On 7th February 2011, we posted on the JUST website an article entitled “The Arab Uprising 12 Questions and 12 Answers” which examined a number of the underlying issues in the Egyptian Revolution and the larger Arab Uprising. We are carrying excerpts from that article since they provide useful background information on the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.
The author of that article, Chandra Muzaffar, has also included two other issues arising from Mubarak’s ouster on 11th February 2011 in his analysis which appears below.
1) Mubarak has handed over power to the Egyptian military high command. What are its immediate tasks?
From media reports, the military will through consultations with various groups that were involved in the Revolution formulate a provisional constitution which will be the basis for holding a free and fair election as soon as possible. The election will not be just for the Presidency; it could also include contests for Parliament. The powers of the President, Parliament and the Cabinet will have to be spelt out. Military rule, in other words, will be a brief prelude to civilian rule, and hopefully, a genuine democracy.
2) The US government appears to be pleased with the military take-over and the proposed transition to civilian rule. Is this what Washington wanted from the beginning?
Powerful vested interests in Washington (perhaps not President Barack Obama himself), it seems to me, would have liked Mubarak to remain in office until September which was Mubarak’s own game plan. But these interests realised, a few days into the mass protests, that Mubarak was so unpopular that they would not be able to keep him on the throne. This is when they came up with Plan B which was to instal Omar Suleiman, a Mubarak confidante with close ties to Tel Aviv, as the Vice-President and President in waiting. Suleiman, his friends in Washington and Tel Aviv soon realised, was widely detested by the protesters partly because of his links and partly because of his direct involvement in the suppression of democratic dissent and in the torture of the dissenters.
Getting the military to run the show for a while is actually the US and Israeli governments’ Plan C. While they are very much aware of the presence of nationalistic elements in the core of the military who would resist any attempt to perpetuate Egypt’s present role as a client state of the US, they also know that the Egyptian military top brass has business ties with huge corporations in the US that deal with military hardware. Besides, training programmes in the US for Egyptian officers and joint military exercises between the two countries over a long period of time have deepened the bond between the Egyptian and US militaries. The US government, to put it differently, is quite confident about the Egyptian military. US officials are therefore hoping that it will manage the transition in such a manner that US and Israeli interests will be well protected
3) How do Egyptian protesters feel about the US’s role in Egyptian politics?
There is a big segment of Egyptian society that resents US and Western attempts to decide and determine its future. These Egyptians know why the US is in the Arab world and in West Asia. It is oil; it is the strategic significance of the entire region: the Mediterranean, the Suez, the Straits of Hormuz; and it is Israel. They know that hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have been sacrificed at the altar of US interests. They know how many precious lives — the lives of little children — were snuffed out because of the Anglo-US led sanctions against Iraq that went on for 13 years, and culminated in the invasion and occupation of that blighted land resulting in more death and destruction.
The Egyptians and other Arabs remember all this. This is why there is so much anger against leaders like Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the deposed President of Tunisia, who are viewed rightly as men who facilitated US hegemony of the Arab world in recent years. They are regarded as lackeys serving an imperial agenda. In Cairo and Tunis there were banners denouncing them as agents of the US.
Mubarak and Ben Ali have also been part and parcel of the blatant hypocrisy that characterises US relations with dictatorial regimes everywhere. US leaders have often claimed that they are committed to strengthening freedom and democracy in the Arab world. The former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, even proclaimed in Cairo in 2005 that, “We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.” She launched a foundation called the Foundation for the Future for this purpose. Its chairman until June 2008 was a close US ally, the Malaysian politician, Anwar Ibrahim.
In reality, the US, as everyone knows, gave its full support to Mubarak and Ben Ali and other such dictators who imprisoned, tortured and killed political dissidents with impressive democratic credentials. It is only when these dictators were on the verge of collapse that US officials began to support the democratic aspirations of their people. What makes their hypocrisy worse is their suppression of genuine attempts by people in the region to practise democratic principles. When the Islamic party, Hamas, won a free and fair election in Occupied Palestine in January 2006, it was subjected to a boycott and isolated by the US and the European Union. It is because of such hypocrisy that those who are struggling for change in Egypt and elsewhere have very little faith in the US leadership.
4) In your reply just now you mentioned ‘Israel’. Surely ‘Israel’ is an even more compelling factor in the people’s rage against their leaders.
If US hegemony evokes negative vibes, it is partly because that hegemony has been used to protect and reinforce Israel’s position in the region. Israel—more than the US — is perceived by many Arabs as a bane upon their countries. Leaders and governments who collude with the Israeli regime are often viewed as traitors to the Palestinian cause.
For hosting former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon in Tunis some years ago, Ben Ali was denounced by many Islamic and secular groups in the Arab world. Mubarak, whose country has diplomatic ties with Israel, was condemned by all and sundry for closing the Rafah crossing at the Egypt –Gaza border during the Israeli assault on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. It aggravated the already precarious position of the besieged people of Gaza. When Israel attacked Lebanon in July 2006, Mubarak adopted an antagonistic attitude towards the target, namely, the Hezbollah, the most effective movement in the Arab world resisting Israeli aggression.
Israel and those who hobnob with her, incense a lot of Arabs and Muslims not simply because of the manner in which Israel was created in 1948 which was a terrible travesty of justice. Everything Israel has done since then — the conquest of even more Palestinian and Arab territories, the killing of thousands of Palestinians and other Arabs, the expulsion and eviction of Palestinian families, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the harassment at countless checkpoints which a Palestinian has to endure on a daily basis, and the apartheid wall that barricades Palestinians— have all contributed to the collective humiliation of the Arab and the Muslim. Israel’s arrogance and haughtiness have seared their psyche as nothing else has in the last 63 years. Israel is a perpetual affront to their human dignity. And the protests in Tunisia, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Algeria and in Yemen are about dignity.
5) Surely, the Arab Uprising is not just about how Israeli arrogance and US hegemony have trampled upon the dignity of the people. Hasn’t the economic situation also contributed to mass anger?
Undoubtedly. It has been estimated that about 140 million Arabs— 40% of the total population— live below the poverty line. But absolute poverty alone has seldom given rise to mass uprisings in history. It is widening income and wealth disparities, exacerbated by increasing food prices and high unemployment, that have begun to hurt a lot of people. While the policies and priorities set by the national elite are partly responsible for this economic malaise, the global economic environment has also been a major factor. Global food prices, for instance, shot up dramatically towards the end of 2010 due to a variety of reasons ranging from natural disasters and climate change to the conversion of food crops to bio-fuel and rampant speculation in commodities. Both Tunisia and Egypt import food today, when the latter was in fact self-sufficient in food in the sixties.
Egypt’s present dependence upon food imports reflects a major structural flaw in a number of Arab economies and indeed other economies in both the Global South and the Global North. Starting from the eighties, they began to implement “neo-liberal” capitalist policies which inter-alia required the rolling back of the state that in Egypt’s case meant the dismantling of government managed cooperatives in agriculture, the deregulation of the distribution of agricultural produce and the elimination of farm subsidies and food subsidies. Besides, neo-liberal capitalism also led to the opening up of the domestic market to food imports that were more competitive which in turn affected local food production. Consequently, food production declined significantly and Egypt became a net food importer.
Even high unemployment is, to some extent, a result of the dominance of finance capital,— rather than capital for manufacturing activities or the service sector— typical of neo-liberal capitalism. With hedge funds, investment banks and currency speculators ruling the roost, there has been greater concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands. It is not surprising therefore that income and wealth disparities have become starker in today’s Egypt, compared to the Egypt of the sixties and early seventies.
It is important to keep this in mind as protesters rage against some of the symptoms of the disease such as high food prices, massive unemployment and widening disparities.
- 1) What is the relationship between these economic issues and elite corruption and nepotism which apparently was also one of the causes of the Arab uprising?
When people are suffering as a result of soaring prices of essentials and lack of jobs, allegations about elite corruption and nepotism—especially if they are substantiated — rouse the public ire as few other issues do. It is indisputably true that there is a great deal of corruption at all levels in a number of Arab states. It is often linked to relatives and cronies.
In Tunisia, allegations about Ben Ali’s venality had been circulating for a long while. Invariably, they involved his wife, Leila Trabelsi, whose opulence and extravagance sustained through corrupt means became fodder for the hundreds of thousands of dissidents yearning for change. Their two families had a stake in all major enterprises from banks and airlines to wholesale and retail businesses. Their avarice incited mass hatred.
Much of the anger towards Mubarak and his alleged corruption, revolve around his son Gamal. The father’s nepotism had resulted in the accumulation of so much family wealth that it came to symbolise all the excesses of his 30 year rule in Egypt. What made it worse was Mubarak’s coarse attempt to anoint his son as his successor.
In Yemen too, Ali Abdullah Saleh who has been President since 1978 and was allegedly planning to hand over the reins of power to his son, Ahmed, was forced through popular protest to announce that he had no such intention and that he would relinquish his position when his term expires in 2013. The people are continuing to demand that he leaves office earlier.
- 2) Isn’t this— leaders staying in office for decades on end and then handing over power to their offspring— one of the main reasons why the Arab street has exploded in anger?
Dynastic politics is repugnant under any circumstances. It becomes even more odious when the man on the throne has been in power for ages and is distinguished by an utter lack of competence and rectitude.
WANA where almost all the Arab states are located is perhaps the only region in the world today where unelected incumbents, or incumbents who were elected in farcical elections, have been clinging on to power for decades, and are trying to hand over the reins of authority to their sons. WANA is also the region where elected parliaments, multi-party electoral competition, institutionalised accountability, legalised political dissent, independent judiciaries, and other such norms and principles of democratic governance are rare.
It is because democratic governance has yet to become the accepted practice in WANA, that young people especially those who have had some exposure to values such as freedom of expression and democratic accountability have turned against dictatorial governments. They abhor the repressive laws, the torture techniques and the brutal suppression of legitimate dissent associated with these regimes. A segment of the older generation that had always resented the political suppression by the elites, have decided to join hands with the young. The result is the explosion of anger that we are witnessing in many of the cities of the region.
- 3) While this anger must have built up over a period of time, there must have been some trigger…………….
In the case of Tunisia, it was the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a young vegetable seller who was struggling to make ends meet in the midst of soaring food prices and was constantly harassed by the municipal authorities, that triggered an outpouring of angry emotions. 10 days after his funeral, on the 14th of January 2011, Ben Ali who had been in power for 23 years, fled from his country, responding in a sense to the clarion call for his ouster from all strata of society. This gave hope to people in Jordan, Algeria and Egypt who were also hungering for meaningful change. When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians came out in the open asking Hosni Mubarak to resign from his presidency, the people of Yemen were encouraged to pressurise their leader to quit.
It is obvious that the Tunisian struggle against tyranny had a cascading effect. Bouazizi’s suicide was emulated in Egypt. Four Egyptians set themselves on fire. But the person who coaxed and challenged the people to congregate in the thousands in Tahrir (Liberation) Square on 25 January to urge Mubarak to step down was a young girl by the name of Asma Mahfouz, one of the founders of the April 6 Youth Movement that has played a big part in organising the mass protests since that day. It was Asma Mahfouz’s courage — and her passionate plea to others to show courage— that convinced a lot of people that they should overcome their fear and stand up for justice. Her voice, like the deaths of her four compatriots, was the trigger that Egypt was waiting for.
- 4) Is the constant refrain about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin) in the Uprising and the so-called danger of the Uprising becoming like the Islamic Revolution of Iran that one hears over CNN in particular part of that agenda?
The Ikhwan is one of a variety of movements and organisations that is part of the protest in Egypt. It did not initiate the protest. Of course as a grassroots movement it is reputed to be the most disciplined and the best organised. It has been around for more than 80 years, though officially it is still banned.
Though it is only one of the actors at the moment— some Western commentators argue— the Ikhwan could well assume leadership once a new government is formed in Egypt, as it happened in Iran. After all, the Islamic element in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was also one of the Revolution’s many components and yet within a couple of years, the religious elite was entrenched in power and had side-lined the other actors.
Those who make this comparison overlook two important differences. The Iranian Revolution, it is true, was diverse but Ayatollah Khomeini, given his religious credentials and his selfless sacrifice, was widely acknowledged as its overall leader. In his almost 20 year struggle against the Shah of Iran, both within the country and in exile, Khomeini articulated a vision of struggle and change that was essentially religious. There were a number of other illustrious clerics, like Ayatollah Taleghani and Ayatollah Mutahhari who were also at the helm of the Iranian Revolution. There is no one from the Ikhwan who plays a role in the Egyptian Uprising that comes anywhere close to the commanding stature of Khomeini or the other Ayatollahs in the Iranian Revolution.
It was partly because of Khomeini’s stature that he was able to shape post-revolutionary Iran in a specific religious mould. The war that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, with the support of a number of Arab monarchies and the connivance of the US, Britain and other Western nations, imposed upon Iran from 1980 to 1988, helped Khomeini to consolidate his religious grip upon his people. There is nothing to suggest that such extraordinary circumstances that allowed a particular leadership with a particular religious orientation to reinforce its position would present themselves again in the case of Egypt.
Besides, the Ikhwan which at various points in history was known for its rigid, sometimes dogmatic conservatism has also undergone some significant changes. Mainstream groups within the movement have become more tolerant of theological differences, more accommodative of the role of women and non-Muslim minorities, and less exclusive in their notion of state and law. It is significant that in the wake of the massacre of Christians in Alexandria a few weeks ago, the Ikhwan played a major role in projecting Muslim-Christian solidarity. Ironically, the political ban on Ikhwan has strengthened its commitment to humanitarian and welfare principles in Islam, and appears to have diluted its earlier obsession with the primacy of power. Nonetheless, there are still some elements within the Ikhwan who remain attached to a superficial, literalist interpretation of Islamic rules and injunctions.
In any case, why are political elites and media commentators in the US, Britain and other Western countries so concerned about the Ikhwan and its ideology in Egypt when they have no qualms about cooperating and collaborating with an Islamic state that adopts an atavistic approach to law and marginalises women and non-Muslim minorities? Is it because Saudi Arabia is not only an unquestioningly loyal ally but is also totally subservient to US and Western hegemony?
In other words, it is not the ‘Islamic state’ or ‘Islamic law’ that is the problem. If the West is assured of acquiescence with its power and dominance, it would be quite happy to accept the Ikhwan. The US and other Western elites are not sure if the Ikhwan will reject their hegemony — as the Islamic Iranian leadership has done— and insist upon the independence and sovereignty of Egypt and the Arab people as a whole. Will the Ikhwan leaders follow the example of Hamas in Palestine and Hizbollah in Lebanon and pursue a principled position on the liberation of Palestinian and other Arab lands, and oppose Israel’s nefarious designs in the region? Will the Ikhwan — as required by the Qur’an—privilege justice and the dignity of the oppressed and the victims of aggression over and above the interests of the US, British and Israeli elites? Because these are worrying questions for those who seek to perpetuate their hegemony and their power, the Ikhwan and where it stands has become an issue.
- 5) Instead of focusing upon the Ikhwan, shouldn’t US and Israeli elites reflect on how they can play a constructive role in an Arab world that is asserting its dignity and its honour?
This is precisely what they should be doing. If the people succeed in bringing about fundamental change in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in WANA, US and Israeli elites cannot continue with their present policy of controlling, manipulating and dominating the region through elites who represent their interests more than the well-being of the Arab masses. They should adjust to the new realities on the ground.
In more concrete terms, this means justice for the Palestinians—- justice that they have been denied for the last 63 years. Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to Israel and to a new Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza that will have East Jerusalem as its capital. Palestinian and other Arab prisoners in Israeli jails should be released. The Golan Heights should be returned in its entirety to Syria and the Sheba Farms should be restored to Lebanon. Israel should eliminate its nuclear weapons and WANA should be declared a nuclear weapons free zone. If the US is sincere about respecting and fulfilling the aspirations of the people of the region, it should coax, cajole and coerce Israel to take these measures.
As Israel moves towards peace based upon justice in a new WANA, all the states in the region should also accord formal recognition to Israel.
While the resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict will be the litmus test of whether or not the US is sincere in its attitude towards the Arab people, it will also have to show through deeds that it no longer seeks to perpetuate its political or economic hegemony anywhere in WANA. It should not try to maintain its political control over the region by ensuring that its proxies and agents are elected through the ballot-box. The US should also cease to use the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other such institutions and arrangements to push through neo-liberal capitalist policies and programmes that are clearly inimical to the people’s interest. Instead of trying to shape the destiny of the Arab world for its own hegemonic purpose, the US elite should learn to respect the autonomy and integrity of the people of WANA. It should allow them to harness their own religious and cultural strengths in order to construct their own future, guided by their own vision.