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The Libyan government faces international condemnation for a vicious assault on the growing uprising against the four-decade rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. On Monday, Libyan troops and pro-government mercenaries attacked a large demonstration in the capital of Tripoli. Armed forces hunted down protesters in the streets, while Libyan warplanes and helicopters fired on them from above. The violence comes amidst more signs that Gaddafi’s government is losing ground. On Monday, several Libyan officials broke with Gaddaffi, including the justice minister and the country’s delegation to the United Nations. For more, we are joined by Libyan American activist Abdulla Darrat. “It really shows what over the last 40 years has become a country dominated by the megalomania of this one human being, who cares more for his self and his power than he cares for anybody in Libya,” Darrat says.

AMY GOODMAN: The Libyan government faces international condemnation for a vicious assault on the growing uprising against the four-decade rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. On Monday, Libyan troops and pro-government mercenaries attacked a huge demonstration in the capital of Tripoli. Armed forces hunted down protesters in the streets, while Libyan warplanes and helicopters fired on them from above. The death toll is unknown, but witnesses reported scores dead. Al Jazeera reports at least 61 people were killed in overnight clashes Sunday, following at least 300 people killed over the previous week. As many as 1,500 people may be missing in Libya since the start of demonstrations last week.

The violence comes amidst more signs that Gaddafi’s government is losing ground. On Monday, a number of Libyan officials broke with Gaddafi, including the justice minister and the country’s delegation to the United Nations. Libyan Deputy Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi condemned the attacks on protesters.

IBRAHIM DABBASHI: So, I think it is a one-man show. It is a kind of end of the game. And he’s trying to kill as much as he can from the Libyan people and try to destroy as much as he can from the Libyan country.

AMY GOODMAN: Libyan Deputy Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi. There are reports many top military officials and low-ranking soldiers have also joined with the uprising. Two Libyan fighter pilots have also defected to Malta, saying they flew there after refusing orders to bomb the protesters. The opposition now fully controls Libya’s second-largest city, Benghazi, after seizing it over the weekend.

We go now to Washington, D.C., to Abdulla Darrat. He’s a Libyan American activist and co-founder of the website EnoughGaddafi.com.

Welcome to Democracy Now! What do you understand is happening? It’s very hard to get information out. Often the video we see is from people’s cell phones, posting them online. Abdulla, what do you know so far?

ABDULLA DARRAT: Well, what we can tell at the moment is that the regime is in the kind of throes of desperation, on its way out. But what we don’t know is how many people it’s planning to take down with it along the way. Unfortunately, over the last couple days, the violence has actually intensified in Tripoli as the regime attempts to use irrational violence with sporadic gunfire, gunships from helicopters and other forms of terrorism to keep people off the streets. They recognize that if the population of Tripoli gets out into the streets and, en masse, collects in some of its central squares, that Tripoli will fall and the regime will be done.

So what they have tried to do, attempted to do, is to scare people and to make sure that they do not leave their homes by bringing—intensifying the amount of mercenaries that are on the streets, by shooting almost at random throughout the neighborhoods in Tripoli, and also by spreading all types of misinformation. As you mentioned, Amy, at the moment it’s very difficult to confirm reports of anything on the ground. All we can really rely on at the moment are eyewitness accounts. However, we saw even on Al Jazeera yesterday what appeared to be the regime calling into Al Jazeera channels and spreading misinformation about the use of bombs from aircraft in attempts to, what I believe, scare the population and deter them from entering the streets and really taking Tripoli, which for the most part, as you mentioned, is really the regime’s last stronghold.

AMY GOODMAN: Abdulla Darrat, the information that mercenaries are being used, meaning that they have to supplement forces at home because they’re not willing to fire on fellow Libyans, is this correct?

ABDULLA DARRAT: That appears to be the case. I—

AMY GOODMAN: And what about the Human Rights—go ahead.

ABDULLA DARRAT: I mean, it appears to be the case that the mercenaries have been brought in as additional force. There are also a number of security battalions and other army forces that are also fighting with them. The army is not innocent of the violence. Although there are certain interests and certain factions within the army that have laid down their arms, we still do see a number of people within the army, within the security forces, who are also joining the fighting. The mercenaries seem to be an attempt really to, as I mentioned before, terrorize the population, as the regime really understands that what it comes down to is that these people who are entering the streets see the safety in numbers, know that—understand that if they come out en masse, the regime will be toppled.

AMY GOODMAN: War crimes are being committed. What about the Human Rights Watch report?

ABDULLA DARRAT: Well, the Human Rights Watch report—and they’ve had—they’ve issued several over the last couple days and will probably continue to issue more. We’ve seen, as you mentioned, Amy, the use of mercenaries, and the mercenaries have been, for all intents and purposes, snipers, for the most part. They’ve been positioned on top of roof buildings and have been systematically picking off protesters one at a time. A lot of the images and videos that we’re seeing that are slowly trickling out of the country; as you know, the internet service is slow and inconsistent, so we’re not getting all of these images all at once. But what we are seeing is that those who have died in the recent violence have died often from gunshot wounds to the head, to the eye, to the ear. It’s sharpshooting.

Another kind of confirmed set of war crimes is that they have been using anti-aircraft weapons to shoot protesters, a 50-caliber machine gun, 50-caliber machine guns. There’s a video that recently came out that shows the shells from this. We’re also hearing reports, also confirmed by eyewitnesses, that security forces are going into hospitals and killing doctors and healthcare workers so that they do not care for the injured.

The violence is gruesome and staggering and really justifies to the eyes of the international community why this regime must be stopped and why it must end. It really shows what over the last 40 years has become a country dominated by the megalomania of this one human being, who cares more for his self and his power than he cares for anybody in Libya. He has an utter disrespect and complete, complete almost—it’s almost as if he despises the population. And that’s been apparent in his utter disregard for their lives, their safety, their interests.

AMY GOODMAN: What about what the U.S. and U.S. contractors can do, the news that General Dynamics signed a $165 million contract to arm the Libyan armed forces’ elite second brigade two years ago, or Halliburton, Shell, Raytheon, Dow Chemical? Do you think President Obama is doing enough?

ABDULLA DARRAT: Well, it took them a little—it took them a few days, I think, to finally make a statement yesterday. And unfortunately, I think that they were possibly waiting to see if the regime could actually quell the uprising or not, in the same type of opportunism that we saw in Egypt and Tunisia, where the State Department and the White House appear to only jump on the side of the protesters when they realize that the regime is on its way out. I think that’s completely unfortunate.

And beyond that, in Libya, what we have seen is an almost utter disregard for human life. This isn’t just a question of political interests, but people’s humanity. These are war crimes that are being committed, and the Obama administration must do more than just condemn the actions. They must rally the international community to intervene in other ways, to intervene possibly with peacekeepers, to allow medical equipment into the country, to perhaps create a no-fly zone over Libya so that more mercenary aircraft and other warships do not enter Libyan airspace. I mean, there’s a number of things that the international community must do immediately in order to ensure—

AMY GOODMAN: Abdulla Darrat, as we wrap up, your own website that I mentioned, “Enough Gaddafi,” that you established two years ago to take on the brutality of the Gaddafi regime, was hacked two days ago by the government, by the Libyan government?

ABDULLA DARRAT: Yes, ma’am.

AMY GOODMAN: So it’s empty now?

ABDULLA DARRAT: Yes, yes. The website is currently down, but we hope we can get it up soon. I mean, we were only one victim amongst many who have been victimized online through Facebook or through their own websites over the last couple days, as the regime really tries to black out any information. I mean, they’ve really tried to seal off the whole country and systematically destroy the population while nobody watches. And I think finally word is getting out. People are learning of the atrocities inside the country, and I hope that the senselessness of the violence will compel people to act against this regime and finally bring it down.

AMY GOODMAN: Abdulla Darrat, I want to thank you for being with us, Libyan American activist, one of the co-founders of EnoughGaddafi.com, speaking to us from Washington, D.C.

ABDULLA DARRAT: Thank you, Amy.

AMY GOODMAN: Al Jazeera reporting, “What we are witnessing today is unimaginable. Warplanes and helicopters are indiscriminately bombing one area after another. There are many, many dead.” Adel Mohamed Saleh said in a live broadcast, “Anyone who moves, even if they are in their car, they will hit you.”

This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. From the Middle East to the Midwest—when we come back, we go to Ohio and Madison, Wisconsin, where mass protests continue.

 

In what appears to be as close to a consensus as the world community can ever hope to achieve, the United States reluctantly stood its ground on behalf of Israel and on February 18, 2011 vetoed a resolution on the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was supported by all 14 of the other members of the UN Security Council. The resolution was also sponsored by 130 member countries before being presented to the Council. In the face of such near unanimity the United States might have been expected to some respect for the views of every leading government in the world, including all of its closest European allies, to have had the good grace to at least abstain from the vote. Indeed, such an obstructive use of the veto builds a case for its elimination, or at least the placement of restrictions on its use. Why should an overwhelming majority of member countries be held hostage to the geopolitical whims of Washington, or in some other situation, an outlier member trying to shield itself or its ally from a Security Council decision enjoying overwhelming support. Of course this American veto is not some idiosyncratic whim, but is an expression of the sorry pro-Israeli realities of domestic politics, suggesting that it is Israel that is the real holder of the veto in this situation, and the U.S. Congress and the Israeli Lobby are merely designated as the enforcers.

 

Susan Rice, the American chief representative in the Security Council, appeared to admit as much when she lamely explained that the casting the veto on this text “should not be misunderstood to mean support for settlement construction,” adding that, on the contrary, the United States “rejects in the strongest terms the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity.” Why then? The formal answer given is that the United States, agreeing with Israel, believes that only in the context of direct negotiations can the issue of settlements be addressed alongside other unresolved matters such as refugees, borders, and the status of Jerusalem. This seems absurdly arrogant, and geopolitically humiliating. If the 14 other members of the Security Council believe that Israeli should be censured for continuing to build unlawful settlements, and that no negotiations can proceed until it ceases, then it would seem that a united front would be the most effective posture to resumed negotiations. This is especially so here as it is a no brainer to realize that every additional settlement unit authorized and constructed makes it less likely that a truly independent and viable Palestinian state can ever be brought into being, and that there exists the slightest intention on the Israeli side to do so.

 

In view of this feverish Israeli effort to create still more facts on the ground, for the Israelis to contend that negotiations should resume without preconditions, is to hope that the Palestinian Authority will play the fool forever. After all for more than 43 years the Israelis have been whittling away at the substance of the two state consensus embodied in unanimous Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), contending at every phase of the faux peace process that an agreement must incorporate ‘subsequent developments,’ that is, unlawful settlements, ethnic cleansing. In the end, the Israelis may turn out to have been more clever by half, creating an irresistible momentum toward the establishment of a single secular democratic state of Palestine that upholds human rights for both peoples and brings to an end the Zionist project of an exclusive ‘Jewish state.’ With great historic irony, such an outcome would seem to complete the circle of fire ignited by Lord Balfour’s secret 1917 promise to the Zionist movement of ‘a Jewish homeland’ in historic Palestine, a process that caused a Palestinian catastrophe along the way and brought war and bloodshed to the region.

 

The disingenuousness of the Israeli position was confirmed by the recent publication of the Palestine Papers that showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that even when the Palestinian Authorities caved in on such crucial issues as Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees, their Israeli counterparts, including the supposedly more moderate predecessors to the Netanyahu leadership, displayed no interest in reaching even an agreement so heavily weighted in Tel Aviv’s favour. What seems inescapable from any careful reading of these negotiating positions behind closed doors during the prior decade is that the public negotiations are a sham designed to buy time for Israel to complete its illegal dirty work of de facto annexation in the West Bank, a position it has long adopted in the form of Israeli de jure annexation of the entire expanded city of Jerusalem in defiance of the will of the international community and the understanding of international law, objectively considered. To contend that stopping the unlawful encroachments of continuing settlement activity on occupied Palestinian territory, an assessment that even the United States does not question substantively, is an inappropriate Palestinian demand seems so excessive as to humiliate any Palestinian representatives that stooped so low as to accept it. Equally so, is the Israeli claim that this demand has not been made in the past, which to the extent accurate, is not an argument against freezing further settlement activity, but a disturbing comment on Palestinian complacency in relation to their failure to insist upon respect for their rights under international law.

 

In the context of this latest incident in the Security Council, the Palestinian Authority deserves praise for holding firm, and not folding under U.S. pressure, which was strongly applied, including reported warnings from President Obama by phone to President Mahmoud Abbas of adverse ‘repercussions’ if the text calling for an end to illegal settlement building was brought before the Security Council for a vote. Obviously, the United States Government realized its predicament. It did not want to be so isolated and embarrassed in this way, finding itself caught between its international exposure as willing to support even the most unreasonable Israeli defiance of the UN and its domestic vulnerability to a pro-Israeli backlash in the event that it failed to do Israel’s bidding in this matter of largely symbolic importance.

 

We should not forget that had the Security Council resolution been adopted, there is not the slightest prospect that Israel would have curtailed, let alone frozen, its settlement plans. Israel has defied a near unanimous vote (with, hardly a surprise, the U.S. judge casting the lone negative vote among the 15 judges) of the World Court in 2004 on the unlawfulness of the settlement wall. Here, an American dissent could not bring Israel in from the cold of its refusal to abide by this ruling as thankfully there is no veto power in judicial settings. In that instance of the wall, Israel wasted no time denouncing the advisory opinion of the highest UN judicial body, declaring its refusal to obey this clear finding that the wall built on occupied Palestinian territory should be dismantled forthwith and Palestinians compensated for any harm done. Instead, despite brave nonviolent Palestinian resistance, work continues to this day on finishing the wall.

 

With respect to the settlements it is no wonder that American diplomacy wanted to avoid blocking an assertion of unlawfulness that it was on record as agreeing to, a fact awkwardly acknowledged by Ambassador Rice in the debate, knowing that the resolution would not have the slightest behavioural impact on Israel in any event. It should be noticed that as much as Israel defies the UN and international law, it still cashes in its most expensive diplomatic chips to avoid censure whenever possible. I believe that this is an important, although unacknowledged, Israeli recognition of the legitimizing role of international law and the UN. It is also connected with an increasing Palestinian reliance on soft power, especially its BDS campaign. This partial shift in Palestinian tactics worries Israel. In the last several months Israeli think tanks close to the government refer to as ‘the delegitimation project’ with growing anxiety. This approach of the Palestinian Global Solidarity Movement is what I have been calling a Legitimacy War. For the last several years it is being waged and won by the Palestinians, joining the struggles of those living under occupation and in exile.

 

On the PA side there was reported anxiety that withdrawing the resolution in this atmosphere would amount to what was derisively referred to as a possible ‘Goldstone 2,’ a reference to the inexcusable effort by the Palestinian Authority back in October 2009 to have consideration of the Goldstone Report deferred for several months by the Human Rights Council as a prelude to its institutional burial, which has now more or less taken place thanks to American pressures behind the scene. It has even been suggested that had the PA withdrawn the resolution Abbas would have been driven from power by an angry popular backlash among the Palestinian populace. In this sense, the PA was, like the United States, squeezed from both sides: by the Americans and by their own people.

 

Of course, in the background of this incident at the UN are the tumultuous developments taking place throughout the region, which are all adverse to Israel and all promising in relation to the Palestinian struggle even though many uncertainties exist. It is not only the anti-autocrat upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, the outcome of which is still not clear from the perspective of genuine regime change as distinct from recasting the role of dictatorial leader, but the wider regional developments. These include the political rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Turkish diplomacy that refuses to tow the Washington line, the failure of American interventionary diplomacy in Iraq, and the beleaguered authoritarian governments in the region some of whom are likely to give more active support on behalf of Palestinian goals to shore up their own faltering domestic legitimacy in relation to their own people.

 

In many ways, the failed Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement activity is a rather trivial event in the broader setting of the underlying conflict. At the same time it is a significant show of the play of forces that are operative in Washington and Ramallah, and above all, it is an unseemly display of the influence Israel wields with respect to the Obama Administration. Is it not time that the United States revisited its Declaration of Independence or began to treat the 4th of July as a day of mourning?

 

 

23 February, 2011

Richardfalk.wordpress.com

 

 

 

 

22 February, 2011

Countercurrents.org

The first reports came by email on February 14, two days before media and the U.S State Department acknowledged government attacks on the innocent Bahraini Shi’i.

 

Hello,

I was at a peaceful protest and people were chanting legitimate demands asking for parliament, constitution, basic human rights, and etc… Out of nowhere, riot police then came charging down attacking the protesters with rubber bullets, tear gas and sound bombs. Despite foreign journalist present at the scene, more and more violence is being used at the moment. Officials need to be aware of the situation. International media must be told of this unfair, unjust situation of peaceful protesters being attacked by frequent violence.

 

The emails continued for several days, more frequently and with increasing despair. Finally on the February 17 night, police killed several protestors and wounded hundreds of those who were sleeping in tents in Pearl Square.

 

What is the reality of this once again suppression of a persecuted majority in an Arab nation? Due to the attacks being upon Shi’i, the aggression gains added importance. The Shi’is are unique. In Bahrain, they “have limited opportunities in the public sector, and are even more excluded in the military, where no Shi’is hold important positions, even if Shi’is serve as normal soldiers.” Persecuted in Saudi Arabia, second-rate citizens in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and present day Bahrain, where they are a majority, and downtrodden when the Maronites controlled Lebanon’s politics, the Shi’i have never been a favored group in societies, and international communities have ignored their plights. Why?

 

The reason is not religious. The masses of Islam are no different from the masses of Protestants, they don’t care to whom and how their neighbor prays. Creating a conflict between opposing groups creates havoc and a reason to maintain control. By prompting, promoting and provoking a Sunni/Shi’i divide, western nations have contributed to preventing Arab nations from evolving into democratic, egalitarian and stable states. The Sunni/Shi’i divide, portrayed as a religious conflict, is actually an economic conflict.

 

Similar to Northern Ireland, where Irish Catholics protested against their second-class citizenship and economic persecution by English Protestants, the deprived Shi’i minorities (majority in Bahrain) have legitimately protested their economic subservience – for decades. During these decades, the United States played a significant role in the continued repression of the followers of Ali. While supporting Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War, encouraging the Maronite and Sunnis in Lebanon, and having close relationships with Saudi Arabian and Bahrain monarchies, the U.S. government ignored the legitimate grievances of the Shi’i and implicitly allowed these grievances to erupt into challenges. Adding to the total collapse of U.S. policy, the U.S. has been antagonistic to Hezbollah, the organization that led the Shi’i to achieve equality in Lebanon, and despite contrary western propaganda, enabled Lebanon to evolve to a more democratic, egalitarian and stable state. American polices have forced Shi’i to turn to benefactors who will assist them in their plight. After soul mates from Iran naturally respond, the U.S. then accuses Iran of meddling and controlling, and exporting terrorism. Anti-Shi’i is one of the most punishing of the anti-isms and is aggravated by a western world that excuses nefarious anti-shi’i policies. Recognition of the rights of the Shi’i will diminish the Sunni/Shi’i divide.

 

Iran and Saudi Arabia most represent the divide, with each nation fearing that the other nation wants to overthrow its government. U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and U.S. administrations close relations with the Kingdom supports Iran’s arguments. Arab hostility to Iran occurs from the Islamic Republic’s disregard of its Sunni minority and its contentious attitude with the Gulf State, its claims on Island territories and its supposed assistance to a rebellious Shi’i.

 

Middle East stability dictates reconciliation between the Arab world and Iran, between Sunnis and Shiites, and specifically between Saudi Arabia and Iran. By cooperating, Iran and Saudi Arabia can stabilize the Middle East. This does not mean that the two authoritarian nations should be excused for suppression of internal democratic movements and be able to avoid responsibility towards their own peoples. Nor does it mean that their accord should be allowed to prompt an arrangement that subverts other nations or constructs an anti-American coalition. It only means that, by peculiarities of international politics, these nations happen to have significant power to resolve a crushing situation. The world should be aware of this unique power and use it to advantage. Trace the situation. It emerges from U.S. failures, which predict a U.S. loss of influence, which Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claims will create a political vacuum, which will be filled by oil rich Iran and very oil rich Saudi Arabia, which merits a repair of the Sunni and Shi’i divide, and then leads to Middle East peace and stability.

 

Support of autocratic monarchies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf State nations has strengthened these regimes and delayed them from extending sufficient freedoms to their populations, including Shi’i. The latter ethnicity is important because U.S. proclamations of freedom of religion and minority rights, except for Iraq, are rarely applied to the Shi’i – just the opposite – the victimized and mostly powerless Shi’i, who have been attacked by Sunnis from India to Saudi Arabia, are constantly and falsely portrayed as aggressive, terrorist prone and always ready to seize control. This depiction disguises government corruption, reinforces Sunni domination and exaggerates a Sunni/Shi’i divide that seeks amelioration.

 

Bahrain is now a crucial focus for rights of Arab peoples. The outcome of the events in Peal Square will portend the future of the Middle East and influence the political situation in Iraq.

A sectarian government in Iraq increases the probability of a continuous and crushing civil war between the Shiites and Sunnis. The strife could undermine and consume the opposing Islamic states; Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. A stable and non-sectarian Iraq at their borders relieves these states of responsibility to assist opposing factions and limits charges of neglecting brethren from attack. A non-sectarian government serves as a buffer between Shiite Iran and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.

 

Is cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia far-fetched? Major problems exist between Iran and the Arab states – territorial disputes, threats of closing the Straits of Hormuz, Arab states’ alliances with the United States, claims that Iran supports a Shi’i uprising in Bahrain, and the Sunni/Shi’i divide. Nevertheless, previous events indicated that Iran and Saudi Arabia intended to diminish antagonisms and more eagerly cooperate in stabilizing their Middle East.

 

On March 4, 2007, the Iranian president and Saudi leaders had official talks in which they “pledged to fight the spread of sectarian strife in the Middle East, which was the biggest danger facing the region.” Following this meeting, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, on Oct.4, 2007, highlighted what he has said is the emergence of a “power vacuum in the region,” and indicated Iran’s readiness to fill that vacuum, while encouraging cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to achieve that goal. On August 18, 2008, seven Arab countries, including Kuwait, announced their intentions to reopen their embassies in Baghdad. The Arab Interim Parliament (AIP), which has been active in addressing Arab Nations’ social and economic affairs, stated on August 25, 2000, “it was examining a proposal to have its chairman hold a dialogue between the Arab and Iranian nations.”

 

A series of economic agreements between Iran and Gulf State demonstrated a recognized dependence. London-based economic weekly MEED reported on August 3, 2008 that UAE-based Quest Energy and an Iranian company are developing a project to build a 1,000 megawatt power plant in Iran. On August 17, 2008, the Saudi Press Agency reported that “Iran signed a deal to export gas to Oman that could open new export routes well beyond the neighboring Arab state.”

 

A Bahrain that evolves into a non-sectarian and independent democracy initiates a hopeful path to stabilization of the entire Middle East. This task will fail if the western world does not recognize its role in aggravating the problems of the Arab world. Instead of inciting division and hatred, and juggling Middle East lives to favor their own interests, isn’t it preferable that western agencies and governments encourage a Shi’i/Sunni rapport? Start with Bahrain.

 

Dan Lieberman is editor of Alternative Insight, a monthly web based newsletter. He can be reached at: alternativeinsight@earthlink.net

 

 

 

 

 

On 7^th February 2011, we posted on the JUST website an article entitled “The Arab Uprising 12 Questions and 12 Answers” which examined a number of the underlying issues in the Egyptian Revolution and the larger Arab Uprising. We are carrying excerpts from that article since they provide useful background information on the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.

 

The author of that article, Chandra Muzaffar, has also included two other issues arising from Mubarak’s ouster on 11^th February 2011 in his analysis which appears below.

 

 

1) Mubarak has handed over power to the Egyptian military high command. What are its immediate tasks?

 

From media reports, the military will through consultations with various groups that were involved in the Revolution formulate a provisional constitution which will be the basis for holding a free and fair election as soon as possible. The election will not be just for the Presidency; it could also include contests for Parliament. The powers of the President, Parliament and the Cabinet will have to be spelt out. Military rule, in other words, will be a brief prelude to civilian rule, and hopefully, a genuine democracy.

2) The US government appears to be pleased with the military take-over and the proposed transition to civilian rule. Is this what Washington wanted from the beginning?

 

Powerful vested interests in Washington (perhaps not President Barack Obama himself), it seems to me, would have liked Mubarak to remain in office until September which was Mubarak’s own game plan.  But these interests realised, a few days into the mass protests, that Mubarak was so unpopular that they would not be able to keep him on the throne. This is when they came up with Plan B which was to instal Omar Suleiman, a Mubarak confidante with close ties to Tel Aviv, as the Vice-President and President in waiting. Suleiman, his friends in Washington and Tel Aviv soon realised, was widely detested by the protesters partly because of his links and partly because of his direct involvement in the suppression of democratic dissent and in the torture of the dissenters.

 

Getting the military to run the show for a while is actually the US and Israeli governments’ Plan C. While they are very much aware of the presence of nationalistic elements in the core of the military who would resist any attempt to perpetuate Egypt’s present role as a client state of the US, they also know that the Egyptian military top brass has business ties with huge corporations in the US that deal with military hardware. Besides, training programmes in the US for Egyptian officers and joint military exercises between the two countries over a long period of time have deepened the bond between the Egyptian and US militaries. The US government, to put it differently, is quite confident about the Egyptian military. US officials are therefore hoping that it will manage the transition in such a manner that US and Israeli interests will be well protected

 

3) How do Egyptian protesters feel about the US’s role in Egyptian politics?

 

There is a big segment of Egyptian society that resents US and Western attempts to decide and determine its future. These Egyptians know why the US is in the Arab world and in West Asia. It is oil; it is the strategic significance of the entire region: the Mediterranean, the Suez, the Straits of Hormuz; and it is Israel.  They know that hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have been sacrificed at the altar of US interests. They know how many precious lives — the lives of little children — were snuffed out because of the Anglo-US led sanctions against Iraq that went on for 13 years, and culminated in the invasion and occupation of that blighted land resulting in more death and destruction.

 

The Egyptians and other Arabs remember all this. This is why there is so much anger against leaders like Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the deposed President of Tunisia, who are viewed rightly as men who facilitated US hegemony of the Arab world in recent years. They are regarded as lackeys serving an imperial agenda.  In Cairo and Tunis there were banners denouncing them as agents of the US.

 

Mubarak and Ben Ali have also been part and parcel of the blatant hypocrisy that characterises US relations with dictatorial regimes everywhere. US leaders have often claimed that they are committed to strengthening freedom and democracy in the Arab world. The former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, even proclaimed in Cairo in 2005 that, “We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.” She launched a foundation called the Foundation for the Future for this purpose. Its chairman until June 2008 was a close US ally, the Malaysian politician, Anwar Ibrahim.

 

In reality, the US, as everyone knows, gave its full support to Mubarak and Ben Ali and other such dictators who imprisoned, tortured and killed political dissidents with impressive democratic credentials. It is only when these dictators were on the verge of collapse that US officials began to support the democratic aspirations of their people. What makes their hypocrisy worse is their suppression of genuine attempts by people in the region to practise democratic principles. When the Islamic party, Hamas, won a free and fair election in Occupied Palestine in January 2006, it was subjected to a boycott and isolated by the US and the European Union. It is because of such hypocrisy that those who are struggling for change in Egypt and elsewhere have very little faith in the US leadership.

 

4) In your reply just now you mentioned ‘Israel’. Surely ‘Israel’ is an even more compelling  factor in the people’s rage against their leaders.

If US hegemony evokes negative vibes, it is partly because that hegemony has been used to protect and reinforce Israel’s position in the region. Israel—more than the US — is perceived by many Arabs as a bane upon their countries. Leaders and governments who collude with the Israeli regime are often viewed as traitors to the Palestinian cause.

 

For hosting former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon in Tunis some years ago, Ben Ali was denounced by many Islamic and secular groups in the Arab world. Mubarak, whose country has diplomatic  ties with Israel, was condemned by all and sundry  for closing the Rafah crossing at the Egypt –Gaza border during the Israeli assault on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. It aggravated the already precarious position of the besieged people of Gaza. When Israel attacked Lebanon in July 2006, Mubarak adopted an antagonistic attitude towards the target, namely, the Hezbollah, the most effective movement in the Arab world resisting Israeli aggression.

 

Israel and those who hobnob with her, incense a lot of Arabs and Muslims not simply because of the manner in which Israel was created in 1948 which was a terrible travesty of justice. Everything Israel has done since then — the conquest of even more Palestinian and Arab territories, the killing of thousands of Palestinians and other Arabs, the expulsion and eviction of Palestinian families, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the harassment at countless checkpoints which a Palestinian has to endure on a daily basis, and the apartheid wall that barricades Palestinians— have all contributed to the collective humiliation of the Arab and the Muslim. Israel’s arrogance and haughtiness have seared their psyche as nothing else has in the last 63 years. Israel is a perpetual affront to their human dignity. And the protests in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Algeria and in Yemen are about dignity.

 

5) Surely, the Arab Uprising is not just about how Israeli arrogance and US hegemony have trampled upon the dignity of the people.  Hasn’t the economic situation also contributed to mass anger?

 

Undoubtedly. It has been estimated that about 140 million Arabs— 40% of the total population— live below the poverty line.   But absolute poverty alone has seldom given rise to mass uprisings in history. It is widening income and wealth disparities, exacerbated by increasing food prices and high unemployment, that have begun to hurt a lot of people.   While the policies and priorities set by the national elite are partly responsible for this economic malaise, the global economic environment has also been a major factor. Global food prices, for instance, shot up  dramatically towards the end of 2010 due to a variety of reasons ranging from natural disasters and climate change to the conversion of food crops to bio-fuel and rampant speculation in commodities. Both Tunisia and Egypt import food today, when the latter was in fact self-sufficient in food in the sixties.

 

Egypt’s present dependence upon food imports reflects a major structural flaw in a number of Arab economies and indeed other economies in both the Global South and the Global North. Starting from the eighties, they began to implement “neo-liberal” capitalist policies which inter-alia required the rolling back of the state that in Egypt’s case meant the dismantling of government managed cooperatives in agriculture, the deregulation of the distribution of agricultural produce and the elimination of farm subsidies and food subsidies. Besides, neo-liberal capitalism also led to the opening up of the domestic market to food imports that were more competitive which in turn affected local food production. Consequently, food production declined significantly and Egypt became a net food importer.

 

Even high unemployment is, to some extent, a result of the dominance of finance  capital,— rather than capital for manufacturing activities or the service sector— typical of neo-liberal capitalism. With hedge funds, investment banks and currency speculators ruling the roost, there has been greater concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands. It is not surprising therefore that income and wealth disparities have become starker in today’s Egypt, compared to the Egypt of the sixties and early seventies.

 

It is important to keep this in mind as protesters rage against some of the symptoms of the disease such as high food prices, massive unemployment and widening disparities.

 

1. 1) What is the relationship between these economic issues and elite corruption and nepotism which apparently was also one of the causes of the Arab uprising?

When people are suffering as a result of soaring prices of essentials and lack of jobs, allegations about elite corruption and nepotism—especially if they are substantiated — rouse the public ire as few other issues do. It is indisputably true that there is a great deal of corruption at all levels in a number of Arab states. It is often linked to relatives and cronies.

 

In Tunisia, allegations about Ben Ali’s venality had been circulating for a long while. Invariably, they involved his wife, Leila Trabelsi, whose opulence and extravagance  sustained through corrupt means became fodder for the hundreds of thousands of dissidents yearning for change. Their two families had a stake in all major enterprises from banks and airlines to wholesale and retail businesses.  Their avarice incited mass hatred.

 

Much of the anger towards Mubarak and his alleged corruption, revolve around his son Gamal. The father’s nepotism had resulted in the accumulation of so much family wealth that it came to symbolise all the excesses of his 30 year rule in Egypt. What made it worse was Mubarak’s coarse attempt to anoint his son as his successor.

 

In Yemen too, Ali Abdullah Saleh who has been President since 1978 and was allegedly planning  to hand over the reins of power to his son, Ahmed, was forced through popular protest to announce that he had no such intention and that he would relinquish his position when his term expires in 2013. The people are continuing to demand that he leaves office earlier.

 

1. 2) Isn’t this— leaders staying in office for decades on end and then handing over power to their offspring— one of the main reasons why the Arab street has exploded in anger?

Dynastic politics is repugnant under any circumstances. It becomes even more odious when the man on the throne has been in power for ages and is distinguished by an utter lack of competence and rectitude.

 

WANA where almost all the Arab states are located is perhaps the only region in the world today where unelected incumbents, or incumbents who were elected in farcical elections, have been clinging on to power for decades, and are trying to hand over the reins of authority to their sons. WANA is also the region where elected parliaments, multi-party electoral competition, institutionalised accountability, legalised political dissent, independent judiciaries, and other such norms and principles of democratic governance are rare.

 

It is because democratic governance has yet to become the accepted practice in WANA, that young people especially those who have had some exposure to values such as freedom of expression and democratic accountability have turned against dictatorial governments. They abhor the repressive laws, the torture techniques and the brutal suppression of legitimate dissent associated with these regimes. A segment of the older generation that had always resented the political suppression by the elites, have decided to join hands with the young. The result is the explosion of anger that we are witnessing in many of the cities of the region.

 

1. 3) While this anger must have built up over a period of time, there must have been some trigger…………….

In the case of Tunisia, it was the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a young vegetable seller who was struggling to make ends meet in the midst of soaring food prices and was constantly harassed by the municipal authorities, that triggered an outpouring of angry emotions.  10 days after his funeral, on the 14^th of January 2011, Ben Ali who had been in power for 23 years, fled from his country, responding in a sense to the clarion call for his ouster from all strata of society. This gave hope to people in Jordan, Algeria and Egypt who were also hungering for meaningful change. When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians came out in the open asking Hosni Mubarak to resign from his presidency, the people of Yemen were encouraged to pressurise their leader to quit.

 

It is obvious that the Tunisian struggle against tyranny had a cascading effect. Bouazizi’s suicide was emulated in Egypt. Four Egyptians set themselves on fire. But the person who coaxed and challenged the people to congregate in the thousands in Tahrir  (Liberation) Square on 25 January  to urge Mubarak to step down  was a young girl by the name of Asma Mahfouz, one of the founders of the April 6 Youth Movement that has played a big part in organising  the mass protests since that day. It was Asma Mahfouz’s courage — and her passionate plea to others to show courage— that convinced a lot of people that they should overcome their fear and stand up for justice. Her voice, like the deaths of her four compatriots, was the trigger that Egypt was waiting for.

 

1. 4) Is the constant refrain about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin) in the Uprising and the so-called danger of the Uprising becoming like the Islamic Revolution of Iran that one hears over CNN in particular part of that agenda?

The Ikhwan is one of a variety of movements and organisations that is part of the protest in Egypt. It did not initiate the protest. Of course as a grassroots movement it is reputed to be the most disciplined and the best organised. It has been around for more than 80 years, though officially it is still banned.

 

Though it is only one of the actors at the moment— some Western commentators argue— the Ikhwan could well assume leadership once a new government is formed in Egypt, as it happened in Iran. After all, the Islamic element in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was also one of the Revolution’s many components and yet within a couple of years, the religious elite was entrenched in power and had side-lined the other actors.

 

Those who make this comparison overlook two important differences. The Iranian Revolution, it is true, was diverse but Ayatollah Khomeini, given his religious credentials and his selfless sacrifice, was widely acknowledged as its overall leader. In his almost 20 year struggle against the Shah of Iran, both within the country and in exile, Khomeini articulated a vision of struggle and change that was essentially religious. There were a number of other illustrious clerics, like Ayatollah Taleghani and Ayatollah Mutahhari who were also at the helm of the Iranian Revolution.  There is no one from the Ikhwan who plays a role in the Egyptian Uprising that comes anywhere close to the commanding stature of Khomeini or the other Ayatollahs in the Iranian Revolution.

 

It was partly because of Khomeini’s stature that he was able to shape post-revolutionary Iran in a specific religious mould. The war that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, with the support of a number of Arab monarchies and the connivance of the US, Britain and other Western nations, imposed upon Iran from 1980 to 1988, helped Khomeini to consolidate his religious grip upon his people.  There is nothing to suggest that such extraordinary circumstances that allowed a particular leadership with a particular religious orientation to reinforce its position would present themselves again in the case of Egypt.

 

Besides, the Ikhwan which at various points in history was known for its rigid, sometimes dogmatic conservatism has also undergone some significant changes. Mainstream groups within the movement have become more tolerant of theological differences, more accommodative of the role of women and non-Muslim minorities, and less exclusive in their notion of state and law. It is significant that in the wake of the massacre of Christians in Alexandria a few weeks ago, the Ikhwan played a major role in projecting Muslim-Christian solidarity.  Ironically, the political ban on Ikhwan has strengthened its commitment to humanitarian and welfare principles in Islam, and appears to have diluted its earlier obsession with the primacy of power. Nonetheless, there are still some elements within the Ikhwan who remain attached to a superficial, literalist interpretation of Islamic rules and injunctions.

 

In any case, why are political elites and media commentators in the US, Britain and other Western countries so concerned about the Ikhwan and its ideology in Egypt when they have no qualms about cooperating and collaborating with an Islamic state that adopts  an atavistic approach to law and marginalises women and non-Muslim minorities? Is it because Saudi Arabia is not only an unquestioningly loyal ally but is also totally subservient to US and Western hegemony?

 

In other words, it is not the ‘Islamic state’ or ‘Islamic law’ that is the problem. If the West is assured of acquiescence with its power and dominance, it would be quite happy to accept the Ikhwan. The US and other Western elites are not sure if the Ikhwan will reject their hegemony — as the Islamic Iranian leadership has done— and insist upon the independence and sovereignty of Egypt and the Arab people as a whole. Will the Ikhwan leaders follow the example of Hamas in Palestine and Hizbollah in Lebanon and pursue a principled position on the liberation of Palestinian and other Arab lands, and oppose Israel’s nefarious designs in the region?  Will the Ikhwan — as required by the Qur’an—privilege justice and the dignity of the oppressed and the victims of aggression over and above the interests of the US, British and Israeli elites?   Because these are worrying questions for those who seek to perpetuate their hegemony and their power, the Ikhwan and where it stands has become an issue.

 

1. 5) Instead of focusing upon the Ikhwan, shouldn’t US and Israeli elites reflect on how they can play a constructive role in an Arab world that is asserting its dignity and its honour?

This is precisely what they should be doing. If the people succeed in bringing about fundamental change in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in WANA, US and Israeli elites cannot continue with their present policy of controlling, manipulating  and  dominating the region through elites who represent their interests more than the well-being of the Arab masses. They should adjust to the new realities on the ground.

 

In more concrete terms, this means justice for the Palestinians—- justice that they have been denied for the last 63 years. Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to Israel and to a new Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza that will have East Jerusalem as its capital. Palestinian and other Arab prisoners in Israeli jails should be released. The Golan Heights should be returned in its entirety to Syria and the Sheba Farms should be restored to Lebanon. Israel should eliminate its nuclear weapons and WANA should be declared a nuclear weapons free zone. If the US is sincere about respecting and fulfilling the aspirations of the people of the region, it should coax, cajole and coerce Israel to take these measures.

 

As Israel moves towards peace based upon justice in a new WANA, all the states in the region should also accord formal recognition to Israel.

 

While the resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict will be the litmus test of whether or not the US is sincere in its attitude towards the Arab people, it will also have to show through deeds that it no longer seeks to perpetuate its political or economic hegemony anywhere in WANA. It should not try to maintain its political control over the region by ensuring that its proxies and agents are elected through the ballot-box. The US should also cease to use the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other such institutions and arrangements to push through neo-liberal capitalist policies and programmes that are clearly inimical to the people’s interest. Instead of trying to shape the destiny of the Arab world for its own hegemonic purpose, the US elite should learn to respect the autonomy and integrity of the people of WANA. It should allow them to harness their own religious and cultural strengths in order to construct their own future, guided by their own vision.

 

 

 

 

 

22 February, 2011 Countercurrents.org

Tunisian and Egyptian revolts have sparked battle for freedom in a number of Arab countries. With the ouster of entrenched Pro-US Presidents Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, the Arab world has erupted in popular protests for reforms and getting rid of tyrants. This week witnessed fierce anti-government demonstrations in Benghazi, the second largest town of Libya with hundreds of casualties. Similar demonstrations were witnessed in Algeria, Bahrain and Yemen. The governments have quickly resorted to violence to crush unrest before it gathers momentum that might threaten their grip on power.

After allowing several days of rallies in Bahrain capital, Manama, the riot police Thursday (2/17) stormed a protest encampment in Pearl Square before dawn, firing tear gas, beating demonstrators or blasting them with shotgun sprays of birdshot. At least five people were reported killed in the police assault on sleeping protesters.

Tellingly, unlike in Egypt, where the struggle was between democracy and dictatorship, Bahrain is suffering a flare-up in old divisions between its ruling Sunni minority and restive Shiites, who constitute 70 percent of the local population of 500,000.

The tension between the Sunni rulers and the Shiite majority runs deep, as it does throughout the Arab Middle East. Bahrain riots have broader regional implications since Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority in its eastern, oil-producing districts.

According to US Religious Freedom Report 2010, Saudi Shiite faced significant employment discrimination in the public and private sector. A very small number of Shiite occupied high-level positions in government-owned companies and government agencies. Many Shiite believed that openly identifying themselves as Shiite would negatively affect career advancement. In the public sector, Shiite were significantly underrepresented in national security- related positions, including the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the National Guard, and the Ministry of the Interior.

The Report went on to say that there was no formal policy concerning the hiring and promotion of Shiite in the private sector, but anecdotal evidence suggested that in some companies, including the oil and petrochemical industries, a “glass ceiling” existed and well-qualified Shiite were passed over for less qualified Sunni colleagues. Engineer Abdulshaheed al-Sunni, a high-ranking Shiite official at the King Abdulaziz Sea Port in Dammam, reportedly resigned in September 2009 due to oppression and injustice which prevented him from being promoted.

New York Times has quoted analysts as saying that Saudi Arabia would never allow the Bahraini monarchy to be overthrown. Bahrain is linked with Saudi Arabia through a 16-mile causeway. Ever since Bahrain began a harsh crackdown on protesters on Thursday, rumors have flown that Saudi Arabia provided military support or guidance. “Saudi Arabia did not build a causeway to Bahrain just so that Saudis could party on weekends,” said Toby Jones, an expert on Saudi Arabia at Rutgers University. “It was designed for moments like this, for keeping Bahrain under control.”

Most of Bahrain’s Shiites are poor, marginalized and discriminated against. They complain that the government is bringing in Sunnis from outside Bahrain and granting them citizenship in order to bolster the ruling elite’s political base: the country is less than 30 percent Sunni. More than 50,000 “imported” Sunnis from southern Pakistan, Balochistan, Jordan and Yemen – have been naturalized. Virtually everyone in the Ministry of Defense and the police is an “imported” Sunni from Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Pakistan.

According to US Religious Freedom Report 2010, only a few Shiite citizens held significant posts in the defense and internal security forces, although more were found in the enlisted ranks. The police force reported it did not record or consider religious belief when hiring employees, although Shiite continued to assert that they were unable to obtain government positions, especially in the security services, because of their religious affiliation. Shiite were employed in some branches of the police, such as the traffic police and the fledgling community police.

To borrow Pepe Escobar, the key problem is that Shiites defying the powers in Bahrain would seduce all other minority Gulf Arab Shiites, from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia itself.

Bahraini protesters have been insisting that this is a movement by the people for the people. When the protests started on Feb. 14, in a so-called Day of Rage modeled after events in Egypt and Tunisia, demonstrators called for a constitutional monarchy, an elected cabinet and a constitution written by the people, as opposed to one imposed by the king.

They want fair elections; the release of all political prisoners; and the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa (the king’s uncle, in power for no less then 39 years since independence from Britain), as well as the entire parliament. The prime minister, a major landowner, has come to symbolize the ill-gotten gains of the royal family, which virtually owns the entire country outright.

After Thursday’s attack on sleeping protesters by the security forces, the protesters are now calling that King Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa should step down.

The main Shiite party, al-Wifaq, had already lost any belief in the current democratic facade, withdrawing from the elected lower house of parliament (18 seats from a total of 40) in protest against the previous crackdown.

Bahrain is a key element of the US administration’s strategy against Iran: it is the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, and will be the linchpin of any possible military action in the Gulf by US forces. The Manama naval base lets the U.S. military protect Saudi oil installations and the Gulf waterways used to transport oil, without any sensitive presence of Western troops on Saudi soil.

Bahrain’s king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, and his family have long been American allies in efforts to push back the regional influence of Iran. In diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks, he urged American officials to take military action to disable Iran’s nuclear program. Bahrain, with its U.S. naval base, could be a target of Iranian reprisals if the United States or Israel attacked Iran.

Demonstrations in Kuwait

Tiny Bahrain riots have large implications for the oil-rich Persian Gulf region which controls world’s almost half known oil reserves.

On Friday (2/18) Kuwait, another oil-rich Persian Gulf state with about 30 percent Shiite population, witnessed violent demonstration. However, this demonstration by about 1,000 stateless residents, many of whom are of Iranian origin, was not for political reasons but to press for their demand for citizenship, free education, free health care and jobs, benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals.

The elite special forces forcefully dispersed the demonstration, using smoke bombs, water cannon, tear gas and batons after protesters ignored warnings to leave. At least five people, including a security man, were hurt as Kuwaiti riot police clashed with the stateless protesters demanding rights.

The stateless, known as bidoons claim they have the right to Kuwaiti citizenship, but the government says that ancestors of many of them came from neighboring countries and that they are therefore not entitled to nationality.

The bidoons belong to the same origins and races that live in Kuwait. Those origins and races exist on a wide geographical area, stretching from the Arabian Peninsula in the south, to the deserts of Iraq in the north, and to Iran in the east.

According to Kuwaiti government statistics, they currently number about 93,000 people but media sources place the number of Kuwaiti bidoon higher, at 120,000.

Many bidoons are denied driver’s licenses, cannot get birth certificates for their babies or death certificates for the dead. They are also banned from getting their marriage contracts attested. Due to stringent state restrictions, a majority of them are living in dire economic conditions in oil-rich Kuwait, where the average monthly salary of native citizens is more than $3,500.

Currently, the government obstructs the Biduoon’s right to civil documentation by requiring them to relinquish citizenship claims before they can receive birth, marriage, or death certificates. The government does not recognize their right to work, and Bidoon children may not attend government schools. Despite the establishment of two previous administrative bodies to address their situation, the first in 1993, Bidoon attempts to claim citizenship continue to be blocked.

Refugees International Organization, in its May 2010 report said that the government of Kuwait continues to balk at granting nationality to its stateless residents, or bidoon as lack of legal status impacts all areas of their lives.

Kuwait must begin immediate and transparent reviews of all bidoon cases towards providing naturalization, the Organization urged adding: Kuwait should guarantee the bidoon the right to work and earn equitable incomes, allow their children to enroll in public schools, provide them healthcare free of charge, and issue certificates that record births, marriages, and deaths.

The bidoon’s demonstrations also highlight a simmering deep rooted issue of Shiite-Sunni divide in Kuwait as many of the bidoons have Iranian ancestory.

The US Religious Freedom Report 2010 cited some reports indicating many Shiite government employees face difficulties when it comes to promotions from one grade to another particularly in certain government authorities. The report added some leading positions are forbidden for the Shiites even if they are efficient to take over these posts because these posts are awarded only to Sunnis.

The reports added the government has imposed some restrictions on religious practices, hinting many Shiites are upset over the dearth of Shiite mosques in Kuwait and this can be attributed to slow government measures to agree to the construction of new Shiite mosques in the country. At the moment there are 35 Shiite mosques in the country compared to more than 1,100 Sunni mosques. Since 2001 the government has given its consent for the construction of only six new Shiite mosques.

Bahrain and Kuwait are members of the six-member regional grouping, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which also includes Oman Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar and Oman have very nominal (5%) Shiite population while the UAE hosts around 15% Shiite population. Alarmed by the demonstrations in Bahrain the GCC Foreign Ministers held an emergency meeting on Thursday (2/14) in Bahrain, and pledged full support to King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. In their statement the Ministers said that that any attempt to destablize Bahrain’s security and stability will be seen as a transgression against security and stability of the GCC countries at large.

Abdus Sattar Ghazali is the Executive Editor of the online magazine American Muslim Perspective: www.amperspective.com email: asghazali786@gmail.com

 

 

23 February, 2011

Richardfalk.wordpress.com

Egypt’s revolutionaries must guard against the army, and the west, adding a veneer of democracy to a military regime

The Egyptian revolution has already achieved extraordinary results: after only eighteen intense days of dramatic protests. It brought an abrupt end to Mubarak’s cruelly dictatorial and obscenely corrupt regime that ruled the country for more than thirty years. It also gained a promise from Egyptian military leaders to run the country for no more than six months of transition – the minimum period needed for the establishment of independent political parties, free elections and some degree of economic restabilisation.

It is hoped that this transition would serve as the prelude to, and first institutional expression of, genuine democracy. Some informed observers, most notably Mohamed ElBaradei, worry that this may be too short a time to fill the political vacuum that exists in Egypt after the collapse of the authoritarian structures that used its suppressive energies to keep civil society weak – and to disallow governmental institutions, especially parliament and the judiciary – to function with any degree of independence. It is often overlooked that the flip side of authoritarianism is nominal constitutionalism.

In contrast, some of the activist leaders that found their voices in Tahrir Square are concerned that even six months may be too long – giving the military and outside forces sufficient time to restore the essence of the old order, while giving it enough of a new look to satisfy the majority of Egyptians.

Such a dismal prospect seems to be reinforced by reported US efforts to offer emergency economic assistance apparently designed to mollify the protesters, encourage popular belief that a rapid return to normalcy will provide this impoverished people – 40 per cent of whom live on less than $2 per day, facing rising food prices and high youth unemployment – with material gains.

A fresh start

The bravery, discipline and creativity of the Egyptian revolutionary movement is nothing short of a political miracle, deserving to be regarded as one of the seven political wonders of the modern world. To have achieved these results without violence, despite a series of bloody provocations – and persisting without an iconic leader – without even the clarifying benefit of a revolutionary manifesto, epitomises the originality and grandeur of the Egyptian revolution of 2011.

Such accomplishments shall always remain glories of the highest order that can never be taken away from the Egyptian people, regardless of what the future brings. And these glorious moments belong not just to those who gathered at Tahrir Square and at the other protest sites in Cairo – but belong to all those ignored by the world’s media, those who demonstrated at risk to and often at the cost of their life or physical wellbeing, day after day throughout the entire country in every major city.

Both the magnitude and intensity of this spontaneous national mobilisation was truly remarkable. The flames of an aroused opposition were fanned by brilliantly innovative, yet somewhat obscure, uses of social networking, while the fires were lit by the acutely discontented youth of Egypt – and kept ablaze by people of all class and educational backgrounds coming out into the street.

The inspirational spark for all that followed in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, let us not forget, was provided by the Tunisian revolution. What happened in Tunisia was astonishing in equal measure to the amazing happenings in Egypt – not only for being the initiating tremor – but also for reliance on nonviolent militancy to confront a ruthlessly oppressive regime so effectively that the supposed invincible dictator, Ben Ali, escaped quickly to Saudi Arabia for cover.

The significance of the Tunisian unfolding and its further developments should not be neglected or eclipsed during the months ahead. Without the Tunisian spark we might still be awaiting the Egyptian blaze.

The next step?

As is widely understood, after the fireworks and the impressive cleanup of the piles of debris and garbage by the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square – itself a brilliantly creative footnote to their main revolutionary message – there remains the extraordinarily difficult task of generating ex nihil a new governing process based on human rights, the will of the Egyptian people – and a mighty resolve to guard sovereign rights against the undoubted plots of canny external actors scared by and unhappy with the revolution, seeking to rollback the outcome – and seeking, by any means, the restoration of Mubarakism without Mubarak.

The plight of the Egyptian poor must be placed on the top of the new political agenda, which will require not only control of food and fuel prices – but the construction of an equitable economy that gives as much attention to the distribution of the benefits of growth as to GNP aggregate figures.

Unless the people benefit, economic growth is a subsidy for the rich, whether Egyptian or foreign.

Short of catastrophic imaginings, which, if interpreted as warnings may forestall their actual occurrence, there are immediate concerns: It seemed necessary to accept the primacy of the Egyptian military with the crucial task of overseeing the transition – but is it a trustworthy custodian of the hopes and aspirations of the revolution? Its leadership was deeply implicated in the corruption and the brutality of the Mubarak regime, kept in line over the decades by being willing accomplices of oppressive rule and major beneficiaries of its corrupting largess.

How much of this privileged role is the military elite ready to renounce voluntarily out of its claimed respect for and deference to the popular demand for an end to exploitative governance in a society languishing in mass poverty? Will the Egyptian military act responsibly to avoid the destructive effects of a second uprising against the established order?

The influence of the west

It should also not be forgotten that the Egyptian officer corps was mainly trained in the United States, and that coordination at the highest level between US military commanders and their Egyptian counterparts has already been resumed, especially with an eye toward maintaining “the cold peace” with Israel. These nefarious connections help explain why Mubarak was viewed for so long as a loyal ally and friend in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh – and why the inner counsels of these governments are reacting with concealed panic at the outburst of emancipatory politics throughout the region.

I would suppose that these old relationships are being approached with emergency zeal to ensure that however the transition to Egyptian democracy goes, it somehow exempts wider controversial regional issues from review and change that may reflect the values that animated the revolutionary risings in Tunisia and Egypt.

The impact on the Middle East

These values would suggest solidarity with movements throughout the Middle East to end autocratic governance, oppose interventions and the military presence of the United States, solve the Israel/Palestine conflict in accordance with international law – rather than “facts on the ground”, and seek to make the region – including Israel – a nuclear free zone, reinforced by a treaty framework establishing peaceful relations and procedures of mutual security.

It does not require an expert to realise that such changes, consistent with the revolutionary perspectives that prevailed in Egypt and Tunisia, would send shivers down the collective spines of autocratic leaders throughout the region, as well as being deeply threatening to Israel and to the grand strategy of the United States – and, to a lesser extent, the European Union – determined to safeguard economic and political interests in the region by reliance on the military and paramilitary instruments of hard power.

What is at stake, if the revolutionary process continues, is Western access to Gulf oil reserves at prices and amounts that will not roil global markets – as well as the loss of lucrative markets for arms sales.

Also at risk is the security of Israel, so long as its government refuses to allow the Palestinians to have an independent and viable state within 1967 borders that accords with the two state solution long favoured by the international community – and long opposed by Israel.

Such a Palestinian state – existing with full sovereign rights on all territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war – would mean an immediate lifting of the Gaza blockade, withdrawal of occupying Israeli forces from the West Bank, dismantling of the settlements – including those in East Jerusalem, allowing Palestinian refugees to exercise some right of return, and agreeing either to the joint administration of Jerusalem or a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.

It should be understood that such a peace was already implicit in Security Council Resolution 242 that was unanimously adopted in 1967, proposed again by Arab governments in 2002 with a side offer to normalise relations with Israel – and already accepted by the Palestinian National Council back in 1988 and reaffirmed just a few years ago by Hamas as the basis for long-term peaceful coexistence.

It should be understood that this Palestinian state claims only 22 per cent of historic Palestine – and is a minimal redress of justice for an occupation that has lasted almost 44 years – recall that the 1947 UN partition plan gave the Palestinians 45 per cent and that seemed unfair at the time. We must also understand the expulsion that resulted in an outrageously prolonged refugee status for millions of Palestinians, deriving from the nakba of 1948.

But until now, even this minimal recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination has been unacceptable to Israel, as most recently evidenced in the Palestine Papers which provide evidence that even, when the Palestinian Authority agreed to extravagant Israeli demands for retention of most settlements, including in East Jerusalem – and abandonment of any provision for the return of Palestinian refugees, the Israelis were not interested, and walked away.

The question now is whether the revolutionary challenges posed by the outcome in Egypt will lead to a new realism in Tel Aviv, or more of the same – which would mean a maximal effort to rollback the revolutionary gains of the Egyptian people. If that proves impossible, then at least do whatever possible to contain the regional enactment of revolutionary values.

Grassroots amateurs

Does this seemingly amateur – in the best sense of the word – movement in Egypt have the sustaining energy, historical knowledge and political sophistication to ensure that the transition process fulfills revolutionary expectations? So many past revolutions, fulsome with promise, have faltered precisely at this moment of apparent victory.

Will the political and moral imagination of Egyptian militancy retain enough energy, perseverance and vision to fulfill these requirements of exceptional vigilance to keep the circling vultures at bay? In one sense, these revolutions must spread beyond Tunisia and Egypt – or these countries will be surrounded and exist in a hostile political neighborhood.

Some have spoken of the Turkish domestic model as helpfully providing an image of a democratising Egypt and Tunisia, but its foreign policy under AKP leadership is equally, if not more, suggestive of a foreign policy worthy of these revolutions and their aftermath – and essential for a post-colonial Middle East that finally achieves its “second liberation”.

The first liberation was to end colonial rule. The second, initiated by the Iranian revolution in its first phase, seeks the end of geopolitical hegemony – and this struggle has barely begun.

Shaking the foundations of post-colonial rule

How dangerous would intervention – probably not overt, but in the form of maneuvers beneath the surface of public perception – really be? The foreign policy interests of these governments and allied corporate and financial forces are definitely at serious risk. If the Egyptian revolutionary process unfolds successfully in Egypt during the months ahead, it will have profound regional effects that will certainly shake the foundations of the old post-colonial regional setup – not necessarily producing revolutions elsewhere but changing the balance, in ways that enhance the wellbeing of the peoples and diminish the role of outsiders.

These effects are foreseeable by the adversely affected old elites, creating a strong – if not desperate – array of external incentives to derail the Egyptian revolution by relying on many varieties of counter-revolutionary obstructionism. It is already evident that these elites, with help from their many friends in the mainstream media, are already spreading falsehoods about the supposed extremism and ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood seemingly intent on distracting public attention, discrediting the revolution -and building the basis for future interventionary moves, undertaken in the name of combating extremism, if not outrightly “justified” as counter-terrorism efforts.

It is correct that, historically, revolutions have swerved off course by succumbing to extremist takeovers. In different ways this happened to both the French and Russian revolutions – and more recently to the Iranian revolution. Extremism won out, disappointing the democratic hopes of the people, leading to either the restoration of the old elite or to new forms of violence, oppression, and exploitation.

Why? Each situation is unique and original, but there are recurrent patterns. During the revolutionary struggle, opposition to the old regime is deceptively unifying, obscuring real and hidden tensions that emerge later to fracture the spirit and substance of solidarity. Soon after the old order collapses – or as in Egypt – partially collapses, the spirit of unity is increasingly difficult to maintain. Some fear a betrayal of revolutionary goals by the untrustworthy managers of transition. Others fear that reactionary and unscrupulous elements from within the ranks of the revolution will come to dominate the democratising process. Still others fear all will be lost unless an all out struggle against internal and external counter-revolutionary plots – real and imagined – is launched immediately.

And often, in the confusing and contradictory aftermath of revolution, some or all of these concerns have a foundation in fact.

The revolution does need to be defended against its real enemies, which definitely exist – as well to avoid imagined enemies that produce tragic implosions of revolutionary processes. It is in this atmosphere of seeking to consolidate revolutionary gains that the purity of the movement is at risk, and is tested in a different manner than when masses of people were in the streets defying a violent crackdown.

The danger in Egypt is that the inspirational nonviolence that mobilised the opposition can, in the months ahead, either be superseded by a violent mentality or succumb to external and internal pressures by being too passive or overly trusting in misleading reassurances.

Perhaps, this post-revolutionary interval – between collapse of the old and consolidation of the new- poses the greatest challenge to yet face this exciting movement led by young leaders who are just now beginning to emerge from the shadows of anonymity. All persons of good will should bless their efforts to safeguard all that has been so far gained – and to move forward in solidarity toward a sustainably humane and just future for their society, their region, and their world.

Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has authored and edited numerous publications spanning a period of five decades, most recently editing the volume International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (Routledge, 2008).

He is currently serving his third year of a six year term as a United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights

 

24 February, 2011      The Associated Press

CAIRO — As Saudi Arabia’s 86-year-old monarch returned home from back surgery, his government tried to get ahead of potential unrest in the oil-rich country Wednesday by announcing an unprecedented economic package that will provide Saudis interest-free home loans, unemployment assistance and sweeping debt forgiveness.

The total cost was estimated at 135 billion Saudi riyals ($36 billion), but this was not largesse. Saudi Arabia clearly wants no part of the revolts and bloodshed sweeping the already unsettled Arab world.

Saudi officials are “pumping in huge amounts of money into areas where it will have an obvious trickle-down by addressing issues like housing shortages,” said John Sfakianakis, chief economist for the Riyadh, Saudi Arabia-based Banque Saudi Fransi. “It has, really, a social welfare purpose to it.”

The most prominent step was the injection of 40 billion riyals ($10.7 billion) into a fund that provides interest-free loans for Saudis to buy or build homes. The move could help reduce an 18-year waiting list for Saudis to qualify for a loan, Sfakianakis said.

Another 15 billion riyals ($4 billion) was being put into the General Housing Authority’s budget, while the Saudi Credit & Savings Bank was to get 30 billion riyals ($8 billion) in capital. The bank provides loans for marriage and setting up a business, among other things, and is supported by the Saudi government.

Other measures included a 15 percent cost of living adjustment for government workers, a year of unemployment assistance for youth and nearly doubling to 15 individuals the size of families that are eligible for state aid. The government also will write off the debts of people who had borrowed from the development fund and later died.

While Saudi Arabia has been mostly spared the unrest rippling through the Middle East, a robust protest movement has risen up in its tiny neighbor, Bahrain, which like others around the region is centered on calls for representative government and relief from poverty and unemployment.

There are no government figures in Saudi Arabia that provide a national income breakdown, but analysts estimate that there are over 450,000 jobless in the country. Despite the stereotype of rich Saudis driving SUVs, large swaths of the population rely on government help and live in government-provided housing. The nation has a rapidly growing population of youths – about two-thirds of the population is under 29 – many of whom are chaffing under the harsh religious rules that keep the sexes largely segregated.

A Facebook page calling for a “March 11 Revolution of Longing” in Saudi Arabia has begun attracting hundreds of viewers. A message posted on the page calls for “the ousting of the regime” and lists demands including the election of a ruler and members of the advisory assembly known as the Shura Council.

King Abdullah returned to the situation Wednesday after spending three months in the United States and Morocco getting treatment for a bad back. The economic sweeteners were announced before his plane landed.

The unrest in Bahrain, a Gulf Cooperation Council member state, is what has most worried Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab nations. Their worries, in turn, translate into concerns in the broader global oil market since most of those nations are key OPEC members. Saudi Arabia, alone, sits atop the world’s largest proven reserves of conventional crude.

A disruption in crude supplies from the Gulf would make the current, two-year-high levels of over $100 per barrel, appear cheap. Oil prices have already spiked because of Libya’s unrest.

Investment bank Goldman Sachs said in a research report that the Bahrain protests spotlight how the Gulf states are also vulnerable, noting that the unrest in the island nation and in Libya “increase the risks of major supply disruptions.”

While analysts largely discount the kind of wide-scale protests in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates that have rocked the rest of the Arab world – and it’s not possible to know if the Facebook campaign has much support from within Saudi Arabia – leaders need to pay attention to the issues raised by the demonstrators, they say.

Abdullah, viewed as a reformer, has sought to address similar complaints before.

He has worked to ensure that the government has first and final say on all religious edicts – a step aimed at weeding out the conflicting and often increasingly austere messages put forward by competing clerics.

He has also set up a coed postgraduate university, and is pushing hard to complete a series of mega-projects to help diversify the country’s economic base and provide jobs for young Saudis.

Boosting the financing for development and housing funds will help address a key gripe of many Saudis, and the cost of living adjustment will help offset inflation in the kingdom, which stood at about 5.3 percent in January. Banque Saudi-Fransi, in a research note released late Wednesday, said the country is trying to stem the spiraling cost of housing by building 200,000 new units per year through 2014.

But few other Arab nations have had much success in using money to quash the protests.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak offered it as a carrot in the first days of the protests, but was ousted shortly thereafter. The 15 percent pay and pension raise he promised, however, remains in effect for public sector employees. Others, like Jordan and Yemen have looked to boost subsidies, and Jordan is reviving a government body that ensures the prices of basic commodities are within reach of the poor.

But Jordan, like other Arab countries where the protests are still ongoing, is not in the clear, and Saudi Arabia’s leaders are watching closely, hoping to stave off a contagion within their borders.

 

 

27 February, 2011 Nader.org

The large demonstrations at the state Capitol in Madison, Wisconsin are driven by a middle class awakening to the spectre of its destruction by the corporate reactionaries and their toady Governor Scott Walker.

For years the middle class has watched the plutocrats stomp on the poor while listening to the two parties regale the great middle class, but never mentioning the tens of millions of poor Americans. And for years, the middle class was shrinking due significantly to corporate globalization shipping good-paying jobs overseas to repressive dictatorships like China. It took Governor Walker’s legislative proposal to do away with most collective bargaining rights for most public employee unions to jolt people to hit the streets.

Republicans take rigged elections awash in corporatist campaign cash seriously. When they win, they aggressively move their corporate agenda, unlike the wishy-washy Democrats who flutter weakly after a victory. Republicans mean business. A ram rod wins against a straw all the time.

Governor Walker won his election, along with other Republicans in Wisconsin, on mass-media driven Tea Party rhetoric. His platform was deceitful enough to get the endorsement of the police, and firefighters unions, which the latter have now indignantly withdrawn.

These unions should have known better. The Walker Republicans were following the Reagan playbook. The air traffic controllers union endorsed Reagan in 1980. The next year he fired 12,000 of them during a labor dispute. (This made flying unnecessarily dangerous.)

Then Reagan pushed for tax cuts—primarily for the wealthy—which led to larger deficits to turn the screws on programs benefitting the people. Reagan, though years earlier opposed to corporate welfare, not only maintained these taxpayer subsidies but created a government deficit, over eight years, that was double that of all the accumulated deficits from George Washington to Jimmy Carter.

Maybe the unions that endorsed Walker will soon realize that not even being a “Reagan Democrat” will save them from being losers under the boot of the corporate supremacists.

The rumble of the people in Madison illustrates the following:

1. There is an ideological plan driving these corporatists. They create “useful crisis” and then hammer the unorganized people to benefit the wealthy classes. Governor Walker last year gave $140 million in tax breaks to corporations. This fiscal year’s deficit is $137 million. Note this oft-repeated dynamic. President Obama caved to the Minority party Republicans in Congress last December by going along with the deficit-deepening extension of the huge dollar volume tax cuts for the rich. Now the Republicans want drastic cuts in programs that help the poor.

2. Whatever non-union or private union workers, who are giving ground or losing jobs, think of the sometimes better pay and benefits of unionized public employees, they need to close ranks without giving up their opposition to government waste. For corporate lobbyists and their corporate governments are going after all collective bargaining rights for all workers and they want to further weaken The National Labor Relations Board.

3. Whenever corporations and government want to cut workers’ incomes, the corporate tax abatements, bloated contracts, handouts and bailouts should be pulled into the public debate. What should go first?

4. For the public university students in these rallies, they might ponder their own tuition bills and high interest loans, compared to students in Western Europe, and question why they have to bear the burden of massive corporate welfare payouts—foodstamps for the rich. What should go first?

5. The bigger picture should be part of the more localized dispute. Governor Walker also wants weaker safety and environmental regulations, bargain-basement sell-outs of state public power plants and other taxpayer assets.

6. The mega-billionaire Koch brothers are in the news. They are bankrolling politicians and rump advocacy groups and funding media campaigns in Wisconsin and all over the country. Koch Industries designs and builds facilities for the natural gas industry. Neither the company nor the brothers like the publicity they deserve to get every time their role is exposed. Always put the spotlight on the backroom boys.

7. Focusing on the larger struggle between the people and the plutocracy should be part and parcel of every march, demonstration or any other kind of mass mobilization. The signs at the Madison rallies make the point, to wit—“2/3 of Wisconsin Corporations Pay No Taxes,” “Why Should Public Workers Pay For Wall Street’s Mess?”, “Corporate Greed Did the Deed.”

8. Look how little energy it took for these tens of thousands of people to sound the national alarm for hard-pressed Americans. Just showing up is democracy’s barn raiser. This should persuade people that a big start for a better America can begin with a little effort and a well-attended rally. Imagine what even more civic energy could produce!

Showing up lets people feel their potential power to subordinate corporatism to the sovereignty of the people. After all, the Constitution’s preamble begins with “We the People,” not “We the Corporations.” In fact, the founders never put the word “corporation” or “company” in our constitution which was designed for real people.

As for Governor Walker’s projected two-year $3.6 billion deficit, read what Jon Peacock of the respected nonprofit Wisconsin Budget Project writes at: http://www.wisconsinbudgetproject.org about how to handle the state budget without adopting the draconian measures now before the legislature.

Ralph Nader is a consumer advocate, lawyer, and author. His most recent book – and first novel – is, Only The Super-Rich Can Save Us. His most recent work of non-fiction is The Seventeen Traditions.

 

 

27 February, 2011 Gush Shalom

This is a story right out of “1001 Nights”. The genie escaped from the bottle, and no power on earth can put it back

When it happened in Tunisia, it could have been said: OK, an Arab country, but a minor one. It was always a bit more progressive than the others. Just an isolated incident.

And then it happened in Egypt. A pivotal country. The heart of the Arab world. The spiritual center of Sunni Islam. But it could have been said: Egypt is a special case. The land of the Pharaohs. Thousands of years of history before the Arabs even got there.

But now it has spread all over the Arab world. To Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen. Jordan, Libya, even Morocco. And to non-Arab, non-Sunni Iran, too.

The genie of revolution, of renewal, of rejuvenation, is now haunting all the regimes in the Region. The inhabitants of the “Villa in the Jungle” are liable to wake up one morning and discover that the jungle is gone, that we are surrounded by a new landscape.

WHEN OUR Zionist fathers decided to set up a safe haven in Palestine, they had the choice between two options:

They could appear in West Asia as European conquerors, who see themselves as a bridgehead of the “white” man and as masters of the “natives”, like the Spanish conquistadores and the Anglo-Saxon colonialists in America. That is what the crusaders did in their time.

The second way was to see themselves as an Asian people returning to their homeland, the heirs to the political and cultural traditions of the Semitic world, ready to take part, with the other peoples of the region, in the war of liberation from European exploitation.

I wrote these words 64 years ago, in a brochure that appeared just two months before the outbreak of the 1948 war.

I stand by these words today.

These days I have a growing feeling that we are once again standing at a historic crossroads. The direction we choose in the coming days will determine the destiny of the State of Israel for years to come, perhaps irreversibly. If we choose the wrong road, we will have “weeping for generations”, as the Hebrew saying goes.

And perhaps the greatest danger is that we make no choice at all, that we are not even aware of the need to make a decision, that we just continue on the road that has brought us to where we are today. That we are occupied with trivialities – the battle between the Minister of Defense and the departing Chief of Staff, the struggle between Netanyahu and Lieberman about the appointment of an ambassador, the non-events of “Big Brother” and similar TV inanities – that we do not even notice that history is passing us by, leaving us behind.

WHEN OUR politicians and pundits found enough time – amid all the daily distractions – to deal with the events around us, it was in the old and (sadly) familiar way.

Even in the few halfway intelligent talk shows, there was much hilarity about the idea that “Arabs” could establish democracies. Learned professors and media commentators “proved” that such a thing just could not happen – Islam was “by nature” anti-democratic and backward, Arab societies lacked the Protestant Christian ethic necessary for democracy, or the capitalist foundations for a sound middle class, etc. At best, one kind of despotism would be replaced by another.

The most common conclusion was that democratic elections would inevitably lead to the victory of “Islamist” fanatics, who would set up brutal Taliban-style theocracies, or worse.

Part of this, of course, is deliberate propaganda, designed to convince the naïve Americans and Europeans that they must shore up the Mubaraks of the region or alternative military strongmen. But most of it was quite sincere: most Israelis really believe that the Arabs, left to their own devices, will set up murderous “Islamist” regimes, whose main aim would be to wipe Israel off the map.

Ordinary Israelis know next to nothing about Islam and the Arab world. As a (left-wing) Israeli general answered 65 years ago, when asked how he viewed the Arab world: “though the sights of my rifle.” Everything is reduced to “security”, and insecurity prevents, of course, any serious reflection.

THIS ATTITUDE goes back to the beginnings of the Zionist movement.

Its founder – Theodor Herzl – famously wrote in his historic treatise that the future Jewish State would constitute “a part of the wall of civilization” against Asiatic (meaning Arab) barbarism. Herzl admired Cecil Rhodes, the standard-bearer of British imperialism, He and his followers shared the cultural attitude then common in Europe, which Eduard Said latter labeled “Orientalism”.

Viewed in retrospect, that was perhaps natural, considering that the Zionist movement was born in Europe towards the end of the imperialist era, and that it was planning to create a Jewish homeland in a country in which another people – an Arab people – was living.

The tragedy is that this attitude has not changed in 120 years, and that it is stronger today than ever. Those of us who propose a different course – and there have always been some – remain voices in the wilderness.

This is evident these days in the Israeli attitude to the events shaking the Arab world and beyond. Among ordinary Israelis, there was quite a lot of spontaneous sympathy for the Egyptians confronting their tormentors in Tahrir Square – but everything was viewed from the outside, from afar, as if it were happening on the moon.

The only practical question raised was: will the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty hold? Or do we need to raise new army divisions for a possible war with Egypt? When almost all “security experts” assured us that the treaty was safe, people lost interest in the whole matter.

BUT THE treaty – actually an armistice between regimes and armies – should only be of secondary concern for us. The most important question is: how will the new Arab world look? Will the transition to democracy be relatively smooth and peaceful, or not? Will it happen at all, and will it mean that a more radical Islamic region emerges – which is a distinct possibility? Can we have any influence on the course of events?

Of course, none of today’s Arab movements is eager for an Israeli embrace. It would be a bear hug. Israel is viewed today by practically all Arabs as a colonialist, anti-Arab state that oppresses the Palestinians and is out to dispossess as many Arabs as possible – though there is, I believe, also a lot of silent admiration for Israel’s technological and other achievements.

But when entire peoples rise up and revolution upsets all entrenched attitudes, there is the possibility of changing old ideas. If Israeli political and intellectual leaders were to stand up today and openly declare their solidarity with the Arab masses in their struggle for freedom, justice and dignity, they could plant a seed that would bear fruit in coming years.

Of course, such statements must really come from the heart. As a superficial political ploy, they would be rightly despised. They must be accompanied by a profound change in our attitude towards the Palestinian people. That’s why peace with the Palestinians now, at once, is a vital necessity for Israel.

Our future is not with Europe or America. Our future is in this region, to which our state belongs, for better or for worse. It’s not just our policies that must change, but our basic outlook, our geographical orientation. We must understand that we are not a bridgehead from somewhere distant, but a part of a region that is now – at long last – joining the human march towards freedom.

The Arab Awakening is not a matter of months or a few years. It may well be a prolonged struggle, with many failures and defeats, but the genie will not return to the bottle. The images of the 18 days in Tahrir Square will be kept alive in the hearts of an entire new generation from Marakksh to Mosul, and any new dictatorship that emerges here or there will not be able to erase them.

In my fondest dreams I could not imagine a wiser and more attractive course for us Israelis, than to join this march in body and spirit.

 

 

 

 

Published on The Nation (http://www.thenation.com)

 | February 22, 2011

The Arab revolution is circling around the region’s oil, and there’s talk of nationalizing or strengthening state control of industries in Egypt. So far, the Arab revolt has been mostly non-ideological. But at stake is the incalculable wealth of a long-suppressed region.

With Bahrain, the anchor of the US military presence in the gulf, wobbling, and with the seeds of revolt planted in Kuwait, the revolt in Libya could provoke a burst of Arab nationalism aimed at taking control of the Middle East oil resources. With Tripoli, Libya’s capital, in flames and Benghazi and most of Libya’s eastern region already in rebel hands, there are reports that the holdings of ENI and other oil firms operating in Libya might be nationalized by a new government.

Reports Bloomberg [1]: “Certainly all the oil majors will be shaking if the new leaders decide to nationalize everything.”

Oil prices have jumped sharply [2] since the Libyan revolt began, and ENI is scared silly.

Reports CNN [2]:

“Libya sits atop large reserves of oil and gas that have yet to be developed. Libya holds around 44 billion barrels of oil reserves—the largest in Africa—according to Oil and Gas Journal, an industry publication.”

ENI, which gets one-seventh of its oil from Libya, and another big chunk from nearly Egypt, is evacuating its personnel [1], and its stock plummeted:

“Eni said yesterday it has already begun to evacuate non-essential staff and dependants. The company, which gets another 13 percent of its production from Egypt and has smaller operations in Tunisia and Yemen, has said it continues to operate in all the countries affected by political unrest.”

BP, too, is evacuating its oil workers [3] from Libya.

Libya produced about 1.6 million barrels of oil in January, roughly two-thirds of Iraq’s total output and one-fifth of Saudi Arabia’s. The country supplies about 10 percent of Europe’s oil supplies, and Italy’s ENI oil company is vastly dependent on Libya.

Bahrain, which doesn’t produce much oil now, is a lynchpin of the Persian Gulf’s Arab states, and the gateway to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who’ve pledged to produce more oil to make up any shortfall from the Arab-wide turmoil, have threatened to use any and all means to shore up Bahrain’s regime. But increasingly Saudi Arabia is surrounded, by unrest in Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Djibouti, and possibly—starting on March 8—in Kuwait. In addition, there’s trouble in Jordan, and Saudi Arabia isn’t on good terms with Iraq.

For both Iranian and Arab nationalists, control of oil has been the touchstone for revolutionary politics. Historically, the marriage of Arab countries with people but no oil, such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and countries with oil but few people, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, has been a long-standing goal of Arab nationalists going back to President Nasser of Egypt. Leaders who’ve challenged the domination of Middle East oil by the West have been overthrown or isolated, from Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 to Saddam Hussein’s vital takeover of Iraqi oil in 1972. After the US invasion of Iraq, when the United States briefly toyed with the idea of privatizing Iraq’s vast oil wealth, Iraqi nationalism prevailed, resoundingly defeating any attempt by Western and foreign companies to seize Iraq’s oil production, and since then Iraq’s successive governments have limited the intrusion of foreign companies into Iraq’s oil industry.

So far, the Arab revolt is one without ideology. By all accounts, it’s been a revolution for freedom, for dignity, for democracy. How, exactly, that plays out now is unclear. In Egypt, for instance, there’s a growing split among the opposition movement, pitting pro-labor youth activists against moderate, reform-minded leaders who are willing, it seems, to make overly broad compromises with the establishment. And a troubling aspect of the events in Egypt is that there is pressure on the Egyptian government, including the military, to privatize state-owned enterprises. Last week, in a major piece on economic policy in Egypt, the New York Times reported [4] that the military is divided over what to do about state-owned businesses. And it said:

“Already there are signs that the military is purging from the cabinet and ruling party advocates of market-oriented economic changes, like selling off state-owned companies and reducing barriers to trade.”

Now, it’s true that the military in Egypt has created a vast, corrupt network of patronage, military-owned businesses, and a military-industrial complex that sustains the generals’ lavish lifestyle. Eliminating the military’s privileges, and seizing the assets of its elite, ought to be a key goal of the revolution. But that’s not the same thing as dismantling Egypt’s nationalized industries and adopting a free-market, neoconservative economic doctrine. (In fact, the neocons who’ve been clamoring for revolution in the Middle East often see it in terms of privatizing state-owned companies, especially oil, telecommunications and banking.)

The Times expressed concern [4] over moves by the post-Mubarak military authorities to purge or arrest super-wealthy Egyptian businessmen:

“The military-led government also struck at advocates of economic openness, including the former finance minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, who was forced from his job, and the former trade minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid, whose assets were frozen under allegations of corruption. Both are highly regarded internationally and had not been previously accused of corruption.”

And it quoted [4] Rachid bemoaning the talk of nationalization: “Now there are a lot of voices from the past talking about nationalization—‘Why do we need a private sector?’ ”

Swirling around the Arab revolt, thus, are huge questions about whether the new Arab world will finally get control of its economic power, or once again cede that control to the United States and to its former colonial masters in Europe.

Source URL: http://www.thenation.com/blog/158781/will-arab-revolt-challenge-big-oil

Links:

[1] http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/02/21/bloomberg1376-LGZ62Z0D9L3501-6T1OVCQIDLN4SHA60NEQRIUFUT.DTL

[2] http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/21/markets/libya_oil_unrest/?hpt=T1

[3] http://www.cnbc.com/id/41664034

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18military.html?_r=1&;ref=egypt