ideological tensions and what are due to socio-economic tensions and how the two may overlap. Emmanuel Macron’s flash visit to northern Mali – more of a public relations effort than anything – may usefully draw attention to an ever-widening troubled area.

Rene Wadlow is President of the Association of World Citizens.

25 May 2017

Rouhani’s electoral victory, and empowering of the Iranian presidency

By Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC)

Hassan Rouhani’s landslide victory in the Iranian presidential election on Friday, 17 May heralds a continuation on the country’s path towards global re-engagement, both on a popular level and in terms of economic and political cooperation. However, the intense campaign that preceded the election points to increasing tension between state institutions such as the presidency, and parallel institutions, including the Revolutionary Guard and parts of the clerical establishment, especially since presidents have previously frequently become more confrontational towards such institutions at the end of their tenures, as evidenced by former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s fallout with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2011.

With a turnout of nearly seventy-five per cent, Rouhani’s victory, by a margin of twenty per cent over his nearest competitor, principalist cleric Sayyed Ibrahim Raisi, suggests an evolutionary shift within the calculus of Iranians. Although many citizens had previously abstained from voting as it had been seen as endorsing the system, Iranians, in particular those from younger and urban backgrounds, are increasingly turning to the electoral process to shape the country’s politics. Further, most citizens prefer non-violent, incremental changes to Iran’s governance structures. Trita Parsi observes that in most Iranian elections the system outsider has had the most appeal – Khatami in 1997 and Ahmadinejad in 2005 are examples – because Iranian citizens see elections as the only means of altering the country’s political trajectory. Significantly, Khamenei tacitly supported Raisi, especially in the weeks preceding the poll through criticisms of the nuclear deal and of Rouhani’s ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ to implement a ‘resistance economy’. He also publicly confronted the administration over its acceptance of a UNESCO-developed education curriculum, which some saw as undermining gender roles, although the programme had been endorsed, with little opposition, in 2015.

Rouhani’s victory also benefited from the successful conclusion of the nuclear deal in 2015 – despite the less-than-expected foreign investment that followed – and the growth of Iran’s economy by over 10 per cent in 2016, which caused the riyal to appreciate. Fears over a curb in social freedoms if a principalist candidate were to win also influenced the poll, especially since candidates such as Raisi and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had repressed dissent in the past.

Campaigning had been vigorous, and the candidates – especially Rouhani – crossed many ‘red lines’. The president blamed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for stunting the gains of the nuclear deal; the judiciary for its limits on freedoms; and the public news broadcaster for backing Raisi. He also offended the clergy by demanding that the largest Islamic charity organisation, Astan Quds Razavi, headed by Raisi, be subjected to tax compliance. He further accused the IRGC of crowding out private business. Raisi and Ghalibaf conversely pointed out the nuclear deal’s failings, corruption and recent increases in unemployment during Rouhani’s incumbency. This is typical of Iranian politics, where intense competition for positions increases openness, accountability and criticism, especially in electoral years. The system thus provides room for and tolerates a diversity of opinions, despite vigorous vetting of candidates.

Although most power in Iran remains vested in the Supreme Leader, the president is able to shape most domestic and economic policies through his ability to appoint staff to key institutions, and because of the power he wields in formulating these. Further, in most instances the Supreme Leader prefers to maintain an image of political insulation, and usually contours his political pronouncements in line with popular sentiment, opting to work through informal institutions to realise his preferences. Rouhani’s victory will require him to continue his attempts of increased cooperation globally. This is despite the fact that Khamenei has become disenchanted with this stance, fearing potential reforms, and will act to inhibit it. Further, although many of Rouhani’s criticisms of the IRGC, judiciary and clerical establishment in the regime were politicking, these direct and sharp criticisms and the tendency of Iranian presidents to seek to empower their office in the second term will escalate confrontation between these competing centres of power. This will especially be the case as Rouhani considers his legacy, which is important for Rouhani since seventy-eight-year-old Khamenei reportedly suffers from cancer, and it is reliably believed that Rouhani (and Raisi), wish to succeed him. Therefore, Rouhani tacitly criticised the IRGC and the judiciary in his victory speech, acknowledged his support for the popular reformist cleric and former president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and promised to negotiate directly with the Trump administration for the removal of non-nuclear sanctions.

At a regional level, Rouhani’s victory will not drastically alter the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts, although the administration seems to prefer political solutions to both. Khamenei and the IRGC largely control foreign policy, particularly in this arena. The Iranian-Saudi cold war will likely endure, especially since the Saudi monarchy continues to replenish its military capacity, and because the Trump administration’s pronouncements have emboldened hawks on both sides. Rouhani’s victory will, however, guarantee the maintenance of the nuclear deal, and intensify the administration’s attempts to increase its economic benefits. This will be challenging, especially since the USA is unlikely to remove its ‘non-nuclear’ sanctions component, which has so far complicated efforts to invest in the country and caused its economy to remain sluggish. Rouhani will need to consider domestic measures, such as enhancing productivity and cracking down on corruption, to stimulate economic growth.

Despite Rouhani’s massive victory, he will face constraints both from Iran’s complex governance structure and regional ructions. Significantly, Raisi’s populist rhetoric, including pledges to increase subsidies and create jobs, attracted over 15 million votes (thirty-eight per cent). If Rouhani fails to fulfil his campaign promises, we will see a rise in opposition numbers, opening the doors to a principalist resurgence.

26 May 2017

Winning Iran’s Election Is Just The Beginning Of Rouhani’s Political Struggles

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Iranians just overwhelmingly voted to keep President Hassan Rouhani in power after a fiercely competitive and divisive election campaign. But while the president’s re-election was hailed by moderates as a rejection of isolation and populism, it is only the beginning of a much larger battle for the centrist leader ― one that will require Rouhani to make good on past promises while finding a way to compromise with those whom he now needs on his side.

Iran’s presidential election took place at a time when the country is witnessing its most sensitive political period since its 1979 revolution. There is unprecedented regional turmoil and a newly elected American president who, on his first overseas trip, openly advocated for overt confrontation with the Islamic republic. It is amidst such a backdrop that Rouhani’s resounding victory promises to be especially significant for the country as it defines its future ― and as the global community decides how to react to that future.

Rouhani beat out the other remaining candidates, some from the moderate camp and some from the principlist, or conservative, camp. His main rival, Ebrahim Raisi, took the second largest voting percentage at 38.5 percent. In Raisi was the potential for a more conservative Iran. This potential has, for now, been quelled.

“Rouhani faces a nation disillusioned in part by his promises of economic stability from the nuclear deal.

The Iranian electorate has spoken in its decision between two stark alternatives: strengthening civil society and engaging with the world, or turning inward with economic populism and combative foreign policy. In decisively voting for Rouhani, Iranians have endorsed diplomacy and moderation. And they have done so in direct contrast to U.S. President Donald Trump, who has called for increasing tensions with Iran and championed isolationist foreign policy.

The real test now is what comes next. The near-record voter turnout of over 40 million people, coupled with Rouhani’s strong electoral performance, is a move in the right direction. But the president also faces a divided nation disillusioned in part by the promises of increased domestic civil rights and economic stability from the nuclear deal that Rouhani ran on ― and that have yet to be fully realized. If Rouhani wants to be successful in his second term as president, he’s going to need to follow through on those promises, win over the loyalty of moderate principlists ― including those who tended to favor Raisi ― and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and convince them and foreign powers why the world must engage positively with Iran. But his past looms as he looks ahead.

How Rouhani Became Vulnerable

As president, Rouhani has political sway, but it is Ayatollah Khamenei who makes the top decisions and the moderate principlists, conservatives who are open to working with Rouhani but don’t necessarily support him, who serve as an influential power center in the country. Both have strongly criticized broader negotiations with the United States after the nuclear deal. Thus much of Rouhani’s ability to mandate reform this time around will be determined in part by how much credibility he’s able to regain within these domestic circles and by his willingness to appease key leaders.

During the nuclear negotiations, Rouhani had Ayatollah Khamenei’s blessing and a mostly united nation behind him. He reinforced this support by successfully bringing the country back from the brink of economic collapse, implementing policies that took Iran from a recession to an estimated 7 percent annual economic growth, reduced the inflation rate from 40 percent to single digits, rebounded oil exports to pre-sanctions levels and attracted roughly $12 billion in foreign investment.

But over the course of his first term, Rouhani gradually faced a more polarized public. And support from the supreme leader subsided as well as the eventual nuclear deal failed to produce expected dividends. This endorsement must be regained if Rouhani’s policy preferences are to sustainably implemented.

“Khamenei’s endorsement must be regained if Rouhani’s policy preferences are to be implemented.

In fact, Rouhani’s failure to produce on the nuclear deal proved to be a dark cloud over his other achievements ― the biggest challenge to his re-election bid was the state of the country’s economy nearly two years after those negotiations. Iranians are disappointed with the slow results of the landmark agreement made with the U.S. and other world powers. Rouhani’s signature foreign policy achievement ― the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA ― for many Iranians seems to have been oversold, largely due to the short span between the deal’s implementation and this election and U.S.-induced obstacles to proper sanctions relief.

Opponents of Rouhani capitalized on the president’s difficulty in delivering the fruits of the nuclear deal. They largely mocked his foreign policy strategy of diplomatic engagement with global powers, including direct high-level talks with the United States, labeling it as weak and lambasting him for catering to Western powers. Raisi, the judge who became Rouhani’s biggest rival in the election, accused Rouhani of pursuing “begging diplomacy.” And leading up to the vote, senior Iranian cleric Kazem Seddiqi was known to have accused the politically moderate camp of “being cowardly” when working with foreign, particularly Western, leaders.

Rouhani’s landslide victory represents a public rebuke to these criticisms, but the president will nonetheless have to continue striking a balance between pragmatic foreign policy and preservation of Iran’s rights and dignity. It is a nuance Rouhani didn’t shy away from in his victory speech, when he said that he wanted to engage with the world on the “basis of mutual respect and [Iran’s] national interests” but would not settle for “threats and humiliation.”

“Rouhani must strike a balance between pragmatic foreign policy and preservation of Iran’s rights and dignity.

One of the key ways this balance will be tested is in the way he chooses to approach Iran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia. The president’s willingness to mend tension with the kingdom under certain circumstances is a controversial view that ensued much debate during the campaign and similarly earned him the scorn of his principlist rival. Raisi reportedly claimed, during a presidential debate, that Saudi Arabia acts only in line with American strategic preferences, and characterized the Saudi government as a “cancerous tumor” in the region that seeks to sow division in the Islamic world. His comments stood out because they marked the first time in Iranian politics the “cancerous tumor” label, usually reserved for Israel, had been applied to Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Rouhani has denounced a 2016 attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and exercised inclusive and conciliatory rhetoric in domestic issues, especially in relation to Iranian minorities. And it seemed to work in his favor this election. For the first time, Iran’s Sunni minority coalesced around one candidate, with Iran’s Sunni spiritual leader Molavi Abdul Hamid endorsing Rouhani. This should be interpreted as a positive message by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states and inform their policies towards Iran.

A Challenging Path Forward: Trump And Saudi

What happens next remains to be seen, but if the Arab Islamic American Summit in Saudi Arabia with Donald Trump is any indication, Rouhani has many foreign policy challenges ahead. In fact, while Iranians went to the polls, those very Sunni Arab states who could have looked to Rouhani’s openness for diplomacy in a positive light, reacted with clenched fists. And so did Donald Trump.

Hours after Rouhani declared victory in Iran, Trump signed an over $100 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, further militarizing the region. The deal, according to U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, was designed to help Saudi Arabia counter “malign Iranian influence.” In a similar vein, the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia have indicated that they are taking steps to form an unprecedented anti-Iranian so-called “Arab NATO.” This anti-Iran collaboration was reinforced during the U.S. president’s stay in Saudi Arabia, where Trump declared in his keynote address that, “all nations of conscience must work together to isolate” Iran.

Trump’s apparent eagerness to increase Iran-Saudi tensions, contrary to former U.S. President Barack Obama’s belief that the two countries should “share” the region, will exacerbate regional instability and encourage Saudi Arabia to remain intransigent in response to Rouhani’s overtures. His call in Saudi Arabia for “all nations of conscience” to “isolate” Iran not only will surely fail and put the U.S. and Iran even deeper on the path to confrontation, but will also prove to be a lose-lose strategy for Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and the other regional nations.

“Trump’s apparent eagerness to increase Iran-Saudi tensions will encourage Saudi to remain intransigent in response to Rouhani’s overtures.

Further, the U.S. president’s decision to fight the nuclear deal will only disenfranchise the very Iranian people both he and King Salman of Saudi Arabia claimed to have great respect for. A JCPOA- violating sanctions bill is circulating in the U.S. Senate with significant Democratic support. The Trump administration, despite its recent renewal of JCPOA sanctions waivers, is still fundamentally critical of the deal, raising serious doubts about its sustainability. In the midst of all of this, Iran’s neighborhood is ridden with conflict, with no end in sight to the wars in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

But there is hope. What stands out most about the Iranian election is its uniqueness in the region. Iran’s first experiment with democratic elections occurred over 100 years ago, but the energy and competitive atmosphere during this campaign was unparalleled. It bore far more resemblance to elections in the West than those of America’s regional allies, who are decades behind Iran in terms of democratic practice and mostly run along familial or tribal lines. People still chose the embattled Rouhani, even in spite of all the setbacks his domestic and foreign policies presented.

Now that he has an election mandate, perhaps Rouhani’s biggest fight beyond regaining support from the supreme leader and the public will be reacting to President Trump. Trump stands at a fork in the road as well. He can either accept the resounding call of the Iranian people for peaceful engagement, or he can return to the pre-Obama U.S. policy of unrelenting hostility towards Iran. If he chooses the former, he will find a receptive voice in Tehran. But if he chooses the latter, as his speech in Saudi seemed to indicate, the Iranian people and Rouhani will have to be united in resisting aggressive U.S. policies, as they did during Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran during the 1980s.

It looks like Trump and Rouhani both have a long road ahead of them.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University and a former chief of Iran’s National Security Council’s Foreign Relations Committee.

22 May 2017

Beyond the Body—Reflections on Holistic Health

By Yoginder Sikand

Who are we really—the real ‘I’? Is the real ‘I’ the body? Or the mind? Or a combination of both? Some people think that is just what we are—body and mind. But if the body is in a constant process of decay and we have to vacate it one day and if our minds are constantly swinging this way and that, can we, who intuitively feel that there is something about us that is permanent and everlasting, really be reduced to the temporary body or the ever-changing mind? If we reflect on our own selves deeply, we may discover deep down that our real ‘I’ is something else, something beyond our body and our mind.

Many religions tell us that the real ‘I’ is the soul, and that when the soul is manifested in this world, it is encased in a body-mind organism. Hence, while we are in this world, we human beings have three levels—the bodily or physical level, the mind or mental level, and the soul or spiritual level. Each of these levels has its own needs, the fulfilling of which is essential for our healthy functioning.

Our physical needs are the needs of our physical body, such as proper food, shelter, and clothing. Sexual needs are also a physical need (for most people, though not everyone).

Our mental needs are about cultivating our mind, including our thoughts and emotions, so as to ensure our healthy growth. Our mental needs can be fulfilled in different ways, such as through formal education, inter-personal interaction, exposure to various situations, access to written texts and other media, as well as personal reflection, contemplation and meditation.

Our spiritual needs are about the needs of our soul. These needs can be met by cultivating a personal relationship with God. This is something that is taught in different ways in various theistic religions.

A healthy human being is someone who enjoys good health at all three levels of our being—physical, mental and spiritual—with the needs of the body, mind and soul all provided for adequately and in a balanced manner. A good way to gauge our health, therefore, is to see if we are giving proper and balanced attention to the health of our body, of our mind and of our soul—to each of the levels of our being.

Going by this holistic definition of health, it should come as no surprise that a great many of us suffer from various degrees of ill-health, even if we don’t know it. One reason why this happens is if we ignore or do not adequately provide for the needs related to one or more of the three levels of our being. The same also happens if we fall prey to excess through over-indulgence at one or other level of our being—by having more of something than what we really need.

Take my own case, for example. For many years, I paid no attention to the needs of my soul. It was something I completely ignored—ironically, despite being considered by some people as a ‘scholar’ of religion! I was sunk deep, like in a pit of quick-sand, at the bodily plane. It was as if the only reason I was alive was to maximize sense gratification. Now, I’m not going to go into the details of all this—you’d be shocked if you knew! (Luckily, God places a curtain over many of our misdoings, and so they go with us to the grave, remaining as a secret only between God and us, never to be shared with anyone else.)

In my obsession with sense gratification, which I took to be the purpose of my life, I completely ignored the needs of my soul. Not once in all those many years did I think of God or care to turn to Him, even when I was really down in the dumps. It was hardly surprising, then, that very soon I turned into a psychological wreck.

This is precisely the sort of thing that happens when one ignores or fails to adequately meet the needs of each of the three levels of our being.

As was the case with me, many people are stuck at the physical or bodily level, believing that pandering to the demands and desires of the body is what a ‘good’ and ‘successful’ life is all about. ‘Good’ food, ‘good’ looks, ‘good’ music, ‘good’ clothes, a ‘good’ job, a ‘good’ house’, a ‘good’ car, a ‘good’ bank balance, ‘good’ sex, ‘good’ movies, ‘good’ holidays, and so on—all these, they think, is what human life is about and for.  Today, this tendency is actively promoted by all sorts of forces, including the mass media, the educational system, the advertising industry and corporate houses.

Ill-health can also result if you are too much in the mind, if you are living mainly at the mental level while ignoring the needs of the other levels. For instance, many people who fancy themselves as ‘intellectuals’ are hardened atheists. They take great pride in their denial of God, considering it to be the badge of ‘progressivism’. By turning their back on God, they completely ignore the needs of their soul (hardly surprising, given that they deny the very existence of the soul, claiming that all we are is one huge bundle of molecules). Inevitably, this leads to serious disease—physical, mental and spiritual—that is manifested in different ways.

Often, when we speak of health, what we really mean is physical health, the health of the body. When we ask someone how they are, what we really want to hear (if we aren’t asking this question just as a polite formality!) is whether they are fine physically. Generally, when we put this question to someone, we don’t mean to inquire how the person is mentally, emotionally or spiritually, even though these are vital components of human health.

Why is this so? Why is it that we have such a restricted understanding of health, confined just to the bodily level? This is because most of us operate essentially at the level of the body and its needs and desires. Because of this, we do not factor in the state of our mind and our soul into our understanding of health. And so, even if someone is emotionally sick (for instance, someone who compulsively thinks negatively or is easily prone to anger or irritability) or is spiritually diseased (which is a result of having no room for God in one’s life), as long as one appears physically fine we think that he is in the pink of health.

We can consider ourselves truly healthy not only if our body is free of physical ailments but also if our mind is sound (if we’ve trained ourselves to think positively, for instance, and are emotionally secure) and our soul is in good shape (which can only be when we have established a close relationship with God). True health is thus comprehensive, including all three levels of our being—bodily, mental as well as spiritual. Only by addressing, in a proper and balanced way, the various needs of all three levels—the needs of our body, the needs of our mind, and the needs of our soul—can we be truly healthy.

24 May 2017

Trumped Up Diplomacy in the Middle East

By Richard Falk

In his first overseas trip since moving into the White House, Donald Trump is leaving behind the frustrations, allegations, rumors, and an increasing sense of implosion that seems to be dooming his presidency during its second hundred days. At the same time, a mixture of curiosity and apprehension awaits this new leader wherever he goes making his visit to the Middle East and Europe momentous occasions for the host governments, wide eyed public, and rapacious media. We need to remember that in this era of popular autocrats and surging right-wing populists, Trump is a ‘hero of our time.’

Even if all had gone smoothly for the new president in his home country, there should be expressions of deep concern about his travel itinerary. He visits first the two countries with which the United States has ‘special relationships’ in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Israel. What has long made them ‘special’ are a series of pre-Trump departures from realist and normative foreign policy orientations by successive American presidencies. These departures were motivated by oil geopolitics, arms sales and strategic alliances, hostility to Iran, and a disguised American sweet spot for foreign royalty. It is has long been obvious that uncritical deference to Israeli priorities has seriously undermined U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which would have benefitted much more from policies designed to encourage peace and stability by refraining from regime-changing interventions, massive arms sales, and a diplomacy of respect for the politics of national self-determination.

Most remarkably, the U.S. Government has for decades winked at the billions of support given by Saudi members of the royal family to Wahhabism, that is, to promote fundamentalist Islam, throughout the Muslim world. The first words uttered by Trump on his arrival in Riyadh were that it ‘an honor’ to be visiting.

Then came signed deals adding up to US$110 billion in arms sales and the declaration of a common strategic vision, that is, a super-alliance, called an ‘Arab NATO’ in some circles, a dagger aimed at Iran’s heart. Why turn a blind eye toward the Saudi role in fanning the flames of jihadism while ramping up a military threat to relatively passive Iran that reelected Hassan Rouhani as its president, who has consistently championed moderation at home and normalization abroad.

How can we explain this? Trump has been critical of most aspects of the foreign policy agenda of his predecessors, but on the promotion of the special relationships he seems intent on doubling down on the most misguided aspects of earlier approaches to the region. The shape of his travel itinerary during his days confirms this impression. In this regard, Trump repudiates Obama’s hesitant, but in the end successful, efforts to bring Iran in from the cold, while trying to please Saudi Arabia by ignoring its extreme denial of human rights to its own people as well as its contributions to anti-Western terrorism.

If Trump was truly intent on putting America first, as he insistently asserts, then he could do so very directly and effectively by taking three major steps toward the protection of national interests: first, demand a firm commitment from the Saudi government to cease using private funds and public diplomacy to spread Wahhabism beyond its borders. Any credible public statement along these lines would weaken ISIS and other terrorist movements throughout the world far more than cascades of Tomahawk missiles dumped on a Syrian airfield. Such a challenge to Saudi policies also raises the possibility, however remote, of an endgame in the ‘war on terror.’ If such a reset of Saudi relations could be coupled with an indefinite freeze on arms sales to the Gulf countries that would have been even better, sending a signal throughout the region that America will no longer engage with the bloody conflicts that have brought so much suffering and devastation to the Middle East. This might give some belated meaning to ‘America first.’

The second step would have been even harder for an American president to take. It would require Trump to tell Mr. Netanyahu that no further military assistance for Israel would be authorized until an unconditional freeze on settlement expansion was in place and enforced, and the blockade of Gaza lifted once and for all.

It does not require a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies to appreciate that the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the region and the adoption of effective steps to minimize the sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia Islam would improve future prospects for these horrendously disrupted political realities, at last reducing tensions and risks of wars. Nor does it require special knowledge to identify the obstacles such actions—the one government that already possesses nuclear weapons and the government that feels threatened by a challenge to its regional preeminence. Saudi Arabia and Israel both regard Iran as enemy number one, although it poses no existential threat to either one, and Israel will not even discuss giving up its nuclear arsenal despite being assured by Washington that its qualitative edge in conventional weaponry relative to its neighbors will be upheld.

The special relationships block even the consideration of enlightened initiatives; take them entirely off the table. This contrasts with the American proclivity for coercive diplomacy, which always assertively leaves the military option on the table. Without tension-reducing measures, a few false moves could easily give rise to a major war with Iran, which might bring smiles to leaders in Riyadh and Tel Aviv, but would be disastrous for the societies involved and for the United States, as well as for the region.

Given the leverage and militancy of pro-Israeli lobbies in the United States, more realistically pursuing American national interests toward Israel and the Middle East, seems tantamount to issuing invitations to Trump’s beheading, and despite his wildly gyrations of policy and mood, he has shown no disposition whatsoever to take on AIPAC, inc. Quite the contrary.

Of course, I am not so naïve to think that the advocacy of rationality in foreign policy will have the slightest echo in Washington in the course of Trump’s current diplomatic foray into uncharted territories. What I wish to point out is that this kind of foreign policy fantasy, however desirable if it were to be enacted, has become a species of political suicide. Any political leader who moved in more rational directions would be risking his own life, at least politically. The proposals mentioned above tells us what an American president should do if a rational and humane political system was in place and organized in such ways as to allow the pursuit of national interests, the realization of values associated with peace and human rights, and to attain the benefits of just and sustainable Israeli/Palestinian peace arrangements.

As long as these dysfunctional special relationships are relied upon to define American national interests in the Middle East, violent extremism and turmoil will persist, the authority of the United Nations and international law will suffer, and the credibility of American regional and global leadership will further erode. And maybe worst of all, the mounting ecological and nuclear challenges of global scope and apocalyptical risk will be remain unattended in what has become the greatest display of species indifference to its own survival throughout human history.

Mainstream advice on the Middle East being proffered to the Trump presidency by Beltway sharpshooters takes for granted the geopolitical status quo questioned above. The problems presented by the two special relationships are not even mentioned. Given these perspectives there are three broad kinds of approaches recommended for the region: (1) don’t aim too high, lower expectations, and don’t touch raw nerves in Israel or the Arab world (e.g. moving the American embassy to Jerusalem or telling Israel to dismantle the separation wall, stop expanding settlements, or handle the ongoing hunger strike humanely)[See Aaron David Miller, “From My Twenty Years of Failing at Middle East Peace,” Foreign Policy online, May 19, 2017]; (2) gang up on Iran, which will please both Israel and Saudi Arabia, and will have some positive resonance back in the United States [e.g. Michael Doran, “A Trump Plan for the Middle East,” NY Times, May 19, 2017]; (3) adopt the Israeli hard right view, now pushed within the United States, that the best road to ‘peace’ is to give Israel a green light to exert even greater pressure on the Palestinians to the point of their surrender. [a position repeatedly advocated by Daniel Pipes on the online listserv Middle East Forum and elsewhere, see Pipes, “The Way to Peace: Israeli Victory and Palestinian Defeat,” Commentary, Jan. 2017; Pipes boasts of his work with the Congressional Israel Victory Caucus that wants the U.S. Government to stop talking about ‘the two state solution,’ and support an Israeli shift from managing the status quo to launching a campaign to defeat Palestinians so decisively as to end the conflict.]

The first of these approaches is a cautionary warning to Trump the maker of grand deals not to exceed the boundaries of the feasible. The Israel/Palestine conflict is not ripe for resolution, Israel has no incentive or inclination to reach a fair compromise and even if it were, the Palestinians are currently too fragmented and poorly led to provide a reliable negotiating partner. The second geopolitically oriented approach makes matters worse, pushing the sectarian and secular divides in the direction of a regional confrontation, even combat. The third is geopolitically triumphalist, assuming that the Palestinians can be induced to give up their century old struggle, and go the way of other indigenous lost causes that have succumbed to predatory settler movements.

As Trump dominates the news by his visits to Saudi Arabia and Israel we should not be tricked into thinking that his ‘achievements’ are hopeful developments. The only true beacons of hope for the peoples of the Middle East are the contrarian affirmations of the Palestinian hunger strike, the Rouhani electoral victory, and the BDS Campaign. The fact that such developments are ignored or condemned by the dominant political forces in the West should at least alert us to gathering storm clouds in that tormented region and elsewhere.

Richard Falk is a member of the TRANSCEND Network, an international relations scholar, professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, author, co-author or editor of 40 books, and a speaker and activist on world affairs.

22 May 2017

Putin Aligns with Xi in Crafting the New World (Trade) Order

By Pepe Escobar

15 May 2017 – History will record the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing marked the juncture where the 21st century New Silk Roads assumed their full character of Globalization 2.0, or “inclusive globalization,” as defined by President Xi Jinping in Davos earlier this year.

I have dealt with the monumental stakes here and here. Terminology, of course, remains a minor problem. What was once defined as One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is now promoted as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Much is still somewhat lost in translation in English, what matters is that Xi has managed to imprint the myriad possibilities inbuilt in the concept especially across the Global South.

An amiable host, Xi in Beijing went ‘no holds barred’ extolling the inclusive integration merits of OBOR/BRI. It also helps that along the way, this being China, his spin doctors came up with a lovely metaphor to illustrate how OBOR/BRI should find its force as a common, pan-Eurasian effort; “Wild Swan geese [found across Asia but not in Europe] are able to fly far and safely through winds and storms because they move in flocks and help each other as a team.”

And arguably the key member of this flock of wild swan geese happens to be Russia.

Follow the geese

President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov were guests of honor at the forum – alongside leaders such as Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev and Turkey’s Erdogan. At a business breakfast discussion, Xi seated Putin to his right and Lavrov to his left.

At a Leaders Roundtable summit on the second day of the forum – a sort of Silk Road United Nations, with the microphones open equally to all – Putin touched on a key point; the symbiosis, formalized since 2015, between OBOR/BRI and the Russia-driven Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), currently formed by Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia.

As Putin said, “some 50 European, Asian and Latin American states” are interested in cooperation with the EEU. While the EEU and China are discussing their own, wide-ranging trade/economic deal, the EEU is also consulting, among others, with Iran, India, Serbia, Singapore, and Egypt.

But it was during his speech at the inaugural session of the forum that Putin managed to distill what amounts to a concentrate of Russian foreign policy.

Here are the key topics.

– Through “integration formats like the EEU, OBOR, the SCO, and ASEAN, we can build the foundation for a larger Eurasian partnership.”

– There is now a “unique opportunity to create a common cooperation framework from the Atlantic to the Pacific – for the first time in history.”   Essentially, this is what Putin himself had once proposed – then shunned by EU/NATO – even before Xi announced OBOR in 2013.

– “Russia is not only willing to be a reliable trading partner but also seeks to invest in the creation of joint ventures and new production capacities in partnering states, to invest in industrial facilities, sales, and services.”

– Russia is investing in building “a system of modern and well-connected transport corridors,” “expanding the capacity of the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway, investing significant resources into improvements to the Northeast Passage.”

– And then, looking at the Big Picture, “the infrastructure projects within the EEU and the One Belt, One Road initiative in conjunction with the Northeast Passage can completely reconfigure transportation on the Eurasian continent.”

– Putin expects “newly established financial institutions like the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to offer a supporting hand to private investors.”

And then, the clincher, fully aligned with Xi’s vision; “Greater Eurasia is not an abstract geopolitical arrangement but, without exaggeration, a truly civilization-wide project looking toward the future.”

When in doubt, call the SCO

Compared with the depth and breadth of this shared vision, nothing could be more pedestrian than the official India attitude; not only sending a low-level delegation to Beijing, but imprinting on mainstream Indian media the notion that OBOR/BRI is “little more than a colonial enterprise [that would leave] debt and broken communities in its wake”.

The flock of wild swan geese flying toward Eurasia integration is now a fact of life. East Asian output, for that matter, will surpass North America’s during the Trump era. The future, rather, the dissolution of unipolar hegemony will be decided in Eurasia, particularly East Asia.

India may certainly harbor its own strategic agenda. But self-marginalization of the one and only integrated development project in the 21st century hardly qualifies as savvy diplomacy.

So it looks like Putin once again will have his work cut out for him. India, a historical partner of the former USSR, still maintains good trade relations with Russia. Iran, for its part, is as much a key Indian energy partner as China’s. So the road map ahead spells out Moscow, alongside Tehran, playing the go-betweens trying to sweeten India into the Eurasia integration path.

That could well take place within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which from now on will have a full plate not only trying to smooth out a feasible Afghan peace process but making sure India and Pakistan find a political entente cordiale.

It will be a bit like older brothers trying to instill some sense into younger ones – as Russia and China, as part of their strategic partnership, have already worked hard to manage the twin admission of India and Pakistan into the SCO.

Iran will also become a full member shortly. So we will soon have an active SCO from Southwest Asia all the way to South Asia, with a political-economic integration agenda expanding the initial drive to fight myriad manifestations of Salafi-jihadi terror.

This slowly but surely progressive convergence fits into the larger goals of the Russia-China strategic partnership, which once again, as demonstrated during the Beijing forum, is all about Eurasia integration.

The invisible story at the Beijing forum was that as much as Turkey is a key node of OBOR/BRI and Kazakhstan is a key node between OBOR/BRI and the EEU, it’s China and Russia that will truly advance the complex roadmap of this “civilization-wide project.”

Pepe Escobar is a Brazilian independent geopolitical analyst. He is a frequent contributor to websites and radio and TV shows ranging from the US to East Asia.

22 May 2017