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By Ahmad Abu Shawish

In Nuseirat refugee camp, my home sits at the intersection of two streets: a by-street at the entrance of the house and a main street behind it.

The by-street would often be filled with children — my younger siblings and cousins and neighbors’ kids, most of whom were displaced and living in the six-story building beside us.

The girls would play hajala or hopscotch while the boys would usually play qulul or marbles, trying to knuckle down each other.

These simple games were an attempt to stitch together fragments of normal life, shredded by displacement and horror.

Since April 2024, my family and I started a simple voluntary initiative where we used our solar panels to power a screen in the backyard of our house and display cartoons for the displaced neighboring children.

In May 2024 – when an institution started funding our initiative – we expanded to include psychosocial support for children through joyful activities such as drawing and dancing.

Soso

Every time I passed from the by-street with children there, the children would circle me and ask excitedly whether there would be an activity today or not.

“I want ‘Masha and the Bear’ today, please,” Soso, a 5-year-old girl, would say. She would always ask me to play the famous Russian cartoon whenever we would start an activity.

Her name was Siham al-Ashi; Soso was the pet name I had given her as she would always run toward me, her arms wide open, ready to fold me into a hug.

Her delicate face was always accompanied by a shy, beautiful smile.

Soso had bright brown eyes and her hair was black, most often streaming behind her like a ribbon in the wind.

I often noticed her during the sessions dancing and cheering with her whole being, as if trying to escape the war through joy.

Real Madrid fans

A few meters beyond in the same by-street, I would usually sit with a group of friends on the edge of my house stoop.

Hisham al-Talatine, 21, was one of my close friends.

Hisham and his family lived next door in the same six-story building after being displaced in March 2024 from Gaza City to Nuseirat.

Hisham and I became friends on 30 April 2024 when he came to the door of our house and asked if he could watch the Champions League semifinal between Real Madrid and Bayern Munich.

We watched it together – our friendship grew even vaster as it turned out we both were Real Madrid fans.

Whenever Real Madrid lost, we would sit and complain about every detail. When the team won, we celebrated as though we were the players on the field.

On 1 June 2024, my birthday coincided with Real Madrid lifting the trophy of the Champions League.

The next day, when Hisham and I were at a cafe facing the sea, Hisham handed me a fresh strawberry juice.

“Is that for my birthday or for the champions?” I asked him jokingly.

“This is for the champions – who cares about your birthday?” Hisham replied with a teasing laugh.

He was only joking, far more caught up in Real Madrid’s victory than anything else.

After every Real Madrid match we watched together, Hisham and I would analyze it as though we were part of the team – discussing the coach’s decisions and the players’ substitutions.

With each game, I felt our bond grow stronger.

Hisham and I even shared clothes – he would often come to my house to borrow some.

Whenever I gathered with my friends – where we would debate about football between Real Madrid and Barcelona fans – Hisham would always side with me.

Chess

The by-street wasn’t just filled with children and youth.

Every day, Abu Ahmad Diab, Abu Nahed Halil and his cousin Abu Hadi Halil – displaced men over 50 and displaced in the same nearby building – would gather in the street.

During the cool hours of the day in the late afternoon, they would usually place plastic chairs and gather around a chessboard.

Despite the age gap, joining them was my favorite part of the day. We often played chess until the call to prayer or sometimes until the children’s voices faded into the night.

One day in October 2024, I was hurrying to my tutoring center as a high school student when I passed by Abu Ahmad and Abu Hadi who were in their usual spot, playing chess.

“Come! Let’s see if you’ve learned something new today!” Abu Hadi called out to me.

As Abu Hadi was still learning chess and kept losing, Abu Ahmad teased him: “Right after a clever checkmate? Maybe you should teach yourself first!”

They burst into laughter, and I joined them laughing as I continued my way to the tutoring center.

Apocalypse

On 10 November 2024, at around 1:35 pm, I stepped outside my home.

Children were completely absorbed in their games, and Soso was there, hopping between chalked squares.

A few meters away, Abu Hadi, Abu Nahed and Abu Ahmad huddled around the chessboard.

“Come and see how I’m finally going to beat Abu Ahmad!” Abu Hadi called me with a voice full of playful confidence.

I smiled and was genuinely curious as he had never won a single game before.

But something made me hesitate – some kind of a providence.

For the first time, I didn’t join them and went back inside.

I sat down, scrolling through my phone for a few minutes.

My curiosity tugged at me more to see if Abu Hadi would really manage to defeat Abu Ahmad.

I got up at 1:45 pm and opened the front door.

I headed toward the garden door to open it and go out to the by-street.

But I felt as if everything collapsed – an explosion tore through the street and hurled me back.

A storm of fragments and dust engulfed me, and my eardrums felt as if they had been perforated by the piercing sound.

Chunks of flesh clung to my face and shirt.

Blood splattered across our front door.

I froze.

My arms were trembling – my legs numb.

I couldn’t move. For a moment.

The world went silent – except for the ringing in my ears and the heaviness crushing my chest.

With faltering steps, I tried to open the garden door, but it didn’t budge as it had been twisted and shattered by the blast.

I sprinted back inside the house, turned to the door facing the main street, then stepped outside and headed toward the by-street where we used to gather every day.

The scene was ineffable – horrifying beyond anything words could describe.

Four or five bodies lay motionless on the ground, right in front of our house.

I couldn’t move forward. My knees locked. My voice cracked.

“Ya Allah… Ya Allah,” was all I could cry out.

Dust was all around.

I took a few more steps, and that’s when I saw a little girl, lying on the ground with part of her brain exposed from her head – she was Soso.

I bent down and checked her chest, feeling for her heartbeat with shaky hands.

She was still breathing, her pulse faint.

Some people screamed around me: “Leave her!” “Cover the body!”

I couldn’t. All I was thinking about was saving Soso.

I picked her up in my arms and hurried a few steps toward the main street, desperate to find any transportation to take her to the hospital.

Just then, two people with a motorcycle stopped, took Soso and rushed her to Al-Awda Hospital Nuseirat.

I returned to the site of the incident.

The dust had settled, and I saw the full picture of the street – it transformed into something I still cannot name.

Beheaded and torn bodies were scattered around.

I couldn’t recognize a single face. Not even one.

Then I saw a body – wearing a navy blue T-shirt I knew very well. It was mine.

Only then did I realize it was Hisham’s body.

He had been killed alongside Abu Hadi and Abu Ahmad.

Abu Nahed was severely injured and succumbed to his wounds the next day.

Soso went into clinical death and passed away two days later, on 12 November.

The smell of death in Gaza became familiar – almost routine.

The street that was once full of life now turned into a ghost street.

That airstrike didn’t kill me but it destroyed something inside.

It wiped out all of the vibes that filled the place.

From that moment on, I started avoiding walking through that road – not out of fear, but because I don’t want to relive that terrible scene again.

It is a mental wound that I will carry for the rest of my life.

A few moments separated me from death, but maybe God chose me to live and tell the story of my friends and neighbors.

Ahmad Abu Shawish is a journalist and an activist in Gaza.

25 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Dr Fatima Hendricks

The Gaza-bound flotilla’s nonviolent direct action requires strength and steadfastness. It is an active resistance to decades of injustice from an illegal sea, land, and air blockade.

It is 4:00 am on the 10th day of our sail, aboard a boat in the Global Sumud Flotilla. We have heard explosions hitting other boats and seen drones piercing the night sky.

Tensions are high as we wonder about the fate of the attacked boats and when our turn will come.

I am on night watch and taking a short break, for morning prayers. Despite the adrenaline, my heart is filled with awe at the magnificent starry night and the whooshing of the waves as they splash against our vessel. The splashing waves remind me of the waves of resistance from oppressed peoples and their allies since time immemorial, some violent and others not.

I was first introduced to the concept of nonviolent resistance during my time at the Madina Institute Center for Nonviolence and Peace Studies. However, as a South African growing up during Apartheid, there have been moments when I perceived the strategy of nonviolence as weak, wondering if liberation would have ever come to South Africa without armed struggle.

In recent years, my perspective has been reaffirmed that nonviolent direct action is strategically effective yet difficult to execute. Some describe nonviolence as passive, yet it is one of the most testing, active approaches we can take in resisting oppression. Nonviolence is far from a cop-out or a weak means of struggle, as I am learning on this flotilla.

As comrades on the flotilla, we have often said, “When governments fail, the people set sail.” Governments and corporations have largely been weak in their tangible material interventions for Gaza, offering mostly rhetoric of condemnation and “thoughts and prayers.”

This 38th flotilla to Gaza, aiming to break the illegal and immoral siege, is the largest and most historic to date. It is galvanizing attention on the urgent action required to open a sustainable sea corridor for humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people in Gaza.

Given the occupying power’s war crimes on previous flotillas and its current aggression toward our flotilla in real time, I recall my chat with Ayesha Vahed, a South African attorney and legal reporter practicing in South Africa and The Hague. When asked, Vahed reaffirmed and explained to me that the Global Sumud Flotilla is protected under international law:

According to International Law, the flotilla mission is a completely lawful, civil, nonviolent humanitarian mission. The Israeli blockade, engineered to starve an entire population, is illegal under International Maritime Law. The flotilla has a right to humanitarian passage, based on the fact that the people in Gaza are under an occupying power and have a right to receive aid. This gives the flotilla free passage through international waters, an obligation that has been reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice, which has already ruled that Israel is obliged to allow unrestricted access of aid into Gaza.

Various international lawyers, academics, legal experts, and genocide scholars have mobilized behind this lawful initiative. Furthermore, the confirmation by the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip obliges all States to fulfill their legal obligations under International Law. In a situation of genocide, states have an *erga omnes* obligation, which is an obligation owed to the international community as a whole, to facilitate human rights and protection, which in this case extends to the opening of humanitarian corridors.

Despite this international framework of legality, the Global Sumud Flotilla participants are being described as terrorists. This hasbara campaign is intended to construct a faulty basis for further aggressive actions toward flotilla participants, past and present. However, this type of behavior is not new to nonviolent movements, as was witnessed in the US Civil Rights Movement and the Palestinian Great March of Return.

As we sail in the People’s Flotilla, the mandatory nonviolence training we received in Tunis from GSF trainers stressed that nonviolence is a dynamic method of action, not an avoidance of conflict. I personally witness the intensity of global mobilization and organizing as intensely active, not passive.

During our training in Tunisia, advocate Shabnam Mayet shared the history of flotilla missions to break Israel’s illegal siege, and it was moving to meet and hear from those who had been on past flotilla missions, including the Mavi Marmara in 2010 when Israel Occupation Forces soldiers murdered nine activists during the interception of the vessel in international waters.

Our training also included examples of nonviolent actions shared by comrades from across the world, including historical examples from the Civil Rights Movement in America, the 1956 Women’s March in South Africa, protests by Turkish women who were excluded from official spaces for wearing the hijab, and Mexican anti-government protests.

The flotilla’s collective action across movements and countries involves broad-based mass participation and is a notable example of nonviolent mobilization, coupled with calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions. It is a movement built on strategic resistance to an illegal blockade and occupation.

The flotilla’s nonviolent direct action requires strength and Sumud (steadfastness). It is an active resistance to decades of injustice from an illegal sea, land, and air blockade. It is far from a passive, symbolic, or performative action.

If people ask me how hard it is to enact nonviolence as a strategy of resistance, my response is that it is tough but necessary, given the occupying power’s total disregard for the sacredness of human life. Acting in nonviolence requires great Sumud in the face of genocidal evil and violent occupation.

As humanitarians on a mission of hope, and solidarity with the Palestinian people in Gaza, nonviolence is our means of resistance, and our language of love.

Dr Fatima Hendricks is an occupational therapist, mother of two, and cancer survivor. Dr. Hendricks has three master’s degrees, a doctorate, and 30 years of international experience in health and education program development.

25 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Quds News Network

New York (QNN)- Spain and Italy have sent naval ships to protect the Global Sumud Flotilla after a night of drone attacks on civilian vessels carrying aid to Gaza. Human rights experts are now urging other Mediterranean states to dispatch more military ships to secure the mission.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced Spain’s decision in New York during the UN General Assembly. He said a naval action ship will leave Cartagena on Thursday, fully equipped to escort the flotilla and carry out rescue operations if needed.

Italy already ordered its frigate Fasan to approach the convoy after drones targeted the flotilla in international waters off the Greek island of Gavdos. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni defended the move but urged the flotilla to offload its aid in Cyprus for delivery through the Catholic Church. She described the mission as “dangerous and irresponsible.”

The Global Sumud Flotilla consists of about 50 civilian boats with passengers from 17 countries, including activist Greta Thunberg and former Barcelona mayor Ada Colau. Organizers reported 13 explosions from incendiary objects dropped by drones and more than 15 drones flying at low altitude over one of the boats.

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares condemned the attacks as “totally unacceptable.” He stressed that anyone responsible for harming the flotilla will face international justice. He said Spain is in direct contact with governments whose citizens are on board.

Flotilla condemned Israel and its allies for the assaults, which included explosions, drone swarms, and communications jamming. They vowed to continue sailing toward Gaza despite the threats. “We will not be intimidated,” the coalition declared.

Israel, meanwhile, repeated its threatenings, calling the humanitarian mission “Hamas flotilla”. Israeli officials claimed that the naval blockade is “legal” and promised to take “necessary measures” if the ships approach Gaza. Tel Aviv demanded that all aid be unloaded in Ashkelon for “distribution under Israeli control”, even as UN officials stress that Israel is deliberately blocking food into Gaza, deepening famine.

The attacks and rising tensions sparked urgent calls for wider protection. UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese appealed to Mediterranean states to act. “Send navies now to protect the flotilla, escort it safely to Gaza, and break the siege,” she said. “If not to stop a genocide, when people are being literally slaughtered, when?”

The Global Sumud Flotilla is one of the largest international efforts in years to challenge Israel’s blockade. Its mission is clear, organizers say: deliver food, medicine, and relief directly to Gaza’s starving population.

25 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Bharat Dogra

Jayesh Joshi, founder and coordinator of Vaagdhara voluntary organization, has been in the news recently as co-organizer of a national dialogue on self-reliance of rural communities and a series of village fairs to strengthen tribal communities’ efforts for beej swaraj or self-reliance in seeds. These efforts acquire a special significance at a time of increasing worldwide concern regarding the concentration of the seed industry in the hands of a few giant multinational companies. What should be done in such a difficult situation to increase seed self-reliance or beej swaraj of rural and particularly tribal communities? What have been the efforts of Vaagdhara in this direction? In this interview with Bharat Dogra, Jayesh Joshi answers these and related questions.

Q—There has been an increasing emphasis on policies of self-reliance in recent months or weeks in India and some other developing countries. How important is your campaign for beej swaraj in this context?

A—I think beej swaraj is of very high importance in this as well as wider contexts. In India and several other countries, when we seek self-reliance, then given not just the structure of economy and livelihoods or demographic factors but in addition cultural factors as well, the self-reliance of rural areas or Gram Swaraj is very important. This was emphasized a lot in the freedom movement and in the thinking of Mahatma Gandhi this is seen as the basis of regeneration of villages. What is important is to emphasize that despite all the years that have passed this thinking remains very important, and in fact there are new sources and new reasons for relevance as in the context of climate change. Now in this wider context of gram swaraj, I think that beej swaraj and seeds sovereignty are clearly of very high importance as beej is the essence and the starting point of life, of farming and food. So if you are badly dependent in matters relating to seeds you can not really have gram swaraj.

Q—Nevertheless, the fact remains that in India as well as in several other countries farmers have been becoming more and more dependent in matters relating to seeds. How do you hope to change this situation?

A—We work with tribal communities in Central India in three states where Vaagdhara’s initiatives have been welcomed and supported by people as they feel that these respond very well to their real needs. A helpful factor is that beej swaraj has been very much a part of their livelihoods, their farming and their culture in the past. However due to a number of complex factors including exploitation of tribal communities in colonial times, their well-established systems were disrupted. Later there was a very different pursuit of development which ignored the strengths of tribal community systems and tried to impose new and alien systems including seed-dependence which were disruptive for the communities and their way of life. The new generation struggled to find ways of protecting community strengths as the more influential elites insisted that they have to give up their ‘backward systems’ for new ‘development’. So villagers were confused and in this confused state and amidst alienating influences it was difficult to protect their existing strengths.

In this situation when Vaagdhara started its work we were very sure of at least one thing that we are not going to impose anything on people, and so we approached them with a spirit of understanding and learning. This helped us to understand that in the midst of various constraints and problems they faced, the communities had evolved methods and systems which were very suitable and made a lot of sense in those conditions. One important aspect was to carefully save the seeds of many diverse varieties of crops. However these and other strengths were already in decline. So what we have tried to do is to revive the strengths of communities, give people confidence and support in this and then suggest improvements where needed which take this forward without being disruptive in any way.

Q—What exactly is your approach to beej swaraj?

A—Our approach is that this should be taken forward in a more holistic way along with many other important aspects which strengthen the communities and their farming system and its sustainability. Hence seed self- reliance is a part, a very important and in fact essential part, of strengthening communities, making the community and its farming system more self-reliant, with mobilization of groups of women and men at village and cluster levels being supportive towards each other. In this system there is encouragement for revival of traditional strengths of saving seeds, helped by traditional skills and also new understanding such as that brought by increasing interactions facilitated by Vaagdhara. For instance, the research and documentation work which has listed nearly 100 types of traditional foods including uncultivated ones, the mixed farming systems and rotations associated with them, the various varieties and their characteristics, the nutritional analysis of various crops have been helpful. A very important role has been played by the seeds fairs or melas being organized every year, more recently as many as about 90 at the same time before the planting season so that more people have a chance to know more about what variety of seeds are available with whom and they have better chances of sharing and exchange of seeds. All this people really like and are happy to be involved with as, apart from its practical and economic uses, this has been a part of their culture which was unfortunately disrupted and now it is nice to be part of its revival.

Another wider context is that of promoting natural farming which is best achieved on the basis of the traditional diverse seeds of these communities.

Q-How do you see all this to be helpful in times of climate change?

A—When communities are strengthened and their resilience is strengthened, when they have more self-reliance then their capacity to cope with climate change in the form of adverse and erratic weather also increases. This also happens when their recurring input costs decrease.

Hence climate adaptation improves. In addition climate mitigation is helped when the burden of fossil fuels reduces significantly. In traditional farming of the tribal communities we work with there was no burden of fossil fuels. This burden came only when outside influences changed the prevailing system. With the promotion of natural farming based on diversity of indigenous seeds, again we can realize the farming system which has very little of any burden of fossil fuels, and the soil conservation natural farming promotes is also useful in this context.

Q-How can we take forward beej swaraj?

A—Surely this is not a question of economics only, this is even more integrated with culture and with a way of life, and so should be taken forward in a more holistic way. Again this is not a question of any one organization or any single community. This is a much bigger issue at a national level and world level as our basic thinking about seeds needs to be changed in the direction of regarding seeds as the heritage of humanity to be shared, and never to be used as an instrument of maximizing profits or control over others.

Bharat Dogra is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org                 

By David Blanton

Facing habitat loss, climate change, and shifting livelihoods, Maasai women are leading a transformative program that links sustainable dairy farming with the preservation of the Serengeti’s iconic migrations and the resilience of local communities.

The Serengeti—whose name means “endless plains” in the Maasai language—is one of the most renowned natural landscapes in the world. Spanning northern Tanzania and extending into southwestern Kenya, this vast ecosystem is home to the largest land animal migration on Earth. Every year, a million or more wildebeest, zebras, and gazelles undertake an epic journey across these grasslands, following the seasonal rains in search of fresh pasture and water. This migration supports a diverse food web that includes predators such as lions, cheetahs, and hyenas, making the Serengeti a critical hotspot of biodiversity. UNESCO recognizes the Serengeti as one of the planet’s most impressive natural wonders, celebrating its rich ecological complexity and the spectacle of the migration.

Yet the Serengeti’s “endless plains” are no longer endless. Over the past several decades, human activities have profoundly altered the landscape. Scientific research spanning 40 years and involving teams from seven countries reveals significant habitat fragmentation due to human development and expansion. This fragmentation has disrupted migration corridors and limited the free movement of wildlife across the ecosystem.

“The activities of people have caused extreme changes to the habitat,” writes Joseph Ogutu, a statistician at the University of Hohenheim, in the Conversation. “It has significantly reduced the amount of grass and, because of farms, settlements, and fences, the landscape has become fragmented. This means animals can’t move freely to find resources or mate.” In Kenya’s Maasai Mara Reserve—the northern section of this ecosystem—wildlife populations have dropped by almost 70 percent since the late 20th century. Wildebeest migration routes to the Mara have diminished by over 70 percent, underscoring the severity of the ecological changes.

The pressures driving these changes are multifaceted and intertwined. The human population surrounding the Serengeti is growing rapidly, and Tanzania is among the countries with the highest population growth rates globally. This demographic expansion places tremendous demand on land and natural resources. Agricultural development and livestock grazing expand to meet the needs of this growing population, converting wildlands into farms and grazing plots. These land use changes, coupled with fences and settlements, disrupt traditional animal movements and reduce the availability of quality forage.

Climate change compounds these challenges. Rainfall patterns are becoming more erratic, with more prolonged and more intense droughts alternating with severe flooding events. These extremes threaten both wildlife and human livelihoods. Water sources are drying up more frequently, forcing pastoralists and wildlife alike to travel further for access to water and food. The result is increased competition and tension between people, livestock, and wildlife, as well as mounting risks to soil health and ecosystem function.

For the Maasai people, who have lived in harmony with wildlife around the Serengeti for centuries, these environmental shifts bring urgent challenges. Traditionally semi-nomadic pastoralists, Maasai communities relied on seasonal cattle movement and access to communal grazing lands to sustain their herds and their way of life. Cattle are more than livestock; they represent wealth, social status, and cultural identity. However, increasing land pressure means that less space is available for grazing, and many Maasai families are turning to farming as a supplementary or alternative livelihood. This shift represents a fundamental change in Maasai society and its deep connection to pastoralism.

At the same time, when herd sizes are enlarged to compensate for shrinking grazing areas, land degradation is exacerbated, leading to a vicious cycle of overgrazing, soil erosion, and a lower quality of forage. Women, who traditionally manage milking and child care, often have limited say in household decisions, restricting the potential for broader social and economic change. Early marriage and limited educational opportunities further challenge the empowerment of Maasai women and youth.

A Community-Led Vision for Sustainable Change

Recognizing these complex challenges, Maasai educator and conservationist Meyasi Meshilieck initiated the Maasai Women’s Dairy Program to foster a sustainable and locally driven solution. The program’s philosophy centers on balancing human welfare with the conservation of biodiversity—that is, improving livestock productivity while also reducing environmental impacts.

The core strategy of the program is to encourage Maasai families to keep smaller herds composed of improved breeds of dairy cattle that produce significantly more milk than traditional local breeds. Larger herds have long been equated with wealth and status among the Maasai, but the ecological and economic realities are shifting. Smaller, high-producing herds can generate more income and nutrition with less pressure on the land.

The implementation of this strategy requires a comprehensive approach. The program incorporates training for Maasai women in improved dairy husbandry, the production of forage, and cooperative management. Women’s involvement is essential because their control over income and resources can transform household decision-making, improve child nutrition, and promote education—especially for girls. By empowering women to manage small-scale dairy enterprises, the program also addresses the gender disparities deeply embedded in traditional social structures.

Moreover, the program emphasizes sustainable land-management practices, such as cultivating drought-tolerant forage grasses and using manure to regenerate soils. This integrated approach fosters resilience to variations in climate by improving soil health, reducing erosion, and maintaining pasture productivity even during dry spells. It also seeks to reduce conflicts over land use by promoting more efficient livestock management and minimizing encroachment on protected wildlife areas.

From Pilot Success to Broader Impact

The program began with an experiment at Saravu Farm, located near Arusha in northern Tanzania. In 2018, Meshilieck sold his family’s own indigenous cows and replaced them with an improved breed. It was a big step. He worked through challenges such as securing consistent supplies of forage and water, managing animal health, and developing marketing strategies for milk products. This initial pilot stage, based on trial and error, became the template for the training program.

A critical component of the program’s success has been ensuring the health and well-being of the dairy cows. These hybrid breeds require careful management, including access to clean water, high-quality forage, and attentive husbandry. Recognizing this, the program provides comprehensive training on the care and feeding of animals as well as the prevention of disease. Veterinary services and support are integrated to address health challenges promptly, thus helping to maintain the cows’ productivity and longevity. Although these cows demand more care than traditional breeds, the program’s emphasis on proper management ensures that the benefits of higher milk production will be sustainable for families and the environment alike.

Among the many challenges faced by the pilot phase were securing reliable water and forage during droughts, managing animal health, and establishing markets for milk products. Through collaboration with local communities and adaptation to environmental constraints, these challenges were gradually overcome. Techniques such as rainwater harvesting and the introduction of drought-resistant forage species helped to ensure the availability of feed and water. Cooperative marketing and the processing of milk extended its shelf life and increased income for farmers.

Initial training has begun to pay off and holds great promise. Participating women are getting increased earnings from milk sales, which will eventually allow them to invest in household improvements and education. Herd sizes per family should eventually substantially increase, while both income and milk production increase—a win-win scenario for families and the environment. Encouraged by these results, Saravu Farm transitioned into a training center, providing hands-on workshops for Maasai women from across the region.

Building on the pilot’s foundation, the program is now scaling up. Training has expanded to additional villages, where women are taught about animal husbandry, the cultivation of forage, and cooperative governance. New groups of women receive improved dairy cattle and access to microloans, enabling them to start their own dairy enterprises.

The program’s design incorporates continuous monitoring and adaptation, recognizing the need to balance technical feasibility with cultural acceptance. It strives to foster community ownership and collaboration among local leaders, pastoralists, conservationists, and government agencies. The aim is to create a replicable model that can be adapted and expanded throughout Tanzania and other regions facing similar pressures on pastoralist lands adjacent to protected areas.

Maasai culture is resilient and often resistant to change, so the program employs a variety of techniques to introduce new ideas and build acceptance. It begins by consulting with elders to secure their support, while also focusing on women as key change agents. Cultural elements such as song and dance are used to convey messages in ways that resonate deeply within the community, and support from local influencers helps reinforce these efforts. To broaden outreach, the program also leverages radio and social media to spread information and shape attitudes. Finally, women who have already been trained serve as mentors for new groups, creating a cycle of guidance and empowerment.

Linking Human Well-being to the Success of Conservation

Threats to the Serengeti habitat and wildlife, and the challenges facing Maasai communities, are deeply interconnected. Conservation efforts cannot succeed without simultaneously addressing the social and economic needs of the people living alongside the park. Poverty, food insecurity, and the lack of alternatives often drive unsustainable land use practices, whereas community well-being enhances the prospects for effective stewardship.

The reduction of herd sizes through improved dairy management directly alleviates overgrazing and soil degradation, thus helping to restore critical wildlife habitats. The restoration of these habitats supports the migratory species that define the Serengeti’s ecosystem, preserving the ecological processes essential to its resilience. Additionally, increased income from milk sales allows families to diversify their diets, invest in health and education, and reduce pressures to convert more wildlands into farmland.

Empowering women is a crucial multiplier in this equation. When women control resources, evidence shows that child nutrition improves, educational attainment rises, and harmful practices such as early marriage decline. These social shifts contribute to more sustainable rates of population growth and greater social stability.

The Maasai Women’s Dairy Program exemplifies how integrating social development and environmental conservation can create synergistic benefits. Rather than pitting people against wildlife, it fosters a shared future where pastoralists and the ecosystems that support them can both thrive, even amid rapid environmental change. This community-driven model offers valuable lessons for similar regions throughout the world that are facing pressures from population growth, climate change, and habitat loss—showing that sustainable livelihoods and conservation can go hand in hand to protect people, animals, and the planet.

David Blanton is the founder and executive director of Serengeti Watch, a nonprofit conservation association that works with local communities and travel companies to advance conservation, human welfare, and sustainable tourism.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Nilofar Suhrawardy

Without doubt, as the US President Donald Trump addressed the United Nations General Assembly, he was heard with rapt attention. He set the tone of his speech by beginning with criticism of UN. It is possible, Trump is angry at Palestine being given so much importance by UN and has chosen to lash out at it in his own style. Nevertheless, each word of his was heard very seriously. There is nothing surprising about this as he himself tacitly underlined during his address that he has greater authority and power than the UN. Perhaps, what needs to be clearly understood that his authority and power exists as US President and not simply as Donald Trump. This point is being deliberately made as he credited himself for having brought several wars to an end/ceasefire, to do which UN played no role. Or perhaps as he probably implied, he succeeded where UN failed. Here, he didn’t fail to state that “everyone” thought that he should be given Nobel Peace Prize for doing so. However, for a change, he chose not to repeat this point.

One is tempted to also wonder as to whether he was addressing American citizens during an electoral campaign and not respected leaders from across the world. The frequency with which he criticized his predecessor and highlighted his “failures” in comparison to his (Trump) having succeeded naturally draws attention to this point. But then well, this seems to be his, that of Trump’s style putting forward his own point, as he desires to, without failing to criticizing his predecessor. Unintentionally, perhaps, this also led to his criticism of his own country, though not with him as president but during the term of his predecessor. This naturally makes one wonder whether he was giving importance to his self, that is Donald Trump, pushing that of United States to the background. Perhaps, this may not have been his point. But his words can certainly be interpreted from various angles. It may be reiterated, he was making (or supposed to be) the address as US President and not just as Donald Trump. Nevertheless, this was to a degree balanced by his commenting on US having the most powerful weaponry in the world. 

But Trump remains Trump. He credited himself for having demolished Iran’s uranium enrichment facility.  He did not refrain from threatening severe consequences for those fuelling Ukraine-crisis by buying oil from Russia. Interestingly, he did not fail to mention Gaza-war with emphasis on it being brought to an end. As expected, he did not blame Israel for its continuity but emphasized that hostages must be returned. No reference was also made to UN’s role regarding the Gaza-war. It is possible, this is one issue, where US probably does not appreciate the role being played by UN, which has repeatedly called for an end to Gaza-war. Trump is also probably not pleased with its key allies, including Britain, having announced their recognition of Palestine as a state. This week has also been marked by France, Canada, Australia, Portugal and several other countries recognizing Palestine as a state. Expressing his displeasure at this, Trump said during his address that this would further encourage Hamas terrorists and their “atrocities.” This is one move of the UN, which has support of the majority, but that of US and Israel. In other words, recognition of Palestine as a state has reached this stage because of UN.

Of course, Trump certainly made a valid point by strongly criticizing UN but then there is a crucial point which cannot be missed here. Not the UN, but the UN members particularly the most powerful members of the body should be blamed for the stage it has reached, leading to criticism from US President Trump. Limitations of UN are due to what, it seems, they have reduced UN to!

Nilofar Suhrawardy is a senior journalist and writer with specialization in communication studies and nuclear diplomacy. She has come out with several books.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Norman G. Finkelstein

I devote a chapter of my forthcoming book, Gaza’s Gravediggers, to the point that describing the situation in Gaza as a “war” rather than a “genocide” egregiously distorts what is happening there. In a postscript to this chapter, reprinted below, I comment on the new UN report that found Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

In September 2025, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry released a new report in which it found that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.[1] It reached this conclusion after extensively documenting (from UN sources and respected human rights organizations) that Israel had willfully committed acts defined by Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention—Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group—“with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”[2] The report explicitly addressed Israel’s contention that it was engaged in a “war of self-defense” against Hamas.[3] It found that, on the contrary, if not this or that “discrete” or “individual” incident but, instead, the “totality” or “overall factual situation” of the Israeli assault was scrutinized[4]—the absolute number of Gazans, and proportion of civilians versus combatants, killed and injured; [5] the systematic targeting of civilians along evacuation routes and in safe zones;[6] the systematic targeting of homes, vital infrastructure, and healthcare facilities (as well as medical personnel);[7] the systematic denial of basic necessities (food, water, fuel, electricity, medicine) to the civilian population and use of “starvation as a method of warfare”;[8] the systematic targeting of children, including “toddlers,” in the head and chest,[9] as well as the targeting of Gaza’s only IVF (in vitro fertilization) clinic;[10] the systematic targeting of cultural, educational, and religious sites;[11] the systematic resort to sexual and gender-based violence, including “many cases of rape”;[12] etc.—then it was impossible to reconcile the “overall factual situation” with a defensive “war” against Hamas. The report thus eschewed the terminology of the laws of war. There was, for example, no mention of “disproportionate” attacks anywhere in it. A disproportionate attack presupposes that a legitimate military site was targeted but an excessive number of civilians were killed. The report found, however, that, overwhelmingly, it was Gaza’s civilian population and infrastructure that was targeted. Indeed, the massive death and destruction was proportionate to Israel’s genocidal goal. Further to this point, the report only occasionally paused to examine an Israeli claim that it was targeting Hamas in this or that attack:[13] in the grand scheme of things, beside the magnitude of death and destruction visited on Gaza, the lethal incidents in which a Hamas militant might have been present amounted to a trifle and an irrelevance.[14] The report’s upshot was that the quantity (gross numbers) and quality (selection of targets) of the Israeli attack couldn’t be squared with the paradigm of a war: “[T]here was no military necessity to justify the pattern of conduct.”[15] It was palpably not Hamas but the entirety of Gaza’s population that was being targeted; indeed, the “war” aspect of the hostilities was, all told, a fiction.[16] The body of this chapter expounded that the laws of war and genocide frameworks are mutually antithetical. The Commission’s latest report confirmed this: as it concluded that Israel was committing a genocide in Gaza, it dispensed with the language and investigative modus operandi of a “war” situation.

To clinch its case that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza, the Commission had to demonstrate not only that Israel willfully committed acts listed in Article II of the Convention, but also that the “intent” behind Israel’s commission of these acts was to physically destroy the Gazan population. The report found that from right after 7 October forward, senior Israeli officials repeatedly uttered genocidal statements;[17] that the Israeli security forces dispatched to Gaza understood these to be genocidal orders, weren’t subject to “any genuine investigations or prosecutions” for committing acts prohibited by the Convention, and that, on the contrary, Israeli officials were “encouraging , permitting and authorizing such criminal behavior to continue”;[18] that Israel’s genocidal intent could reasonably be inferred from the quantity and quality of the criminal acts committed by Israeli forces.[19] The report thus concludes that “Israeli political and military leaders possess the specific intent to commit genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, based on their statements and the pattern of conduct of those under their command since 7 October 2023.”[20] A slightly more nuanced analysis would perhaps read like this:

Israel intentionally committed acts that perforce resulted in the destruction of the Gazan population. The inevitable massive death and destruction that Israel visited on Gaza traced back to primal vengeance, [21] Israel’s perceived need to restore the Arab world’s fear of it, [22] and its determination to “solve” the Gaza Question once and for all—an historical opportunity long coveted and then miraculously gifted on 7 October, that Israel was dead-set on exploiting, come what may, to the hilt. The genocide commenced immediately after Hamas’s attack—the initial public statements by senior Israeli officials perfectly, indeed eerily, foreshadowed what would unfold in the next two years—but it was necessarily calibrated to take account of the response abroad. If Israel didn’t outright nuke Gaza, that’s because, functioning as Israel must within the constraints, albeit feeble, imposed by the vicissitudes of international public opinion, it couldn’t. But even as Israel’s overarching objective was not to annihilate but rather to ethnically cleanse Gazans, [23] it was also prepared to kill off as many civilians and pulverize as much infrastructure as was politically feasible in order to “persuade” the population to leave or “persuade” the international community to take it in. This is not idle speculation, it’s a fait accompli: Israel has already committed genocide in Gaza. Absent external political constraints, and if Gazans prove unwilling or unable to leave, then Israel, its leadership as well as Israeli Jewish society en masse—this was a national project—won’t recoil at totally annihilating Gaza’s population. Far from it. If need be, Israel won’t just be “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” Gaza’s population, it will be positively gleeful and relish the prospect. Whereas Heinrich Himmler, cognizant at some level of his criminality, feigned anguish in his infamous Posen speech at the onerous burden placed by History on the shoulders of Germany to rid the world of the Jews, Israeli security forces danced the hora and then flaunted their foul deeds on social media. It was the giddiness of a child, magnifying glass in hand, burning ants.

__________________________________________________________

1 Legal Analysis of the Conduct of Israel in Gaza Pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel (16 September 2025, A/HRC/60/CRP.3;  https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session60/advance-version/a-hrc-60-crp-3.pdf).

2 The Commission did not find evidence of a fifth act defined by Article II of “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Legal Analysis, para. 16).

3 Ibid., para. 177.

4 Ibid., paras. 144, 158, 160, 254.

5 Ibid., paras. 180-86; see also ibid., paras. 48, 50. A classified Israeli intelligence report found that 83 percent of Gazans killed were civilians (ibid., paras. 21, 180).

6 Ibid., para. 182; see also ibid., paras. 49, 58-59.

7 Ibid., paras. 187, 204-8; see also ibid., paras. 87-90, 93-106. A military expert stated that “Israel is dropping [more bombs] in less than a week than what the United States was dropping in Afghanistan in a year, in a much smaller, much more densely populated area” (ibid., para. 22).

8 Ibid., paras. 190-203; see also ibid., paras. 48, 85-86, 96, 100, 104, 110-126. The report noted that “The denial of entry for special infant milk, resulting in the starvation of new-born and young infants, is especially powerful evidence of an intention to destroy the population” (ibid., para. 190).

9 Ibid., 214-19; see also ibid., paras. 28, 30, 32, 46, 56 (“toddlers” at paras. 28, 215). The report observed that “The targeting of children is relevant to infer the genocidal intent of the Israeli authorities because … the extensive and deliberate targeting of Palestinian children shows that the military operations were not conducted solely to defeat Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, nor can they legitimately contribute to the other stated goals of defending the state of Israel and securing the release of Israeli hostages (ibid., para. 218). On a related note, the Commissioner General of UNRWA stated that “10 children lost one or both legs in the war every day,” and another UN organization reported that “Gaza is home to the largest cohort of child amputees in modern history” (ibid., paras. 53, 214).

10 Ibid., para. 207; see also ibid., paras. 57, 79, 151-54.

11 Ibid., paras. 188-89; see also ibid., paras. 91-92, 146.

12 Ibid., paras. 209-213; see also ibid., paras. 65-71 (“many cases” at para. 66), 73, 80. The report states that “the nature and scale of these acts [of sexual and gender-based violence] do not support and cannot justify Israel’s claims that its military operations were conducted in self-defense, to defeat Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, or to secure the release of Israeli hostages” (ibid., para. 212).

13 Ibid., paras. 35-44, 95, 103, 118, 185. Incidentally, in just one single instance did the Israeli alibi hold up, if only in part.

14 Israel’s critics fixated on to its use of AI to liquidate alleged Hamas militants as they returned home, killing many family members. See Yuval Abraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing in Gaza,” +972 Magazine (3 April 2024). But this too was largely an irrelevance and a distraction: long before AI came along, Israel routinely killed many civilians as it targeted alleged Hamas militants in densely populated civilian neighborhoods; of the more than 200,000 Gazan homes damaged or destroyed since 7 October, it’s implausible that AI was implicated in more than a tiny fraction of the attacks; harping on the use of AI to track down alleged Hamas militants obscured the crux that, overwhelmingly, Israel wasn’t even targeting Hamas but instead the entire civilian population. The criminality wasn’t that Israel committed disproportionate attacks, in which an excessive number of civilians were killed when targeting Hamas, but that it was committing genocide as it targeted not Hamas but the Gazan people.

15 Legal Analysis, para. 179.

16 One indicative juxtaposition is that, during the period March-August 2025, 50 Israelis versus 12,000 Gazans, 11,000 of them civilians, were killed. A global ratio of 1:240 or combatant ratio of 1:20 betokens at minimum a slaughter or extermination not a war. The figure of Hamas militants killed can itself be misleading: most of them almost certainly died not on the battlefield but alongside Gazan civilians in the course of Israel’s genocidal assault. For the numerical data, see International Crisis Group, The World’s Shame in Gaza (2 September 2025), and ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data), “Gaza after Two Years” (17 September 2025).

17 Legal Analysis, paras. 221-33; see also paras. 162-176.

18 Ibid., paras. 163, 184, 232, 237, 242.

19 “Considering the evidence in totality, the Commission has found that Israeli authorities were aware of the high probability that their military operations, the imposition of a total siege, including the blocking of humanitarian aid in Gaza, and the destruction of housing and of health systems and facilities would lead to the physical destruction of Palestinians, in whole or in part in Gaza. Importantly, in relation to the blocking of humanitarian aid, Israeli authorities were put on notice by the International Court of Justice, the Security Council and various human rights experts and groups. . . . The Commission therefore finds that Israeli authorities knowingly and deliberately inflicted such conditions of life to bring about the destruction of Palestinians in Gaza”; “[T]he Commission finds that genocidal intent was the only reasonable inference that could be drawn based on the pattern of conduct of the Israeli authorities” (ibid., paras. 144, 220).

20 Ibid., para. 238.

21 “[V]engeance is a great value. There is vengeance for what they did to us. . . . [I]n 100 years they will know that you don’t mess with the Jews”—senior Israeli security forces officer (ibid, para. 173).

22 “The fact that 50,000 have already been killed in Gaza is necessary and required for future generations. . . . They need a Nakba from time to time to feel the price”—head of Israel’s Military Intelligence (ibid., para. 175).

23 The report mistakenly infers that Israel’s intention was to “trap Palestinians in Gaza, creating such conditions that would prohibit them from escaping and ultimately lead to their destruction” (ibid., para. 201).

Norman G. Finkelstein received his PhD from the Princeton University Politics Department in 1987.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Rima Najjar

I. Introduction: The Mirage of Statehood, the Echo of Oslo, and the Sovereign Framework of Palestinian Demands

In the wake of Macron’s renewed calls for a two-state solution — echoed by Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Western states — Palestinian liberation is once again being reduced to a diplomatic choreography of betrayal, deferral, and self-serving rhetoric. This framework is not neutral. It is a pacifying slogan, a liquidationist architecture that erases the totality of Palestinian demands. The thesis of this essay is clear: the two-state “solution” is not a solution. It is a mechanism of suppression — designed to fragment, defer, and ultimately dissolve the revolutionary imperative of Palestinian self-determination in their own homeland.

What is unfolding now is not a rupture with Zionist domination — it is a repetition: the same colonial logic, the same diplomatic choreography, the same refusal to honor Palestinian inalienable rights. The current discourse carries an eerie echo of Oslo — not in its promises, but in its betrayals. The “past” here is not simply the 1993 accords, but the broader architecture of managed containment: a history in which Palestinian demands are diluted and domesticated through international frameworks that privilege colonial permanence over indigenous restoration. These frameworks do not merely misunderstand Palestinian aspirations — they are designed to suppress them. They treat the settler as permanent, the refugee as negotiable, and the homeland as divisible.

Edward Said understood this clearly. In his 1993 essay The Morning After, he called Oslo a “Palestinian Versailles” — a catastrophic concession that legitimized occupation, erased the diaspora, and deferred the right of return. He warned that the agreement transformed resistance into “terror” and colonization into “coordination.” Said’s refusal was not just political — it was epistemic. He saw Oslo as a betrayal of narrative sovereignty, a surrender not only of land but of meaning. Yet even as he sounded the alarm, others celebrated the accords as a diplomatic breakthrough. History repeats itself: the machinery of deception is reactivated, and once again, some mistake containment for peace.

Macron’s motivations are layered. Geopolitically, he seeks a counterweight to U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza, positioning France as a moral broker in a fractured global order. Domestically, he responds to surging public anger across Europe, where support for Israel has plummeted to historic lows. The Paris Peace Forum’s “Call for the Two-State Solution” frames the proposal as a humanitarian gesture and a bid to restore the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. But this restoration is not sovereignty — it is containment.

Several EU countries have joined Macron’s initiative — France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta — alongside Australia and Canada. But the fractures are visible: Germany, Italy, Greece, and the Netherlands have refused to sign on, citing concerns about premature recognition and geopolitical fallout. Beyond Europe, Iran has denounced the initiative as a distraction from the war and a ploy to rehabilitate the PA without dismantling Zionist occupation. Russia remains noncommittal, emphasizing the need for Palestinian unity before any framework can be endorsed. China, while formally endorsing the two-state idea, cautions against proposals that intensify fragmentation or ignore the humanitarian toll. The result is a fragmented chorus of recognition — more symbolic than structural, more performative than transformative, and deeply misaligned with the revolutionary demands of Palestinian liberation.

Against this backdrop, Palestinian demands remain clear, coherent, and inalienable:

• The right of return for all refugees, as enshrined in UN Resolution 194
• The right to full sovereignty over historic Palestine — not a fragmented pseudo-state
• The right to resist occupation and colonization, including the dismantling of settlements and the apartheid wall
• The right to representation — not through compromised bodies like the PA, but through unified, grassroots, and diasporic voices
• The right to memory and narrative sovereignty, refusing erasure and distortion

These are not negotiable. They are not contingent. They are not subject to diplomatic choreography. They are the infrastructure of justice — and any proposal that ignores them is not a peace plan, but a blueprint for continued dispossession.

II. The Deceptive Architecture of the Two-State Proposal

The two-state proposal, as currently propagated by Macron and echoed by select Western and Arab states, is not a blueprint for justice — it is a rhetorical device designed to pacify, defer, and obscure. Its architecture is deceptive not because it lacks detail, but because its vagueness is strategic. It offers the illusion of statehood while preserving the infrastructure of Zionist domination.

• Slogan vs. Substance: The phrase “حل الدولتين” circulates as a tranquilizing slogan, not a political solution. It promises peace while entrenching occupation. It functions as a diplomatic sedative, soothing international conscience without altering material conditions.
• Macron’s Framing: Macron’s proposal centers on disarmament, security coordination, and the restoration of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. But these are not steps toward sovereignty; they are mechanisms of containment. The PA is not empowered; it is subcontracted. Its role is not to negotiate liberation but to manage suppression: policing its own people, coordinating with the occupier, and administering fragments of territory without borders, airspace, or movement. This is not representation — it is colonial choreography. 
   
  The absence of unified Palestinian voice is not incidental; it is engineered. Meanwhile, the resistance — elected into governance in 2006 — was not defeated but removed through external intervention. The U.S. and its allies refused to honor the democratic outcome, imposing sanctions and backing internal fragmentation. In doing so, they redefined legitimacy as compliance. The resistance, despite siege and isolation, remains the only actor grounded in popular mandate and committed to liberation. Its exclusion from diplomatic frameworks is not a failure of representation — it is a strategy of suppression.
• Strategic Vagueness: The absence of defined borders is not an oversight — it is a feature. It enables Israel to expand settlements, annex land, and redraw maps while claiming to support “peace.” This ambiguity is not limited to the proposal — it is embedded in Israel’s own geography. The Israeli entity has never declared its borders, allowing it to operate as a fluid colonial project: expanding when convenient, retracting when strategic, and denying reciprocity. The two-state framework mirrors this logic, offering Palestinians a phantom state while preserving Israeli mobility, impunity, and cartographic control. Vagueness is not a flaw — it is the diplomatic architecture of apartheid.
• Colonial Continuity: The wall, the checkpoints, the settlements — none are addressed in the proposal. These are not temporary obstacles; they are permanent fixtures of Zionist control. The two-state framework treats them as negotiable, when they are in fact non-negotiable instruments of apartheid.
• International Diplomatic Theatre: The proposal is not designed to meet Palestinian demands — it is designed to restore Western credibility. Palestinian demands are clear, consistent, and rooted in both lived resistance and international law: the dismantling of settlements, the lifting of the siege on Gaza, the right of return for refugees, the end of military occupation, and the recognition of full sovereignty over historic Palestine. This last demand is juridically grounded — affirmed by UN Resolution 3236 and upheld by the International Court of Justice as an erga omnes obligation — that is, a duty owed by all states to the international community as a whole, enforceable even in the absence of direct injury.”

III. From Oslo to Macron — The Evolution of Diplomatic Containment

The two-state proposal is not a rupture — it is a refinement of the existing colonial architecture. It does not dismantle the machinery of occupation; it rebrands it. By partitioning Palestine into fragments and labeling the arrangement as peace, the proposal preserves settler sovereignty while offering diplomatic cover to its enablers.

From Oslo to Macron, the diplomatic apparatus has evolved not to resolve the conflict, but to manage its optics. Each iteration retools the language of peace to preserve the infrastructure of domination. The choreography shifts, but the logic remains: defer core demands, empower compromised actors, suppress resistance, and reframe colonization as coordination.

• Oslo’s Inception: The 1993 Oslo Accords introduced the architecture of deferral. It recognized the Palestinian Authority as a provisional administrator, not a sovereign entity. It postponed final status issues — borders, refugees, Jerusalem — while enabling Israel to expand settlements and entrench control. Oslo did not initiate peace; it institutionalized asymmetry.
• The Buffer Apparatus: Oslo subcontracted Palestinian governance to the PA, transforming it into a buffer between the occupier and the occupied. This apparatus was not designed to represent Palestinian will — it was designed to absorb resistance, manage dissent, and coordinate security with Israel. It was containment disguised as autonomy.
• Post-2006 Erasure: When the resistance was elected into governance, the diplomatic framework did not adapt — it retaliated. The U.S. and its allies imposed sanctions, backed internal fragmentation, and redefined legitimacy as compliance. The electoral mandate was erased, and the buffer apparatus was preserved.
• Division as Tactic: The two-state framework divides Palestinians geographically (Gaza vs. West Bank), politically (PA vs. Hamas), and existentially (citizen vs. refugee). These divisions are not incidental — they are strategic. They fragment the national body, isolate resistance, and prevent unified representation. Fragmentation is not a symptom — it is a tactic of control.
• Diaspora Erased: From Shatila to Santiago, the global Palestinian community is excluded from the “state” narrative. The two-state framework treats the diaspora as irrelevant, despite its central role in sustaining memory, mobilization, and mandate. Statelessness is not resolved — it is ignored. The proposal offers no return, no representation, no recognition.
• Macron’s Reanimation: Macron’s proposal does not depart from Oslo — it reanimates it. It centers on disarmament, security coordination, and the restoration of the PA in Gaza. It offers no borders, no control over airspace, no guarantees of return. It excludes the resistance, retools the buffer, and performs concern without confronting colonization.
• Legal Choreography: Even appeals to international law are choreographed. While Palestinian self-determination is affirmed in UN resolutions and ICJ opinions, international law itself is a Western production — drafted to manage decolonization without dismantling global hierarchies. Its selective application suppresses resistance while legitimizing occupation.

This evolution is not accidental — it is strategic. Each diplomatic gesture refines the machinery of deferral. The language of peace becomes a technology of control. The two-state proposal is not a solution — it is the latest iteration of containment.

IV. Israeli Opposition — A Strategic Performance

Israel’s rejection of Macron’s two-state proposal is not a contradiction — it is a continuation. It does not stem from fear of Palestinian empowerment, but from the strategic calculus of fragmentation. The proposal, as designed, poses no threat to Zionist control. Its rejection is not principled — it is performative.

• Why Oppose Macron’s Deal? Israel opposes the proposal not because it grants Palestinians sovereignty, but because it reactivates a diplomatic framework that implies negotiation. In rejecting it, Israel deepens the fragmentation of Palestinian representation, delegitimizes international mediation, and reasserts its unilateralism. The goal is not to prevent peace — it is to prevent parity.
• The Logic of Control: Once the PA abandoned the demand for full sovereignty, Israel saw no need to entertain negotiations. The subcontracted governance model serves Israeli interests: it outsources control, deflects accountability, and suppresses resistance. Negotiation becomes unnecessary when containment is already achieved.
• Rejection as Leverage: By opposing the proposal, Israel positions itself as the aggrieved party — claiming that even the most diluted frameworks are too generous. This rhetorical posture allows it to demand further concessions, redefine security, and expand settlements under the guise of self-defense. Rejection becomes a tool of escalation. But this opposition is not reactive — it is strategic. It aligns with Israel’s openly declared vision of a “Greater Israel,” which includes permanent control over the West Bank, annexation of settlement blocs, and the denial of Palestinian sovereignty. The rejection of Macron’s proposal is not a refusal of peace — it is a refusal of partition. It signals that the era of negotiation is over, and that the Zionist project now seeks territorial maximalism without diplomatic constraint. In this context, rejection is not a breakdown — it is a declaration: that the land is not to be shared, and that containment will proceed without consent.
• Normalization Without Negotiation: Israel no longer needs the two-state proposal to secure international legitimacy. Through normalization agreements, economic partnerships, and strategic alliances, it bypasses the Palestinian question entirely. Macron’s proposal reintroduces a framework Israel has already outgrown — one that implies accountability, borders, and recognition.
• The Spectacle of Refusal: Israeli opposition is not a refusal of colonial logic — it is a refusal to share the stage. The proposal, even in its vagueness, gestures toward diplomacy. Israel prefers domination without dialogue. Its rejection is not a retreat — it is a declaration: that Greater Israel is not negotiable, and containment will not be co-authored.

V. The Rhetoric of Peace as a Technology of Control

Peace, in the architecture of international diplomacy, is not a destination, it is a device. It functions not to resolve injustice but to regulate its visibility. The rhetoric of peace is deployed to manage perception, suppress resistance, and reframe colonization as coordination. It is not neutral. It is a technology of control.

Western actors invoke peace to perform moral authority while evading accountability. They speak of “calm,” “restraint,” and “de-escalation” only when Palestinians resist. The language is asymmetrical: occupation is never named, apartheid is never condemned, and Zionist violence is treated as security. Peace becomes a euphemism for pacification.

This rhetoric is not accidental — it is strategic. It allows diplomats to condemn violence without confronting its source. It enables the media to report “clashes” without naming the colonizer. It permits humanitarian organizations to deliver aid while avoiding the politics of siege. Peace, in this context, is not a moral imperative, it is a discursive shield.

The two-state proposal is saturated with this rhetoric. It promises “coexistence” without dismantling the wall, “security” without ending the blockade, and “statehood” without sovereignty. It offers Palestinians a future without return, borders, or representation. It retools the language of liberation into the grammar of containment.

Even the appeals to international law are choreographed. The right to self-determination is affirmed in resolutions and court opinions but never enforced. The law is cited to condemn resistance, not occupation. It is invoked to regulate Palestinian conduct, not Israeli expansion. This selective application reveals its function: to legitimize diplomacy while suppressing liberation.

Peace, as deployed by Macron and his allies, is not a horizon, it is a trap. It is designed to defer justice, obscure power, and restore Western credibility. It is not the opposite of war — it is the continuation of colonization by rhetorical means.

VI. The Archive of Refusal — Naming What the Proposal Erases

To understand the two-state proposal, one must read not only its text but its omissions. What it does not name, it does not intend to address. Its architecture is built on erasure: of history, of suffering, of resistance. It offers a future without memory, a state without return, a peace without justice.

It erases the Nakba — not as a historical rupture but as a living wound. It does not mention the dispossession of 1948, the destruction of villages, the exile of millions. It treats the refugee as a humanitarian subject, not a political agent. The right of return is not deferred; it is denied.

It erases Gaza — not as a territory but as a testimony. The siege is not named, the bombings are not condemned, the resistance is not acknowledged. Gaza becomes a site of humanitarian concern, not colonial violence. Its suffering is instrumentalized to justify intervention, not liberation.

It erases the resistance — not as a military force but as a political will. The elected mandate of Hamas in 2006 is ignored, the popular support is dismissed, the ideological clarity is vilified. Resistance is framed as extremism, while occupation is framed as security. The proposal does not negotiate — it selects its interlocutors based on compliance.

It erases the diaspora — not as a scattered population but as a global archive of memory and mobilization. The millions in exile are not consulted, not represented, not returned. Their testimony is excluded from the diplomatic record. Their longing is treated as nostalgia, not as a juridical claim.

The two-state proposal does not seek resolution — it seeks erasure. To accept its terms is to participate in the deletion of Palestinian history, agency, and futurity.

Section VII: Comparative Refusals and Revolutionary Precedents

The refusal of partition is not a rhetorical flourish — it is a historical imperative. Palestine’s rejection of the two-state illusion is not an anomaly, but a continuation of revolutionary clarity shared across liberation movements. To accept a framework that leaves half a people in exile and half a homeland under occupation is not compromise — it is consent to erasure.

Would Algeria have accepted a “two-state” compromise that preserved French settler rule over Algiers while relegating native sovereignty to the margins? Would China have negotiated its liberation by conceding its heartland to colonial administration and calling it peace? These are not speculative provocations. They are mirrors held up to the machinery of consent.

Palestine is not Gaza plus West Bank. It is not a cartographic remainder. It is a homeland — dispossessed, unpartitioned, and unyielding. To reduce it to fragments is to participate in the very fantasy the archive refuses.

As Ghassan Kanafani wrote, “The only land Palestinians can claim is the land of revolution.” This is not metaphor — it is method. It is the architecture of justice, not the opposite of peace. Revolution, in this context, is not so much a call to arms as it is a refusal to forget, a refusal to negotiate dignity, a refusal to render testimony into diplomacy.

VIII. Conclusion: Toward a Liberated Vocabulary and Palestine

To reject the two-state proposal is not to reject peace, it is to reject pacification. It is to refuse a framework built on erasure, asymmetry, and containment. This refusal is not nihilistic — it is ethical. It insists that any future worth building must begin with truth, justice, and return.

Refusal is not the absence of vision — it is its precondition. It clears the ground of deceptive scaffolding so that liberation can be imagined without compromise. It names what diplomacy obscures: that sovereignty cannot coexist with siege, that representation cannot be subcontracted, and that peace cannot be built atop apartheid.

A liberated vocabulary begins with refusal. It names occupation as apartheid, siege as warfare, and resistance as political will. It does not sanitize violence with euphemism. It does not defer justice with process. It does not confuse containment with sovereignty. It speaks from the archive of struggle, not the choreography of diplomacy.

The architecture of return begins with the restoration of memory. It affirms the Nakba not as a past event but as a present structure. It centers the refugee not as a humanitarian subject but as a political agent. It reclaims Gaza not as a crisis zone but as a site of resistance. It recognizes the diaspora not as dispersion but as mobilization.

This vocabulary is not invented, it is remembered. It lives in the chants of return, the testimonies of survivors, the maps drawn in exile. It is inscribed in the rubble of erased villages, the silence of censored histories, the persistence of mobilized diasporas. It is not a lexicon of policy — it is a language of liberation.

To move toward Palestine is to restore this language. To speak of sovereignty without subcontracting, of return without condition, of justice without deferral. It is to reject the deceptive architecture of the two-state proposal and to build, instead, a framework rooted in memory, mandate, and refusal.

Palestine does not need a proposal — it needs recognition. Not of its fragments, but of its wholeness. Not of its containment, but of its horizon. Not of its erasure, but of its voice.

Note: First published in Medium

Rima Najjar is a Palestinian whose father’s side of the family comes from the forcibly depopulated village of Lifta on the western outskirts of Jerusalem and whose mother’s side of the family is from Ijzim, south of Haifa. She is an activist, researcher, and retired professor of English literature, Al-Quds University, occupied West Bank.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Azmat Ali

The UN Human Rights experts concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza. Days earlier, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed Palestinian statehood, with 142 nations in favour. Together, these developments deliver a verdict: the world now formally recognises both the destruction of Gaza as genocidal and the denial of Palestinian sovereignty as untenable. What remains in doubt is whether the institutions that made these declarations have the will — or the power — to act.

Gaza’s devastation

For more than seven decades, Palestinians have endured dispossession, occupation, and repeated military assaults. Since 7 October 2023, the scale of destruction has been intensified. Nearly 65,000 people have been killed, entire neighbourhoods reduced to rubble, hospitals dismantled, and water and sanitation systems destroyed. Gaza today is not a battlefield but a place deliberately stripped of the conditions needed for survival.

The devastation is measured not only in bombings but in hunger. In August 2025, famine — the gravest category of food insecurity — was officially declared. More than half a million Palestinians are now on the brink of starvation, with another million facing emergency conditions. Famine in Gaza is not a natural disaster but a “man-made” outcome of deliberate policy.

Genocide in legal terms

International law defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Legal and academic voices describe Gaza in precisely these terms. The International Association of Genocide Scholars has concluded that Israel’s actions meet the criteria of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, citing the systematic destruction of healthcare, education, and humanitarian infrastructure; the killing of thousands of children; and repeated rhetoric by Israeli leaders to “flatten Gaza.” Within Israel itself, B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights have echoed these conclusions, with Amnesty International reinforcing them.

The International Court of Justice, in a case filed by South Africa, has already ordered Israel to implement provisional measures to prevent genocidal acts and ensure humanitarian access. Israel has ignored these rulings, dismissing them as politically motivated. Yet genocidal intent can be inferred from systematic destruction, starvation, forced displacement, and the rhetoric of leaders. Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich’s claim that “Gaza will be totally destroyed” is not mere bluster in legal terms but probative evidence of intent.

Escalating beyond Gaza

Israel insists its campaign is an act of self-defence against Hamas and rejects the jurisdiction of both the ICC and ICJ. Yet the evidence points to a campaign extending far beyond Hamas targets. Entire communities have been erased, food and medicine obstructed, and civilian infrastructure dismantled.

The conflict has also extended outside Gaza’s borders. On 9 September 2025, Israeli warplanes struck Hamas officials in Doha, killing aides and provoking outrage across the Gulf. Qatar accused Israel of violating its sovereignty. Critics warn these attacks are extrajudicial executions that risk sparking wider regional conflicts.

Law without enforcement and Legitimacy without power

International law derives its authority not from lofty declarations but from the willingness of states to uphold it. If genocide can be formally named yet ignored, then the very idea of a rules-based order collapses.

The General Assembly’s vote reflects the opposite dilemma: overwhelming legitimacy, but no power to enforce. Recognition of Palestine at this level does not halt bombardments, dismantle settlements, or lift the blockade. What it does achieve is to further isolate Israel as it is already shrinking its allies.The Security Council role remains pivotal in re-enforcing the concrete action. Law without enforcement and legitimacy without power reveal the fracture at the heart of the rule-based system.

For the Global South, this week is confirmation of what many have long argued: international law is applied selectively, shielding the powerful while disciplining the weak. For the West, especially the United States and its allies, it represents a crisis of credibility. How can Washington defend a rules-based order in Ukraine while undermining it in Palestine? How can Europe condemn Russian aggression under international law while enabling Israel’s bombardment in Gaza?

The long shadow of precedent

Genocide declaration does not fade away. Bosnia and Rwanda remain case studies in how failure to act on early warnings haunts international legitimacy. The finding on Gaza would cast a similar shadow. Future courts, historians, and diplomatic debates will return to this moment as the point at which the world knew — and chose whether to act or to look away.

The General Assembly’s resolution is more than symbolic. It cements Palestine’s status in the global imagination as a legitimate state-in-waiting. Even if recognition is not yet universal, the momentum is irreversible. With Ireland, Spain, and Norway already granting recognition in May, powerful European countries and others are likely to follow that would enable Palestine’s claim to shift from political demand to near-global consensus.

Consequences for Israel — and beyond

For Israel, these developments mean not only intensifying diplomatic isolation but growing legal jeopardy. The genocide finding strengthens the case at the ICJ and increases pressure on the ICC to prosecute. States that continue supplying arms to Israel now face heightened risk of complicity. The reputational cost of association with a state accused of genocide will only grow heavier.

Beyond Israel, the implications reach the credibility of the multilateral system itself. If institutions cannot act on their own findings, their authority will be fatally undermined. Such erosion of trust will embolden authoritarian regimes worldwide, destabilising an already fractured order.

What comes next?

The immediate outcome of this week would not be an end to bombardment or the instant birth of a Palestinian state. The deeper outcome is a reckoning: states can no longer hide behind neutrality or silence. They must choose between upholding the principles drafted after World War II or abandoning them to expediency.

For Palestinians, the genocide declaration and the General Assembly’s vote together create a historical record that cannot be erased. Whatever the realities on the ground, the world has registered its verdict. For Israel and its allies, this is a warning: the legal and moral costs of continuing the campaign are mounting, and history will not absolve indifference.

The breaking point

Ultimately, this week is about more than Gaza or Palestine. It is about whether international law still carries force. If the genocide finding and the New York Declaration are left to gather dust, they will expose the hollowness of the world system. If they spark concrete action — prosecutions, sanctions, recognition, or peacekeeping — they could mark the beginning of an irreversible shift.

The true outcome lies not in the declarations themselves but in how the world responds. What is beyond dispute is that Palestinians are enduring one of the gravest humanitarian catastrophes of our time. The question now is whether the world still has the will to act or continue to ignore international law and human dignity.

This week has made one truth undeniable: silence is no longer an option.

Azmat Ali is a student at the School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

24 September 2025

Source: countercurrents.org

By Drop Site Daily

Israeli forces kill at least 29 people across Gaza since dawn, including 25 in Gaza City, according to Al Jazeera, while 38 killed and 190 injured Palestinians arrive at Gaza’s hospitals over the past 24 hours. Israel continues its assault on Gaza City, as health services collapse after bombing destroys the Jordanian field hospital and the only remaining children’s hospital. Both President Donald Trump and Hamas leadership indicate that they have drafted plans for an end to the genocide. Trump bails out Argentina’s economy after its peso collapses under the leadership of Javier Milei. France, Belgium, Monaco, Luxembourg, Malta, and Andorra recognized Palestine as a state on Monday at the United Nations, bringing the number of member states to recognize Palestine to 156 out of 193. Iran warns it may scrap its International Atomic Energy Agency cooperation deal if snapback sanctions are put in place.

The Genocide in Gaza

• At least 29 people have been killed by Israeli forces across Gaza since dawn, including 25 in Gaza City, medical sources told Al Jazeera.
• In Gaza City, the health care system continues to collapse, with another hospital shutting down—the Jordanian Field Hospital in Tel al-Hawa. On Monday, al-Rantisi Children’s Hospital, the only pediatric facility in northern Gaza, and an eye hospital also ceased operations. The Jordanian army said it is relocating its field hospital to Khan Younis for the first time since October 7, 2023, noting it had never evacuated even during the war’s early bombardment.
• Israeli occupation vehicles are advancing into Gaza City’s Tel al-Hawa neighborhood, journalist Abdel Qader Sabbah reports, where explosive-laden robots are being detonated and shelter centers are being forcibly evacuated under threat of bombing. Residents describe a prevailing state of fear and panic.
• Israel threatened military action against the Global Sumud Flotilla, falsely claiming that it is “organized by Hamas” and “intended to serve Hamas,” and vowing to prevent it from reaching Gaza. Activists were instructed to dock in Ashkelon and hand over aid for Israeli-controlled delivery, as Israel maintains a naval blockade of Gaza that has been in place since 2007. Past flotillas, including the 2010 Mavi Marmara mission, were intercepted by force, resulting in ten deaths. Trump envoy Tom Barrack admitted in an interview with The National News’ Hadley Gamble that Israel struck Global Sumud Flotilla ships in Tunisia earlier this month, citing it as part of a broader pattern of attacks on the region.

Ceasefire Negotiations

• Trump will present Arab and Muslim leaders on Tuesday with U.S. principles for ending the Gaza genocide, in what officials describe to Axios as Washington’s most detailed proposal yet. The plan calls for the release of captives, an Israeli withdrawal, post-war governance in Gaza without Hamas, and Arab states contributing troops and funding for a transitional period, with Indonesia already offering soldiers. Arab officials said they view the proposal as an American plan requiring their input, and some signaled openness to sending forces if the Palestinian Authority is included and the process advances toward statehood, according to Axios.
• Hamas drafted a proposal offering the release of ten captives and two U.S. bodies in exchange for a two-month ceasefire, Saudi channel Al Arabiya reported, with American guarantees to uphold the truce and allow humanitarian aid. Senior Hamas officials told Asharq Al-Awsat that a new initiative is underway and that clarity may emerge within about ten days, with several Arab states involved at the UN in efforts to secure Israeli withdrawal from residential areas. Israel’s N12 reported that Hamas leaders in Qatar drafted a letter to Trump seeking a personal guarantee the ceasefire would hold, but the letter has not yet been signed or sent. Drop Site News has not independently verified these reports.

U.S. News

• The Trump administration is preparing a bailout for Argentina as President Javier Milei faces a collapsing peso and political setbacks, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent saying Monday that Washington is ready to use tools from central bank swaps to peso purchases. The move briefly eased pressure on Argentine bonds and currency, as Milei—already dependent on a $20 billion IMF package—seeks U.S. backing to steady markets before October’s congressional elections. Investors have been pulling out since Milei’s September 7 local election defeat, a loss that sharpened concerns he may lack the congressional support to advance his agenda.
• President Trump signed an executive order officially designating Antifa as a domestic terrorist organization, citing what the order calls the group’s “coordinated efforts to obstruct enforcement of Federal laws through armed standoffs, organized riots, violent assaults on law enforcement, and routine doxing of political figures and activists.” Antifa is not an organization.
• The United States is considering sanctions as soon as this week against the entire International Criminal Court, six sources told Reuters, a move that could jeopardize the court’s day-to-day operations. The potential retaliation comes in response to the ICC’s investigations into suspected Israeli war crimes.
• Trump special envoy Tom Barrack, who faced backlash in August for telling Lebanese journalists to “act civilized,” today described ordinary Iranians as “thoughtful, civilized, and educated.” He said Iran’s regime was “manipulative,” adding that Israel may have to strike the country directly again, possibly with U.S. involvement. Barrack, the administration’s Special Envoy on Syria and Hezbollah disarmament, also said Hezbollah has “zero” incentive to disarm “when Israel is attacking everybody.”
• Former FTC Chair Lina Khan warns that today’s high economic concentration makes it easier for a president with authoritarian tendencies to control critics and censor dissent. With five firms dominating U.S. media markets, she notes, censorship is far simpler than if dozens of companies competed.
• The White House says it has received a letter from Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro but calls it “full of lies,” with Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt asserting that the administration’s stance remains unchanged and continues to view Maduro as an “illegitimate leader.” The letter, from September 6, proposed direct talks with envoy Richard Grenell.
• Big Pharma is bracing for a “patent cliff,” with exclusive rights for nearly 200 top-selling drugs set to expire by 2030, amounting to $236B in lost revenue, according to The Lever. Rather than investing in new research, major firms are buying smaller companies and their patents, fueling consolidation that regulators warn could raise prices, stifle innovation, and increase the risk of drug shortages.

International News

• France, Belgium, Monaco, Luxembourg, Malta, and Andorra recognized Palestine on Monday, bringing the total number of UN member states acknowledging Palestine to 156 out of 193, or over 81%. The move follows recognition by the UK, Canada, Australia, and Portugal.
• Iran warns it will scrap its International Atomic Energy Agency cooperation deal if UN sanctions are reimposed, with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi telling reporters in New York that snapback by the UK, France, and Germany would invalidate the agreement. He said Tehran would respond and seek new conditions with the agency, and stressed the moment is one to choose “cooperation or confrontation.”
• At the UN General Assembly in New York, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa called for U.S. sanctions to be lifted, saying they punish ordinary Syrians, and urged a “new chapter” with Washington. He told retired U.S. General and former CIA Director David Petraeus that Syria has moved from the battlefield to the “theater of dialogue,” highlighting the country’s skilled workforce and urging the U.S. to seize the moment for diplomacy.
• Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas publicly condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack for the first time at the UN General Assembly, saying the PA “condemn[s] the occupation’s crimes just as we condemn the killing and capture of civilians as Hamas did,” while offering Hebrew New Year greetings and praising Palestinian steadfastness. He outlined a comprehensive reform agenda to improve governance, including financial and education reforms and a single social welfare system, which is now undergoing an international audit.
• Airports in Norway and Denmark were shut down for hours after multiple large drones entered restricted airspace, in what Denmark called the “most serious attack so far” on the country’s critical infrastructure. The drones reportedly flew over airports in Oslo and Copenhagen for several hours, causing shutdowns and massive flight disruptions for several hours before escaping without being intercepted. Though no one claimed responsibility, officials linked the incident to Russia’s hybrid tactics in northern Europe, echoing recent drone and aircraft intrusions in Poland, Romania, and Estonia.
• The Afghan Taliban again rejected President Trump’s demand that the U.S. be allowed to take back Bagram air base, saying that Afghanistan will not surrender “even an inch” of its territory. Bagram, abandoned during the 2021 U.S. withdrawal, has been under Taliban control since, but has recently drawn the attention of Trump and other U.S. officials who have discussed it as a possible counterterrorism asset, as well as forward base to surveil Chinese nuclear assets. Taliban officials cited the Doha Agreement, under which Washington pledged not to threaten Afghanistan’s independence, and warned that any attempt to retake Bagram would be seen as a violation.
• Italy’s state-owned channel TG3 opened its newscast with a statement of solidarity with the September 22 nationwide general strike for Gaza, condemning the “daily massacre of civilians, health workers, and journalists, and mass deportations carried out by the Israeli government.” The move marks a sharp break from the pro-Israel stance of Italy’s right-wing ruling coalition. Italy’s government oversees the public broadcaster RAI and has resisted EU measures targeting Israel.
• France is circulating a draft proposal for an “International Stabilization Mission” to replace Israeli forces in Gaza and oversee Hamas’s disarmament, according to the Times of Israel. The UN-mandated, regionally led force would be funded by Gulf donors, with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar as preferred participants. The plan envisions an initial phase of ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian access, followed by transferring security to the Palestinian Authority, reconstruction, and elections, while stressing that dismantling Hamas is a “core element.”
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto told the UN two-state conference that Jakarta is ready to send troops to help secure Gaza after the war, reaffirming an offer first made last year. Indonesia remains the only country to make such a pledge publicly, while Arab states have hinted at joining the International Stabilization Mission backed by France but insist on a role for the Palestinian Authority that Israel rejects.

More from Drop Site

• Drop Site’s Sharif Abdel Kouddous appeared on Democracy Now! Tuesday to talk about the pardon of Egyptian-British activist Alaa Abd El-Fattah by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. El-Fattah, a human rights activist, was freed from prison after spending most of the past 12 years in prison. He was imprisoned in 2014 for protesting without permission. El-Sisi also freed five other prisoners.

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23 September 2025

Source: dropsitenews.com