PAS President Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang has just discovered that there is no ‘Islamic State’ in the Qur’an.
And yet since its inception in 1951, PAS has espoused the cause of an Islamic State. It is the ideological foundation of the party. On a number of occasions especially since 1982, when the party leadership proclaimed ‘the rule of the ulama’, the goal of an Islamic State has been bandied about to show the people that it is PAS that occupies the moral high ground compared to UMNO which PAS often condemns as a secular party.
If the quest for an Islamic State has been so fundamental to PAS’s struggle all these years, is Hadi’s recent discovery an open admission that the party was wrong in its understanding and interpretation of the Qur’an? Is Hadi— and also the Mentri Besar of Kelantan, Datuk Nik Abdul Aziz, PAS’s Spiritual Adviser— guilty of misleading Muslims and non-Muslims alike, perhaps unwittingly?
It is of course true that there is no Islamic State in the Qur’an if by that one means a description and explanation of how power and authority are derived, organized, exercised and relinquished in the religion. For these are some of the essential attributes of a state. What the Qur’an offers is guidance in relation to the values and principles that are vital for good governance such as the ruler’s sense of responsibility; his adherence to honesty and accountability; the importance of consultation with the people; justice and fairness on the part of a person who wields power and authority; his genuine commitment to the poor and the needy; and his determination to liberate the oppressed.
It is not just in relation to governance or welfare— which PAS now enunciates as its mission— that the Qur’an is a book of guidance. It embodies universal values and principles pertinent to all aspects of human life— and death. The depth of Quranic wisdom as an eternal source of guidance is reflected in the fact that it does not attach itself to a particular political structure or a specific economic system.
In this regard, the idea of an Islamic state emerged to a large extent as a reaction of sorts to Western colonialism that had conquered most Muslim countries by the beginning of the twentieth century. It was reinforced by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 which prodded elements within religious and political circles to intensify their struggle for an Islamic alternative. Various concepts of an Islamic State were subsequently popularized through the writings of men like Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin( the Muslim Brotherhood), and Sayyid Qutb, one of its leading ideologues, both Egyptians, and Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat Islami in Pakistan. There was also a rigid, puritanical version of the Islamic State associated with the teachings of an 18th century preacher, Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab that became the ideological basis of Saudi Arabia. Much later, in 1979, a Shia oriented Islamic state was established, the product of a people’s revolution in Iran.
However different the theories and practices associated with the Islamic State project —- from Afghanistan under the Taliban to Saudi Arabia to Sudan to Iran— there are certain broad similarities that seem to define both the idea and its implementation. Invariably, the State determines how Islam should be interpreted, understood and practised. Other approaches to the religion are sidelined and often suppressed. This leads to religious-cum-political authoritarianism which in almost every Islamic state has resulted in the stifling of legitimate dissent and the incarceration of dissenters. Given this perspective on state power, it is not surprising that the implementation of sharia in every instance has bestowed primacy upon hudud, the Islamic criminal code. It is this emphasis that has created a 2P—punish and prohibit— culture in those societies that claim to be Islamic. In a genuine Islamic ethos, it is the 2E — educate and enlighten—approach that would prevail.
While the roles prescribed for the non-Muslim citizenry are often observed, it is also true that their subordinate status is a norm in these so-called Islamic states. Similarly, concessions may be made to women in the public sphere but the privileging of the male is both legally sanctioned and socially legitimized. In all Islamic states, there is a preoccupation with protecting and perpetuating a religiously moulded popular culture which tends to negate the finer attributes of individual creativity. This is partly because preserving Islamic identity as defined by the elite is so central to the Islamic State project.
To a greater or lesser degree, PAS’s outlook and orientation mirrors these characteristics associated with the Islamic State project. It may have dropped the label but the content remains. There is hardly any evidence to suggest that the party has in recent years undergone an ideological and intellectual transformation. Has PAS, like the Islamic reform movements in Indonesia and Turkey, gone beyond hudud and fiqh (jurisprudence) to articulate values and principles that distinguish the contextual from the universal in text and tradition? Has the party like the Nahda (Renaissance Party) in Tunisia evolved a theory of shared citizenship rooted in the Quranic vision of a common humanity that transcends religious affiliation? Why has PAS not done what the Ikhwan-ul- Muslimin in Egypt did recently? The new party it has established in preparation for the coming national election, the Freedom and Justice Party, has not only allowed Christians to be full and equal members but has also appointed a Christian as the party’s Vice-President. Though a PAS leader, the late Zuikifli Muhammad, first raised the question of allowing non-Muslims to become associate members of the party in the early sixties, Pas has made no move in that direction. All that it has done is to establish a non-Muslim supporters club which has no membership rights!
This is why it is wrong to describe PAS, in the wake of its recent election, as a party which is now spearheaded by ‘reformers’ and ‘progressives.’ While there are some individuals who are reform-minded in the party hierarchy, PAS as a whole remains a hudud oriented, Islamic State inclined party. What makes the present leadership different from its predecessors is the dominance of individuals who are willing to forge tactical alliances and engage in strategic manoeuvres to attain power— to capture Putrajaya— even if it means setting aside for the time being their decades’ old dream of establishing an Islamic State. Seizing power through the ballot-box is their primary goal. This is why PAS is prepared to adjust to the agendas of its Pakatan Rakyat partners, the DAP and PKR in order to maximize non-Muslim/non-Malay support in the coming General Election. Its motto is simple: power first; dogma afterwards.
Any wonder that the PAS President has now come to the realization that there is no Islamic State in the Qur’an!
Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is a political scientist who has written extensively on Muslim societies since the late seventies. His latest book is entitled Muslims Today: Changes Within; Challenges Without (Islamabad: Iqbal Institute, International Islamic University, 2011)