By Ranjan Solomon
The story of Ukraine is inseparable from the twilight of the Soviet Union. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced Perestroika and Glasnost, promising economic modernization and political openness. Europe and the United States, charmed by his popularity, cheered these moves, yet often misread the signals. Gorbachev’s reforms unleashed centrifugal forces within the USSR: nationalist movements surged, the economy teetered, and political authority fragmented. While celebrated abroad, he lacked the domestic authority to stabilize the union, and Western encouragement at times accelerated disintegration rather than containing it.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and military pressure had already strained the Soviet economy. By 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving Boris Yeltsin to preside over a Russia in chaos. Privatization created oligarchs while ordinary citizens endured hyperinflation and unemployment. Into this vacuum, the United States and Western Europe moved decisively. Clinton’s administration (beginning 1993) expanded NATO eastward despite reportedly promising Gorbachev that the alliance would not “move an inch eastward.” Each new member—Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states—was, from Moscow’s perspective, a strategic encirclement (Carnegie, 2015). Europe, meanwhile, applied selective morality: promoting democracy while advancing its economic and security interests, often overlooking the historical and cultural complexities of Russia’s neighbours.
By November 2013, Ukraine found itself at a crossroads. President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to suspend an EU association agreement in favour of closer ties with Moscow sparked the Euromaidan protests. Over three months, violent clashes left more than 100 dead (BBC, 2014). The West hailed this as a democratic uprising, yet it also aligned Ukraine decisively with NATO and EU strategic objectives. Russia viewed the ouster as a direct threat, leading to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the insurgency in Donbas (Carnegie, 2015; CEPA, 2016). NATO’s eastward posture, long framed as defensive, had become an instrument of strategic projection.
Into this volatile environment rose Vladimir Putin, who assumed the Russian presidency in 1999. He quickly consolidated power, curtailed oligarchic excesses, and restored a sense of national purpose. Putin approached Ukraine as both neighbour and buffer, acutely aware of NATO’s encroachment. Western actors, by contrast, often pursued episodic interventions, emphasizing short-term strategic goals rather than sustained, historically grounded policy.
Ukraine’s political turbulence continued. In 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, a former comedian, won the presidency with over 73% of the vote. He faced a divided country, Russian-speaking eastern regions, and Western expectations that often-constrained sovereignty. Billions in U.S. and EU aid flowed to Kyiv, sometimes contingent on policy directions. Zelensky publicly protested some conditions, highlighting how international assistance can shape, and sometimes constrain, domestic governance (USA Facts, 2025; EEAS, 2025).
The military-industrial complex looms large. The U.S., responsible for roughly 40% of global military expenditure, allocated $182.8 billion to support Ukraine by 2025 (China Daily, 2025), while the top Pentagon contractors received $771 billion from 2020 to 2024 (Quincy Institute, 2025). For Ukraine, physical damage has reached $152 billion, with reconstruction estimates up to $486 billion (Social Europe, 2023).
Diplomatic efforts illustrate the asymmetry of power. The 2025 Alaska summit between Trump and Putin excluded Zelensky from initial talks, exemplifying how Ukrainian sovereignty can be sidelined (The Australian, 2025). Biden’s administration, despite structured support, often acted reactively, constrained by domestic politics and NATO consultation. The result has been a perception of indecision in the West, contrasting sharply with Russia’s disciplined strategy.
International institutions, including the UN Security Council, remain limited. Dominated by five permanent members—the victors of WWII—the council struggles to mediate impartially. NATO’s operational posture, framed as defensive, often functions as strategic projection, exacerbating conflict rather than preventing it.
Way Forward: Philosophical and Strategic Perspective
The Ukraine crisis challenges the post-Cold War unipolar paradigm. A durable solution requires embracing multipolarity, historical literacy, and mutual respect for sovereignty. Peace is cultivated not through military aid or sanctions alone, but through dialogue that acknowledges demographic realities, historical grievances, and security concerns. Western powers must reckon with the consequences of past interventions; Russia, Ukraine, and Europe must negotiate in a framework that transcends zero-sum thinking. Philosophically, the crisis compels a re-evaluation of international ethics: power without justice, strategy without history, and aid without sovereignty, cannot achieve lasting peace. Global governance structures—UN, NATO, EU—must evolve to reflect equitable participation and shared responsibility, ensuring no nation is perpetually marginalized or encircled.
Ranjan Solomon is a political commentator
16 August 2025
Source: countercurrents.org