By V.A. Mohamad Ashrof
This article examines the theological and legal tensions arising from the linguistic distinction drawn between the Arabic term ‘Allah’ and the English term ‘God’ within pluralistic secular frameworks. Centred on a recent controversy in Guruvayur, Kerala—where elected councillors chose to swear their oaths ‘in the name of Allah’ rather than the statutory ‘in the name of God’—this article deconstructs what it identifies as the Delusion of Distinction.
In the municipality of Guruvayur, Kerala—a region celebrated for its sacred identity as a “temple town” and its long history of communal coexistence—a legal and theological tremor recently surfaced. During their official induction, councillors belonging to the Muslim League opted to swear their oaths ‘in the name of Allah’ instead of the constitutionally prescribed ‘in the name of God’ as stipulated in the Third Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the Oaths Act of 1969. This prompted a formal complaint by Kerala Congress (M) leader R. H. Abdul Salim, who sought their disqualification on the grounds of procedural deviation.
Though appearing at first glance to be a matter of bureaucratic literalism, the episode unveils a deeper theological crisis. The controversy rests on a shared—but flawed—assumption held by both the councillors and their critics: that ‘Allah’ and ‘God’ refer to distinct ontological realities. This article argues that such an assumption represents a fundamental departure from Quranic hermeneutics. By transforming a linguistic signifier into a marker of tribal exclusivity, both parties inadvertently resurrect the very barriers the Quran sought to dismantle. Through linguistic, theological, and constitutional analysis, this article demonstrates that ‘Allah’ is not a sectarian brand name for a Muslim deity but a universal reference to the Absolute.
The Etymological Reality: ‘Allah’ as the Universal Definite
Any resolution of this dispute must begin with the foundations of Semitic linguistics. The word Allah (الله) is a contraction of al (the) and ilah (deity or god). Its literal meaning is “The God”—singular, definite, and unique.
This etymology is not exclusive to Islam; it belongs to a shared Abrahamic heritage. The term is cognate with the Hebrew Elohim and the Aramaic Alaha. Long before the advent of Islam, Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews used Allah in their prayers and scriptures. Even today, Arabic translations of the Bible employ Allah to refer to the God of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.
When the Guruvayur councillors insist on ‘Allah’ to the exclusion of ‘God’, they commit what may be termed a semantic fallacy. They treat a common noun elevated into a proper noun as though it were a sectarian trademark. From a Quranic standpoint, this is a regression. The Quran did not introduce a new deity; it came to correct distorted human understandings of the One God already invoked across languages and cultures. To claim that ‘Allah’ cannot be translated as ‘God’ is to deny the linguistic fluidity intrinsic to the Semitic tradition itself.
The Quranic Bridge: Unity of the Divine Referent
The strongest rebuttal to this linguistic exclusivism emerges from the Quran itself. In Q.29:46, the Quran outlines a principled framework for interfaith engagement:
“And do not argue with the People of the Scripture except in a way that is best … and say: ‘We believe in what has been revealed to us and what has been revealed to you. Our God (Ilahuna) and your God (Ilahukum) is One, and to Him we submit.’”
The phrase wa-ilahuna wa-ilahukum waḥid is theologically decisive. Rather than employing sectarian nomenclature, the Quran deliberately uses the generic term Ilah to assert unity of referent. It does not say, “Our Allah and your God are the same,” but affirms that the object of worship is one, regardless of the linguistic label.
By insisting on ‘Allah’ as a non-translatable term within a secular constitutional oath, the councillors unintentionally convey the message: “Our God is not your God.” This directly contradicts the Quranic mandate. If the God of the Quran is the same God worshipped in the Torah and the Gospel, then He is undoubtedly the same ‘God’ invoked in a secular oath. To deny this reduces Rabb al-‘Alamin (Lord of the Worlds) to a Rabb al-Muslimin (Lord of the Muslims)—a localised, tribal deity.
Linguistic Tribalism and the Delusion of Distinction
The Delusion of Distinction arises from the mistaken belief that divine sanctity is bound to the phonetics of a particular language. This form of linguistic tribalism is explicitly rejected in Q.17:110:
“Say: Call upon Allah or call upon the Most Merciful (al-Raḥman). Whichever you call—His are the most beautiful names.”
This verse establishes a principle of linguistic plurality. If the Quran permits substitution of Allah with al-Raḥman, it validates any name that truthfully points to the Divine essence. The Most Beautiful Names (al-Asma’ al-Ḥusna) are attributes—Justice, Mercy, Truth—not magical sounds rendered invalid through translation.
To suggest that the English word ‘God’ is ontologically inferior is to confine the Divine to Arabic phonetics. Yet if Allah is truly the Creator of all humanity, then God, Ishwar, Daivam, Yahweh, and Dieu are all legitimate references to the same transcendent reality. By erecting linguistic barriers, one does not defend Islam; one provincialises God.
Deconstructing the Legal Complaint: A False Dichotomy
The complaint filed by R. H. Abdul Salim is likewise grounded in a false dichotomy. It assumes that because the statute specifies ‘God’, the use of ‘Allah’ constitutes defiance of constitutional authority.
In a multilingual and pluralistic democracy, ‘God’ functions as a constitutional placeholder for the highest moral authority recognised by an individual’s conscience. To penalise an elected representative for invoking the Arabic equivalent of that placeholder is a form of sectarian legalism. However, the councillors’ refusal to accept ‘God’ inadvertently reinforces Salim’s premise, as though they were indeed swearing by a different authority.
A Quranically informed position would have recognised that swearing by ‘God’ is swearing by Allah. By turning the issue into a public contestation, the Divine Name was reduced to a political marker rather than a moral anchor. This constitutes what may be called semantic idolatry.
The Abrahamic Continuum and the Error of Brand-Naming
The Quran consistently presents itself as a confirmation (muṣaddiq) of previous revelations, not a rupture. Q.2:136 commands believers to declare:
“We believe in Allah and what has been revealed to us … and what was given to Moses and Jesus … We make no distinction between any of them.”
If no distinction is to be made between the prophets, none can be made between the Divine source who sent them. The God who spoke to Moses as Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh and to Jesus as Alaha is the same Being identified as Allah in Arabic.
Insisting that Allah cannot be translated into God or Daivam introduces a distinction precisely where the Quran insists on unity. It amounts to a brand-name theology, implying that the Islamic God is a different “product” from the God of previous revelations—an implication bordering on theological incoherence within tawḥid.
Meaning over Sound: The Essence of the Divine Names
Islamic spirituality is rooted in meaning (ma‘na), not mere sound (lafẓ). The Divine Names describe attributes of essence, not phonetic charms. If God is al-Ḥaqq (The Truth), then invoking Truth in any language is an invocation of God.
To treat ‘Allah’ as possessing a sacramental power denied to ‘God’ is a form of phonetic fetishism. It ignores the Quranic assertion that God is closer to the human being than their jugular vein (50:16)—a proximity entirely independent of language.
More subtly, it risks a form of semantic shirk: the suggestion that Allah and God represent rival referents. Tawḥid rejects this absolutely. There is no “Muslim God” and “secular God”. Any sincere reference to the Creator is a reference to Allah.
Kerala, Language, and the Fitna of Identity Politics
Kerala has long exemplified a composite cultural ethos, where Islam historically integrated local linguistic traditions rather than displacing them. The Guruvayur controversy signals a troubling drift towards linguistic Arabisation as identity politics.
This discord born of symbolism overshadowing substance. A public oath should foreground accountability and service, not linguistic posturing. The Quran declares that wherever one turns, there is the Face of God (2:115). By rejecting the word ‘God’, the councillors turned away from that Face as it appears within the linguistic reality of their own society.
Towards a Quranic Secularism
The Oaths Act exists to ensure moral accountability, not theological gatekeeping. The spirit of the law rests in sincerity of intention (niyyah), not phonetic precision.
A genuinely Quranic secularism recognises that universal principles of justice, equity, and integrity are manifestations of the Divine in the public sphere. Within such a framework, ‘God’ is not a secular substitute for Allah but its English synonym.
The Guruvayur councillors erred because they accepted the premise of otherness. A truly Quranic response would have affirmed: “I swear in the name of God, whom I call Allah in the language of my faith.”
The Guruvayur episode exposes a deeper malaise: the branding of the Divine. While the councillors may have acted from a sense of religious sincerity, their stance revealed a lack of Quranic depth. By treating Allah and God as distinct, they perpetuated a Delusion of Distinction that fractures what the Quran insists is One.
A mature secular democracy requires linguistic flexibility, just as faith traditions require theological breadth. Whether one says Allah, God, or Ishwar, the referent is the same Lord of the Worlds. Recognising this unity is essential for an inclusive public square where service, justice, and integrity matter more than the phonetics of devotion.
V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence.
10 January 2026
Source: countercurrents.org