Just International

United Nations vs. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Humanitarian Intervention or Colonial War?

“ALL NECESSARY MEANS”

 

Vienna, 28 March 2011

On Saturday, 26 March 2011, the President of the International Progress Organization sent the following Memorandum to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Memorandum by the President of the International Progress Organization on Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) and its implementation by a “coalition of the willing” under the leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Vienna, 26 March 2011

On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council adopted a binding resolution with the stated goal to protect civilians in the domestic conflict in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Although the “concurring votes” of the permanent members are required under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter for all decisions on other than procedural matters, the decision, adopted without the consent of China and Russia, is considered legally valid since it has become customary among United Nations member states to treat abstention as consent.

In order to meet the requirement of Article 39 of the Charter for the imposition of coercive measures, including the use of force, the Council has determined that the “situation” of domestic conflict in Libya constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In contravention to the provisions of Articles 42ff of the Charter related to the collective enforcement of resolutions by the Council itself, operative paragraphs 4 and 8 of the resolution authorize all Member States, individually or through regional organizations or arrangements, to undertake “all necessary measures” for the protection of civilians and for the enforcement of a so-called “no fly zone” in the airspace of Libya.

It is obvious that the delegation of virtually unlimited authority to interested parties and regional groups – as has become customary since the Gulf War resolutions of 1990/1991 – is not only incompatible with the United Nations Charter, but with the international rule of law as such. Although the provisions of Articles 43ff of the Charter for the making available to the Security Council of armed forces and national air force contingents have remained dead letter and the Military Staff Committee has never become operational, the Security Council can under no circumstances authorize a use of force the extent and form of which is solely at the discretion of those parties that volunteer to intervene on behalf of the UN. The procedures outlined in the operative paragraphs of resolution 1973 (2011), and their implementation by the interested parties, including NATO, contradict the doctrine of collective security which is the foundation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in several important respects:

1.      The notion “all necessary measures” – which interested member states are invited to take “to protect civilians” (Par. 4) and “to enforce compliance with the ban on flights” (Par. 8) – is not only vague but also totally undefined. In a context of international power politics, imprecise terms will unavoidably be interpreted according to the self-interest of the intervening parties and, thus, can never be the basis of legally justified action. Such terms have often been used as pretext for a virtually unrestrained use of force.

2.      The lack of a precise definition of the term “all necessary measures” makes it impossible, a principio, to ascertain the compatibility and commensurability of the adopted measures with the goals stated in the resolution. This effectively guarantees interested states and groups of states, as well as their political and military leaders, to act outside a framework of checks and balances, and with total impunity.

3.      To “authorize” states to use “all necessary means” in the enforcement of a legally binding resolution is an invitation to an arbitrary and arrogant exercise of power, and makes the commitment of the United Nations Organization to the international rule of law void of any meaning. The fact that the Security Council adopted the same approach earlier, namely in resolution 678 (1990), dealing with the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, does not justify the present action in the domestic conflict situation in Libya.

4.      The interpretation of the term “all necessary means” by two senior members of the British Government, shortly after the adoption of the resolution, is evidence of the problems caused by the use of an undefined term, and in particular of the abuses of power this invites. Both, the Secretaries of Defense and Foreign Affairs explicitly declined to exclude the targeted killing of the Libyan leader as one of the possible “measures” authorized under the text of resolution 1973 (2011). Although they did not repeat these views in later statements, and the British Prime Minister did not support their interpretation of “all necessary measures,” the Pandora’s box has now been opened.

5.      The characterization of the resolution by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation as “defective and flawed” insofar as it “allows everything” and “resembles medieval calls for crusades,” was very much to the point. Shocking as this assessment may be for the self-appointed guardians of mankind and representatives of the so-called “international community,” a procedure by which a country’s leadership is declared an international outlaw, and everyone (state or regional group) is invited to join in the battle in whichever way he pleases indeed resembles the rationale of the crusades. However, a medieval hostis declaration has no room in modern international law. International vigilantism and a humanitarian free-for-all are elements of anarchy and belong in a pre-modern system of imperial powers, as it existed before the abrogation of the jus ad bellum.

6.      In the context of Chapter VII enforcement measures, including the use of armed force, the formula “all necessary measures” effectively invites unilateral action by the self-appointed members of a “coalition of the willing,” something which not only gradually subverts, but perverts the United Nations’ rationale of collective security in the service of an undeclared imperialist agenda, hidden behind humanitarian motives such as those proclaimed under the slogan of the “Responsibility to Protect” (a set of principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, which seems to have replaced the earlier phraseology of “humanitarian intervention”).

7.      The ban on the use of force according to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter will become totally meaningless if, by way of a Chapter VII resolution, every member state can effectively use force in pursuit of an abstract goal in a unilateral manner, and without any checks and balances.

8.      The stated goal of the “protection of civilians” has been implemented by interested member states, first and foremost the former colonial powers in North Africa in tandem with the United States, in a way that has caused even more deaths among innocent civilians.

9.      Contrary to the purposes of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the implementation of resolution 1973 (2011) by interested parties has led to an increased threat to international security instead of containing it. What was essentially a domestic conflict, resulting from an armed uprising, has now become an international one. By intervening in a domestic conflict situation on the side of one party, the states that undertook to enforce the resolution, individually and through NATO, have further fuelled the conflict and brought about a situation that may lead to the disintegration of Libya, with the prospect of long-term instability in the entire North African and Mediterranean region.

10.  The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as coordinating entity for the enforcement of the flight ban and, eventually, all military operations in Libya has further complicated the international dimension of the conflict. NATO is a mutual defense pact of European states, including Turkey, and two North American states. Even if in the disguise of “crisis response operations” and noble humanitarian motives, offensive action in North Africa – outside the treaty area – will further threaten international peace and security. NATO’s involvement as a regional organization, albeit not representing the concerned Arab and North African regions, also testifies to the dangers of the general authorization formula in resolution 1973 (2011). NATO certainly represents a spectrum of interests that is totally different from that of the concerned region. In view of its composition and political agenda, it is totally inappropriate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to act as the exclusive enforcer of Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council.

11.  By deciding to “protect civilians” in Libya while not acting in comparable situations of uprisings in Bahrain and Yemen, the Security Council has obviously chosen a policy of double standards that seems to be determined by the strategic and economic interests of the intervening countries.

12.  In an act of utmost hypocrisy, the intervening countries hide their vested interests behind the stated humanitarian goal of resolution 1973 (2011). Under the cover of the “Responsibility to Protect,” which the Secretary-General of the United Nations evoked as rationale of the resolution, an effectively unilateral use of force has taken hold, amounting to military measures that, as acts of war on the side of one party in a domestic conflict, go far beyond the stated goals of the resolution and are carried out with total impunity and without sufficient checks and balances. Due to the authorization formula of “all necessary means,” the Security Council has made itself a mere bystander. Because of the voting provision of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, the authorization cannot be cancelled without the consent of those permanent members that have succeeded in inserting it into the resolution.

13.   It is to be recalled that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1970 (2011) by which the Security Council has referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), provides for a kind of “preventive impunity” for all officials and personnel from countries militarily intervening in Libya in so far as they will, in spite of the referral decision under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This approach, which amounts to an effective amendment of the Rome Statute of the ICC, for which the Security Council has no authority, again reveals the predominance of political considerations over those of justice or human rights.

14.  In line with the Security Council’s tendency, since the end of the Cold War, to arrogate powers not given to it in the Charter, and to broaden its mandate as global “administrator of justice,” resolution 1973 (2011) appears to have further widened the scope of action on the basis of Chapter VII so as to include the protection of the civilian population in situations of domestic conflict. However, if the Council aspires to be an enforcer of rights and an arbiter in domestic conflicts, it will have to abide by the basic principles of the rule of law, first and foremost the exclusion of arbitrariness in the enforcement of the law. As long as it encourages member states to act as they please, allowing them to further their own national interests in the disguise of enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations, the Security Council’s practice will itself constitute a threat to international peace and security.

15.  In view of the legal contradictions resulting from the authorization of the use of “all necessary measures” under Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council, impacting on the very legitimacy of the world organization as an agent of collective security, the member states in the United Nations General Assembly should consider to seek an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice according to Article 96(1) of the Charter.

The West’s Intervention: Democracy Discrimination in the Middle East

 

25 March, 2011

The horrible manner in which Ahmed Farhan, a 29-year-old Bahraini youth, met his death, as seen in a spine-chilling video clip on Youtube, tells of why there should be an immediate stop to the use of brutal firepower against peaceful protesters in the Middle East.

Farhan was shot in the head from a helicopter, the bullet splitting his skull and dividing his brain into segments like an orange. A doctor at the scene had to hold together the four parts of Farhan’s head in his hands so as to put him to rest and give his corpse a semblance of normality. Watching the video clip could give viewers nightmares for days. Such brutal action by the state is inhuman and sheer arrogance of power.

The various characteristics of unrest across the Middle East show the difference of manner with which the regimes are responding to protests. Unlike Egypt, the governments of Yemen, Bahrain and Libya have employed brutal firepower to silence the peaceful protesters. The more authoritarian and stronger a regime, the more aggressive and brutal its treatment of protesters.

So we have to ask why, after implementing a no-fly zone in Libya, have Western powers not done the same in Yemen and Bahrain, which are also engaged in brutal violence against their citizens; why this discrimination?

Furthermore, Turkey, the foremost democracy in the Muslim world and a Nato ally, was not invited to the Paris talks on Libya. To enforce a no-fly zone in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, a southward-partnered coalition comprising countries such as Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, and India would have been a more credible international operation.

All the protests in the Middle East have the same objectives, being based on a desire for freedom, democracy, human and food security and gender equality – the very values the West supports. So why this discrimination in the West’s response? Is it still all about oil and their fear of the “bogeymen”, the Islamist Jihadists? Mu’ammar Gadhafi has often changed the nature of his relationship with the West in the last four decades, hence it seems easier to punish him like a naughty child, pampered sometimes with carrots and shown the stick at other times. Gadhafi is not a big liability for the West in the way that the other oil monarchies are, for access to Libyan oil will continue under any Libyan regime.

Since their emergence as post-colonial powers, all the Middle Eastern regimes have destroyed or curbed the rise of opposition, either in the name of Islam or Arab culture. But if Islam is against democracy, then why is it still welcomed and functioning in Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan? And why do most modern Muslim political philosophers see a commensurability between the Quranic advice that Muslims conduct their affairs through mutual consultation (Quran: 42:38), and legislature? If Islam and democracy are incompatible, as claimed by the monarchies and dictatorships, then why are they hiding behind the fig leaf of invented religious and cultural excuses that serve the interests of political elites and their cronies at the cost of their own citizenry? And by the way, the early caliphs of Islamic polity were no monarchs.

At the present juncture, it seems that the oil monarchies of the Gulf will not go down easily, and nor are they ready for genuine political change. They refuse to become constitutional monarchies, instead employing religio-political rhetoric emphasising that they are still searching for an Islamic model based on their culture. This is turning a blind eye to/ignoring centuries of Islamic political philosophy in which Muslim political thinkers have vigorously argued for shura – a consultative model for Islamic political functioning. Nor are they ready to opt for public referenda to determine what type of political set-up their populaces want. It seems strange that in this day and age when several regimes have been toppled or succumbed to people power, the oil monarchies are not ready for a civilian political option – that they can go scot-free with no international repercussions.

Furthermore, when two of my previous articles for The Nation cited the above-mentioned countries as examples of Muslim democracies, I received nearly identical responses from several Western readers. They hold that these Muslim democracies are “not democratic enough” from the point of view of Western liberal political philosophy. It must be reiterated here that “democracy” is a contested term. Thailand’s democracy has been described as that of a rice-eating people. There are other similar non-Western definitions of democracy, just as there are of secularism. Hence, Muslims are also free to come up with their version of democracy – as long as it adheres to the objectives of open political participation, freedom and accountability.

The emerging Shi’a-Sunni conflict in Bahrain is going to have serious implications for intra-Muslim relations across the Middle East and the world. The rise of Iran after its Islamic revolution of 1979, followed by the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the emergence of Iraq as the first Arab Shi’a state after the American invasion has definitely divided the Middle East into Sunni and Shi’a zones. This development has immense implications for Arab Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon with their Shi’a minorities. It has divided the Middle East into Sunni and Shi’a zones. The Sunni zone comprises Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf states, while the Shi’a zone includes Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This division and the emergence of Shi’a protest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is not only unsettling for the Middle East but will also have repercussions for other Muslim communities in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and also Southeast Asia. The onset of Sunni-Shi’a tension with potential for conflict and violence as seen before will only complicate the situation, because there is a historical absence of intra-Muslim dialogue amidst mutual Sunni-Shi’a religious distrust.

Amidst all the ongoing bloodshed in the Middle East, the post-Islamist face of the protest which emerged in Tunisia and Egypt led by unemployed youth and the dissatisfied middle-class is being obscured and brutally suppressed by regimes who want to last forever and are not open to the democratic alternative. But the face of the Middle East is changing; it is no longer the “old” Middle East.

It is time to discard the false assumption of Islamic exception to democracy, for the democratic option has never been made available to the Middle Eastern populace, either during the colonial or the post-colonial era. And it seems strange that while in the past it was Islamists who were the targets of state oppression, now it is post-Islamists who are becoming the victims of similar brutal repression. This offers convenient fodder for jihadist propagandists to make their case once again.

Is the cycle repeating itself? Is this the end of the democracy season in the Middle East? Is there a way to end the decades’ old post-colonial political morass in the Middle East, or is it always about oil and other interests? Have Ahmed Farhan and thousands of others to die in vain?

Dr Imtiyaz Yusuf is Professor of Islamics and Religion at Assumption University’s Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion.

The Kill Team

 

 

 

MARCH 27, 2011 Rollingstone.com

How U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan murdered innocent civilians and mutilated their corpses – and how their officers failed to stop them. Plus: An exclusive look at the war crime photos censored by the Pentagon

Cpl. Jeremy Morlock with Staff Sgt. David Bram

Early last year, after six hard months soldiering in Afghanistan, a group of American infantrymen reached a momentous decision: It was finally time to kill a haji.

Among the men of Bravo Company, the notion of killing an Afghan civilian had been the subject of countless conversations, during lunchtime chats and late-night bull sessions. For weeks, they had weighed the ethics of bagging “savages” and debated the probability of getting caught. Some of them agonized over the idea; others were gung-ho from the start. But not long after the New Year, as winter descended on the arid plains of Kandahar Province, they agreed to stop talking and actually pull the trigger.

Bravo Company had been stationed in the area since summer, struggling, with little success, to root out the Taliban and establish an American presence in one of the most violent and lawless regions of the country. On the morning of January 15th, the company’s 3rd Platoon – part of the 5th Stryker Brigade, based out of Tacoma, Washington – left the mini-metropolis of tents and trailers at Forward Operating Base Ramrod in a convoy of armored Stryker troop carriers. The massive, eight-wheeled trucks surged across wide, vacant stretches of desert, until they came to La Mohammad Kalay, an isolated farming village tucked away behind a few poppy fields.

To provide perimeter security, the soldiers parked the Strykers at the outskirts of the settlement, which was nothing more than a warren of mud-and-straw compounds. Then they set out on foot. Local villagers were suspected of supporting the Taliban, providing a safe haven for strikes against U.S. troops. But as the soldiers of 3rd Platoon walked through the alleys of La Mohammad Kalay, they saw no armed fighters, no evidence of enemy positions. Instead, they were greeted by a frustratingly familiar sight: destitute Afghan farmers living without electricity or running water; bearded men with poor teeth in tattered traditional clothes; young kids eager for candy and money. It was impossible to tell which, if any, of the villagers were sympathetic to the Taliban. The insurgents, for their part, preferred to stay hidden from American troops, striking from a distance with IEDs.

While the officers of 3rd Platoon peeled off to talk to a village elder inside a compound, two soldiers walked away from the unit until they reached the far edge of the village. There, in a nearby poppy field, they began looking for someone to kill. “The general consensus was, if we are going to do something that fucking crazy, no one wanted anybody around to witness it,” one of the men later told Army investigators.

The poppy plants were still low to the ground at that time of year. The two soldiers, Cpl. Jeremy Morlock and Pfc. Andrew Holmes, saw a young farmer who was working by himself among the spiky shoots. Off in the distance, a few other soldiers stood sentry. But the farmer was the only Afghan in sight. With no one around to witness, the timing was right. And just like that, they picked him for execution.

He was a smooth-faced kid, about 15 years old. Not much younger than they were: Morlock was 21, Holmes was 19. His name, they would later learn, was Gul Mudin, a common name in Afghanistan. He was wearing a little cap and a Western-style green jacket. He held nothing in his hand that could be interpreted as a weapon, not even a shovel. The expression on his face was welcoming. “He was not a threat,” Morlock later confessed.

Morlock and Holmes called to him in Pashto as he walked toward them, ordering him to stop. The boy did as he was told. He stood still.

The soldiers knelt down behind a mud-brick wall. Then Morlock tossed a grenade toward Mudin, using the wall as cover. As the grenade exploded, he and Holmes opened fire, shooting the boy repeatedly at close range with an M4 carbine and a machine gun.

Mudin buckled, went down face first onto the ground. His cap toppled off. A pool of blood congealed by his head.

The loud report of the guns echoed all around the sleepy farming village. The sound of such unexpected gunfire typically triggers an emergency response in other soldiers, sending them into full battle mode. Yet when the shots rang out, some soldiers didn’t seem especially alarmed, even when the radio began to squawk. It was Morlock, agitated, screaming that he had come under attack. On a nearby hill, Spc. Adam Winfield turned to his friend, Pfc. Ashton Moore, and explained that it probably wasn’t a real combat situation. It was more likely a staged killing, he said – a plan the guys had hatched to take out an unarmed Afghan without getting caught.

Back at the wall, soldiers arriving on the scene found the body and the bloodstains on the ground. Morlock and Holmes were crouched by the wall, looking excited. When a staff sergeant asked them what had happened, Morlock said the boy had been about to attack them with a grenade. “We had to shoot the guy,” he said.

It was an unlikely story: a lone Taliban fighter, armed with only a grenade, attempting to ambush a platoon in broad daylight, let alone in an area that offered no cover or concealment. Even the top officer on the scene, Capt. Patrick Mitchell, thought there was something strange about Morlock’s story. “I just thought it was weird that someone would come up and throw a grenade at us,” Mitchell later told investigators.

But Mitchell did not order his men to render aid to Mudin, whom he believed might still be alive, and possibly a threat. Instead, he ordered Staff Sgt. Kris Sprague to “make sure” the boy was dead. Sprague raised his rifle and fired twice.

As the soldiers milled around the body, a local elder who had been working in the poppy field came forward and accused Morlock and Holmes of murder. Pointing to Morlock, he said that the soldier, not the boy, had thrown the grenade. Morlock and the other soldiers ignored him.

To identify the body, the soldiers fetched the village elder who had been speaking to the officers that morning. But by tragic coincidence, the elder turned out to be the father of the slain boy. His moment of grief-stricken recognition, when he saw his son lying in a pool of blood, was later recounted in the flat prose of an official Army report. “The father was very upset,” the report noted.

The father’s grief did nothing to interrupt the pumped-up mood that had broken out among the soldiers. Following the routine Army procedure required after every battlefield death, they cut off the dead boy’s clothes and stripped him naked to check for identifying tattoos. Next they scanned his iris and fingerprints, using a portable biometric scanner.

Then, in a break with protocol, the soldiers began taking photographs of themselves celebrating their kill. Holding a cigarette rakishly in one hand, Holmes posed for the camera with Mudin’s bloody and half-naked corpse, grabbing the boy’s head by the hair as if it were a trophy deer. Morlock made sure to get a similar memento.

No one seemed more pleased by the kill than Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs, the platoon’s popular and hard-charging squad leader. “It was like another day at the office for him,” one soldier recalls. Gibbs started “messing around with the kid,” moving his arms and mouth and “acting like the kid was talking.” Then, using a pair of razor-sharp medic’s shears, he reportedly sliced off the dead boy’s pinky finger and gave it to Holmes, as a trophy for killing his first Afghan.

According to his fellow soldiers, Holmes took to carrying the finger with him in a zip-lock bag. “He wanted to keep the finger forever and wanted to dry it out,” one of his friends would later report. “He was proud of his finger.”

After the killing, the soldiers involved in Mudin’s death were not disciplined or punished in any way. Emboldened, the platoon went on a shooting spree over the next four months that claimed the lives of at least three more innocent civilians. When the killings finally became public last summer, the Army moved aggressively to frame the incidents as the work of a “rogue unit” operating completely on its own, without the knowledge of its superiors. Military prosecutors swiftly charged five low-ranking soldiers with murder, and the Pentagon clamped down on any information about the killings. Soldiers in Bravo Company were barred from giving interviews, and lawyers for the accused say their clients faced harsh treatment if they spoke to the press, including solitary confinement. No officers were charged.

But a review of internal Army records and investigative files obtained by Rolling Stone, including dozens of interviews with members of Bravo Company compiled by military investigators, indicates that the dozen infantrymen being portrayed as members of a secretive “kill team” were operating out in the open, in plain view of the rest of the company. Far from being clandestine, as the Pentagon has implied, the murders of civilians were common knowledge among the unit and understood to be illegal by “pretty much the whole platoon,” according to one soldier who complained about them. Staged killings were an open topic of conversation, and at least one soldier from another battalion in the 3,800-man Stryker Brigade participated in attacks on unarmed civilians. “The platoon has a reputation,” a whistle-blower named Pfc. Justin Stoner told the Army Criminal Investigation Command. “They have had a lot of practice staging killings and getting away with it.”

From the start, the questionable nature of the killings was on the radar of senior Army leadership. Within days of the first murder, Rolling Stone has learned, Mudin’s uncle descended on the gates of FOB Ramrod, along with 20 villagers from La Mohammad Kalay, to demand an investigation. “They were sitting at our front door,” recalls Lt. Col. David Abrahams, the battalion’s second in command. During a four-hour meeting with Mudin’s uncle, Abrahams was informed that several children in the village had seen Mudin killed by soldiers from 3rd Platoon. The battalion chief ordered the soldiers to be reinterviewed, but Abrahams found “no inconsistencies in their story,” and the matter was dropped. “It was cut and dry to us at the time,” Abrahams recalls.

Other officers were also in a position to question the murders. Neither 3rd Platoon’s commander, Capt. Matthew Quiggle, nor 1st Lt. Roman Ligsay has been held accountable for their unit’s actions, despite their repeated failure to report killings that they had ample reason to regard as suspicious. In fact, supervising the murderous platoon, or even having knowledge of the crimes, seems to have been no impediment to career advancement. Ligsay has actually been promoted to captain, and a sergeant who joined the platoon in April became a team leader even though he “found out about the murders from the beginning,” according to a soldier who cooperated with the Army investigation.

Indeed, it would have been hard not to know about the murders, given that the soldiers of 3rd Platoon took scores of photographs chronicling their kills and their time in Afghanistan. The photos, obtained by Rolling Stone, portray a front-line culture among U.S. troops in which killing Afghan civilians is less a reason for concern than a cause for celebration. “Most people within the unit disliked the Afghan people, whether it was the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army or locals,” one soldier explained to investigators. “Everyone would say they’re savages.” One photo shows a hand missing a finger. Another depicts a severed head being maneuvered with a stick, and still more show bloody body parts, blown-apart legs, mutilated torsos. Several show dead Afghans, lying on the ground or on Stryker vehicles, with no weapons in view.

In many of the photos it is unclear whether the bodies are civilians or Taliban, and it is possible that the unidentified deaths involved no illegal acts by U.S. soldiers. But it is a violation of Army standards to take such photos of the dead, let alone share them with others. Among the soldiers, the collection was treated like a war memento. It was passed from man to man on thumb drives and hard drives, the gruesome images of corpses and war atrocities filed alongside clips of TV shows, UFC fights and films such as Iron Man 2. One soldier kept a complete set, which he made available to anyone who asked.

The collection also includes several videos shot by U.S. troops. In a jumpy, 30-minute clip titled “Motorcycle Kill,” soldiers believed to be with another battalion in the Stryker Brigade gun down two Afghans on a motorcycle who may have been armed. One of the most chilling files shows two Afghans suspected of planting an IED being blown up in an airstrike. Shot through thermal imaging, the grainy footage has been edited into a music video, complete with a rock soundtrack and a title card that reads ‘death zone.’

Even before the war crimes became public, the Pentagon went to extraordinary measures to suppress the photos – an effort that reached the highest levels of both governments. Gen. Stanley McChrystal and President Hamid Karzai were reportedly briefed on the photos as early as May, and the military launched a massive effort to find every file and pull the pictures out of circulation before they could touch off a scandal on the scale of Abu Ghraib. Investigators in Afghanistan searched the hard drives and confiscated the computers of more than a dozen soldiers, ordering them to delete any provocative images. The Army Criminal Investigation Command also sent agents fanning out across America to the homes of soldiers and their relatives, gathering up every copy of the files they could find. The message was clear: What happens in Afghanistan stays in Afghanistan.

By suppressing the photos, however, the Army may also have been trying to keep secret evidence that the killings of civilians went beyond a few men in 3rd Platoon. In one image, two dead Afghans have been tied together, their hands bound, and placed alongside a road. A sign – handwritten on cardboard from a discarded box of rations – hangs around their necks. It reads “Taliban are Dead.” The Pentagon says it is investigating the photos, but insists that there is little more investigators can do to identify the men. “It’s a mystery,” says a Pentagon spokesman. “To be perfectly honest, I’m not sure they know where to take it next. All we have is two apparently dead Afghans handcuffed to each other against a mile marker. We don’t know much beyond that. For all we know, those two guys may have been killed by the Taliban for being sympathizers.”

But such statements suggest that the Pentagon isn’t following every lead. A Stryker vehicle in the photos, for example, bears identifying marks that are clearly visible in the image. And according to a source in Bravo Company, who spoke to Rolling Stone on the condition of anonymity, the two unarmed men in the photos were killed by soldiers from another platoon, which has not yet been implicated in the scandal.

“Those were some innocent farmers that got killed,” the source says. “Their standard operating procedure after killing dudes was to drag them up to the side of the highway.”

Army prosecutors insist that blame for the killings rests with a soldier near the bottom of the Stryker Brigade’s totem pole: Calvin Gibbs, a three-tour veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan who served as a squad leader in 3rd Platoon. Morlock and five soldiers charged with lesser crimes have pleaded guilty in exchange for testifying against Gibbs, who faces life in prison for three counts of premeditated murder.

The 26-year-old staff sergeant has been widely portrayed as a sociopath of Mansonesque proportions, a crazed killer with a “pure hatred for all Afghans” who was detested and feared by those around him. But the portrait omits evidence that the Army’s own investigators gathered from soldiers in Bravo Company. “Gibbs is very well-liked in the platoon by his seniors, peers and subordinates alike,” Spc. Adam Kelly reported, adding that Gibbs was “one of the best NCOs I’ve ever had the pleasure of working with in my military career. I believe that because of his experience, more people came back alive and uninjured than would have without him having been part of the platoon.” Another soldier described Gibbs as an “upbeat guy, very funny. He was one of those guys you could talk to about anything and he would make you feel better about the situation.”

At six-feet-four and 220 pounds, Gibbs could certainly intimidate those around him. Growing up in a devout Mormon family in Billings, Montana, he had dropped out of high school to get an equivalency degree and enlist in the Army. He plunged into soldiering, accumulating a slew of medals in Iraq, where the line between legitimate self-defense and civilian deaths was often blurry at best. In 2004, Gibbs and other soldiers allegedly fired on an unarmed Iraqi family near Kirkuk, killing two adults and a child. The incident, which was not prosecuted at the time, is now under investigation by the Army.

Before he joined Bravo Company in November 2009, Gibbs worked on the personal security detail for one of the top commanders in Afghanistan, a controversial, outspoken colonel named Harry Tunnell. Tunnell, who at the time was the commander of 5th Stryker Brigade, openly mocked the military’s approach to counterinsurgency – which emphasizes the need to win the support of local civilians – as better suited to a “social scientist.” “Political correctness dictates that we cannot talk about the oppressive measures employed during successful counterinsurgency campaigns,” he wrote. Tunnell also pushed his men to go after “guerrilla hunter killers,” insisting that the enemy “must be attacked relentlessly.”

When Gibbs left Tunnell’s detail and arrived at the front, he quickly became an extreme version of a relentless attacker. After he took command, Gibbs put a pirate flag on his tent. “Hey, brother,” he told a friend. “Come down to the line and we’ll find someone to kill.” A tattoo on his left shin featured a pair of crossed rifles offset by six skulls. Three of the skulls, colored in red, represented his kills in Iraq. The others, in blue, were from Afghanistan.

By the time Gibbs arrived, morale in the Stryker Brigade had hit rock bottom. Only four months earlier, the unit had been deployed to Afghanistan amid a chorus of optimism about its eight-wheeled armored vehicles, a technological advancement that was supposed to move infantry to the battlefield more quickly and securely, enabling U.S. troops to better strike against the Taliban. By December, however, those hopes had dissolved. The Taliban had forced the Strykers off the roads simply by increasing the size and explosive force of their IEDs, and the brigade had suffered terrible casualties; one battalion had lost more soldiers in action than any since the start of the war. Gibbs, in fact, had been brought in after a squad leader had his legs blown off by an IED.

The soldiers were bored and shellshocked and angry. They had been sent to Afghanistan as part of a new advance guard on a mission to track down the Taliban, but the enemy was nowhere to be found. “To be honest, I couldn’t tell the difference between local nationals and combatants,” one soldier later confessed. During the unit’s first six months in Afghanistan, the Taliban evaded almost every patrol that 3rd Platoon sent out. Frustrations ran so high that when the unit came across the body of an insurgent killed by a helicopter gunship in November 2009, one soldier took out a hunting knife and stabbed the corpse. According to another soldier, Gibbs began playing with a pair of scissors near the dead man’s hands. “I wonder if these can cut off a finger?” Gibbs asked.

The Pentagon’s top command, rather than addressing the morale problems, actually held up the brigade as a media-worthy example of progress in the war. The month after the helicopter incident – only four weeks before the killings began – the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, paid a heavily publicized visit to the area. The military’s strategy of counterinsurgency, he reminded members of 5th Stryker Brigade, required them to win hearts and minds by protecting the population. “If we’re killing local civilians,” he cautioned, “we’re going to strategically lose.”

Gibbs had a different idea about how to breathe new life into 3rd Platoon. Not long after he arrived, he explained to his fellow soldiers that they didn’t have to wait passively to be attacked by the enemy’s IEDs. They could strike back by hitting people in towns known to be sympathetic to the Taliban. “Gibbs told everyone about this scenario by pitching it – by saying that all these Afghans were savages, and we had just lost one of our squad leaders because his legs got blown off by an IED,” Morlock recalled. Killing an Afghan – any Afghan – became a way to avenge the loss.

The members of Bravo Company began to talk incessantly about killing Afghans as they went about their daily chores, got stoned or relaxed over a game of Warhammer. One idea, proposed half in jest, was to throw candy out of a Stryker vehicle as they drove through a village and shoot the children who came running to pick up the sweets. According to one soldier, they also talked about a second scenario in which they “would throw candy out in front and in the rear of the Stryker; the Stryker would then run the children over.” Another elaborate plan involved waiting for an IED attack, then using the explosion as an excuse to kill civilians. That way, the soldiers reasoned, “you could shoot anyone in the general area and get away with it.”

“We were operating in such bad places and not being able to do anything about it,” Morlock said in a phone interview from the jail at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state. “I guess that’s why we started taking things into our own hands.”

After killing the Afghan boy at La Mohammad Kalay, members of 3rd Platoon were jubilant. “They were high-fiving each other about having killed the guy,” one soldier recalled. They put the corpse in a black body bag and stowed it on top of their Stryker for the ride back to FOB Ramrod. No sooner had they arrived at the base than they were recounting the tale to soldiers they barely knew.

A few hours after the shooting, during a routine checkup at the base’s clinic, Holmes and Morlock bragged about having killed an insurgent to Alyssa Reilly, a fair-skinned, blond medic who was popular among the men in the unit. Reilly later paid the soldiers a social visit, and they all sat around playing spades. When it came time for their wager, Morlock and Holmes said they would bet a finger. Then they tossed the finger that Gibbs had sliced from Mudin’s body on the card pile. “I thought it was gross,” Reilly told investigators.

Morlock was particularly eager to volunteer the truth to his fellow soldiers, evidently unconcerned about how they would react to his having murdered an unarmed Afghan. The same evening he shot Mudin, several members of Bravo Company convened in the privacy of a Stryker vehicle for a nightcap of hashish, a common activity among the unit. Hash supplied by Afghan translators was a major part of the daily lives of many soldiers; they smoked up constantly, getting high in their vehicles, their housing units, even porta-potties. Now, in the tanklike interior of the Stryker, surrounded by its mesh of wires and periscopes and thermal-imaging computers, Morlock passed the hash and recounted the killing in detail, even explaining how he had been careful not to leave the grenade’s spoon and pin on the ground, where they might have been used as evidence that a U.S. weapon had been involved in the attack. For the same reason, he’d also been careful to brush away traces of white explosive powder around Mudin’s body.

Before the military found itself short of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, Morlock was the kind of bad-news kid whom the Army might have passed on. He grew up not far from Sarah Palin in Wasilla, Alaska; his sister hung out with Bristol, and Morlock played hockey against Track. In those days, he was constantly in trouble: getting drunk and into fights, driving without a license, leaving the scene of a serious car accident. Even after he joined the Army, Morlock continued to get into trouble. In 2009, a month before he deployed to Afghanistan, he was charged with disorderly conduct after burning his wife with a cigarette. After he arrived in Afghanistan, he did any drug he could get his hands on: opium, hash, Ambien, amitriptyline, flexeril, phenergan, codeine, trazodone.

As Morlock bragged about the killing, word of the murder spread back home to families and friends. Soldiers e-mailed photos to their buddies and talked about the killing during visits home. On February 14th, three months before the Army launched its investigation, Spc. Adam Winfield sent a Facebook message to his father, Chris, back in Cape Coral, Florida. A skinny, bookish 21-year-old, Winfield was pissed off at being disciplined by Gibbs. “There are people in my platoon that have gotten away with murder,” he told his father. “Everyone pretty much knows it was staged. . . . They all don’t care.” Winfield added that the victim was “some innocent guy about my age, just farming.”

During Facebook chats, Winfield continued to keep his father in the loop. “Adam told me that he heard the group was planning on another murder involving an innocent Afghanistan man,” Chris Winfield, himself a veteran, later told investigators. “They were going to kill him and drop an AK-47 on him to make it look like he was the bad guy.” Alarmed, the elder Winfield called the command center at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and told the sergeant on duty what was going on. But according to Winfield, the sergeant simply shrugged it off, telling him that “stuff like that happens” and that “it would be sorted out when Adam got home.” Tragically, commanders at the base did nothing to follow up on the report.

Back in Afghanistan, Winfield was having second thoughts about reporting the incident. He believed the killings were wrong, but he had finally earned a place in the “circle of trust” erected by Gibbs, who had started off thinking of him as too “weak” to belong to the kill team. Reversing course, he begged his father to stop contacting the Army, saying that he feared for his life. Winfield said Gibbs had warned him that if he told anyone about the murder, he would “go home in a body bag.” His father agreed to keep the matter quiet.

Given the lack of response from their superiors, the soldiers of 3rd Platoon now believed they could kill with impunity – provided they planted “drop weapons” at the scene to frame their victims as enemy combatants. The presence of a weapon virtually guaranteed that a shooting would be considered a legitimate kill, even under the stricter rules of engagement the military had implemented as a key element of counterinsurgency. A drop weapon was the ultimate get-out-of-jail-free card. And in the chaotic war zone, they were easy to find.

The military keeps close track of the weapons and ammunition it issues to soldiers, carefully documenting every grenade exploded, every magazine expended. So Gibbs made it his business to gather “off the books” weapons through a variety of channels. He got friendly with guys in the Afghan National Police and tried to trade them porn magazines in exchange for rocket-propelled grenades; he cajoled other units to give him munitions; he scrounged for broken and discarded UXO – unexploded ordnance – until he had collected a motley arsenal of random weaponry, old frag grenades, bent RPG tails, duct-taped claymore mines, C-4, mortar rounds. His best find was a working AK-47 with a folding butt stock and two magazines, which he pulled from the wreckage of an Afghan National Police vehicle that had been blown up near the base’s gate. Gibbs placed the AK-47 and the magazines in a metal box in one of the Strykers. Later, a corporal named Emmitt Quintal discovered the gun and wondered what it was doing there. As he recalled, Staff Sgt. David Bram “sat me down and explained to me that it was basically to cover our ass if anything happened.”

Two weeks after the murder of Gul Mudin, something did.

It was the night of January 27th and the platoon was driving along the highway near their forward operating base. Suddenly, through their thermal imaging, they spotted a human heat signature on the side of the road – a potentially suspicious sign, since the Taliban often operate at night, using the cover of darkness to plant IEDs.

The patrol stopped 100 yards away from the man, and a handful of soldiers and an interpreter got out of their vehicles. They could see that the man was crouched down, or curled up like a ball close to the ground. As they approached, the man stood up and held his arms in front of his chest. To the soldiers, the motion was either an indication that he was cold, or that he was hiding a suicide-bomb vest.

Shouting to the man in Pashto, the soldiers illuminated him with intense, high-power spotlights and ordered him to lift up his shirt. But the man began to pace back and forth in the blinding white light, ignoring their calls. “He was acting strange,” recalls a soldier. For several minutes the man shuffled around as the soldiers fired warning shots at him. The bullets skipped around him.

Then – ignoring the warnings – the man began walking toward the troops. “Fire!” someone yelled. Gibbs opened fire, followed by at least five other soldiers. In the course of a few seconds, they expended approximately 40 rounds.

The man’s body lay on the ground. He turned out to be completely unarmed. According to official statements made by several soldiers, he also appears to have been deaf or mentally disabled. Above his beard, a large portion of his skull was missing, blown away by the hail of bullets. Spc. Michael Wagnon collected a piece of the skull and kept it as a trophy.

It was the team’s second killing of an unarmed man in as many weeks, and the second time they violated a body. But rather than investigate the shooting, the platoon’s officers concentrated on trying to justify it. When 1st Lt. Roman Ligsay radioed Capt. Matthew Quiggle, the platoon’s commanding officer, and informed him that the same unit had shot an unarmed Afghan male, the captain was furious. “He strongly believed that we had illegitimately killed a local national,” recalls Quintal.

Quiggle ordered Ligsay to search until they found a weapon. “Lt. Ligsay was pretty freaked out,” Quintal recalls. “He was positive he was going to lose his job.” For the next hour the platoon swept the area with their flashlights looking for weapons, but they couldn’t find anything.

Then Staff Sgt. Bram ordered Quintal to hand him the AK-47 magazine that Gibbs had stowed in the metal box in the Stryker. A private named Justin Stoner passed it down. A few minutes later, a voice called out in the darkness. “Sir!” Bram yelled. “I think I found something.”

Lt. Ligsay walked up and saw the black magazine lying on the ground. He called it in, and the platoon breathed a sigh of relief. The members of the kill team knew it was a drop magazine, but it turned the shooting into a legitimate kill.

“The incident was staged to look like he may have had a weapon,” Stoner told investigators. “Basically, what we did was a desperate search to justify killing this guy. But in reality he was just some old, deaf, retarded guy. We basically executed this man.”

Under the rules of engagement, however, the U.S. military still considers the man responsible for his own death. Because he ignored the platoon’s warnings and moved in their direction, no one has been charged in his killing – even though the Army now knows he was gunned down by soldiers intent on shooting unarmed civilians for sport.

Within a month, according to the Army, Gibbs executed another civilian and planted a weapon on the body. It was during Operation Kodak Moment, a routine mission to photograph and compile a database of the male residents of a village called Kari Kheyl. On February 22nd, the day of the mission, Gibbs hid the AK-47 he had stolen from the Afghan National Police in a black assault pack. As the platoon made its way through the village, he went to the hut of Marach Agha, a man he suspected of belonging to the Taliban, and ordered him outside.

First Gibbs fired the AK-47 into a nearby wall and dropped the weapon at Agha’s feet. Then he shot the man at close range with his M4 rifle. Morlock and Wagnon followed up with a few rounds of their own. With the scene staged to his satisfaction, Gibbs called in a report.

Staff Sgt. Sprague was one of the first to respond. Gibbs claimed that he had turned a corner and spotted the man, who had fired at him with the AK-47, only to have the rifle jam. But when Sprague picked up the Kalashnikov, it seemed to be in perfect operating condition. A short time later, as he walked down a dusty alley in the village, Sprague himself came under attack from small-arms fire. He responded instinctively by squeezing the trigger on the AK-47 – and the gun fired “with no problems at all.”

Sprague reported the discrepancy to Lt. Ligsay. When the body was identified, relatives also reported that Agha was a deeply religious man who would never have taken up arms. He “did not know how to use an AK-47,” they told Ligsay. Once again, however, no action was taken, nor was Gibbs disciplined.

With their commanding officers repeatedly failing to investigate, the kill team was starting to feel invulnerable. To encourage soldiers in other units to target unarmed civilians, Gibbs had given one of the “off the books” grenades he had scrounged to a friend from another battalion, Staff Sgt. Robert Stevens. “It showed up in a box on my desk,” recalled Stevens, a senior medic. “When I opened the box, I saw a grenade canister, which had a grenade in it and a dirty green sock.” Figuring the sock was some kind of joke, Stevens threw it away. Later, when he saw Gibbs, he mentioned getting the grenade.

“Did you get the other thing?” Gibbs asked.

“What, the sock?” Stevens said.

“No, what was in the sock,” Gibbs replied.

Inside the sock, Gibbs had placed a severed human finger.

Stevens got the message. On March 10th, as his convoy was driving down Highway 1, the central road connecting Kandahar to the north, Stevens stuck his head out of his Stryker’s open hatch and tossed the grenade. It detonated a few seconds later than he had anticipated, and when it blew, it thudded into the vehicle. Stevens immediately began firing at a nearby compound of huts, yelling at another platoon member to do the same. “Get the fuck up, Morgan!” he screamed. “Let’s go, shoot!”

No casualties were reported from the incident, but it earned Stevens an Army Commendation Medal and a Combat Medical Badge. Stevens later admitted that he had concocted the ambush not only because he wanted to get rid of the illegal grenade but because he “wanted to hook up the guys in the company” with their Combat Infantryman Badges, 14 of which were awarded in the aftermath of the shooting. All of the awards were revoked when the Army learned the attack had been faked.

The assault staged by Stevens suggested a new way to target Afghan civilians. In addition to approaching targets on foot, Gibbs decided to use his Stryker as a shooting platform, affording greater mobility with the protection of armor. In a perverse twist, the vehicle that had proved ineffective at combating the Taliban was about to be turned on the very people it was supposed to defend.

On March 18th, during a maintenance run to Kandahar Airfield, the unit drove past a populated area of the city. According to one soldier, Gibbs opened the hatch of the moving Stryker and tossed out a grenade. As it exploded with a loud bang, shrapnel hit the Stryker. “RPG!” Gibbs shouted. “RPG!” Sgt. Darren Jones, who had discussed faking attacks with Gibbs, opened fire indiscriminately on the local residents, who frantically scrambled to avoid the incoming rounds. Gibbs raised his M4 and laid down fire as well.

There is no way to know how many, if any, casualties resulted from the fusillade. Lt. Ligsay, who was in the same Stryker with Gibbs and Jones, maintains that he mistakenly believed the attack to be genuine and ordered the convoy to keep moving. The platoon did not return to the area to conduct a battle damage assessment, and no charges were ever filed in the incident.

A few weeks later, sometime in late March or early April, members of 3rd Platoon fired on unarmed civilians twice on the same day, indicating a growing sense of their own invincibility. Five soldiers were part of a patrol in a grape field in the Zhari District when they spotted three unarmed men. According to Stevens, Gibbs ordered the soldiers to open fire, even though the men were standing erect and posed no threat. All five soldiers fired their weapons at the men, but they managed to escape unscathed. Gibbs was not pleased. “He mentioned that we needed to work on our accuracy,” Stevens recalled, “because it did not appear that anyone was hurt.”

That same evening, while manning a guard tower overlooking a field in the Zhari District, soldiers from 3rd Platoon were directly told not to shoot at an elderly farmer who had been granted permission to work his land nearby. Despite the warning, two soldiers reportedly shot at the farmer as if he were an armed combatant. They once again failed to hit their target, but the officer in charge was furious. “This farmer has never been a problem,” he later told investigators. “He’s 60 to 70 years old.”

One morning that spring, Gibbs approached Morlock flashing what looked like a small metal pineapple. “Hey, man, I’ve got this Russian grenade,” he said. Gibbs added that the weapon would be the perfect tool to fake another attack, since the Taliban were known to carry Russian explosives. Morlock liked the idea. The night before, talking with a bunch of soldiers outside their bunk rooms, he had announced that he was looking to kill another haji, a pejorative term that U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan use for Muslims. One soldier who took part in the conversation dismissed it as idle talk. “I didn’t really think anything of it,” he told investigators, “because soldiers say stuff like that all the time.”

The morning of May 2nd, the platoon was on a routine patrol in a village called Qualaday, a few miles from base. Following standard procedure, the unit’s leaders entered a house to talk with a man who had previously been arrested for having an IED. That inadvertently left the rest of the platoon free to roam the village looking for targets, without having to worry about an officer’s supervision.

Outside the house, Morlock was overheard instructing Winfield in how a grenade explodes, cautioning him to remain on the ground during the blast. Then the two soldiers moved off with Gibbs. Nearby, in a compound filled with children, they picked out a man with a white beard and escorted him outside. “He seemed friendly,” Winfield recalled. “He didn’t seem to have any sort of animosity toward us.”

Gibbs turned to his men. “You guys want to wax this guy or what?” he asked. Morlock and Winfield agreed that the man seemed perfect.

Gibbs walked the Afghan to a nearby ditch and forced him to his knees, ordering him to stay that way. Then he positioned Morlock and Winfield in a prone position behind a small berm no more than 10 feet away. “To be honest,” Morlock later told investigators, “me and Winfield thought we were going to frag ourselves, ’cause we were so fucking close.”

With everyone in position, Gibbs took cover behind a low wall and chucked a grenade toward the Afghan. “All right, dude, wax this guy!” he shouted. “Kill this guy, kill this guy!”

As the grenade went off, Morlock and Winfield opened fire. Morlock got off several rounds with his M4. Winfield, who was armed with the more powerful SAW machine gun, squeezed off a burst that lasted for three to five seconds.

Gibbs shouted for Morlock to proceed with the next stage of the plan. “Get up there and plant that fucking grenade!”

The man lay where he had fallen. One of his feet had been blown off by the blast; his other leg was missing below the knee. Morlock ran up and dropped the Russian pineapple grenade near the dead man’s hand. Gibbs walked up to the body, stood directly over it, and fired twice into the man’s head, shattering the jaw.

Later, when the scene had calmed down – after soldiers had pushed away the dead man’s wife and children, who were screaming, hysterical with grief, and Morlock had spun the story to the higher-ups – Gibbs took out a pair of medical shears and cut off the corpse’s left pinky finger, which he kept for himself. Then, wearing a surgical glove, he reached into the dead man’s mouth, pulled out a tooth and handed it to Winfield.

Winfield held the tooth for a while. Then he tossed it aside, leaving it behind on the ground at Qualaday.

This time, though, the villagers refused to be placated. The dead man, it turned out, was a peaceful cleric named Mullah Allah Dad. Two days later, the murder provoked an uproar at a districtwide council attended by Capt. Quiggle, the unit’s commanding officer. The district leader launched into a blistering attack of the platoon. “He pretty much told us that we planted the grenade in order to shoot the guy,” recalled 1st Lt. Stefan Moye, who escorted Quiggle to the meeting.

But the next day, instead of launching an inquiry into the platoon’s behavior, Quiggle dispatched Moye to the scene of the shooting to do damage control. With Gibbs hovering nearby, the lieutenant found two elderly villagers who claimed to have seen Mullah Allah Dad with a grenade. Relieved, Moye urged them to spread the word. “This is the type of stuff that the Taliban likes to use against us and try to recruit people to fight against us,” he said.

His mission accomplished, Moye left the village feeling that the platoon could return to its usual rhythms. “After that,” he said, “everything was normal.”

Things might have remained “normal,” and the killings might have continued, if it hadn’t been for what began as a trivial spat between bunkmates. Around midnight, the same evening that Moye returned from pacifying village elders, Pfc. Stoner walked into the company’s tactical operations center to register a complaint. Stoner, who had helped plant the AK-47 magazine on the civilian murdered by the highway, said he was sick and tired of other soldiers in the unit using his room as “a smoke shack for hash.” Worried that the lingering odor would get him busted, he had asked them to find another place to get stoned. They had refused, pausing only to remove the battery from the room’s smoke detector.

“They baked the room many times until it stank constantly,” Stoner said. “I was worried for my own job.” Emphasizing that he wasn’t a snitch, Stoner told the sergeant on duty that he didn’t want to get his fellow soldiers in trouble. Then, growing emotional, he mentioned that “he and a bunch of other guys had executed a local national out on Highway 1.” The sergeant didn’t take the story seriously enough to report it up the chain of command. “I thought he was just upset and needed to talk to someone about the incident,” he later recalled. Instead of alerting his superiors about the murder allegation, the sergeant simply assured Stoner that the matter of hash smoking in his room would be handled quietly, and that his identity would be kept confidential.

But discretion wasn’t exactly the unit’s strong suit. By the next day, everyone knew that Stoner had ratted them out. “Everyone began to panic,” Quintal recalls. Gibbs, who didn’t care for hashish, gathered members of the kill team in his room. “We need to address the situation with Stoner,” he reportedly said. “Snitches get stitches.”

On May 6th, Gibbs and six other soldiers descended on Stoner’s room, locking the door behind them, and attacked Stoner while he was sitting on his bed. Grabbing him by the throat, they dragged him to the floor and piled on, striking him hard but taking care to avoid blows to the face that might leave visible bruises. “I’ve been in the Army four years,” Morlock said as he pummeled Stoner in the stomach. “How could you do this to me?” Before leaving, they struck Stoner in the crotch and spit in his face.

A few hours later, Gibbs and Morlock returned to Stoner’s room. As Stoner sat on his bed, still dazed from the assault, Morlock explained that the beating would not happen again, so long as Stoner kept his mouth shut “from fucking now on.” If Stoner were disloyal again, Gibbs warned, he would be killed the next time he went out on patrol. “It’s too easy,” he added, explaining that he could hide Stoner’s body in a Hesco barrier, one of the temporary structures used to fortify U.S. positions.

Then Gibbs reached into his pocket and took out a bit of cloth. Unfolding it, he tossed two severed fingers on the floor, with bits of skin still hanging off the bone. If Stoner didn’t want to end up like “that guy,” Morlock said, he better “shut the hell up.” After all, he added, he “already had enough practice” at killing people.

Stoner had no doubt that Morlock would follow through on the threat. “Basically, I do believe that Morlock would kill me if he had the chance,” he said later.

But the beating proved to be the kill team’s undoing. When a physician’s assistant examined Stoner the next day, she saw the angry red welts covering his body. She also saw the large tattoo across Stoner’s back. In gothic type, beneath a grinning red skull flanked by two grim reapers, it read:

what if im not the hero

what if im the bad guy

Stoner was sent to talk to Army investigators. In the course of recounting the assault, he described how Gibbs had thrown the severed fingers on the floor. The investigators pressed him about how Gibbs came by the fingers. Stoner told them it was because the platoon had killed a lot of innocent people.

At that point, the investigators asked Stoner to start from the beginning. When had the platoon killed innocent people? Bit by bit, Stoner laid out the whole history, naming names and places and times.

As other members of the platoon were called in and interviewed, many confirmed Stoner’s account and described the shootings for investigators. Morlock, who proved particularly gregarious, agreed to speak on videotape. Relaxed and unconcerned in front of the camera, he nonchalantly described the kills in detail.

Morlock’s confession kicked off an intense search for evidence. When the Army’s investigators were dispatched to FOB Ramrod, they went straight to the top of a Hesco barrier near Gibbs’ housing unit. Right where Morlock said it would be, they found the bottom of a plastic water bottle containing two pieces of cloth. Inside each piece of cloth was a severed human finger. But then a strange thing happened. When investigators compared prints of the two fingers to those in the company’s database, the prints didn’t match up. Either the records were screwed up, which was quite possible, or there were more dead guys out there who were unaccounted for.

Last week, on March 23rd, Morlock was sentenced to 24 years in prison after agreeing to testify against Gibbs. “The Army wants Gibbs,” says one defense lawyer. “They want to throw him in jail and move on.” Gibbs insists that all three killings he took part in were “legitimate combat engagements.” Three other low-level soldiers facing murder charges – Winfield, Holmes and Wagnon – also maintain their innocence. As for the other men in Bravo Company, five have already been convicted of lesser crimes, including drug use, stabbing a corpse and beating up Stoner, and two more face related charges. In December, Staff Sgt. Stevens was sentenced to nine months in prison after agreeing to testify against Gibbs. He was stripped to the lowest service rank – private E-1 – but over the protests of military prosecutors, he was allowed to remain in the Army.

So far, though, no officers or senior officials have been charged in either the murders or the cover-up. Last October, the Army quietly launched a separate investigation, guided by Brig. Gen. Stephen Twitty, into the critical question of officer accountability. But the findings of that inquiry, which was concluded last month, have been kept secret – and the Army refuses to say whether it has disciplined or demoted any of the commanders responsible for 3rd Platoon. Even if the commanding officers were not co-conspirators or accomplices in the crimes, they repeatedly ignored clear warning signs and allowed a lethally racist attitude to pervade their unit. Indeed, the resentment of Afghans was so commonplace among soldiers in the platoon that when Morlock found himself being questioned by Army investigators, he expressed no pity or remorse about the murders.

Toward the end of Morlock’s interview, the conversation turned to the mindset that had allowed the killings to occur. “None of us in the platoon – the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant – no one gives a fuck about these people,” Morlock said.

Then he leaned back in his chair and yawned, summing up the way his superiors viewed the people of Afghanistan. “Some shit goes down,” he said, “you’re gonna get a pat on the back from your platoon sergeant: Good job. Fuck ’em.”

Qatar Boost For Libyan Rebel Council

Published: 28 March, 2011

Qatar has become the first Arab country to recognise Libya’s rebel national council as the representative of the North African nation, easing the way for the opposition to profit from oil sales on global markets.

Over the past two days, rebels have seized control of the bulk of Libya’s oil industry – including the country’s largest oilfields in the so-called Sirte basin and the main terminals – as they have pushed back Muammer Gaddafi’s forces with the assistance of Nato air strikes.

A Libyan opposition leader said that Qatar had also agreed to sell oil on its behalf in international markets – although Qatari officials were on Monday unavailable to comment on any such deal. But Washington made clear that opposition oil sales need not be subject to the sanctions imposed on Libya.

However, US Treasury officials cautioned that the rebels would have to create a payment mechanism that did not involve the Gaddafi-controlled National Oil Company, the central bank or any other government institutions.

The Qatari news agency said that the national council, which until now has only been recognised by France, had “practically become the representative of Libya and its people”.

Interactive: The fighting in Libya

The current situation in the fighting between opposition fighters and forces loyal to Col Muammer Gaddafi

Doha is already providing an economic lifeline to the rebels, supplying them with petrol, diesel and cooking gas and helping to avert a fuel crisis.

Libya’s oil production has dropped to a trickle from a pre-crisis level of 1.6m barrels a day, triggering a price rally in global oil markets and forcing Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, to boost its production to offset the shortfall.

Opposition officials said they could boost production to about 400,000 b/d. At current prices of $115 per barrel, the exports would be worth $1.4bn a month.

Ali Tarhouni, a rebel official in charge of economic and oil matters, said Libya’s opposition could return to the global market within weeks. “We contacted the oil company of Qatar and thankfully they agreed to take all the oil that we wish to export and market this oil for us,” he told reporters in Benghazi.

But Lawrence Eagles, head of oil research at JPMorgan, said there were still significant “operational constraints” for the return of Libyan oil exports.

“Although fighting in and around the key export infrastructure has diminished, as opposition forces continue to make gains, it remains far from clear as to the operational readiness of vessels to dock at Libyan ports and the status of onshore facilities to load oil,” he said.

Western oil traders are unlikely to start buying oil from the rebels as soon as the legality of the move becomes clear, analysts said. Moreover, some of the largest buyers of Libyan oil, including Eni of Italy, Total of France and Repsol YPF of Spain, have operations in both the rebel-controlled east and the Gaddafi regime-controlled west, potentially deterring them from buying the rebels’ crude.

But developing nations such as China and India, which in the past had bought Libyan oil in relatively large quantities, could move faster, analysts said.

Foreign ministers from 35 countries will meet in London Tuesday to discuss Libya’s future amid hopes that the African Union will provide Col Gaddafi with an exit from Libya by offering asylum.

China ‘to overtake US on science’ in two years

28 March 2011

 

 

Science and environment correspondent, BBC News

China is on course to overtake the US in scientific output possibly as soon as 2013 – far earlier than expected.

That is the conclusion of a major new study by the Royal Society, the UK’s national science academy.

The country that invented the compass, gunpowder, paper and printing is set for a globally important comeback.

An analysis of published research – one of the key measures of scientific effort – reveals an “especially striking” rise by Chinese science.

The study, Knowledge, Networks and Nations, charts the challenge to the traditional dominance of the United States, Europe and Japan.

The figures are based on the papers published in recognised international journals listed by the Scopus service of the publishers Elsevier.

In 1996, the first year of the analysis, the US published 292,513 papers – more than 10 times China’s 25,474.

By 2008, the US total had increased very slightly to 316,317 while China’s had surged more than seven-fold to 184,080.

Previous estimates for the rate of expansion of Chinese science had suggested that China might overtake the US sometime after 2020.

But this study shows that China, after displacing the UK as the world’s second leading producer of research, could go on to overtake America in as little as two years’ time.

“Projections vary, but a simple linear interpretation of Elsevier’s publishing data suggests that this could take place as early as 2013,” it says.

Professor Sir Chris Llewellyn Smith, chair of the report, said he was “not surprised” by this increase because of China’s massive boost to investment in R&D.

Chinese spending has grown by 20% per year since 1999, now reaching over $100bn, and as many as 1.5 million science and engineering students graduated from Chinese universities in 2006.

“I think this is positive, of great benefit, though some might see it as a threat and it does serve as a wake-up call for us not to become complacent.”

The report stresses that American research output will not decline in absolute terms and raises the possibility of countries like Japan and France rising to meet the Chinese challenge.

“But the potential for China to match American output in terms of sheer numbers in the near to medium term is clear.”

Quality questions

The authors describe “dramatic” changes in the global scientific landscape and warn that this has implications for a nation’s competitiveness.

According to the report, “The scientific league tables are not just about prestige – they are a barometer of a country’s ability to compete on the world stage”.

Along with the growth of the Chinese economy, this is yet another indicator of China’s extraordinarily rapid rise as a global force.

However the report points out that a growing volume of research publications does not necessarily mean in increase in quality.

One key indicator of the value of any research is the number of times it is quoted by other scientists in their work.

Although China has risen in the “citation” rankings, its performance on this measure lags behind its investment and publication rate.

“It will take some time for the absolute output of emerging nations to challenge the rate at which this research is referenced by the international scientific community.”

The UK’s scientific papers are still the second most-cited in the world, after the US.

Dr Cong Cao, associate professor at Nottingham University’s School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, agrees with the assessment that the quantity of China’s science is yet not matched by its quality.

A sociologist originally from Shanghai, Dr Cao told the BBC: “There are many millions of graduates but they are mandated to publish so the numbers are high.

“It will take many years for some of the research to catch up to Western standards.”

As to China’s motivation, Dr Cao believes that there is a determination not to be dependent on foreign know-how – and to reclaim the country’s historic role as a global leader in technology.



 

REFLECTIONS: NATO’s FASCIST WAR

 


 

You didn’t have to be clairvoyant to foresee what I wrote with great detail in three Reflection Articles I published on the CubaDebate website between February 21 and March 3: “The NATO Plan Is to Occupy Libya,” “The Cynical Danse Macabre,” and “NATO’s Inevitable War.”

 

Not even the fascist leaders of Germany and Italy were so blatantly shameless regarding the Spanish Civil War unleashed in 1936, an event that maybe a lot of people have been recalling over these past days.

 

Almost 75 years to the day have passed since then, but nothing that has happened over the last 75 centuries, or even 75 millenniums of human life on our planet can compare.

 

Sometimes it seems that those of us who serenely voice our opinions on these issues are exaggerating. I dare say that we have actually been naive to assume that we all should be aware of the deception or colossal ignorance that humanity has been dragged into.

 

In 1936 there was an intense clash between two systems and ideologies of more or less equal military power.

 

The arms back then seemed more like toys compared with today’s weapons. Humanity’s survival was not threatened despite the destructive power and the locally lethal force deployed. Entire cities and even nations could have been virtually destroyed. But never was the human race, in its totality, at risk of being exterminated several times over for the stupid and suicidal power developed by modern science and technology.

 

With these current realities in mind, it is embarrassing to read the continuous news reports on the use of powerful laser-guided rockets with 100% accuracy, fighter-bombers that go twice the speed of light, potent explosives that blow apart uranium-hardened metals that have an everlasting effect on the inhabitants and their descendants.

 

Cuba stated its position regarding the internal situation in Libya at the meeting in Geneva. Without hesitating, Cuba defended the idea of a political solution to the conflict in Libya and was categorically opposed to any foreign military intervention.

 

In a world where the alliance between the United States and the developed capitalist powers of Europe increasingly take hold of the people’s resources and fruits of their labor, any honest citizen, whatever their standpoint to the government, would be opposed to a foreign military intervention in their country.

 

But most absurd about the current situation is the fact that before the brutal war broke out in Northern Africa, in another region of the world, nearly 10 000 kilometers away, a nuclear accident had occurred in one of the most populated areas of the world following a tsunami caused by a 9.0 earthquake, which has already cost a hard-working nation like Japan nearly 30 000 lives. Such accident would have not occurred 75 years before.

 

In Haiti, a poor and underdeveloped country, a nearly 7.0 quake according to the Richter scale, caused over 300 000 deaths, countless people wounded and hundreds of thousands harmed.

 

However, what was terribly tragic in Japan was the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant, whose consequences are still to be assessed.

 

I will only recall some of the main stories published by the news agencies:

 

ANSA.- Fukushima 1 nuclear plant is releasing “extremely high and potentially lethal radiations,” said Gregory Jaczko, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the US nuclear entity.

 

EFE.- The nuclear threat stemming from the serious situation at a Japanese plant, following the earthquake, has triggered security revisions in atomic plants around the world and has made some countries paralyze their plans.

 

Reuters.- Japan’s devastating earthquake and deepening nuclear crisis could result in losses of up to $200 billion for Japanese economy, but the global impact remains hard to gauge.

 

EFE.- The deterioration of one reactor after another at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear center continued to feed fears of a pending nuclear disaster as desperate attempts to control a radioactive leak did nothing to provide even a glimmer of hope.

 

AFP.- Japan´s Emperor Akihito expressed concern about the unpredictable character of the nuclear crisis hitting Japan following the quake and tsunami that killed thousands of people and left 500 000 homeless. New quake reported in the Tokyo area.

 

There are reports talking about even more concerning issues.

 

Some refer to the presence of toxic radioactive iodine in Tokyo’s drinking water, which doubles the tolerable amount that can be consumed by the smallest children in the Japanese capital. One of these reports says that the stocks of bottled water are shrinking in Tokyo, a city located in a prefecture at more than 200 kilometers from Fukushima.

 

This series of circumstances poses a dramatic situation on our world.

I can express freely my views on the war in Libya.

I do not share political or religious views with the leader of that country. I am a Marxist-Leninist and a follower of Marti, as I have already said.

 

I see Libya as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and a sovereign State of the nearly 200 members of the United Nations.

 

Never, a large or small country, in this case with only 5 million inhabitants, was the victim of such a brutal attack  by the air force of a militaristic organization with thousands of fighter-bombers, more than 100 submarines, nuclear aircraft carriers, and sufficient arsenal to destroy the planet many times over.  Our species had never encountered this situation and there had been nothing similar 75 years ago, when the Nazi bombers attacked targets in Spain.

Now, however, the criminal and discredited NATO will write a “beautiful” little story about its “humanitarian” bombing.

If Gaddafi honors the traditions of his people and decides to fight to the last breath, as he has promised, together with the Libyans who are facing the worst bombing a country has ever suffered, NATO and its criminal projects will sink into the mire of shame.

The people respect and believe in men who fulfill their duty.

More than 50 years ago, when the United States killed more than a hundred Cubans with the explosion of merchant ship “La Coubre” our people proclaimed “Patria o Muerte.” (Homeland or Death). They have fulfilled this, and have always been determined to keep their word.

“Anyone who tries to seize Cuba,” said the most glorious fighter in our history-“will only gather the dust of her soil soaked in blood.”

I beg you to excuse the frankness with which I address the issue.

 

Fidel Castro Ruz

28 March 2011

8:14 p.m.

 

Commentary: The Spratly Situation in the South China Sea


When the Cold War ended in 1989, many international relations experts opined that the Spratly archipelago in South China Sea will be a potential flashpoint as China (also Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei were having conflicting claims of territories.

Francis Fukuyama, a well known International Relations scholar, came up with the thesis that the end of history has come with the ultimate success of liberal democracy and states that do not embrace liberal economy will not progress. War as an instrument of policy was relegated to a lesser position compared to economic growth that comes with trade and commerce. Many International Relations experts said that the battle amongst states has shifted from theatres of war to markets.

As a state that stakes a claim to the whole of the Spratly archipelago, China’s position will have important implications for East Asia’s stability. Within the last twenty years, by embracing some aspects of capitalism, China has emerged as the second largest economic power in the world and is poised to replace the US in the top position. It is also a major military power in the region and has the potential to become a superpower in line with its global economic dominance.

In relation to the Spratly islands, China has announced that the Spratly archipelago as its sovereign territory. It even claims the whole of the South China Sea as Chinese territory based on its nine-dotted-line claim which encroaches into the territories claimed by other coastal states. The first announcement about its sovereignty over the islands was in 1955 following the Peace Treaty that officially ended the Second World War in the Far East. Since then, there has been no change in China’s position in relation to the archipelago. It used force in the archipelago against Vietnam in 1979 and in 1988. Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, China realized that the Spratly issue will be an obstacle to its modernization programme and relegated it to the next generation to foster cordial bilateral relations with the ASEAN states. Although at one time, China was unwilling to even discuss the problem with any other claimant state, she later adopted a policy of dealing bilaterally with states that have claims in the Spratly archipelago. On realizing that the policy was not well received by the ASEAN states and it was not in its interest, China decided to deal with ASEAN as a whole.  A Joint Statement issued after the Meeting of Heads of States/Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, on 16th December 1997, noted that China will follow its five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its relations with ASEAN states amongst which is the peaceful settlement of disputes.  While the Joint-Statement covers the overall economic prosperity and the security of the region, its Point No. 8 specifically addressed the issue by providing for the exercise of self-restraint to promote peaceful resolution of the problem by encouraging friendly relations, cooperation and development amongst the competing states as well as promoting peace and the stability of the region.

This was followed by the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China on 4th November, 2002, in Phnom Penh. Points 5 and 6 of the DOC provided for the promotion of peace in the disputed area pending peaceful settlement by juridical means. Point No. 5  provides for  promotion of trust and confidence amongst the parties by exercising self-restraint in conducting their activities in the disputed area by not occupying uninhabited geographical features, involving in dialogues and exchange of views between defence and military officers, humane treatment of persons in danger or distress, notifying each other of their military exercises and exchanging information. Exploring cooperative activities which include marine environment protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime, including but not limiting to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea and illegal traffic in arms are addressed in Point No. 6.

The non-binding nature of the DOC appears to be conducive to the temporary management and maintenance of peace in the Spratly archipelago. That may also be in line with the ASEAN way of handling the issue and in the interest of China as well. For a complex issue like the Spratlys, there should be a more binding code of conduct that calls for more commitment towards resolution. The non-binding nature of the DOC provides the parties a way to manage the problem while giving some breathing space to find an acceptable solution in future. All the smaller contestants were looking upon the magnanimity of the Chinese dragon to find a lasting position among the islands in the Spratly archipelago. On the other hand, China was eyeing total control of the potential oil and other marine resources in the archipelago that will help much towards its emergence as the number one economic power as well as a credible military power in world politics.

The statement by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the Hanoi ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2010  that the US has ‘strategic interest’ in the South China Sea and it could play a role in solving the dispute, has angered China as that will be a challenge to her sovereignty claim in the Spratly archipelago. President Obama’s meeting with ASEAN leaders on 22nd September, 2010 in New York during which the Spratly dispute was discussed would have added further salt to the injury, especially when China has declared that the South China Sea and the territories within the water are her sovereign territory of core interest that cannot be compromised. Following the US announcement of its interest in the Spratly issue, China seems to be prepared to relook the DOC for one that is more binding. Whether that will become a reality will be an important issue of China’s domestic politics. Military history shows that nations have gone to war when core interests were challenged, especially in their sovereign territories. Whether China will use force to resolve the Spratly issue is a concern of not only those states that have conflicting claims in the archipelago but also those have national interests in East Asia.

It is important to see the Spratly conflict from the perspective of the emerging US-PRC rivalry in East Asia. China is fast rising as an important economic and military power, fast exerting its influence amongst the states in Southeast Asia. The US has realised that if it continues to remain aloof and less committed in East Asia, China will become more dominant and hegemonic and that will have negative implications for US interests in the region. Hence there is a need for the US to return to East Asia and to use the Spratly issue as a smokescreen to counter China’s influence in the region, especially amongst the ASEAN states.

Given that major powers always compete in influencing states to win support, the US and China are trying their best to win over the Southeast Asian states. Most important is whether the US-PRC rivalry will destablise the region. Currently both powers, despite the irritants, enjoy cordial bilateral relations, especially in trade. Both benefit from the sizeable markets of each other. The US also needs China to pacify North Korea while fearing that China, North Korea and Russia may form an alliance that may be detrimental to the US interests in the Northeast as well as Central Asia. An antagonized China will become a thorn in the flesh, especially when the US is still bogged down in Afghanistan, entangled in Iraq and sees a threat from ‘nuclear’ Iran. Similarly China too is not in a position to antagonize the US as it is no match to the US military might and any military conflict with the US will only be harmful to its national aspirations of becoming a dominant actor in international politics.

Currently, all ASEAN states enjoy good economic relations with China, including those having conflicting claims in the Spratly archipelago. China’s economic dominance is evident in the neighbouring states, especially in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.  Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are also benefitting economically from China. China’s economic and military power might cause anxiety amongst the ASEAN states, especially those with overlapping claims in the Spratly archipelago. They have to balance their relationship between the two great powers; but given the history of the region they may choose to bandwagon with the US. Besides, any conflict in the Spratly archipelago will also not be in the interest of the ASEAN Dialogue partners, such as the European Union, India, Australia, Japan and others that may wish to see a peaceful East Asia that will benefit them economically.

Malaysia has to handle the US-PRC rivalry with much caution, diplomatic skills and wisdom. There are five elements of its national interest involved here. China is a very important trade partner, an influential regional military power and a rising economic  giant with much clout in the region, especially amongst the ASEAN states. If Malaysia aligns more towards the US, then it will antagonize China to the detriment of bilateral relations. With regard to the US, it is also a major trade partner, an important military power with long cordial bilateral defence relations and a likely ‘ally’ at times of crisis as it proved during the 1963-1965 Confrontation with Indonesia and assisting Malaysia against communism after the fall of Saigon in 1975 . Malaysia must also take into consideration the importance of ASEAN as a regional organization when viewing the situation. Hence, it has to be careful that its response to the US-PRC rivalry and the Spratly problem does not harm ASEAN’s position as a regional inter-governmental organization committed to promote peace and stability in the region. Malaysia must also determine how it is going to manage its diplomatic relations especially with those ASEAN states having conflicting claims in the Spratly archipelago. As the ultimate objective of a state is to promote its national interest and protect its sovereign rights, each may adopt different positions in responding to the US-PRC rivalry and the Spratly issue. Finally, Malaysia has to exercise its diplomatic skills to protect and promote her sovereign rights in a milieu of emerging US-PRC rivalry and the complexity of the Spratly problem.

There are enough peace-promoting mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus 3, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and others that can help to mitigate the negative impact of US-PRC rivalry on the region. Given that US-PRC relations are of mutual benefit, that ASEAN countries gain from both powers, and a peaceful East Asia is a prerequisite for the economic growth of all the states in the region as well as for extra-regional powers, there is little probability of the Spratly dispute escalating. The territorial dispute in the Spratly archipelago needs peaceful settlement using the mechanisms available in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The aim of the United Nations Charter is to promote international cooperation to achieve international peace and security for humanity. The decision to resolve the Spratly dispute by peace or war is a choice for the sovereign states involved in the dispute but it is important for that decision to be tempered by the wisdom derived from the lessons of military history which show that while war brings chaos and destruction peace brings progress and prosperity.

Napoleon’s Dictum

 

April 2, 2011

 

 

IT WAS Napoleon who said that it is better to fight against a coalition than to fight as part of one.

 

Coalitions mean trouble. To conduct a successful military operation, one needs a unified command and a clear, agreed upon aim. Both are rare in coalitions.

 

A coalition is composed of different countries, each of which has its own national interests and domestic political pressures. Reaching an agreement on anything needs time, which will be used by a determined enemy to his own advantage.

 

All this has become very apparent in the coalition war against Muammar Qaddafi.

 

 

THERE IS no way to get rid of this “eccentric” tyrant but by sheer military force. This seems to be obvious by now.

 

As the Hebrew joke goes, Qaddafi may be mad, but he is not crazy. He perceives the rifts in the coalition wall and is shrewd enough to exploit them. The Russians abstained in the Security Council vote – which in effect meant voting for the resolution – but since then have been carping about every move. Many well-meaning and experienced leftists around the world condemn everything the US and/or NATO do, whatever it is.

 

Some people condemn the “Libyan intervention” because there is no similar action against Bahrain or Yemen. Sure, it is a case of blatant discrimination. But that is like demanding a murderer go unpunished because other murderers are still free. Two minuses make a plus, but two murders do not become a non-murder.

 

Others assert that some of the coalition partners are themselves not much better than Qaddafi. So why pick on him? Well, it’s he who provoked the world and stands in the way of the Arab awakening. The need to remove others must be dealt with, too, but should not in any way serve as an argument against solving the present crisis. We cannot wait for a perfect world – it may take some time to arrive. In the meantime, let’s do our best in an imperfect one.

 

 

EVERY Day that passes with Qaddafi and his thugs still there, the coalition malaise gets worse. The agreed aim of “protecting Libyan civilians” is wearing thin – it was a polite lie from the beginning. The real aim is – and cannot be otherwise – the removal of the murderous tyrant, whose very existence in power is a continuous deadly menace to his people. But that was not spelled out in coalitionese.

 

It is clear by now that the “rebels” have no real military force. They are not a unified political movement and they have no unified political – let alone military – command. They will not conquer Tripoli by themselves, perhaps not even if the coalition supplies them with arms.

 

It is not the case of an irregular force fighting a regular army and gradually turning into an organized army itself – as we did in 1948.

 

The fact that there is no rebel army to speak of may be a positive phenomenon – it shows that there is no hidden, sinister force lurking in the wings, waiting to replace Qaddafi with another repressive regime. It is indeed a democratic, grassroots uprising.

 

But for the coalition, it creates a headache. What now? Leave Qaddafi, a wounded and therefore doubly dangerous animal, in his lair, ready to pounce on the rebels the moment the pressure is off? Go in and themselves do the job of removing him? Go on talking and do nothing?

 

One of the most hypocritical – if not downright ridiculous – proposals is to “negotiate” with him. Negotiate with an irrational tyrant? What about? About postponing the massacre of the rebels for six months? Creating a state which is half democratic, half brutal dictatorship?

 

Of course there must be negotiations – without and after Qaddafi. Different parts of the country, different “tribes”, different political forces yet to rise must negotiate about the future shape of the state, preferably under UN auspices. But with Qaddafi??

 

 

ONE ARGUMENT is that it should all be left to the Arabs. After  all, it was the “Arab League” that called for a no-fly zone.

 

Alas, that is a sad joke.

 

That Arab League (actually the “League of Arab States”) has all the weaknesses and few of the strengths of a coalition. Founded with British encouragement at the end of World War II, it is a loose – very, very loose – association of states with vastly different interests.

 

In a way, it represents the Arab World as it is – or was until yesterday. It is a world in which two (and perhaps three) contradictory trends are at work.

 

On the one hand, there is the perpetual longing of the Arab masses for Arab unity. It is real and profound, nourished by memories of past Arab glories. It finds its most concrete current expression in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Arab leaders who have betrayed this trust are paying the price now.

 

On the other hand, there are the cynical calculations of the member states. From the very first moment of its existence, the League has reflected the labyrinthine world of mutually antagonistic and competing regimes. Cairo always vies with Baghdad for the crown of Arab leadership, ancient Damascus competes with both. The Hashemites hate the Saudis, who displaced them in Mecca.  Add to this the myriad ideological, social and religious tensions, and you get the picture.

 

The first major undertaking of the League – the 1948 intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian war – ended in an Arab disaster, largely because the armies of Egypt and Jordan tried to forestall each other, instead of concentrating their energies against us. That was our salvation. Since then, practically all Arab regimes have used the Palestinian Cause each for its own interests, with the Palestinian people serving as a ball in this cynical game.

 

The present Arab Awakening is not led by the League, by its very nature it is directed against everything the League is and represents. In Bahrain the Saudis are supporting the same forces the rebels are fighting against in Tripoli.  As a factor in the Libyan crisis, the League is best ignored.

 

There is a third level of inter-Arab relations – the religious one. Islam has a strong hold on the Arab masses almost everywhere, but like every great religion, Islam has many faces indeed. It means quite different things to Wahabis in Riadh, Taliban in Kandahar, al-Qaeda people in Yemen, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, royalists in Morocco and the simple fellah on the shores of the Nile. But there is a vague sense of community.

 

So any Muslim Arab feels that he or she belongs to three different but overlapping identities, with the borders between them ill-defined – the “wotan”, which is the local nation, like Palestine or Egypt, the “kaum”, which is the pan-Arab identity, and the “umma”, which is the all-Islamic community of believers. I doubt whether there are two scholars who agree on these definitions.

 

SO HERE we are, people of March 2011, after having followed our basic human instinct and pushed for armed intervention against the threatened disaster in Libya.

 

It was the right, the decent thing to do.

 

With due – and sincere – respect to all those who criticized my stand, I am convinced that it was the humane one.

 

In Hebrew we say: He who starts doing a good deed must finish it. Qaddafi must be removed, the Libyan people must be given a decent chance to take their fate into their own hands. So, too, the Syrian people, the Yemenites, the Bahrainis and all the others.

 

I don’t know where it will lead them – each of them in their own country. I can only wish them well – and hope.

 

And hope that this time Napoleon’s dictum will not be proven right.

 

 

Washington Prepares To Escalate The War In Libya

 

 

31 March, 2011

WSWS.org

The ongoing public debate in Washington and the American media on “arming the rebels” in Libya points to a dramatic escalation of the US-led war.

President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, followed by their British counterparts, Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Secretary William Hague, have spoken in almost identical terms over the past two days, insisting in response to questions about arming the anti-Gaddafi forces that they were “not ruling it out.”

The debate has intensified in the face of a growing debacle for the US-led intervention. Armed anti-Gaddafi forces have carried out a headlong retreat after confronting resistance from both military forces loyal to the government in Tripoli and armed civilians hostile to the US-backed opposition. According to reports from Libya, they have been pushed back to the strategic highway junction town of Ajdabiya, the site of some of the heaviest US-NATO bombing.

The earlier advance of some 200 miles along the Mediterranean coast, which was celebrated by Western governments and media, was due entirely to air strikes carried out by US and NATO warplanes, which effectively acted as the air force of the so-called “rebels.”

Forces supporting the Gaddafi regime beat a tactical retreat rather than be wiped out from the air. After a week of bombing and missile attacks, last weekend the Pentagon sent in low-flying, heavily armed AC-130 gunships and A10 attack planes, aircraft that have been used to deadly effect in close-air support for US troops from the Vietnam War to the Fallujah massacre in Iraq and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

The “rebel” advance essentially amounted to a drive-through, with the US-backed fighters encountering no opposition. “There wasn’t resistance,” Faraj Sheydani, one of the anti-Gaddafi fighters told the New York Times. “There was no one in front of us. There’s no fighting.”

This changed on Tuesday, when the US-backed insurgents approached the town of Sirte, Gaddafi’s birthplace. In the village of Bin Jawad, about 80 miles east of Sirte, according to a report by McClatchy Newspapers reporter Nancy Youssef, women were sent out on buses. “As soon as the women were out of harm’s way,’ the article said, “the men began shooting at the rebels from their houses.”

On Wednesday, the rout continued, with the oil-producing towns of Ras Lanuf and Brega falling back under government control and the US-backed forces fleeing back to Adjdabiya. As Youssef reported, “Most [of the ‘rebels’] it turned out had no intention of fighting when it mattered.”

In an attempt to overcome the severe limitations of this force, Washington has already sent in operatives tasked with organizing the “rebels” into an armed unit capable of waging civil war. As the New York Times reported on Wednesday, the Central Intelligence Agency has deployed “clandestine operatives into Libya to gather intelligence for military airstrikes and make contacts with rebels.”

In addition, the Times reported, citing British officials, “dozens of British special forces and MI6 intelligence officers are working inside Libya.”

ABC News, meanwhile, reported that President Obama Wednesday signed a secret presidential finding “authorizing covert operations to aid the effort in Libya.”

“The presidential finding discusses a number of ways to help the opposition to Muammar Gaddafi, authorizing some assistance now and setting up a legal framework for more robust activities in the future,” the network reports.

It is in this context that the drumbeat for “arming the rebels” has begun. The phrase is meant to conceal the fact that any attempt to provide significant weaponry to the disorganized forces based in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi would entail the deployment of US “trainers,” “advisors” and special forces units, making a mockery of the pledge made Monday night by Obama that he would “not put ground troops into Libya.”

As the Times reported, citing unnamed administration officials, “supplying arms would further entangle the United States in a drawn-out civil war, because the rebels would need to be trained to use any weapons, even relatively simple rifles and shoulder-fired anti-armor weapons.”

The proposal to provide arms, it adds, “carries echoes of previous American efforts to arm rebels, in Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and elsewhere, many of which backfired.”

All of the examples given by the Times were counterrevolutionary operations mounted by the CIA. In Angola, the agency poured in arms, money, advisors and South African troops to back the UNITA movement of Jonas Savimbi, fueling a civil war that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands.

In Nicaragua, the CIA directed the infamous contra mercenaries in a terror war against the population, killing more than 40,000 people, mostly civilians. And in Afghanistan, the CIA armed and funded the Islamist mujahideen against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul in a war that left more than a million Afghans dead.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the armed conflict in Libya is not a “revolution,” a “pro-democracy movement” or a “humanitarian” intervention, but rather a similar operation run by the CIA and allied intelligence agencies. Its aim is not to liberate the Libyan people, but rather to install a more pliant regime in Tripoli that will guarantee US control of oil production in that country and the wider region.

The discussion on arming the anti-Gaddafi forces is dominated by the same lies and duplicity that have characterized the US intervention from its outset.

 

Officially, NATO is not contemplating such action. NATO’s secretary general, the right-wing Danish politician Anders Fogh Rasmussen, insisted in an interview with CNN: “The UN mandate authorizes the enforcement of an arms embargo. We are not in Libya to arm people, but to protect people.”

Rasmussen’s statement is meant to placate a number of NATO members, including Turkey, Germany and Italy, which have publicly opposed any move to arm the forces in Benghazi and voiced reservations about the extent of the US-led bombing campaign. The Obama administration has formally transferred command of the Libyan operation to NATO, which the US dominates politically and militarily, creating a similar structure to the one that exists in Afghanistan.

US and British officials have taken the opposite position, insisting that the March 17 UN resolution authorizing “all necessary means” to protect civilians somehow abrogates a February 26 resolution barring the introduction of all arms and munitions into Libya.

“It is our interpretation that [UN Security Council Resolution] 1973 amended or overrode the absolute prohibition on arms to anyone in Libya, so that there could be a legitimate transfer of arms if a country should choose to do that,” Clinton said Tuesday.

British Prime Minister Cameron stuck to the same script in parliament Wednesday, declaring, “Our view is that this [UN resolution] would not necessarily rule out the provision of assistance to those protecting civilians in certain circumstances.”

Speaking in a House of Commons debate on March 18—the day after the UN Security Council approved the resolution authorizing a no-fly zone—Cameron took the opposite position, declaring, “The resolution helps to enforce the arms embargo, and our legal understanding is that that arms embargo applies to the whole of Libya.”

Legal experts interviewed by the British Guardian made it clear that any other interpretation of the UN resolutions could be based only on willful deception. They point out that the March 17 resolution calls for the “strict implementation” of the arms embargo approved in February and that the February resolution demands that any breaching of the ban on arms and munitions receive prior approval from a UN committee established to enforce the measure—and not be carried out unilaterally by one or another government.

If the US moves ahead with arming the anti-Gaddafi forces, it will be defying the United Nations in order to conduct an illegal war no less openly than Bush did in invading Iraq.

One of the persistent questions arising in response to the proposals for arming the “rebels” is what precise role is played in their operations by Al Qaeda and other Islamist forces.

US Adm. James Stavridis, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, testifying at a US Senate hearing Tuesday allowed that US intelligence agencies had detected “flickers” of an Al Qaeda presence within the Libyan armed opposition.

“We have seen flickers in the intelligence of potential Al Qaeda, Hezbollah; we’ve seen different things,” said the admiral. “But at this point, I don’t have the detail sufficient to say that there’s a significant Al Qaeda presence or any other terrorist presence in and among these folks.”

Hillary Clinton brushed off a similar question, declaring, “We don’t know as much as we would like to know” about the “rebels.”

The US ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz, admitted to the New York Times that he had no way of knowing whether the “rebels” were “100 percent kosher, so to speak.” And former CIA agent Bruce Riedel, now an analyst at the Democratic Party-oriented think tank, the Brookings Institution, allowed that there were bound to be such elements. He said, “The question we can’t answer is: Are they 2 percent of the opposition? Are they 20 percent? Or are they 80 percent?”

US intelligence analysts have acknowledged that members of the Libya Islamic Fighting Group are playing a role in the attempt to oust Gaddafi. The organization was founded by Libyan veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and was placed on a list of groups affiliated with the Taliban after September 11.

Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondents Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai reported Wednesday that “some of the 200 or so Libyans operating near the Afghan border may be on their way home to steer the anti-Gaddafi revolution in a more Islamist direction.” Among them, the report said, is Abu Yahya al-Libi, who is Al Qaeda’s “senior Islamist ideologue and bin Laden’s head of operations for Afghanistan.” If Yahya is successful in reaching eastern Libya, it added, “he’ll be able to operate with relative freedom, without worrying about Gaddafi’s secret police.”

If the Libyan intervention has demonstrated anything, it is the fraud of Washington’s so-called global war on terrorism. In its bid to oust Gaddafi and install a US puppet state in Libya, the CIA and the Pentagon are allied with Al Qaeda against a regime which had placed its secret service at the disposal of the CIA for combating the Islamist movement.

Gaddafi has opportunistically attempted to dissuade the US and other Western powers from attacking him by pointing to the role of the Islamists among the rebels, but to no avail.

The CIA’s ties to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda precede those forged with the Libyan dictator. It has long seen the terrorist movement as a useful tool, first for attacking the Soviets, then for providing a pretext for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now as foot soldiers in Washington’s bid to re-colonize an oil-rich North African country.

 

 

London Conference Plots Imperialist Carve-Up Of Libya

 

 

30 March, 2011

WSWS.org

The conference on Libya held Tuesday at London’s Lancaster House was a repulsive exercise in hypocrisy and cynicism. In the name of liberating the Libyan people, the United States and Britain brought together foreign ministers from 40 countries and dignitaries from international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and the Arab League to sanction an escalation of the air war against the former colony and set the stage for the installation of a stooge regime.

As American, British and French missiles and bombs continued to rain down on Libyan government troops and civilian populations in cities such as Tripoli and Sirte, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and British Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the military assault would continue indefinitely. Clinton spoke of further economic and political sanctions against the regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi and indicated that Washington was moving toward arming the so-called “rebel” forces.

The conference followed President Barack Obama’s televised speech Monday night, in which he not only justified the aggression in Libya, but argued that the president had a right to launch military attacks and wars anywhere in the world to defend American “values” and “interests” and maintain “the flow of commerce.” This is an open-ended brief for imperialist war that even goes beyond the scope of the Bush administration’s doctrine of preventive war.

It increases the short-term potential for US intervention in a number of countries in the Middle East, including Syria and Iran, and, longer-term, for war against more formidable rivals such as China.

Interviewed on the “NBC Nightly News” program Monday evening, Obama reiterated Clinton’s statements at the London conference opening the door to deeper US involvement in the war, including the arming of the opposition forces led by the Benghazi-based Interim Transitional National Council.

This expansion of US militarism is backed with particular enthusiasm by the liberal and pseudo-left advocates of “humanitarian” imperialism, who cut their teeth by lining up behind American bombs and bullets in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Expressing the contemptuous attitude of these forces for fundamental democratic principals, the New York Times published an editorial Tuesday praising Obama’s speech on Libya, while chiding him for violating basic democratic and constitutional norms.

After declaring that “the rebels will likely need air support for quite some time,” the newspaper wrote: “The president made the right choice to act, but this is a war of choice, not necessity. Presidents should not commit the country to battle without consulting Congress and explaining their reasons to the American people.”

Having registered its disapproval for the record, the Times immediately brushed aside the illegality of the war, noting, “Fortunately, initial coalition military operations have gone well.”

Opening the London conference, the British Prime Minister Cameron declared, “We are all here in one united purpose, that is to help the Libyan people in their hour of need.” He denounced Gaddafi for continuing to resist militarily against the US-NATO-backed rebel forces, saying the Libyan leader was thereby in “flagrant breach of the UN Security Council resolution” that sanctioned the military intervention. The air war would continue, he said, until the regime was in full compliance with the resolution—something that could be realized only by the fall of Gaddafi from power.

As the Guardian noted, Cameron and Clinton were careful in their remarks at the conference to refrain from directly repeating their demand that Gaddafi step down, because among the governments represented at the conference there are differences over openly making regime-change an aim of the war.

“Cameron did not repeat his demand for Gaddafi to stand down immediately and to face justice at the International Criminal Court,” the Guardian noted. “The conference is attended by Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister, who is hoping to broker a ceasefire between Gaddafi and the rebel forces. Franco Frattini, the foreign minister of Libya’s former imperial ruler, Italy, who has raised the prospect of spiriting Gaddafi to exile, is also attending.”

Behind the façade of unity there are bitter conflicts within the war camp. The US no doubt encouraged Britain to hold the conference in order to rein in France, which led the initial drive for war in Libya, and to use the British as a cat’s paw to assert American hegemony in a post-Gaddafi Libya.

Many divisions were evident. The African Union, whose efforts to broker a ceasefire and negotiations between Gaddafi and the rebels were blocked by the launching of military action, boycotted the conference. Likewise Russia, which the previous day had denounced the war coalition for exceeding the “humanitarian” terms of the UN resolution.

Egypt, along with some other Arab countries, also refused to attend. The military rulers of Egypt likely felt it unwise to risk the wrath of a restive population by openly joining in the colonial-style carve-up of neighboring Libya.

There are also differences over relations with the Interim Transitional National Council. To date, only France and Qatar have formally recognized the self-appointed anti-Gaddafi leadership. One of the aims of Washington and London in holding the conference was to legitimize the “democratic” opposition leadership, but differences within the war coalition prevented them from allowing the Transitional National Council delegates in attendance to formally participate in the deliberations.

As a result, a conference advertised as enabling the Libyan people to determine their own future had no Libyan participants. Cameron nevertheless went out of his way to promote the Transitional National Council, meeting with its chairman, Mahmoud Jabril, at 10 Downing Street, naming it as the axis of a new government in his initial remarks, and opening up the Foreign Office’s main briefing room for a press conference by Jabril’s fellow rebel delegates.

Clinton also ostentatiously held a meeting with Jarbil, allowing the two of them to be photographed together in order to underscore American support for the council. US officials announced that Washington was sending a special envoy to deepen its relations with the opposition leadership.

 

The right-wing, pro-imperialist character of the council is embodied in the delegates who represented it in London. Jabril taught for many years in the US after obtaining a PhD at the University of Pittsburgh. From 2007, he headed Gaddafi’s National Economic Development Board, which spearheaded the introduction of capitalist market relations and the opening of Libya to foreign investment.

The two senior opposition figures who gave the press conference were Guma El-Gamaty, the council’s coordinator in Britain, and Mahmoud Shammam, the council’s head of media, who is based in Washington.

Shammam is managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine and has previously served as editor of Arab Newsweek. He is also a member of the advisory board on the Middle East at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. At the press conference, he appealed for the US and its allies to begin arming the opposition forces.

El-Gamaty is a Libyan writer and political commentator. He has been living in the UK for more than 30 years and was active with the Libyan opposition movement abroad in the 1980s. For the past few years, he has worked a researcher at the University of Westminster.

All of these figures have close ties with American and European corporate, political and, it can be safely presumed, intelligence organizations.

Clinton’s press conference following the meeting exposed the fraud of America’s supposed struggle against Al Qaeda and the “war on terror” as a whole. The US Secretary of State made clear that Washington had not ruled out arming the so-called “rebels” and asserted that such action would be permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the military intervention in Libya.

A Reuters reporter questioned Clinton on possible US arms for the opposition, citing the remarks that day of US Adm. James Stavridis, who told a Senate committee that there were “flickers” of US intelligence on links between the Interim Transitional National Council and Al Qaeda and Hezbollah.

“How great a concern is that?” the reporter asked. “And is that part of the US debate over any potential arms transfers to the transitional council?”

Clinton brushed aside the danger of funneling US arms to Al Qaeda via the Libyan opposition, saying, “We do not have any specific information about specific individuals from any organization who are part of this, but, of course, we’re still getting to know those who are leading the Transitional National Council.”

The next questioner, from the Times of London, called it “quite striking” that “none of the names” of the rebel leaders were public, “apart from three or four of the 30-odd of them.” He continued: “Do you think they should be more transparent in term of declaring who they are, where they’re from, what kind of groupings they come from, and how they’re using the money?”

Clinton merely replied that “we’re picking up information,” adding that “this is a work in progress.”

Just two days before, Clinton had appeared with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on several Sunday interview programs, during which they insisted that the US had to continue to support Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, despite his deadly attacks on demonstrators, because of the threat represented by the presence of Al Qaeda in Yemen.

The dismissal by the Obama administration—as well as the media—of possible links between the Libyan opposition and Al Qaeda makes fairly clear that the relationship between the United States and Al Qaeda is complex and intimate. After all, the top figures in the terrorist network, including Osma bin Laden, got their start as assets of the CIA in the US-backed mujahedin guerilla war of the 1980s against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

This double standard in relation to the supposed central enemy in the “war on terror” is but one of many contradictions that expose the imperialist and neo-colonial character of the US-led war in Libya